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HISTORY  OF  THE 

WORLD  WAR 


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HISTORY 

OF  THE 

WORLD 
WAR 

FRANK  H.SIMONDS 


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Published   for 
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HISTORY  OF  THE 

1  WORLD   WAR 


PREFACE 

The  World  War,  entering  its  thirty-fourth  month,  as  these  Hnes  are  writ- 
ten, has  had  three  distinct  phases,  both  on  the  mihtary  side  and  on  the  larger 
and  more  significant  human  side.  The  three  military  phases  are  supplied  by 
the  Marne  campaign  and  its  immediate  consequences;  the  Russian  campaign, 
with  its  Balkan  episode  and  its  Verdun  ending;  the  Allied  offensive  in  the 
west,  which  began  at  the  Somme  in  July,  1916,  and  is  still  proceeding  before 
Arras  and  along  the  old  Aisne  battlefield. 

In  the  Marne  campaign  Germany  sought  a  complete  triumph  by  a  swift 
and  terrible  thrust  at  France,  the  only  one  of  her  foes  then  in  any  sense  pre- 
pared for  war.  Her  thrust  was  parried  at  the  Marne  and  permanently  blocked 
at  the  Yser  and  at  Ypres.  Thereafter  she  had  to  turn  east  and  restore  the  fail- 
ing fortunes  of  Austria  and  protect  her  own  imperilled  marches. 

In  the  Russian  campaign  Germany  sought  to  dispose  of  Russia,  as  she  had 
endeavoured  to  dispose  of  France  in  the  Marne  campaign.  Immediate  success 
escaped  her  in  this  field.  Despite  terrible  defeats  and  long  retreats,  Russian 
resistance  was  not  broken,  although  the  Russian  Revolution,  now  the  main 
factor  on  the  eastern  front  and  unmistakably  a  consequence  of  Russian  defeat, 

vi 


PREFACE 


vu 


gives  to  the  German  campaign  of  191 5  a  value  that  was  not  perceived  at  the 
time.  What  the  permanent  value  will  be  remains  problematical.  But  as  she 
had  to  turn  east,  with  her  western  task  incomplete  m  1914,  Germany  had, 
after  a  brief  and  glorious  campaign  on  behalf  of  her  Turkish  ally,  to  return  west 
in  February,  1916,  and  seek  at  Verdun  what  she  had  not  attained  on  the 
Marne.  Her  failure  there  cost  her  the  initiative  and  condemned  her  to  the 
defensive. 

The  campaign  which  opened  at  the  Somme  is  still  proceeding.  Since  they 
began  their  attack  on  July  i,  1916,  the  Allies  have  steadily,  if  only  slowly, 
pushed  the  Germans  back  and  the  recent  victory  of  Arras  demonstrates  that 
the  British  army  has  at  last  reached  a  high  state  of  efficiency,  while  there  are 
signs,  far  from  conclusive  to  be  sure,  of  a  decline  in  German  morale.  At  all 
events,  the  Germans  remain  on  the  defensive  and  the  end  of  this  third  phase 
has  not  come. 

Looking  now  to  the  broader  horizon,  it  will  be  perceived  that  here,  too, 
there  are  three  aspects.  In  its  inception,  in  the  hrst  months  of  battle,  the 
conflict  still  seemed  to  men,  not  alone  of  neutral  nations  but  of  involved 
nations,  one  more  war,  greater  and  more  terrible  tlian  all  past  wars,  but  a  war 
comparable  to  them  in  origin  and  purpose. 

But  as  the  struggle  progressed,  it  brought  more  and  more  clearly  to  the  eyes 
of  men  of  all  nations,  save  those  of  Central  Europe,  the  truth  that  the  German 
attack  was  something  more  than  a  bid  for  world  power;  comparable  with  that 
of  France  under  Napoleon  or  Louis  XIV,  of  Spain  under  Charles  V.  It  be- 
came clear  that  Germany  was  not  attacking  armies  or  nations  alone,  but  also 
the  whole  fabric  of  our  common  civilization  and  all  the  precepts  and  doctrines 
of  humanity,  which  represent  the  slow  progress  up- 
ward from  barbarism. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  shocked  the  whole  world. 
The  crimes  committed  by  German  soldiers  in  Belgium 
and  northern   France,  crimes  not  belonging  to  the 
order  of  excesses  incident  to  war,  but  crimes  ordered 
by   commanding  officers  for  the  deliberate 
purpose  of  terrifying  a  helpless  population 
and  disarming  men  by  the  brutality  practised 
upon  women  and  children,  these  slowly  but 
surely  inclined  the  balance  of  neutral  opinion 
against  Germany.     At  first  these  brutal  and 
bestial  crimes  onlv  gave  new  heart  and  new 
determination   to   the    nations    directly   as- 
sailed, but  in  the  end  they  earned  for  Ger- 
many the  condemnation  of  neutral  nations 
the  world  over. 


viii  PREFACE 

In  its  third  phase  there  came,  together  with  the  growing  anger  and  detesta- 
tion of  German  violence  and  the  clearer  perception  ot  the  danger  of  Germanism 
to  all  civilization,  the  recognition  that  the  war  was,  after  all,  one  more  stand 
of  autocracy  against  democracy,  that  in  its  essence  the  German  thing,  already 
become  abominable  in  the  sight  of  all  the  non-German  world,  was  the  final 
expression  of  militarism,  which  had  its  origin  in  caste  and  Crown;  that  the 
"  Superman  "  was  only  the  old  tyrant  in  a  new  disguise. 

In  this  stage  we  have  seen  the  Russian  Revolution  and  the  entrance  of  our 
own  country  into  the  war.  The  clearest  definition  of  the  war,  as  it  is  now  seen 
everywhere  save  in  the  Central  Empires,  has  been  supplied  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  in  that  document  which  determined  in  fact,  if  not  tech- 
nically, American  enlistment. 

In  succeeding  volumes  I  shall  endeavour  to  set  forth  the  development  of  this 
world  verdict  upon  German  purposes  and  German  methods.  In  the  present 
volume,  I  have  sought  merely  to  outline  the  events  preceding  the  war  and  the 
first  campaigns  in  the  struggle.  Not  until  the  first  phase  was  completed  had 
the  real  character  of  German  menace  been  established,  save  in  the  minds  of 
the  French  and  Belgians  on  whose  soil  German  armies  had  written  their  his- 
tory of  shame.  Not  until  the  war  had  entered  its  second  phase  was  there 
apparent  that  spirit  which  was  to  dominate  the  councils  and  arm  the  spirit  of 
the  nations  allied  against  Germany.  Not  until  that  hour  was  it  to  take 
on,  consciously,  in  the  minds  of  millions,  the  character  of  a  crusade,  a  concerted 
defence  of  civilization  against  a  new  barbarism,  which  combined  the  science  of 
the  head  with  barbarism  of  the  heart,  the  weapons  of  the  Twentieth  Century 
with  the  spirit  of  Attila. 

And,  conversely,  when  the  war  did  take  on  this  new  character  it  became 
something  different  from  all  wars  of  which  we  have  trustworthy  record — a  war 
fought  not  for  territorial  gain  or  battlefield  success,  but  a  war  fought  between 
two  ideas,  two  conceptions  of  life,  of  civilization,  of  humanity;  two  faiths,  of 
which  there  can  be  room  for  but  one  in  this  world,  since  each  is  utterly  destruc- 
tive of  the  other. 

lardily,  perhaps,  but  completely  in  the  end,  we  in  America,  far  removed  as 
we  are  from  the  European  world,  have  perceived  the  issues  of  the  war.  Instinc- 
tively the  mass  of  men  and  women,  the  plain  people  of  the 
United  States,  like  those  of  Britain  and  France,  have  prevailed 
over  the  wisdom  of  politicians  and  the  doubts  of  statesmen. 
Late,  but  not  too  late,  the  nation  which  had  Lexington  and 
Concord  in  its  own  history,  recognized  that  neutrality  was  im- 
possible when  a  new  battle  for  democracy  was  going  forward. 
And  almost  at  the  same  moment  there  has  been  heard,  broken 
as  yet  and  uncertainly,  a  new  voice  in  Germany,  repeating  some- 
thing of  the  words  that  now  fill  the  world  outside  of  the  Central 


PREFACE  ix 

Empires  Whatever  be  the  outcome  of  the  war,  at  least  it  is  certain  now  that 
even  German  things  will  never  be  again  what  they  were  when  Prussian  mili- 
tarism crushed  Belgium  under  an  iron  heel  and  German  necessity  thrust  its 
bayonet  through  international  good  faith  and  common  humanity. 

My  acknowledgments  are  due  both  to  the  French  and  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernments and  General  Staffs  for  the  courtesy  which  permitted  me  to  visit  their 
armies  and  their  battlefields,  among  others  the  Marne,  Nancy,  Champagne, 
and  the  Somme,  escorted  by  officers  who  explained  the  actions,  and  for  the 
kindness  and  frankness  with  which  they  supplied  all  information  at  their  dis- 
posal. To  the  interest  of  the  President  of  France  I  owe  my  opportunity  to 
visit  Verdun  and  to  meet  General  Petain  during  the  great  battle,  and  to  Field- 
Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig  I  am  indebted  for  the  chance  to  see  the  British  army 
and  to  meet  its  Commander-in-Chief  just  before  the  battle  of  Arras  and  to 
look  eastward  from  Mont  St.  Eloi  at  Vimy  Ridge,  soon  to  fall  to  Canadian 
valour.  Nor  should  I  fail  to  acknowledge  here  my  gratitude  to  General  Dubois, 
Governor  of  Verdun,  who  twice  welcomed  me  to  his  ruined  city  and  permitted 
me  to  visit  Fort  de  Vaux,  newly  reconquered  from  the  German  Crown  Prince. 

On  one  other  point  I  desire  to  make  an  explanation;  the  absence  of  any  dis- 
cussion of  naval  operations  from  my  narrative  is  not  due  to  any  failure  on  my 
part  to  appreciate  the  greatness  or  the  importance  of  the  work  performed  by 
the  fleets,  and  in  an  overwhelming  majority  of  cases  by  the  British  fleet,  but 
to  the  fact  that  it  was  agreed  at  the  outset  that  the  history  of  the  naval  opera- 
tions of  the  war  should  be  written  for  a  later  volume.  The  subject  is  of  too 
great  importance  to  be  crowded  in  the  space  at  my  disposal  in  this  volume. 

In  the  years  that  have  followed  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  during  which  I 
liave  been  writing  steadily  about  its  progress,  I  have  made  too  many  mistakes 
and  been  too  frequently  in  error  not  to  appreciate  the  limitations  of  the  present 
volume.  It  represents  merely  an  effort  to  interpret  fairly  and  to  an  American 
audience  the  earlier  incidents  in  the  world  struggle,  hitherto  mainly  explained 
to  Americans  by  commentators  belonging  to  nations  already  at  war  who  have 
reviewed  the  campaigns  horn  the  perspectives  of  belligerents,  and  have  natur- 
ally paid  small  attention  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  citizens  of  a  nation  sepa- 
ated  by  its  history,  by  its  long  neutrality,  and  by  the  expanse  of  the  ocean  from 
the  conflict. 

In  so  far  as  I  have  been  able,  I  have  striven  to  make  this  book  an  American 
comment  upon  a  world  war,  and  no  one  can  be  more  conscious  than  am  I  of  its 
limitations. 

Frank  H.  Simonds. 
Upper  Montclair,  Neiv  Jersey, 
May  I,  1917. 


CONTENTS 


R 


PART   I 


Preface     By  Frank  11.  Simcnds   ...  

Introduction     By  Dr.  Albert  Shazv 

CHAPTER  I 

EUROPE  BETWEEN  1871  AND  1904 

I.  The  First  Years.  Germany  under  Bismarck — Franco-Russian  Alli- 
ance— Italy  joins  the  Central  Powers — Great  Britain's  splendid  isola- 
tion— France — The  race  for  colonies.  II.  A  New  Kaiser  and  a 
New  Policy — Bismarck's  colonial  failure — A  new  Germany — Indus- 
trial expansion — The  Kaiser's  dream  of  empire — Germany  vs.  Eng- 
land.    III.     England  and  France  Draw  Near.    The  failure  of  the 


VI 


x.wii 


CONTENTS  xi 


PAGE 


Kaiser's  policy — Fashoda.  IV.  The  Conven- 
tion OF  1904.  The  "iron  ring" — Anglo-French 
understanding — Germany's  change  of  policy  .        3 

CHAPTER  II 

FROM  TANGIER  TO  ARMAGEDDON  ^  ■ 

I.  Tangier,  The  First  Gesture.  The  opening 
of  a  new  era — Delcasse — The  question  of  sea 
power — The  Kaiser  at  Tangier — France  bows. 
II.  Algeciras — A  German  Defeat.  Germany  and  Austria  stand 
alone — Great  Britain's  stand — Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia 
united — Growth  of  German  hatred  against  England.  III.  After 
Tangier — The  New  France.  France  awakens — Great  Britain's 
apathy.  IV.  The  End  of  the  Concert  of  Europe.  Italy  draws 
away  from  Germany.  V.  Bosnia,  the  Second  Gesture.  Eng- 
land and  Russia  d.raw  close — The  Young  Turks — Austria  annexes 
Bosnia — Russia  protests — Germany  intervenes.  VI.  Agadir — the 
Third  and  Last  Time.  The  Moroccan  crisis — The  Panther — 
Great  Britain  supports  France — Germany  compromises.  VII.  A 
German  Disaster.  The  Kaiser  blamed  for  the  Moroccan  failure — 
Germany  prepares — France  and  Russia  follow  suit — "When.''" — Eng- 
land misreads  the  signs — Turko-Italian  war.  VIII.  The  First 
Balkan  War.  The  Turks  defeated — The  division  of  spoils.  IX. 
The  Conference  of  London.  Its  failure.  X.  The  Second 
Balkan  War.  The  Bulgarian  defeat — A  blow  to  Pan-Germanism — 
The  Rise  of  Serbia.  XI.  Bukharest  and  After.  The  question  of 
nationalism — Serbian  menace  to  Austria — Italy  refuses  aid  to  Austria 
— Russia  vs.  Austria — The  loss  of  German  prestige — ^Armageddon        .      12 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  TWELVE  DAYS 

I.  The  Assassination  of  the  Archduke.  Result  of  Pan-Slavic  prop- 
aganda— A  month  of  calm — The  Austrian  ultimatum — A  challenge 
to  Russia — The  new  crisis  II.  The  Austrian  Case.  The  Pan- 
Slav  menace — Austria's  misrule  of  the  Slavs — Her  right  to  self-preser- 
vation— Serbia's  position — Austria  and  Russia  natural  enemies — The 
conflict  inevitable.  III.  Sir  Edward  Grey.  Fails  to  grasp  sig- 
nificance of  situation — Invasion  of  Belgium   supplies   moral  issue. 


Xll 


CONTENTS 


IV.  The  Austrian  Ultimatum.  Diplomatic  interchanges  of  the 
Powers — Austria  declares,  war  on  Serbia — Russia  mobilizes — Ger- 
man\- declares  war  on  Russia.  V.  Germany's  Course.  Almost  in- 
evitable under  the  circumstances,  for  which  she  was  largely  responsi- 
ble— She  must  fight  or  surrender.  VI.  Britain  and  Germany. 
Britain's  reasons  for  entering  war — France  and  Germany  VII.  Sir 
Edward's  Dilemma.  The  Powers  bid  for  British  support — Theprob- 
lem  of  Belgium — Of  British  and  French  fleets — Belgium  invaded. 
VIII.  Belgium  Decides  TO  Fight  England  stands  by  the  "scrap 
of  paper" — Triple  Entente  becomes  a  triple  alliance — Italy  proclaims 
her  neutrality — Bismarck's  work  undone.  , 

CHAPTER  IV 


40 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK 

The  Two  Strategical  Conceptions.  Decided  to  crush  France 
quickly,  and  then  assail  Russia.  II.  The  Belgian  Problem. 
French  frontier  strongly  fortified — Switzerland  both  strong  and 
difficult — Belgian  route  chosen  for  military  reasons — German  plans 
broken  by  "The  Maine" — ^Abandoned  after  Battle  of  Flanders. 
III.      French  Str.'\tegy.     Germany's  general  plan  correctly  forecast 

■ — Understanding  with  Russia — Plans  for 
Franco-German  frontier — No  decisive 
battle  till  all  should  be  ready — Strategical 
retreat  deceived  Germans — Results  of  Tan- 
nenberg  —  Aims  of  the  contestants  — 
Franco-Russian  plans  fail  through  lannen- 
berg — Great  importance  of  the  Marne 
Battle 


CHAPTER  V 

BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND 
FRENCH  OFFENCE 


I.  Liege.  Strategic  import- 
ance— Fortresses  and  plans 
for  defence — Belgian  mobili- 
zation— German  heavy  artil- 
lery before  Liege  —  The 
city  taken — Then   the   forts 


78 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PACE 

— Moral  effect  on  England  and  France.  II.  Belgian  "Battles." 
Skirmishing  behind  the  Geete — Haelen — English  and  French  support 
fails — King  Albert  retreats  on  Antwerp  before  Kluck  and  Biilow — 
Kluck  occupies  Louvain  and  Brussels — Namur  collapses  before 
Billow's  guns — Namur  a  real  disaster.  III.  The  Moral  Value. 
German  plans  carried  out — Allies  underestimated  German  numbers 
and  power  of  German  guns — Gallant  Belgium  victorious  in  defeat — 
Invasion  of  Belgium  costs  Germany  good  wdl  of  neutrals.  IV. 
French  Beginnings — Muhlhausen.  French  plans — Their  mobili- 
zation well  carried  out — The  first  thrust — Miihlhausen  taken,  lost, 
retaken.  V.  Morhange — the  First  Disaster.  The  destined 
arena  near  Nancy — Armies  of  Heeringen  and  the  Bavarian  Crown 
Prince — Battle  of  Morhange,  or  Metz — French  broken — Their  field 
artillery  outranged — Foch's  "Iron  Corps" — Retreating  French 
rally,  save  Nancy,  and  later  drive  back  Germans.  VI.  Neuf- 
chateau  and  Charleroi.  Ruffy  and  Langle  de  Cary  meet  German 
Crown  Prince  and  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg  in  the  Ardennes — French  are 
driven  back  before  German  artdlery — Ihey  stand  fast  beyond  the 
Meuse — Lanzerac  defeated  at  Charleroi  by  Biilow — French  retreat 
becomes  general,  but  there  is  no  demoralization.  VII.  British 
Disaster.  Joffre's  plans  altered — The  British  in  great  danger — 
Kluck's  attempt  to  "run  around  the  end."  VIII.  The  Great 
Retreat.  Tardiness  of  Field-Marshal  French — A  retreat  by  ex- 
hausted troops — Smith-Dornen's  plight — Five  days  and  nights  of 
fighting  and  marching — The  Marne  a  French  battle.  IX.  Joffre's 
Last  Plan.  French  army  retreats  before  German  thrust  through  Bel- 
gium— Germans  think  retreat  a  rout — Joffre  has  situation  well  in  hand     86 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 

I.  September  5.  What  the  French  did  at  the  Marne — Joffre's  aims — 
He  offers  Kluck  a  chance  at  Paris — Kluck  refuses  bait.  II.  Kluck 
Turns  Southeast.  Thinks  French  are  beaten — Exposes  flank 
to  Maunoury — Gallieni  informs  Joffre — Joffre  plans  offensive — Issues 
famous  order — Role  assigned  to  Maunoury — Role  assigned  to  General 
French.  III.  British  Failure.  General  French's  delay  permits 
Kluck's  escape — British  had  small  part  in  battle — Maunoury  struck 
in  time — Prepared  way  for  Foch's  decisive  blow — General  French 
failed  like  Grouchy.  IV.  The  Battle  of  the  Ourcq.  Maunoury 
attacks  Kluck — Story  of  battle  five  days  long — Inaction  of  British  en- 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

ables  Kluck  to  withdraw  after  almost  win- 
ning. V.  La  Fere-Champenoise.  Billow 
facing  D'Esperey  retires  with  Kluck — Ger- 
mans resolve  to  drive  back  Foch,  at  French 
centre — Foch,  outnumbered,  is  driven  back 
— Borrows  a  corps  from  D'Esperey — 
Launches  drive  at  Prussian  Guard — The 
Guard's  hne,  stretched  too  thin,  is  cut — 
Foch  launches  a  general  attack — Prussian 
Guard  and  Hansen's  army  routed.  VL 
Langle  de  Gary  and  Sarrail.  Langle 
de  Gary  withstands  army  of  Wiirtemberg 
for  three  days,  behind  the  Ornain — Sarrail,  near  Verdun,  resists  all 
attacks  of  Crown  Prince's  army — Parts  played  by  various  armies — 
Foch's  blow  decisive.  VIL  The  Consequences.  Numbers  en- 
gaged— Losses — French  outnumbered — French  over-estimated  vic- 
tory— Germans  under-estimated  defeat — Marne  kills  German  hope 
of  short  war — Germans  stand  at  Aisne  and  entrench — Comparison 
with  Franco-Prussian  War — German  aims  upset  by  "Miracle  of  the 
Marne."  VIIL  The  Second  Battle  of  Nancy.  Crown  Prince 
of  Bavaria  and  General  Ileeringen  try  to  cut  French  line — Castel- 
nau  repulses  attacks  with  great  slaughter — This  battle  really  a 
phase  of  Marne  struggle — Finished  long  before  The  Marne  ended. 
IX.  Tannenberg.  Franco-Russian  plans  for  invasion  of  East 
Prussia  worked  well — Kaiser  calls  Hindenburg — He  engages  army 
from  Warsaw — Hindenburg's  artillery  wins  at  Tannenberg — The 
other  Russian  army  retires — Tannenberg  a  great  victory — It  saved 
Germany,  as  The  Marne  saved  France 115 

CHAPTER  VII 

DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST 

I.  The  Battle  of  the  Aisne.  After  the  Marne — French  plans — German 
army  defeated  but  not  routed — The  British  in  the  German  retreat — 
German  plans — They  neglect  to  seize  sea  coasts — Moltke  replaced  by 
Falkenhayn — German  offensive  at  St.  Mihiel — French  turning  move- 
ment, west  of  the  Oise — Kluck  halts  Generals  French,  Maunoury  and 
D'Esperey  at  the  Aisne — Biilow  halts  Foch  near  Rheims — Wiirtem- 
berg and  the  Crown  Prince  in  the  Argonne — Threatened  envelopment 
of  Verdun — JofFre  fails  to  get  round  German  right.  II.  The  Race  to 
the  Sea.      General  shifting  of  armies — Trench  deadlock,  Noyon  to 


CONTENTS 


XV 


Nancy — Active  front  shifts  to  Flanders — French  aims — German  aims 
— "Calais" — Churchill's  blunder.  III.  Antwerp.  The  appeal  to 
neutral  sympathies — Antwerp's  strategic  importance — Belgians  im- 
pede Germans — Louvain — Siege  of  Antwerp — Mechanic  vs.  engineer 
— 42-centimetre  guns — Antwerp,  evacuated,  surrenders — Ostend 
falls — British  danger.  IV.  The  Battles  of  Flanders.  A  deadly 
blow  aimed  at  England — Many  races  engaged — The  Yser  region — 
Belgians  first  engaged — Aid  from  British  fleet — Belgians  open  sluices 
at  Di.xmude — "Golden  Lads"  of  Brittany — Ypres — Strategy  dis- 
appears in  the  death  grapple.  V.  Checkmate.  French  and  Belgians 
win  on  the  Yser,  the  British  at  Ypres — Terrific  losses — Death  of  Lord 
Roberts — Another  victory  for  Foch — Definite  failure  of  German  plans 
— Germany  must  turn  to  Russia — Deadlock  on  west  front 


149 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  EASTERN  FIELD 

I.  Russian  and  German  Purposes.  East  Prussian  field  becomes  less 
important — Russians  defeat  Austrians  at  Lemberg — Consequences — 
Russian  aims — Germany  tries  to  save  Austria — ^The  drive  at  Warsaw 
fails — Germans,  detained  in  Russia,  allow  French  and  British  to  pre- 
pare— But  British  need  more  time.  II.  Turkey's  Entrance.  Mili- 
tary effect — Political  causes — Anglo-Russian  rapprochement — Ger- 
many replaces  England  as  Turkey's  friend — British  naval  blunder 
allows  escape  of  Gocben 
and  Breslau .      .      .      .175 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE    BATTLE    OF    LEMBERG 

I.  Russian  Mobilization. 
Exposed  position  of  Po- 
land— The  Bobr-Narew- 
Niemen  barrier — Russian 
plans — Two  armies  enter 
East  Prussia — One  is 
beaten  at  Tannenberg — 
Three  armies  against 
Austria — Ivanoff  to  hold 
Austrians  south  of  Lublin 


xvi  CONTENTS 

r\r,E 

— BrusilofF,  released  by  Roumanian  neutrality,  joins  Russky  for  main 
thrust.  11.  Austria's;  Plans.  Russian  speed  and  strength  under- 
estimated— Aims  of  the  two  Austrian  armies — One  stands  before 
Lemberg — The  other  approaches  Lublin — Situation  on  all  the  fronts. 
III.  Lemberg.  An  eight-day  battle — Brusiloff  breaks  the  Austrian 
centre — IvanofF  drives  back  Dankl — Lemberg  a  great  Austrian  dis- 
aster— Important  consequences igi 

CHAPTER  X 

WARSAW 

I.  Conditions  of  the  First  Bid.  German  strateg\- — Need  to  divert 
Russians  from  Galicia — Capture  of  Warsaw  possible — Comparison 
with  Early's  raid  on  Washington.  11.  At  the  Gates  of  Warsaw. 
Rapid  advance  of  Hindenburg's  two  armies — Russian  concentration 
also  rapid — Hindenburg  before  Warsaw — His  orderly  retreat — Efi^^ects 
of  his  threat — Russians  diverted  from  Galicia — But  only  for  a  short 
time.  III.  Lodz.  Hindenburg's  second  effort — Turns  the  Russians' 
flank — First  Russky,  then  Von  Francois,  seems  lost — But  both  es- 
cape— Germans  win  battle  and  reenter  Lodz — Deadlock  on  Polish 
front.  IV.  The  Third  Bid  for  Warsaw.  Russians  press  on  toward 
•  Cracow,  even  after  defeat  at  Lodz — Hindenburg  strikes  again — Hin- 
dered by  bad  weather,  he  fails — Deadlock  again.  V.  Serbia  Trium- 
phant Again.  Serbia  defeated  Turks  inigij — ^Thenthe  Bulgarians — 
Then  the  Austrians  at  Jedar — But  Austrians  take  Belgrad  in  Decem- 
ber, 1914 — Serbia  seems  lost — Austrians  needed  against  Cossacks — 
Serbia  rallies — Belgrad  retaken  200 

CHAPTER  XI 

NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS 

I.  New  Year's,  1915.  Germany's  political  problems — Problems  of  sea 
power — Germany's  isolation.  II.  The  Military  Problem.  Ger- 
many's plans  failed  in  1914 — ^Austria  shaken  by  defeat  at  Lemberg — 
Territorial  gains  and  losses — Colonial  losses — Germany's  herculean 
task.  III.  Italy.  Clamours  for  Italia  Irredenta — Italy's  hopes  with 
Allies — She  joins  them  eventually,  despite  Dunajec.  IV.  Roumania. 
Ambition  of  Roumanians — Their  conflicting  sympathies — Roumania 
follows  Italy.  V.  Austria.  Her  domestic  racial  troubles — Their 
effect  on  German  policy 223 


CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER  XII 
ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  DUNAJEC 

PAGE 

In  the  Caucasus.  Germans  send  Turks  against  Russians  in  the  Cau- 
casus— English  position  in  Egypt  and  at  Suez  strengthened — ^Turks 
beatenintheCaucasus.  II.  Layingthe  Roumanian  Peril.  Hungary- 
threatened — Germany  warned — She  makes  demonstration  against 
Roumania — Drives  back  Russians — German  loan  to  Bulgaria — In- 
cursion into  Serbia.  III.  The  Battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes. 
Russians  strike  again  at  East  Prussia — Geographical  conditions — Hin- 
denburg  drives  back  Russians.  IV.  Przemysl.  Russian  siege 
successful — Russia  takes  130,000  prisoners — ^This  success  of  the  Allies 
followed  by  many  reverses.  V.  The  Battle  of  the  Carpathians. 
Review  of  Carpathian  operations — Struggle  at  Dukla  Pass — Russia 
brought  to  a  halt — Her  burden  too  heavy 241 


CHAPTER  XIII 

IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915 

The  Problem.  Germans  very  near  success  in  the  west  in  November — 
Hopes  and  aims  of  both  sides — Hopes  of  neither  reaHzed — British 
military  failure  during  first  year — Little  help  for  Russia  from  the  west. 

II.  Joffre's  "Nibbling."  Allies  too  weak  for  a  drive — ^The  French 
"nibble"  intheVosges — ^Their  costly  but  indecisiveefFortsin  Champagne 
— British  offensive  south  of  Lille — ^All  aimed   at  relieving  Russia. 

III.  Neuve  Chapelle.  British  win  little  at  terrible  cost — First  use 
of  massed  artillery  fire — Disheartening  British  mistakes.  IV.  The 
Second  Battle  of  Ypres.  French  fail  to  abolish  the  St.  Mihiel  sali- 
ent— Germans  need  a  victory — They  first  use  "poison  gas" — Allied 
resentment — Inconsiderable  net  results — The  steadfast  Canadians — 
Battle  is  inconclusive — But  Germans  gain  some  advantage.  Con- 
clusion. Review  of  events  thus  far  covered — Important  results  of 
thcMarne — France  there  willed  to  live  and  there  saved  the  Allies        .   253 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Conclusion  274 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PART  II 

I 

THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR 

By  an  American  Military  Expert 

FACX 

Mobilization  for  War.  Concentration  —  France  well  organized  — 
Army  of  France  mobilized  in  sixteen  days — Inconspicuous  vs. 
bright-coloured  uniforms — Organization  and  function  of  army  corps 
— Germany  springs  surprise  on  Allies — Efficiency  of  plans  depends  on 
accuracy  of  arrangements — Paucity  of  officers — Supply  of  officers — 
Instruments,  devices,  and  supplies  developed  by  war — ^Accurate  tim- 
ing of  movements  necessary — Efficiency  vs.  numbers — Importance 
of  speed — Value  of  strategic  points — Necessity  of  well-thought-out 
programme — Evils  of  party  government — Confidence  in  military 
leaders  essential 281 

II 

TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

By  Stephane  Lauzanne,  Editor  of  the  Paris  "Matin" 

I.  M.  Delcasse.  (a)  France  and  England:  Egypt  the  crucial  diffi- 
culty— To  England,  Egypt;  to  France,  Morocco — France  and  Eng- 
land shake  hands,  (b)  France  and  Italy :  Spheres  of  Influence — Pledge 
of  non-interference — France  and  Italy  sisters  again,  (c)  France  and 
Germany:  Germany  suggests  "getting  together" — Trap  suspected — 
M.  Delcasse  resigns — His  predictions  fulfilled — Becomes  Minister  of 
Marine — Takes  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs — Agreement  of  London — 
Balkan  policy — Retires.  11.  Marechal  Joffre.  Foresaw  nature 
of  the  war — Extols  roles  of  colonels  and  captains — Order  issued  after 
Battle  of  Marne — His  characteristics — Order  issued  on  eve  of  Marne 
battle — Is  a^^omttdi  Marechal  de  France 303 

III 
REPORTS  OF  EYE-WITNESSES  AND  PERSONAL  ADVENTURES 

The  German  Entry  Into  Belgium:  By  Arno  Dosch-Fleurot.  Brussels — 
Refugees  pour  in — "Where  are  the  English?" — "Where  are  the 
French.''  " — Laefdael — Louvain — Order  of  advance;  infantry,  lancers, 
etc. — "  EngHsh  ?  " — First  military  execution— More  executions— 
"Direkt  iiach  Paris" — Hostages — A  "crisis  of  the  nerves" — Louvain 
is  burned — Extent  of  the  havoc — "Three  cities  razed!  there  will  be 
more" — Fifteen  Louvainers  shot 312 


CONTENTS  xix 

IV 

HOW  BRITAIN  DID  THE  JOB 
By  Ian  Hay  (Captain  Beith) 

War  found  Britain  totally  unprepared — Excellence  but  insuf- 
ficiency of  Regular  Army — Swarms  enlist — Organization  lacking — 
Recruiting  officers  snowed  under — Voluntary  system  creates  chaos — 
All  types  enlist — An  army  of  all  talents,  except  soldiering — Men  in 
droves — Spirit  of  discipline  unborn — Men  joined  expecting  to  be 
sent  to  Front — Disappointed  at  necessity  for  eight  months'  training — 
Less  than  year  later,  fought  like  veterans — Such  the  spirit  of  the 
British  armies — That  spirit  saved  the  nation 332 

V 
THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA 
By  Stanley  Washburn 

Vast  operations  and  magnificent  strategy  overshadowed  by  campaign 
in  west — Scale  of  operations  enormous — ^Three  bases,  Brusiloff's, 
Russky's  and  Ewerts's — Russia's  lack,  and  Austria's  possession,  of 
strategic  railways — Remarkable  courage  of  Russian  troops — Battle  of 
Zlota  Lipa — Gnita  Lipa — Halicz^the  Krasne — Brest-Litovsk — ^Aus- 
trians  evacuate  Lemberg — Battle  of  Rawa  Ruska — Dissolution  of 
the  Austrian  defence — Yaroslav — Przemysl — Brave  resistance  of 
Austrian  army — Sambor — Austrian  right  and  German  left  unite  at 
Cracow — Russia  occupies  best  portion  of  Galicia 335 

VI 

HOW  THE  NAVY  SAVED  ENGLAND 

By  Winston  Churchill 

(Former  First  Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty) 

What  kind  of  foe  is  the  "Great  Amphibian?" — German  Rage 
Against  England:  Berlin  mobs  insult  British  Ambassador.  The 
Great  Amphibian:  British  strategy  lies  in  use  of  amphibious  power. 
British  Mobilization.  Navy  Made  Ready:  War  council — 
Army  to  go  to  Continent — Navy  to  undertake  security  of  Britain — ■ 
"Commence  Hostilities."  Army  Plays  Big  Part:  The  "contempti- 
ble little  army" — The  "Grand  Fleet."  British  Command  of  the 
Sea:  German  ships  hide,  or  are  blocked  in  port.  The  Menace  to 
Britain  :  Land  communication  by  Havre  threatened — "  Shift  base  to  ' 


sx 


CONTENTS 


St.  Nazaire" — "Get  ready  to  shift  farther  south  still" — "Better  news; 
victory  on  the  Marne;  shift  base  back  to  Havre."  England  the 
World's  Armourer:  Armies  must  be  raised — They  will  need  arms 
and  equipment — Let  us  transform  industries,  call  out  men,  call  in 
women — Pity  to  have  overlooked  it  before — Slowly,  surely,  empire's 
force  will  be  organized  for  war 342 

VII 

THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

By  Waldemar  Kaempffert  and  Carl  Dienstbach 

How  Aircraft  Influenced  the  War,  and  vice  versa:  The  Tripol- 
itan  War — Balkan  War — European  War.  Airplane  Strength  of 
the  Great  Powers.  The  Doves  of  War:  Germans  take  initiative. 
Surprise  Attacks  Impossible:  German  defeat  at  Marne  due  to 
French  flying  machines.  French  Begin  Reconstruction  of  the 
Airplane:  British  begin  real  air  fighting — Germany  outclassed.  The 
German  Fokkers  :  Boelke  the  aerial  Achilles.  Directing  Artillery 
Fire  from  the  Air:  Decisiveimportanceof  artillery  due  to  airplane. 
Learning  to  Fly  Anew.  Zeppelins  and  Other  Dirigibles. 
How  the  Zeppelins  Patrol  the  North  Sea:  More  than  a  match  for 
Seaplanes.  Zeppelins  in  the  North  Sea  Battles:  British  Admirals 
concede  naval  value.  Hitting  the  Mark  from  a  Height  of  Two 
Miles.  The  Convertible  Airplane:  A  veritable  stroke  of  some 
unknown  Englishman's  genius.  Aircraft  Made  War  More  Scien- 
tific: It  is  essential  that  the  strategist  be  an  engineer  and  a  physicist  347 

VIII 

FLYING  MACHINES  AND  THE  WAR 

An  Interview  with  Orville  Wright:  By  Fred  C.  Kelly 

The  Airplane  will  eventually  prevent  war  by  making  it  too  costly 
because  too  long-drawn-out — Napoleon's  victories  due  to  surprise  at- 
tacks— These  now  impossible  because  of  Airplane — Airplanes  and 
Airships  compared — Flying  machines,  (a)  for  scouting,  (b)  for  attack- 
ing— Success  of  Airplanes  beyond  expectations 362 

IX 

LANGUAGE  OF  THE  BIG  GUNS 

By  Hudson  Maxim,  Inventor  of  Smokeless  Powder 

Consequences  of  introduction  of  armour-plate — Brown  prismatic 
powder — Hundred-ton  guns — Smokeless  powder — Striking  energy  of 


CONTENTS  xxi 

projectiles — In  its  race  with  armour-plate  the  gun  has  won — Range 
and  power  of  guns— Limit  of  vision — Weather  conditions — The  North 
Sea  figlit — A  cannon  of  24-in.  cahbre — German  45-ton  howitzer — If 
Uncle  Sam  would  listen 364 

PART  III 

APPENDIX 

THE  EARLY  FRENCH  OFFENSIVE 
By  Frank  H.  Simonds 

Alsace-Lorraine — Battle  of  Nancy — On  the  Lorraine  field  France  and 
Germany  had  planned  to  fight — The  Marne  a  battlefield  reached  by 
chance — St.  Genevieve — "War;  do  not  trespass" — Bois  de  Facq — 
Where  4,000  Germans  lie  buried — C6te-de-Mousson — Pont-a-Mous- 
son — Bois-le-Pretre — A  Taube  raid — Grand-Couronne — Grand  Mont 
d'Amance — Forest  of  Champenoux — Haraucourt — Corbessaux — 
Luneville — Gerbeviller — The  most  completely  wrecked  town  in 
France — Plateau  of  SaflFais — Miihlhausen — Back  to  Nancy — Nancy 
turns  her  face  toward  the  ancient  frontier 369 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

THE  SPIRIT  OF  FRANCE Coloured    Frontispiece 

PAGE 

BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  IN  PICTURES  .  .  .  .  17  to  24 
Napoleon's  Cuirassiers  at  Waterloo — The  Building  of  the  German 
Empire — The  Man  Who  Built  the  German  Empire — Bismarck  as  the 
Greatest  Statesman  in  Europe — "The  Defence  of  the  Longboyeau 
Gate" — Four  Generations  of  Hohenzollerns — Wilhelm  II,  German 
Emperor. 

BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  IN  PICTURES 41  to  48 

Kaiser  Greets  Kaiser — Dropping  the  Pilot,  Tenniel's  Famous  Cartoon 
— M.  Delcasse,  French  Foreign  Minister  in  1904 — Lord  Lansdowne 
—Two  Staunch  Friends  and  Promoters  of  the  Entente  Cordiale, 
General  Kitchener  and  Colonel  Marchand — Czar  Nicholas  and 
President  Poincare — The  Kaiser  with  a  Former  Friend,  Albert  of  Bel- 
gium—Lord Roberts  and  Lord  Haldane — Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand with  his  Morganatic  Wife — The  Arrest  of  the  Assassin. 

LORD  ROBERTS  OF  KANDAHAR  (in  colour) 55 

THE  TWELVE  DAYS  (AUGUST  4-16,  1914) 67  to  74 

King  Peter  of  Serbia— William  II,  German  Emperor — The  Late 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria-Hungary — The  Rulers  of  the 
Triple  Entente — Mr.  Asquith,  British  Premier,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
British  Foreign  Minister— Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  German  Im- 
perial Chancellor — Count  Berchtold,  Austrian  Premier,  1914 — Diplo- 
matists of  the  Twelve  Days — To  Provide  the  Sinews  of  War. 

BELGIUM  "THE  COCKPIT  OF  EUROPE "  IN  PICTURES  .  gi  to  98 
Albert  of  Belgium — Belgian  Cavalry — One  Shot  From  a  German  42- 
Centimetre  Gun  Put  This  Belgian  Fort  Out  of  Commission — Belgian 
Battery  on  the  March — War  Enthusiasts  in  Brussels — Belgian 
Soldiers  at  Rest  During  a  Lull  in  the  Fighting — A  Typical  Belgian 
Soldier — General  Leman,  Defender  of  Liege — Awaiting  the  Uhlans — 
The  Invasion  of  Belgium,  Epitomized  in  Pictures — Ruined  Town 
Hall  at  Ypres — Belgium  Under  German  Rule. 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS  xxiii 

PAGE 

MARSHAL  FOCH  (I'n  colour) 121 

NOVEL  PHASES  OF  MODERN  WARFARE  SHOWN  IN  PICTURES 

133  to  140 

A  Hidden  and  Defended  Machine  Gun — The  "Agent  de  Liaison" — 
"Poison  Gas"  in  the  War — Machine-Gun  Position  in  the  Open — 
Periscope  and  Metal  Helmet — This  is  the  Result  When  a  Forest  Be- 
comes a  Battlefield — Buckler,  Hand-Grenade,  and  Helm — Barbed- 
Wire  Entanglements — ^The  Gasoline  Engine — Work  and  Play  at  the 
Front. 

HINDENBURG,  VICTOR  OF  TANNENBERG  (in  colour)     .     .     .   145 

"ST.   GEORGE   FOR   ENGLAND!"   FRANCE  AND   ENGLAND 

STAND  TOGETHER 15910166 

British  Highlanders  Landing  at  Boulogne — General  JofFre — General 
Gallieni — Three  French  Generals — Lord  Kitchener  and  Sir  John 
French — General  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  General  Sir  Horace  Lock- 
wood  Smith-Dorrien — French  Army  Joins  Belgians — British  Artillery 
in  a  Rearguard  Action  in  Belgium — When  the  British  Marines  Dis- 
embarked at  Ostend  They  Received  a  Rousing  Welcome  From  the 
Belgians — British  Artillery  in  Action — The  Prince  of  Wales  With  His 
Regiment — On  the  Marne  Front — French  Dragoons  with  Captive  Uh- 
lans— ^The  Advance  of  French  Machine  Gunners  and  Riflemen — A  Big 
French  Gun  on  the  Railroad  at  Verdun — Two  Remarkable  Airplane 
Photographs  on  the  French  Front. 

GLIMPSES  OF  THE  SQUADRONS  OF  THE  AIR.  .  .  .183  to  190 
Americans  Who  Flew  for  France — The  Dreadnought  of  the  Air — -The 
Battle  Cruiser  of  the  Air — The  War  in  the  Air — Women  Volunteers 
for  the  French  Aerial  Service — Aviator's  Photograph  of  a  Modern 
Battlefield— A  Pair  of  Able-bodied  Zouaves  From  the  Gold  Coast  of 
Africa — Turcos — Canadian  Troops — A  True  World  War — Men  of 
Asia  and  Africa. 

MEN  AND  GUNS  OF  THE  TWO  KAISERS .""."."".  207  to  214 

The  Imperial  Guard  Passes  in  Review  Before  Emperor  William — Ger- 
man Generals — One  of  Hindenburg's  Thrusts  at  Warsaw — An  Inci- 
dent During  the  German  Effort  to  Drive  the  Russians  Home  From 
Galicia — EflFect  of  the  German  Bombardment  of  Przemysl — General 
Von    Auffenberg — Typical    Austrian    Infantryman — Parcels    From 


xxiv  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

FAGB 

Friends  at  Home  Arrive  to  Cheer  German  Artillery  Officers  Before 
Warsaw — ^The  Austrians^Dne  of  the  Skoda  Howitzers  That  Re- 
duced Liege. 

PICTURES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE .  231  to  238 

German  Shelters  of  Sandbags,  in  the  Dunes  Along  the  Belgian  Coast — 
The  Elaboration  of  Trench  Warfare — An  Observation  Station — An 
Underground  Passage  Dug  by  the  Austrians  at  Dubus,  Russia,  With 
an  Outlet  in  a  Church — Winter  Quarters — Another  Aspect  of  Life  in 
the  Trenches — A  Light  Gun  Elaborately  Entrenched — Belgians  En- 
trenched Outside  Antwerp — Underground  With  the  British — Austro- 
Hungarian  Shelters  in  the  Alps. 

THE  SLAVS  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 255  to  262 

Part  of  the  Crack  Cavalry  Corps  Formerly  Known  as  the  Czar's  Own 
Hussars — Four  Russian  Generals — Battery  of  Russian  Howitzers 
on  the  Polish  Front — Russian  Soldiers — The  Former  Czar's  Body- 
guard of  Picked  Cossacks  Riding  to  the  Defence  of  Warsaw — Russians 
and  Austrians — Serbia  in  the  War — Serbian  Troops  on  the  March 
Near  the  Austrian  Border. 

MAN-SAVING :  THE  WORK  OF  THE  RED  CROSS  AND  ITS  ALLIES 

295  to  302 
A  Red  Cross  Steamer,  Laden  with  Nurses,  Leaves  New  York  Harbour 
for  the  Theatre  of  War — The  Red  Cross  on  the  Battlefield — An  Am- 
bulance on  Rails — A  Field  Hospital — ^The  Part  of  Priests  and  Nuns — 
Mme.  Carrel  Flushing  a  Wound — The  Carrel  Hospital — Miss  Muriel 
Thompson,  a  British  Nurse,  Who  Was  Decorated  by  King  Albert  for 
Her  Bravery  Under  Fire — Serbian  Red  Cross  Nurse  at  Work  in  a  Hos- 
pital at  Belgrad — Stretcher-bearers  at  Work  After  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne — Loading  a  German  Red  Cross  Train — Wreck  of  a  Red  Cross 
Train  and  the  Mary  Bridge  Across  the  Marne — Red  Cross  Nurses  as 
Stretcher-bearers — Competent  Nursing  Has  Put  This  Little  Man 
Upon  His  Feet  Again. 

FEEDING  THE  MEN  AND  THE  GUNS '319  to  326 

Baking  for  the  German  Army — Russian  Field  Kitchens — Cooking 
for  the  Kaiser — A  Train-Load  of  "Cannon-Fodder"  in  Galicia — • 
Transportation  of  Ammunition  and  Supplies — Food  Supplies  on  the 
Hoof — Russians  Retreating  from  Galicia  Before  the  Germans — A  Ser- 
bian Convoy  in  Retreat — The  Work  of  the  Pioneers. 


LIST  OF  MAPS 


PAGE 


Why  the  Germans  Went  Through  Belgium 8i 

The  First  Battles,  August  15-23,  1914 105 

The  Situation  of  the  French  and  German  Armies  on  August  30,  1914  .      .  113 

The  German  Advance  to  the  Marne 117 

Kluck's  Circle 119 

Battle  of  the  Marne,  Sept.  5th 124 

Battle  of  the  Marne,  Sept.  8th 125 

Battle  of  the  Marne,  Sept.  9th 125 

First  Russian  Invasion  of  East  Prussia,  Checked  by  Hindenburg  at 

Tannenberg 144 

The  German  Retreat  to  the  Aisne,  Sept.  10-15,  1914 151 

The  Race  to  the  Sea 154 

Deadlock  in  the  West,  Nov.  15,  1914 172 

The  Russian  Offensive  on  all  Fronts,  Sept.  i,  1914 193 

The  Russian  Invasion  of  Galicia — Battle  of  Lemberg 197 

The  Russian  Invasion  of  Galicia,  About  October  i,  1914 201 

Hindenburg's  First  Campaign  for  Warsaw,  Oct.  20,  1914        ....  203 

Hindenburg's  Second  Drive  for  Warsaw 206 

The  Battle  of  Lodz,  During  Hindenburg's  Second  Campaign  for  Warsaw  215 

Deadlock  in  Poland,  Dec,  1914-May,  191 5 219 

Serbian  Battlefields 221 

Italia  Irredenta 227 

The  Battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes 246 

The  Galician  Campaign,  Sept.,  1914-May,  1915 250 


INTRODUCTION 

By  ALBERT  SHAW 

The  records  of  what  we  call  "civilization"  are  largely  devoted  to  a  series 
of  periods  or  historical  epochs,  marked  by  such  intensity  of  action  and  such 
profound  changes  that  the  effects  have  a  permanent  bearing.  Such  effects 
in  their  turn  become  causes,  and  bring  about  still  further  events  and  changes. 
It  is  indeed  true  that  in  the  more  uneventful  stretches  of  historic  time  there  are 
silent  forces  and  influences  always  at  work,  and  that  these  are  recognized  by 
students  of  national  hfe  or  of  world  history  as  things  necessary  to  be  under- 
stood. But  such  influences  and  forces  often  operate  obscurely,  and  are  not 
estimated  at  their  full  value  until  they  have  become  revealed  in  the  light  of 
startling  events  in  some  new  period  of  intense  action. 

Thus,  in  the  background  of  the  upheavals  that  produced  the  American  and 
French  revolutions,  are  to  be  found  the  new  movements  in  navigation  and  trade 
due  to  the  discovery  and  colonization  of  undeveloped  parts  of  the  world.  And 
also,  in  the  background,  lies  the  breakdown  of  feudahsm,  with  the  spread  of 
the  new  doctrines  of  human  rights  and  of  political  liberty.  The  economic 
and  political  changes  following  that  intense  period  at  the  end  of  the  Eigh- 
teenth and  the  beginning  of  the  Nineteenth  century  have  been  so  extensive 
in  their  areas,  and  so  vast  in  their  statistical  aggregates,  that  they  almost 
baffle  analysis  and  computation. 

Out  of  that  intense  [period  there  emerged  the  typical  representative  de- 
mocracy that  was  destined  within  a  century  or  more  to  become  the  prevailing 
form  of  political  association  among  men.  There  emerged  from  that  period  the 
modern  ideals  of  local,  national,  and  international  life,  as  swayed  by  the  in- 
telligence of  the  masses.  "  Public  opinion  "  became  a  recognized  institution,  so 
that  its  necessary  instruments — the  right  of  public  assembly  and  the  hberty  of 
the  press — -were  safeguarded  in  constitutions  and  laws.  Invention  and  dis- 
covery also  became  recognized  agents  of  social  progress;  and  through  these 
agents,  within  a  century,  the  civilized  nations  had  achieved  an  economic  eman- 
cipation that  was  giving  to  the  many  what  had  been  available  to  the  privileged 
few  alone  in  the  Eighteenth  Century. 

It  has  been  true,  however,  of  all  historical  progress,  that  conflicting  influ- 
ences are  always  present  and  that  forward  movements  must  fight  their  way, 
sometimes  suffering  retardation  and  temporary  defeat.  The  leading  minds 
of  the  American  and  French  revolutions  had  a  conception  not  merely  of  the 
rights  of  man  as  related  to  the  government  and  growth  of  separate  nations,  but 


xxviii  INTRODUCTION 

they  also  had  in  mind  the  establishment  of  universal  peace  through  a  federa- 
tion of  states  or  nations,  and  through  a  subjection  of  purely  national  ambitions 
to  the  larger  and  better  aims  of  civilization  as  a  whole.  It  was  hoped  and  be- 
lieved that  these  great  conceptions  might  be  realized  through  their  strong  ap- 
peal to  the  growing  intelligence  of  mankind. 

It  was  thought  that  the  masses  of  men,  acquiring  enough  education  to  read 
and  think  and  take  part  in  the  government  of  communities  and  states,  would 
firmly  renounce  so  barbaric  a  thing  as  the  use  of  force  in  the  settlement  of  differ- 
ences between  nations.  It  was  believed  that  those  ideas  and  methods  which  had 
triumphed  in  the  establishment  of  the  United  States  would  in  due  time  have  the 
effect  of  democratizing  and  unifying  the  peoples  of  Europe.  Thomas  Jefferson, 
George  Washington,  and  other  Americans  believed  that  the  Western  Hemis- 
phere should,  in  so  far  as  possible,  keep  aloof  and  develop  the  principles  of 
democracy  and  confederation  until  Europe,  influenced  by  American  success, 
might  also  adopt  full  democratic  methods  in  the  government  of  states  and 
nations,  and  might  substitute  some  form  of  confederation  for  the  military  alli- 
ances and  the  "balance  of  power"  principle  that  must  inevitably  lead  to  peri- 
odic wars. 

Unfortunately,  however,  several  great  forces  of  human  progress  that  were 
stimulated  in  that  period  of  revolutions  set  forth  upon  their  careers  at  un- 
equal rates  of  movement.  Universal  education,  as  one  of  these  forces,  intensi- 
fied devotion  to  the  language,  the  history,  the  ideals,  and  the  aspirations  of 
particular  nations.  Thus  national  unity  and  progress  became  a  passionate 
object  of  endeavour — in  Germany,  for  instance,  then  in  Italy,  then  in  Russia, 
and  in  many  of  the  smaller  principalities  and  racial  or  political  entities.  Hung- 
ary had  evolved  an  intense  national  consciousness,  Poland  had  awakened, 
Bohemia  had  begun  to  demand  a  distinctive  future,  and  the  people  of  the  Bal- 
kan regions  in  particular  had  experienced  an  almost  unprecedented  evolution 
of  political  and  racial  ambition. 

This  exaggerated  nationalism  could  be  ascribed  above  all  else  to  the 
facts  and  the  methods  of  universal  education.  The  rapid  forming  of  the 
reading  and  writing  habit  within  a  period  of  two  or  three  generations  was 
certain  to  promote  nationalism  and  strengthen  language  barriers,  and  thus 
for  a  time  at  least  to  weaken  the  larger  cause  of  unity  and  harmony  among 
nations. 

Furthermore,  the  great  forces  of  invention  and  scientific  discovery  that 
were  set  at  work  were  producing  many  consequences  that  could  not  have  been 
foreseen.  In  some  decades  they  encouraged  vast  migrations,  while  in  others 
they  produced  conditions  that  checked  the  export  of  men  and  promoted  the 
export  of  commodities.  These  discoveries  abolished  epidemics  and  resulted 
in  the  total  increaseof  the  population  of  civilized  countries  by  from  one  hundred 
per  cent,  to  two  hundred  per  cent,  in  a  very  short  period.     The  application  of 


INTRODUCTION  xxix 

science  to  industry  had  enabled  this  expanding  population  to  produce  vastly 
increased  supplies  of  the  necessities  and  luxuries  of  Hfe. 

In  the  industrialized  nations  which  possessed  or  could  secure  supplies  of 
iron  and  coal,  and  which  could  make  and  use  machinery  while  having  the  tech- 
nical abil'ty  to  produce  cloths  of  cotton,  wool,  silk,  and  linen  on  a  large  scale, 
the  output  of  manufactured  articles  increased  in  something  like  a  geometrical 
ratio.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  production  of  articles  of  food  necessary 
to  sustain  the  industrial  population  went  forward  at  an  arithmetical  rate,  or 
even  more  slowly.  The  inevitable  consequence  of  these  two  major  facts  in 
the  conditions  of  Europe's  economic  production  was  an  enormous  growth  of 
foreign  trade.  Regions  that  less  than  a  hundred  years  ago  had  been  almost 
wholly  agricultural,  except  for  the  local  and  household  industries  that  had  sup- 
plied shelter,  clothing,  and  the  ordinary  utensils  and  implements,  had  now 
become  so  transformed  that  more  than  three-quarters  of  the  people  were 
engaged  in  commerce  and  manufactures. 

The  products  of  their  industry  were  sold  throughout  the  world,  and  the 
question  of  markets  had  become  vital.  They  were  obliged  to  study  the  cus- 
toms and  the  wants  of  Asia  and  Africa,  as  well  as  of  North  and  South  America 
and  the  various  parts  of  Europe,  and  to  awaken  new  wants  and  help  form  new 
habits  and  customs,  for  the  sake  of  enlarged  markets.  They  were  obliged  in 
return  to  import  vast  supplies  of  raw  material  to  feed  their  factories,  and  in- 
creasing quantities  of  food  materials  from  the  temperate  zones  and  the  tropics, 
to  provide  the  workers  with  bread  and  meat,  fruits  and  spices,  tea,  coffee,  and 
cocoa. 

This  had  necessitated  a  correspondingly  large  increase  in  the  tonnage  of 
merchant  shipping.  It  had  transformed  the  new  nationalism  that  had  re- 
sulted from  popular  education  into  a  nationalism  of  trade  rivalry  that  extended 
to  the  remote  parts  of  the  earth.  The  growth  of  overseas  commerce,  and  the 
increase  in  the  number  and  importance  of  merchant  ships,  made  the  freedom 
of  the  ocean  highways  a  matter  of  anxious  concern  to  governments.  The 
doctrine  of  naval  expansion  and  power  was  proclaimed  and  justified  on  the 
ground  of  commercial  necessity. 

Let  us  take  the  growth  of  Germany  as  an  illustration.  At  the  end  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  what  is  now  the  German  Empire  had  a  population  of  less 
than  25,000,000.  A  hundred  years  later,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  of 
1914,  this  population  had  grown  to  nearly  70,000,000.  As  recently  as  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  of  iSjo-'ji,  the  German  population  was  only  a  little 
more  than  40,000,000.  At  that  time  German  industry  was  not  highly  devel- 
oped as  compared  with  that  of  England  or  France.  But  it  became  the  policy 
of  the  new  German  Empire  to  promote  scientific  and  technical  education  and 
to  stimulate  the  growth  of  German  manufactures  of  all  kinds.  The  success  of 
this  policy  was  so  great  that  Germany  became  increasingly  able  to  compete 


XXX  INTRODUCTION 

everywhere  with  the  manufactures  of  other  countries.  German  migration 
to  America  practically  ceased  because  there  was  ample  employment  in  the 
home  country.  This  meant,  in  simple  terms,  that  besides  an  average  increase 
in  the  standards  of  living  and  the  conditions  of  German  communities,  which 
absorbed  much  of  the  new  production  of  goods,  there  had  come  to  be  a  popula- 
tion of  many  millions  on  German  soil  who  were  dependent  in  normal  times  upon 
trade  with  the  outside  world. 

What  was  so  true  of  Germany,  was  in  greater  or  less  measure  true  of  other 
industrial  nations.  That  is  to  say,  an  increasing  percentage  of  their  popula- 
tion was  engaged  in  the  production  of  articles  which  required  international 
markets  in  contrast  with  domestic  markets. 

The  period  of  discovery,  in  the  Sixteenth  Century  and  later,  had  been  fol- 
lowed by  the  growth  of  commercial  or  trading  empires,  notably  those  of  Spain, 
England,  France,  Portugal,  and  Holland.  One  of  the  aims  of  the  revolution- 
ary period  of  the  Eighteenth  and  early  Nineteenth  centuries  had  been  to  break 
up  these  empires  and  create  a  series  of  democracies.  Thus  the  United  States 
was  created  out  of  great  strips  of  British,  French,  and  Spanish  commercial 
domain.  The  Latin-American  republics  in  due  time  deprived  Spain  and  Portu- 
gal of  most  of  their  acquisitions  of  the  earlier  period.  Great  Britain,  as  an 
island  nation,  and  as  the  earliest  of  the  countries  to  attain  modern  industrial  de- 
velopment and  large  export  trade,  had  been  driven  to  the  policy  of  naval 
supremacy.  This  unwavering  devotion  to  the  idea  of  a  vastly  superior  navy, 
conjoined  with  Great  Britain's  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  colonial  self- 
government  and  democracy,  had  been  effective  in  keeping  the  British  Empire 
from  falling  apart,  and  in  adding  greatly  to  its  extent  when  Africa  came  to  be 
subdivided  among  the  European  powers. 

Great  Britain,  after  the  American  Revolution,  gave  up  the  old  idea  of  the 
commercial  or  trading  empire,  which  meant  the  exploiting  of  colonies  to 
their  own  detriment  and  to  the  exclusion  of  the  trade  of  other  countries.  Eng- 
land in  due  time  gave  to  her  own  colonies  full  liberty  of  commerce  and  industry; 
and  she  also  opened  her  home  trade  and  the  trade  of  her  colonies  to  the  com- 
peting trade  of  her  European  rivals.  Nevertheless,  the  industries  and  com- 
merce of  England  doubtless  derived  a  certain  measure  of  advantage  from  the 
political  relations  between  the  mother  country  and  the  outlying  parts  of  the 
empire. 

This  position  of  the  British  Empire,  viewed  with  just  and  temperate  judg- 
ment, did  not  greatly  menace  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  world,  and  it 
did  not  obstruct  either  the  process  of  democratic  evolution  or  that  of  the  inter- 
nationalization of  trade  and  commerce.  But  it  made  the  British  Empire  so 
ubiquitous,  as  it  were — so  omnipresent  at  every  point  of  international  rivalry 
or  of  local  transition — that  the  danger  of  serious  clash  with  other  growing  em- 
pires was  illustrated  by  one  incident  after  another.     Thus,  for  a  period  of 


INTRODUCTION  xxxi 

years  there  was  misunderstanding  between  England  and  Russia,  because  of 
Russia's  vast  territorial  expansions  in  Central  Asia  that  seemed  to  threaten 
England's  control  of  India.  There  were  differences  between  England  and 
France,  over  respective  spheres  of  influence  in  Africa. 

II 

Precisely  as  England's  historic  position  had  compelled  her  to  adhere  to  the 
policy  of  naval  supremacy,  so  Germany's  historic  position  in  the  heart  of  Eu- 
rope had  led  her  to  the  maintenance  of  a  policy  of  militarism.  The  conception 
of  a  nation  which  could  at  will  turn  all  its  energies  and  forces  from  the  pursuits 
of  peace  to  the  achievement  of  victory  in  war  has  been  entertained  intelligently 
by  a  certain  number  of  minds  in  many  different  countries.  But  Germany  is 
the  only  modern  country  which  has  so  ordered  her  affairs  as  to  be  the  stronger 
for  war  by  reason  of  every  access  of  strength  for  the  pursuits  of  peace.  It 
would  be  useless  for  us  to  consider  whether  Germany  originally  adopted  the 
military  ideal  through  fear  of  powerful  neighbours  and  the  need  of  self-defence, 
or  whether  the  German  race  is  inherently  militant  and  aggressive.  It  had 
usually  been  thought  that  the  Germans  were  naturally  peace-loving  and  con- 
tented, and  the  world  had  been  disposed  to  praise  them  greatly  for  their  edu- 
cational and  scientific  progress  and  their  many  contributions  to  culture  and 
civiUzation. 

After  the  unification  of  Germany,  following  the  war  with  France  and  the 
smaller  wars  of  the  Bismarckian  period,  there  came  the  rapid  growth  of  in- 
dustry and  commerce  to  which  I  have  referred.  Germany  began  to  assume 
the  role  of  the  leading  power  within  the  European  system.  France  strove  for 
recuperation  and  formed  an  alliance  with  Russia.  Germany  secured  Austria 
and  Italy  as  alUes,  but  rehed  mainly  upon  her  own  military  prowess  for  pro- 
tection against  the  Gallo-Slavic  combination.  In  a  country  like  England, 
military  ideals  were  obsolete,  and  the  army  was  considered  as  an  emergency 
police  force,  somewhat  necessary  but  an  expensive  adjunct  of  government. 
The  island  boundaries  of  the  United  Kingdom  were  fixed  by  Nature,  and  were 
not  to  be  changed.  The  relations  of  the  United  Kingdom  with  Canada,  Aus- 
traha.  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa,  were  increasingly  those  of  mutual  help- 
fulness and  voluntary  cooperation.  The  future  of  India  was  to  be  determined 
by  the  developing  capacity  of  the  Indian  peoples  for  mutual  tolerance  and 
for  maintaining  just  and  beneficent  political  institutions.  Speaking  generally, 
the  British  people  conceived  of  their  empire  as  a  thing  in  harmony  with  world 
progress,  and  not  as  a  thing  that  was  blocking  the  rightful  progress  of  any 
other  nation  or  race. 

But  if  the  British  Empire  on  its  part  was  a  finished  affair,  subject  to  peace- 
ful decentralization  through  the  growth  of  the  oversea  dominions,  it  was  quite 
otherwise  with  the  German  Empire.     The  British  army  was  a  small,  profes- 


xxxii  INTRODUCTION 

sionallzed  body  of  soldiers.  "Tommy  Atkins,"  the  English  private,  was  in 
no  sense  a  civilian  or  an  ordinary  citizen.  But  the  German  army  was  in  an 
almost  complete  sense  the  nation  itself.  There  was  an  exception,  however, 
which  was  fraught  with  a  danger  that  even  yet  is  not  wholly  understood. 
This  exception  lay  in  the  great  body  of  highly  trained  German  officers.  These 
army  officers  were  soldiers  and  not  civilians.  Their  training  for  every  grade 
and  rank  of  commissioned  military  service  was  serious,  intense,  extremely 
intelligent. 

This  permanent  military  caste  was  imbued  with  the  doctrine  of  sheer  force 
for  the  advancement  of  a  nation's  ends;  and  the  progress  and  dominance  of 
the  nation  was  for  them  the  supreme  ethical  law.  Comprised  within  this  great 
body  of  permanent  trained  officers  was  a  vast  system  or  mechanism  for  training 
all  the  young  men  of  the  nation,  as  they  reached  the  suitable  age,  to  serve  the 
country  as  soldiers.  The  system  was  carefully  adjusted  to  promote  rather 
than  injure  the  industrial  and  commercial  advancement  of  the  nation.  The 
well-educated  young  men  could  be  returned  to  civil  life  within  a  year,  while  in- 
tensive training  for  two  or  three  years  made  the  country  bumpkin  or  the  village 
boy  a  more  valuable  civilian  than  he  otherwise  would  have  been.  Thus  while 
German  militarism  employed  this  twofold  system,  one  for  the  development  of 
the  great  body  of  professional  officers,  and  the  other  for  the  disciplining  of  young 
civilians,  there  were  also  the  specialized  groups  under  the  Army  General  Staff, 
such  as  the  engineering  and  technical  groups  and  those  concerned  with  inter- 
national military  intelligence.  Through  these  specialists  all  the  progress  of 
Germany  and  of  other  countries  in  mechanical,  electrical,  and  chemical  en- 
gineering was  so  adapted  as  to  be  available  for  military  purposes. 

At  the  time  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the  population  of  Germany  and 
France  was  almost  equal,  being  about  40,000,000  each.  That  of  the  United 
Kingdom  was  somewhat  more  than  30,000,000.  In  a  period  of  forty  years 
following  that  war,  the  population  of  France  had  remained  almost  unchanged, 
while  the  British  Islands  had  surpassed  France  and  contained  about  45,000,000 
inhabitants.  Germany,  on  her  part,  had  increased  in  numbers  to  a  total  some- 
what less  than  70,000,000.  German  industry,  meanwhile,  had  made  a  far 
more  rapid  relative  development  than  had  the  population,  so  that  Germany 
was  not  only  able  to  throw  the  nation  quickly  upon  a  war  footing  with 
10,000,000  trained  men  under  arms,  but  her  great  workshops  could  supply 
vast  quantities  of  guns  and  munitions,  while  her  chemical  industries  could  pro- 
vide new  kinds  of  explosives  and  war  materials,  and  her  railroads,  which  had 
been  built  from  the  strategic  as  well  as  the  commercial  standpoint,  were 
ready  to  serve  ends  and  objects  that  had  been  carefully  planned  in  advance. 

France,  Russia,  Italy,  and  Austria  were  also  on  the  basis  of  general  military 
training  and  service;  but  in  no  other  country  were  the  collective  resources  of 
the  nation  so  readily  convertible  into  terms  of  immediate  military  efficiency  as 


INTRODUCTION  xxxiii 

in  Germany.  There  were  relatively  few  men  in  Europe,  and  still  fewer  in 
America,  who  could  understand  in  advance  what  this  convertibility  of  na- 
tional power  into  terms  of  immediate  military  efficiency  might  mean  in  case  of 
the  sudden  outbreak  of  a  general  war.  It  was  not  until  the  recent  great  war 
in  Europe  was  nearly  three  years  old  that  there  came  to  be  any  wide  under- 
standing of  the  nature  and  extent  of  Germany's  stupendous  superiority  at  the 
outset  in  national  efficiency  for  war. 

This  adaptabiHty  of  the  nation's  resources  of  men  and  of  industry  to  the 
purposes  of  war  had  been  created,  in  the  first  instance,  because  of  Germany's 
historical  position  amidst  the  conflicting  tribes  and  races  of  Europe.  Russia 
occupied  vast  territories,  her  [population  was  soon  to  reach  the  200,000,000 
mark,  she  also  had  a  system  of  general  military  service  and  a  large  body  of 
professional  officers,  but  her  industrial  resources  were  comparatively  undevel- 
oped. While  Russia  was  dreaming  her  Pan-Slavic  dream,  Germany  was  look- 
ing forward  to  what  she  deemed  her  inevitable  conflict  with  the  Franco-Rus- 
sian alliance.  France  also  was  highly  militarized,  but  the  Germans,  weighing 
all  military  resources  in  the  aggregate,  regarded  their  own  efficiency  as  at  least 
twice  as  great  as  that  of  the  French. 

Thus  as  Germany  grew  in  a  sense  of  military  primacy,  her  body  of  profes- 
sional officers  also  grew  in  the  conviction  that  a  blow  should  be  struck  before 
Russian  resources  of  science  and  industry  should  develop  enough  to  enable 
Russia  to  maintain  large  armies  over  considerable  periods  of  time.  Further- 
more, as  Germany's  foreign  commerce  increased,  her  ambitions  expanded  and 
she  began  to  conceive  of  her  destinies  as  something  more  than  those  of  leader- 
ship within  the  continent  of  Europe.  England,  with  45,000,000  people  in  the 
home  islands,  controlled  a  vast  empire  in  all  continents  and  in  all  seas.  Ger- 
many, with  70,000,000,  was  now  outstripping  England  in  quantity  and  variety 
of  industrial  products  and  was  rapidly  contesting  England's  primacy  in  mer- 
chant marine.  Germany  began  to  demand  her  "place  in  the  sun."  As  her 
sense  of  mihtary  and  commercial  power  increased,  her  national  pride  assumed 
aggressive  and  arrogant  forms.  Although  Germany  accused  John  Bull  of  a 
traditional  arrogance,  the  facts  show  that  in  the  main  there  was  a  surprising 
readiness  on  England's  part  to  recognize  Germany's  progress  and  to  admit 
German  merchants  everywhere  on  equal  terms. 

Fear,  rather  than  arrogance,  however,  is  at  the  root  of  much  discord  and 
conflict  between  nations  as  between  individuals.  Germany  feared  that  the 
vast  merchant  fleet  needful  to  carry  her  expanding  commerce  might  at  some 
critical  time  suff"er  unless  protected  by  a  great  navy.  England,  on  the  other 
hand,  feared  lest  Germany,  already  dominant  on  land  by  reason  of  her  superior 
army,  might  at  some  juncture  destroy  the  British  Empire  if  to  Germany's 
military  machine  there  was  also  added  the  power  of  a  German  navy  approach- 
ing that  of  England  in  extent.    Thus  Britain  was  led  to  lay  aside  all  diff'erences 


xxxiv  INTRODUCTION 

with  France  and  then  with  Russia,  and  to  arrange  for  the  combined  use  of  the 
Enghsh  and  French  fleets,  while  England  also  began  to  construct  new  warships 
and  to  revolutionize  the  world's  navies  in  size  and  character. 

Ill 

Thus  the  modern  world,  as  set  upon  its  course  by  the  mental  and  physical 
forces  culminating  in  the  American  and  French  revolutions,  had  made  vast 
progress  in  different  kinds  and  degrees,  and  these  different  kinds  of  progress 
had  been  accelerated  at  very  different  rates  of  speed.  The  European  masses 
had  within  a  century  been  transformed  from  iUiterate  serfs  and  yokels  to  a 
body  of  more  than  four  hundred  millions  of  people  who  could  read  and  write, 
take  some  part  in  government,  and  entertain  with  dangerous  prejudices  as 
well  as  with  enthusiastic  devotion  those  concepts  making  up  what  we  call 
"patriotism."  Several  hundred  million  people  who  had  never  read  at  all  were 
suddenly  reading  newspapers  and  bringing  collective  pressure  to  bear  upon 
pubHc  policies.  They  were  evolving  great  states  like  Germany  and  Italy  out 
of  fragmentary  entities,  and  they  were  fusing  populations  into  large,  aspiring 
nationalities.  They  were  doing  all  this  within  the  circumscriptions  of  many 
different  languages;  and  with  mistaken  ideas  as  to  race  origins  and  the  historic 
background  of  European  peoples.  Thus  the  spirit  of  nationalism  could  but 
become  excessive  and  therefore  dangerous. 

Furthermore,  the  population  of  the  world  within  a  brief  period  had  in- 
creased from  an  estimated  one  thousand  millions  to  an  estimated  one  thousand 
five  hundred  millions,  the  relative  increase  being  greatest  in  the  highly  civilized 
and  industriahzed  countries,  France  being  the  only  exception.  Not  only  had 
population  increased  in  the  total,  but  it  had  shifted  in  its  groupings  from  rural 
pursuits  to  those  of  industrialized  towns  and  cities.  The  population  move- 
ments had  been  accompanied  by  ever  more  intensified  forms  of  industry,  with 
an  immense  advancement  in  the  earning  power  of  the  average  man  when  ex- 
pressed in  terms  of  the  comforts,  conveniences,  and  luxuries  of  life.  And  such 
altered  conditions  within  national  boundaries  had  of  necessity  been  accom- 
panied by  almost  incomprehensible  increases  in  the  volume  and  variety  of 
international  commerce,  necessitating  the  multiplication  of  merchant  ships. 
These  changes — wrought  within  the  period  of  a  century — were  the  most  stu- 
pendous, both  in  kind  and  in  degree,  that  had  come  about  during  any  cen- 
tury within  the  recorded  history  of  the  human  race. 

The  growth  of  international  commerce  had  created  countless  ties  and  re- 
lationships across  the  boundary  lines  of  states.  Science  and  education  had 
found  many  ways  to  communicate  and  to  cooperate.  But  whereas  there  had 
been  developing  a  network  of  voluntary  association  and  intercourse  among  the 
peoples  of  different  nations,  there  had  been  a  failure  to  secure  the  harmony  and 
cooperation  of  governments,  which  was  the  one  thing  supremely  needful.     The 


INTRODUCTION  xxxv 

powerful  nations  had  intensified  the  danger  arising  from  unregulated  nation- 
alism by  entering  belatedly  upon  an  unwise  policy  of  imperialism  in  rivalry 
with  one  another.  If  two  great  nations  like  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  possessing  a  common  language  and  many  other  bonds  of  unity  and 
agreement,  had  at  times  found  it  hard  to  avoid  conflict  and  to  reconcile  dif- 
ferences arising  from  policies  of  expansion  or  empire  or  trade,  how  much  harder 
must  it  have  been  for  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  to  avoid  conflict  and  recon- 
cile differences  when,  in  addition  to  national  separateness  of  languages  and 
tradition,  there  were  added  the  rivalries  of  imperial  policy  between  two  great 
governments  each  of  which  was  seeking  overlordship  of  the  lands  that  had  once 
constituted  European  Turkey. 

The  Turkish  Empire  at  the  time  of  its  greatest  extent  had  held  in  subjec- 
tion various  lands  and  nationahties  of  southeastern  Europe,  western  Asia,  and 
northern  Africa.  The  forces  of  progress  that  became  so  accelerated  with  the 
revolutionary  period  at  the  end  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  came  to  the  aid  of 
the  western  nations  as  against  the  decayed  despotism  of  Turkey.  Greece, 
Serbia,  Roumania,  and  Bulgaria  emerged  as  European  peoples  and  began  to 
struggle  for  boundaries,  for  seaports,  for  future  security,  as  their  people  became 
intelligent  and  infused  with  an  intense  spirit  of  national  ambition. 

Inevitably  Turkish  authority  was  superseded  in  Egypt  and  the  Barbary 
States,  through  the  commercial  and  colonizing  energy  of  the  western  European 
powers.  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  increasingly  convinced  that  in 
the  further  disintegration  of  the  old  Turkish  Empire  they  must  be  recognized 
in  an  exceptional  way  and  must  be  allowed  by  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and 
France  to  acquire  an  undisputed  influence  from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Not  only  was  Turkey  collapsing,  but  Persia  had  become  subject  to  the  com- 
mercial energy  and  political  influence  of  the  European  empires,  Russia  and 
England  having  substituted  spheres  of  Persian  influence  for  what  at  one  time 
had  seemed  a  dangerous  competition.  Germany's  capacity,  meanwhile,  for 
taking  a  large  part  in  the  commercial  and  economic  development  of  the  world, 
was  increasing  more  rapidly  than  that  of  any  other  European  nation.  With 
this  growth  of  capacity,  as  I  have  already  explained,  came  the  increasing  need 
of  markets.  German  advance  agents  saw  in  the  undeveloped  regions  of  Asi- 
atic Turkey,  and  beyond,  a  great  opportunity  for  obtaining  many  products  and 
materials  needed  in  Germany,  with  the  prospective  opportunity  of  developing 
in  those  regions  a  large  and  permanent  market  for  German  wares.  The  Bag- 
dad Railroad  was  projected  as  a  part  of  a  much  larger  scheme. 

In  furtherance  of  this  larger  ambition  for  an  economic  and  political  con- 
federation extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  German  diplo- 
matic and  military  influence  had  for  a  long  time  been  at  work  in  Constanti- 
nople to  gain  a  dominating  place  in  the  councils  of  the  Turkish  Government. 


xxxvi  INTRODUCTION 

The  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary  was  a  necessary  part  of  the  great  project. 
It  was  further  needful  for  Germany  that  Austrian  rather  than  Russian  influ- 
ences should  guide  the  destinies  of  the  smaller  Balkan  states  which  lay  between 
the  Teutonic  empires  and  the  Turkish  domains. 

The  importance  of  the  Balkan  and  Turkish  struggles  of  recent  years,  and 
of  the  bitter  feud  between  Austria  and  Serbia  over  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
by  the  Vienna  government,  can  only  be  understood  when  one  has  in  mind  the 
great  projects  upon  which  German  policy  was  embarked.  Austria  had  made  a 
bitter  enemy  of  Serbia  when  she  had  destroyed  that  dream  of  a  "greater 
Serbia"  which  required  Bosnia  and  a  part  of  the  Adriatic  coast  for  its  principal 
fulfillment.  The  assassination  of  the  heir  to  the  Hapsburg  throne  gave  Austria 
her  pretext  for  an  attack  that  was  expected  to  secure  control  of  necessary  river 
and  rail  routes  to  Turkey.  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  her  dream  of  con- 
trol at  Constantinople  endangered,  together  with  her  plans  for  further  "peace- 
ful penetration"  of  Persia  and  of  the  Turkish  provinces  south  of  the  Black 
Sea. 

Germany  was  prepared  to  support  Austria  to  the  utmost,  while  Russia 
felt  herself  compelled  to  take  the  field  on  behalf  of  Serbia.  It  was  fully  realized 
by  Germany  that  France  must  support  Russia.  It  was  not  believed  in  Ger- 
many that  Great  Britain  would  be  involved,  and  it  was  expected  that  Italy 
would  remain  neutral  while  perhaps  rendering  a  certain  amount  of  moral  aid 
to  her  allies,  Germany  and  Austria.  The  British  on  their  part  had  not  foreseen 
the  danger,  and  were  quite  unprepared.  The  critical  condition  of  the  Irish 
question  rendered  it  the  more  certain  from  Germany's  standpoint  that  Eng- 
land could  not  bring  military  aid  to  France.  Russia  had  entered  upon  large 
plans  of  military  preparation,  but  these  were  not  to  culminate  for  two  or  three 
years.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  had  immensely  increased  and  strengthened 
her  war  machine  several  years  before. 

From  the  German  standpoint,  the  fateful  hour  had  arrived.  Germany  had 
full  equipment  for  at  least  five  times  as  large  an  army  as  Russia  could  at  once 
supply  with  arms  and  munitions.  Austria-Hungary  might  be  regarded  as 
almost,  if  not  quite,  able  to  cope  with  Russia,  while  Germany,  moving  swiftly 
against  France,  could  bring  the  entire  war  to  an  end  within  a  few  weeks — prob- 
ably by  October  and  certainly  before  Christmas,  1914. 

The  boundary-line  between  Germany  and  France  was  barely  two  hundred 
miles  long,  extending  from  Belgium  to  Switzerland  along  the  border  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  This  stretch  of  boundary  was  strongly  fortified  on  both  sides.  The 
easiest  way  to  France  from  the  southern  parts  of  Germany  and  from  Austria 
was  through  the  edge  of  Switzerland.  The  easiest  way  to  France  from  central 
and  northern  Germany  was  across  Belgium.  But  Belgium  had,  for  the  greater 
part  of  a  century,  been  under  the  protection  of  a  solemn  guarantee  of  neutrahty 
signed  in  successive  treaties,  Germany,  France,  and  Great  Britain  being  parties 


INTRODUCTION  xxxvii 

to  the  agreement.  France  was  not  prepared  for  an  attack  by  way  of  Belgium; 
and  the  German  law  of  "military  necessity"  prescribed  an  attack  upon  your 
enemy  by  the  path  which  your  enemy  has  left  unguarded,  despite  treaties. 

In  choosing  this  path,  Germany  failed  to  understand  the  Belgians  them- 
selves. It  was  expected  that  they  would  protest,  but  it  was  not  expected  that 
they  could  make  war.  Germany  had  expected  to  use  Belgian  railways  and 
highways  so  swiftly  as  to  make  it  certain  that  there  could  be  no  advance  of  the 
French  forces  to  make  formidable  resistance  until  the  German  armies  were 
moving  upon  Paris.  Belgium  was  to  be  fully  indemnified  and  rewarded  for 
having  suffered  under  duress  the  passage  of  the  German  forces. 

An  even  greater  mistake  of  calculation  was  Germany's  confidence  in  the 
inability  of  the  government  and  people  of  Great  Britain  to  drop  the  Irish  ques- 
tion and  unite  in  supporting  a  declaration  of  war.  Belgium's  resistance  had 
delayed  the  movement  of  the  great  German  war  machine,  and  had  given  the 
French  time  to  save  Paris  while  the  Russians  were  invading  East  Prussia.  The 
British,  meanwhile,  were  coming  resolutely  to  the  aid  of  the  French  army; 
and  what  was  to  have  been  a  short  war  was  inevitably  changed  to  a  long 
one.  What  was  to  have  been  a  single  brilliant  campaign,  with  peace  terms 
based  upon  unqualified  victory,  had  been  of  necessity  transformed  into  a  su- 
preme struggle  of  years,  destined  to  involve  the  whole  world  for  reasons  not  so 
much  of  sheer  material  force  as  of  moral  conviction. 

IV 

In  these  introductory  observations,  I  am  not  anticipating  the  great  narra- 
tive that  will  be  found  so  well  related  by  Mr.  Simonds  in  the  chapters  and  vol- 
umes that  are  herewith  presented.  I  am  dealing,  rather,  with  some  of  the  under- 
lying causes  of  the  conflict  and  with  some  of  the  principles  involved  as  bearing 
not  only  upon  the  conditions  that  I  have  already  endeavoured  to  describe,  but 
also  upon  the  further  progress  of  human  society.  It  was  not  at  first  so  clearly 
a  war  of  principles.  Opposing  doctrines  were  not  so  sharply  in  conflict  as  to 
be  clearly  seen  through  all  the  complicated  factors  that  had  entered  into  the 
struggle  in  such  fashion  as  to  confuse  the  underlying  issues.  Gradually  it 
was  seen  that  this  was  a  war  to  bring  harmony  into  the  world  on  principles 
of  justice  and  freedom,  and  to  create  an  organization  of  the  world's  public  opin- 
ion that  should  be  stronger  for  peace  and  order  than  any  single  empire  or  alli- 
ance could  be  for  attaining  its  ends  through  military  power. 

The  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia  had  been  harsh  and  peremptory  beyond 
all  modern  precedents.  Its  principal  objects  and  aims  were  unquestionably 
supported  at  Berlin,  regardless  of  the  details.  The  thing  intended  was  to 
bring  Serbia  under  the  sway  of  the  allied  Teutonic  powers.  Not  only  must 
Austria's  annexation  of  Bosnia  no  longer  be  questioned,  but  Serbia  herself 
must  become  a  vassal  state,  or  ultimately  a  portion  of  a  South-Slav  member  of 


xxxviii  INTRODUCTION 

the  Austro-Hungarian  confederation.  If  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  had  been 
accepted  in  full,  Serbia  would  have  yielded  up  certain  attributes  of  independ- 
ence and  sovereignty  that  Austrian  and  German  policy  would  never  have 
allowed  her  to  recover.  Her  answer  had  to  be  made  very  quickly  by  the 
terms  of  the  ultimatum.  She  must  yield  without  resistance,  or  she  must  make 
a  stand  for  her  own  distinct  future  and  for  the  rights  of  small  nationalities. 

If  Serbia  had  yielded,  the  pretexts  for  an  immediate  war  would  have  been 
removed;  the  projects  of  political  and  economic  assimilation  throughout  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey  would  have  been  pressed  forward  by  the  Teutonic  Empires 
and  tremendous  preparations  would  have  been  made  on  both  sides  for  the 
great  postponed  European  war,  that  should  determine  whether  Russian  or  Ger- 
man influences  were  to  become  predominant  in  southeastern  Europe  and 
western  Asia. 

If  under  England's  leadership  the  issues  between  Austria  and  Serbia  could 
have  been  referred  to  the  Hague  Tribunal  for  settlement,  the  immediate  peace 
might  have  been  preserved.  Furthermore,  it  was  the  hope  of  the  friends  of 
peace  throughout  the  world  that  with  every  postponement  of  war  the  influences 
and  forces  that  were  trying  to  build  up  international  methods  for  preventing 
conflict  would  gain  strength,  so  that  the  truce  maintained  by  the  "balance  of 
power"  might  by  degrees  become  transformed  into  an  assured  and  constructive 
peace  based  upon  world  organization. 

This  desired  transition,  however,  was  not  destined  to  come  about.  Even 
the  non-aggressive  nations  were  reluctant  to  trust  their  destinies  to  an  untried 
kind  of  world  union  for  peace-keeping  and  common  humanitarian  ends.  They 
were  living  in  a  world  that  had  been  transformed  by  modern  science,  industry, 
commerce,  and  education,  while  dangerously  obsolete  in  its  political  structure. 

Germany  had  not  become  formidable  through  her  martial  spirit  and  prowess 
alone,  nor  alone  through  her  expansion  of  industry  at  home  and  of  trade  abroad. 
Her  power  had  been  developed  through  the  marvellous  union  of  these  two 
things.  With  the  growth  of  her  power,  her  world  ambition  had  become  more 
far-reaching  and  more  daring.  And  she  had  come  to  believe  that  she  was  being 
deprived  by  other  ambitious  nations  and  races  of  opportunities  in  the  world 
justly  commensurate  with  her  extraordinary  attainments  in  education,  science, 
industry,  and  social  order. 

Nations  and  races  that  had  believed  they  could  make  better  use  of  lands, 
resources,  and  facilities,  than  others  in  possession,  have  in  all  recorded  time 
persuaded  themselves  that  they  are  justified  in  using  power  to  attain  their 
ends,  believing  that  ultimate  results  will  give  historic  vindication.  Thus  the 
European  colonists  dispossessed  the  aboriginal  races  of  North  and  South 
America.  And  thus  the  European  governments  have  partitioned  Africa  among 
themselves,  while  at  times  menacing  the  integrity  of  China  and  laying  hands 
upon  whatsoever  portions  of  Asia  they  could  secure  by  one  means  or  another. 


INTRODUCTION  xxxix 

Germany's  belated  arrival  as  an  aspirant  for  world  empire  was  attended 
with  the  highest  degree  of  moral  and  physical  preparation  for  the  unrestrained 
use  of  force  in  the  attainment  of  objects  that  the  world  had  known  in  recent 
times.  Only  two  remedies  for  this  condition  were  possible;  and  neither  could 
be  applied  quickly  or  peaceably.  One  possible  remedy  lay  within  the  Ger- 
man nation  itself,  and  this  could  have  come  about  only  by  a  social  revolution. 

The  vast  military  machine  was  not  to  be  rendered  meekly  subordinate  to  a 
civilian  society  led  by  Social  Democrats  like  Liebknecht.  The  army  and 
navy — that  is  to  say,  the  immense  body  of  professional  officers — had  joined 
hands  with  the  great  captains  of  industry  and  of  commerce  to  gain  control 
of  the  German  mind  and  to  shape  German  policy.  The  older  publicists  of 
Germany  were  forgotten.  The  universities  and  technical  schools  were  now 
controlled  by  the  exponents  of  the  new  doctrines  of  German  destiny  and  su- 
premacy. German  nationalism  had  grown  into  German  imperialism;  and  the 
idea  of  leadership  in  central  Europe  had  expanded  to  the  principle  of  leader- 
ship throughout  the  world.  There  was  no  counteracting  sentiment  in  Germany 
of  sufficient  strength  to  bring  about  a  rejection  of  these  views  and  policies. 

The  other  remedy,  outside  of  Germany,  was  almost  equally  impossible. 
NationaHsm  had  also  been  assertive  in  other  lands;  and  imperialism  had  in- 
fected national  policy  elsewhere  than  in  Germany,  even  if  in  lesser  degrees. 

The  doctrines  and  policies  of  Mr.  Cecil  Rhodes,  who  believed  profoundly 
in  the  value  to  backward  regions  of  British  regulation  and  British  justice, 
have  been  discussed  throughout  His  Majesty's  realms  with  entire  freedom 
and  candour.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  the  South  African  War  and  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  two  small  Boer  Republics,  taken  together  with  Mr.  Chamberlain's 
plans  for  imperial  federation  involving  preferential  tariffs,  had  a  great  influ- 
ence upon  the  German  mind. 

As  a  sequel  to  the  Boer  War,  there  came  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  with  a 
constitution  of  the  most  hberal  kind  under  which  the  Boers  were  given  every 
opportunity  for  self-determined  progress  that  reasonable  men  could  desire. 
No  finer  tributes,  whether  in  action  or  in  word,  have  ever  been  paid  by  de- 
feated leaders  to  their  conquerors  than  those  that  the  Boer  generals  Botha 
and  Smuts  have  paid  during  the  recent  war  period  in  which  they  have  rendered 
such  conspicuous  service  to  the  British  cause. 

Germany  could  not,  or  would  not,  understand.  Through  a  long  term  of 
years,  Mr.  Campbell-Bannerman  as  Premier,  then  Mr.  Asquith,  and  at  length 
Mr.  Lloyd-George  himself,  with  Foreign  Ministers  like  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
had  represented  an  England  that  stood  for  democracy  at  home  and  abroad 
and  that  held  out  the  olive  branch  to  all  nations — not  the  least  to  Germany 
— in  the  desire  for  a  world  of  harmony  along  lines  of  justice,  progress,  and 
good  understanding. 

I  might  continue  with  further  allusions  to  the  growth  in  colonial  empire 


xl  INTRODUCTION 

of  the  French  Republic,  so  bitterly  resented  by  Germany  and  so  much  con- 
tributing to  that  crystallization  of  German  policy  that  I  have  already  char- 
acterized. Within  the  volurries  to  which  these  observations  of  mine  are  intro- 
ductory, will  be  found  a  chapter  explaining  the  growth  of  the  greater  France 
in  Asia  and  Africa  and  its  status  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  of  1914.  I  might 
also  allude  to  the  process  of  Russification  that  had  been  sweeping  over  vast 
areas  in  central  Asia,  extending  southward  through  Persia  and  Mesopotamia, 
and  embracing  MongoHa  and  much  of  Manchuria.  A  conspectus  of  the 
growth  of  the  Russian  Empire  as  it  stood  in  1914  will  also  be  given  for  con- 
venient reference  in  these  volumes.  It  is  enough  for  me  to  remark  that  Rus- 
sia's power  to  acquire  political  control  over  Asiatic  regions  and  to  assimilate 
Asiatic  peoples  had  aroused  the  attention  of  all  intelligent  observers,  and  had 
led  Germany  and  Austria  to  look  forward  with  no  little  anxiety  to  a  time 
v/hen  Russia's  abiHty  to  put  twenty  million  or  thirty  million  men  in  the  field 
might  be  attended  by  a  corresponding  ability  to  equip  such  vast  armies  with 
the  necessary  arms  and  munitions,  and  to  maintain  them  on  southern  and 
western  fighting  fronts. 

The  example  of  the  United  States  in  expelling  Spain  from  Cuba,  Porto 
Rico,  and  the  Philippines,  and  in  acquiring  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  had  been 
used  in  Germany  in  a  manner  that  wholly  failed  to  recognize  the  motives, 
methods,  and  objects  of  the  American  people.  Germany  had  regarded  the 
United  States  as,  like  herself,  one  of  the  newer  industrial  nations,  with  an  in- 
evitable tendency  toward  economic  and  political  expansion.  Germany,  on  her 
own  part,  had  desired  to  acquire  the  Philippines,  and  had  looked  forward  to 
obtaining  bases  in  the  West  Indies  and  colonies,  perchance,  on  the  mainland 
of  South  America. 

Democracy  in  America,  like  democracy  in  England,  was  fully  able  to  check 
imperialism  and  to  transform  the  doctrines  of  possession  and  exploitation  into 
those  of  guardianship  and  tutelage.  American  sentiment  had  become  almost 
too  eager  to  cut  the  Philippines  adrift.  The  efforts  of  the  United  States  to 
create  a  system  of  education  in  the  Philippines,  to  reform  agriculture,  to  estab- 
lish security  and  justice  in  the  daily  affairs  of  life,  to  train  the  people  in  local 
self-government,  and  to  give  them  political  institutions  for  permanent  insular 
self-rule,  had  been  remarkably  successful. 

But  Germany  could  only  see  that  the  United  States  was  attaining  a  posi- 
tion of  larger  influence  and  scope  in  the  outer  world,  at  a  time  when  the  south- 
ern and  western  parts  of  the  American  republic,  together  with  Alaska,  still 
afforded  ample  opportunity  for  the  growth  of  population  and  the  development 
of  resources.  Germany,  with  a  greatly  restricted  home  area,  was  second  to 
the  United  States  alone  in  the  volume  of  her  industry,  and  ahead  of  the 
United  States  in  some  forms  of  manufacture  and  commerce.  Furthermore, 
Germany   had    seen    the   United    States   fortify   as  well   as   construct  the 


INTRODUCTION,  xli 

Panama  Canal,  acquiring  dominant  influence  in  Central  America  and  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  while  England  had  been  constantly  strengthening  her  naval 
and  political  authority  along  the  Suez  route,  in  the  Red  Sea,  in  Egypt,  and  in 
Persia. 

V 

Such  was  the  world  in  which  Germany  felt  it  necessary  to  make  her  way, 
first  by  an  unexampled  training  of  her  people  and  development  of  her  industry 
and  commerce,  and  second  by  devising  a  wholly  unexampled  convertibility  of 
human  and  industrial  resources  into  the  instrumentalities  of  war.  Democratic 
transformation  from  within  was  impossible  under  these  conditions.  Was  it 
possible,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  democracies  of  England,  America,  and 
France  to  have  taken  Germany  so  freely  and  generously  into  a  partnership 
for  developing  the  resources  and  trade  of  the  world — while  restricting  land  and 
sea  armaments  and  organizing  the  nations  for  peace — as  to  have  won  the  great 
victory  for  civilization?  The  essential  factors  of  progress  characterizing  the 
Nineteenth  and  Twentieth  centuries  had  been  international,  and  therefore  in- 
divisible by  poHtical  boundaries.  Could  the  rivalries  of  the  nations  have 
been  modified,  and  the  dangers  of  nationalism  gradually  reduced  and  removed, 
if  America,  Great  Britain,  and  France  had  set  more  consistent  examples.?  I 
believe  the  records  will  show  that  each  of  these  three  great  countries  had 
actually  endeavoured  to  do  full  justice  to  Germany  in  every  respect. 

Mighty  as  the  economic  progress  of  the  world  has  been  through  the  appli- 
cation of  steam  and  electricity  to  industry,  the  discoveries  of  chemistry,  and  the 
use  of  railroads  and  steamships,  by  far  the  greater  advancement  has  come 
about  through  intellectual  and  spiritual  changes.  Serfs  have  been  made  into 
freemen.  Margins  of  leisure  have  been  earned  for  countless  millions  by  the 
increase  of  abundance  and  the  gradual  extinction  of  poverty.  The  press,  based 
upon  the  universal  practice  of  reading  and  writing  and  the  growth  of  public 
opinion,  has  intensified  the  nationahstic  sentiment  because  it  has  made  of  the 
local  idiom  or  vernacular  the  chief  agency  of  enlightenment  and  progress. 

In  such  a  period  of  awakened  nationaUsm  and  race  consciousness,  the 
principal  safeguard  against  dangerous  and  devastating  conflicts  lay  in  the 
apphcatlon  to  actual  fife  everywhere  of  the  doctrines  of  Hberty  and  democracy. 
When  freedom  and  equality  had  been  established  among  the  inhabitants  of  a 
given  locality,  and  among  the  peoples  using  a  common  tongue  and  inhabiting 
a  national  area,  it  became  increasingly  probable  that  a  democracy  thus 
grounded  in  the  doctrine  of  human  rights  would  not  maintain  a  governmental 
policy  that  looked  toward  the  permanent  subjection  of  other  races  or  peoples. 
Unfortunately,  governmental  autocracy  had  survived  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  of  1914,  to  a  far  greater  degree  in  some  countries  and  empires  than  In 
others.  In  this  obvious  historical  fact  lies  the  answer  to  the  question  I  have 
proposed. 


xlii  INTRODUCTION 

The  great  conflict  seemed  inevitable,  in  order  that  its  reactions  might 
bring  about  a  much  larger  development  of  democracy  within  certain  countries, 
while  hastening  the  revision  of  imperial  policies  as  regards  certain  other  coun- 
tries that  were  already  democratic  in  many  essential  aspects.  Germany  had 
been  disappointed  in  the  recent  diplomacy  that  had  helped  to  shape  the  course 
of  things  in  Africa  from  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  to  the  Mediterranean.  She 
had  not  been  appeased  by  the  political  development,  during  the  previous 
twenty  years,  of  afi^airs  in  the  Pacific  and  the  South  Seas,  nor  of  affairs  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  The  course  of  events  in  central  Asia  and  in  the  Far 
East  had  not  encouraged  her  to  believe  that  as  against  Russia,  Japan,  Eng- 
land, and  France  she  could  very  rapidly  gain  a  position  of  superiority. 

Thus  she  became  forced  by  the  logic  of  facts  to  encourage  Russia's  ambi- 
tions in  the  Far  East,  in  order  to  divert  Russian  energy  from  southeastern 
Europe  and  Turkey.  While  continuing  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  build  a  fleet 
that  might  in  some  juncture  enable  her  to  try  issues  with  Great  Britain,  Ger- 
many became  more  fully  convinced  that  her  immediate  future  must  be  de- 
voted to  strengthening  her  relations  with  her  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  and  to 
obtaining  economic  and  political  ascendancy  throughout  the  Turkish  Empire. 
Thus  it  became  her  immediate  object  to  consolidate  her  power  on  inner  lines, 
penetrating  Asia  by  railways,  and  building  up  an  empire  that  should  not  be 
dependent  for  its  maintenance  upon  the  security  of  navigation. 

The  precipitation  of  world  war  through  the  attack  upon  Serbia  might  have 
produced  a  more  profound  shock  everywhere  if  its  success  had  not  been  de- 
layed by  the  exertions  of  the  Serbians  themselves  and  the  swift  mobilization 
of  Russia.  If  Germany  had  not  become  so  completely  the  victim  of  her  own 
doctrine  of  power  and  of  success  through  any  means  to  attain  ends,  she  would 
not  have  tried  to  reach  Paris  by  way  of  Belgium.  If  she  had  been  faithful  to 
her  joint  guarantees  of  Belgian  neutrality,  and  had  merely  resisted  French  in- 
vasion along  the  Alsace-Lorraine  boundary,  while  using  her  supreme  initiative 
to  help  Austria  against  Serbia  and  Russia,  the  immediate  course  of  his- 
tory would  have  been  greatly  changed.  It  is  at  least  possible  that  England 
may  have  entered  the  conflict  too  late.  It  would  seem  that  Austrian  policy 
must  have  prevailed  in  Serbia  and  the  Balkans.  Russia  could  not  have 
stood  out  against  Germany;  Italy  could  not  have  become  involved  in  the 
war;  France  could  hardly  have  sustained  such  temporary  advances  as  she 
might  have  made  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 

But  the  major  conflict  would  have  been  merely  postponed.  France,  Rus- 
sia, and  England  would  have  been  obliged  to  make  enlarged  military  and  naval 
preparations.  Italy  would  have  been  compelled  to  reconsider  her  associations, 
and  would  probably  have  severed  her  connection  with  the  Teutonic  Empires 
and  joined  the  Anglo-French  entente.  Germany  felt  that  her  chances  were 
better  in  1914  than  in  a  postponed  world  struggle.     She  knew  the  exact  status 


INTRODUCTION  xliii 

of  every  army  and  navy  in  the  world.  The  only  thing  she  did  not  understand 
was  the  spirit  and  temper  of  the  small  nations  with  their  own  intense  national- 
ism, and  of  the  large  democracies  with  their  determination  to  have  a  world 
of  safety  and  peace. 

VI 

Germany's  trampling  upon  the  treaty  that  had  guaranteed  Belgium's  im^ 
munity  from  war  was  destined  to  become  the  keynote  of  the  world  struggle. 
Those  who  saw  deepest  into  the  situation  perceived  at  once  that  if  the  right 
of  Belgium  to  live  at  peace  and  determine  her  own  destiny  were  not  supported 
successfully,  there  could  remain  no  real  security  for  any  other  nation,  however 
large  and  wealthy,  unless  it  should  henceforth  espouse  militarism  as  com- 
pletely as  Germany  had  done. 

Why,  then,  did  not  the  whole  world  arise  at  once  in  stern  protest  on  behalf 
of  Belgium?  Why  did  not  all  neutrals  join  in  an  ultimatum  to  Germany? 
The  answer  is  not  difficult.  The  situation  seemed  to  be  wholly  European. 
America,  the  most  powerful  of  neutrals,  had  always  endeavoured  to  keep  aloof 
from  struggles  relating  to  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  Furthermore,  the 
processes  as  provided  for  in  advance  seemed  to  be  sufficient  for  the  crisis. 
Russia  and  France  were  already  fighting  Germany,  and  England,  as  the  re- 
maining guarantor  of  Belgium,  had  immediately  entered  the  struggle.  At  a 
later  period  it  became  clear  enough  that  all  neutrals  might  well  have  made  pro- 
test, and  might  indeed  well  have  contributed  of  their  men  and  their  resources 
to  help  Belgium  and  to  vindicate  the  rights  of  neutral  states  in  time  of  war. 
But  events  had  moved  swiftly,  and  there  was  no  voice  of  great  authority  in  the 
neutral  world  that  was  raised  in  potent  leadership.  Russia,  under  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas,  seemed  surprisingly  efficient,  while  the  battle  of  the  Marne 
was  regarded  in  England  and  France,  and  throughout  the  neutral  world, 
as  unquestionably  the  decisive  action  of  the  war,  which  must  culminate 
in  Germany's  humiliation  and  in  the  fixing  of  terms  of  peace  in  the  near 
future. 

There  was,  indeed,  the  growth  of  a  strong  opinion  against  Germany  because 
of  her  methods.  She  had  permitted,  probably  instigated,  the  attack  upon 
Serbia.  She  had  violated  the  rights  of  Belgium.  Though  not  organized  for 
united  action  or  for  common  expression,  there  was  such  a  thing  as  the  public 
opinion  of  the  civilized  world.  And  the  verdict  of  this  public  opinion  was 
against  Germany  for  her  choice  of  the  path  through  Belgium.  Belgium  might, 
indeed,  have  made  formal  protest,  declining  to  match  her  puny  strength  against 
Germany's  armed  hosts;  and  she  might  have  accepted  the  proffered  payments 
for  incidental  damage.  But  such  acceptance  would  have  made  her  the  per- 
manent vassal  of  Germany  in  case  the  war  had  not  ended  in  complete  German 
defeat.     And  if  Germany  had  been  defeated  Belgium  would  have  become  either 


xliv  INTRODUCTION 

a  vassal  of  France  or  an  outpost  of  England,  or  both.  Furthermore,  if  Bel- 
gium had  merely  protested  and  then  yielded,  the  future  of  Holland,  Switzer- 
land, and  Denmark  would  have  been  imperilled. 

Belgium's  heroic  resistance  was  made  for  the  liberties  of  all  those  smaller 
states  that  had  through  generations  of  national  life  vindicated  their  right  to 
exist  and  to  be  treated  with  respect.  Holland  and  Switzerland  armed  them- 
selves for  defense,  but  they,  too,  in  the  opening  campaigns,  regarded  the 
strength  of  the  great  powers  arrayed  against  Germany  as  sufficient,  especially 
after  Italy  had  entered  the  war;  and  so  they  remained  neutral  until  at  length 
their  positions  had  become  increasingly  difficult  and  it  had  become  too  late 
for  them  to  assume  belligerency.  Germany's  disregard  of  neutral  rights,  as 
shown  by  her  attack  upon  Belgium,  had  cost  her  the  support  of  the  world's 
enlightened  sentiment. 

She  brought  herself  under  further  condemnation  by  her  ruthless  methods 
in  warfare.  The  nature  of  her  conquest  and  occupation  of  Belgium  will  form 
the  subject  of  a  chapter  or  two  supplemental  to  Mr.  Simonds's  main  narrative 
in  these  volumes.  The  progress  of  civilization  had  gradually  evolved  many 
rules  of  conduct  and  relationship  affecting  both  times  of  peace  and  times  of 
war,  that  had  come  to  be  embodied  in  what  we  call  international  law.  Such 
rules  had  been  sanctioned  by  faithful  observance  in  many  cases  constituting 
established  precedents;  and  they  had  also  been  further  strengthened  by  being 
written  into  a  great  number  of  treaties  and  agreements  accepted  by  all  nations. 
To  limit  the  ravages  of  war,  rules  had  been  made  regarding  the  treatment  of  the 
inhabitants  of  occupied  districts.  Other  rules  had  related  to  the  care  of  the 
wounded  and  to  the  services  of  medical  relief.  There  were  rules  for  the  pro- 
tection of  unfortified  places  and  of  non-combatant  people  against  needless  in- 
jury of  persons  and  property. 

VII 

War  could  not  be  otherwise  than  terrible  and  ruthless;  yet  it  was  believed 
that  civilized  nations  were  ready  to  confine  its  worst  direct  ravages  to  com- 
batants and  fortifications.  It  was  believed  that  prisoners  of  war,  civiHans  in 
conquered  areas,  non-combatant  persons  on  the  highways  of  the  sea,  the 
agents  of  mercy  relieving  the  wounded  and  maintaining  ambulance  and  hos- 
pital services,  would  henceforth  be  treated  with  scrupulous  regard  for  accepted 
international  rules.  Again  Germany  illustrated  the  danger  to  the  modern 
world  of  an  unrestricted  appeal  to  force  for  the  attainment  of  national  ambi- 
tion, by  a  disregard,  in  many  instances,  of  the  humane  code  which  German 
publicists  themselves  in  times  past  had  helped  to  formulate. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  speak  in  any  detail  of  atrocities  charged  against 
Germany  in  her  treatment  of  the  populations  of  Belgium  and  northern  France, 
nor  of  the  vandalism  proved  against  her  as  respects  monuments  of  architecture 


INTRODUCTION  xlv 

and  the  private  property  of  civilized  peoples.  This  subject  also  will  be  duly 
presented  in  these  volumes.  Nor  is  it  my  purpose  here  to  make  an  indictment 
of  Germany  for  her  terrifying  air  raids  upon  peaceful  places  in  England,  or  for 
her  other  shocking  violations  of  international  law  in  her  methods  of  war- 
fare. My  object  is  to  show  that,  quite  regardless  of  the  temptation  or  the 
provocation,  the  ruthlessness  and  frightfulness  of  Germany's  warfare 
alarmed  and  aroused  the  entire  civilized  world.  In  degree  at  least  this  was 
proving  itself  to  be  wholly  unlike  any  other  war.  Civilization  was  assaulted 
in  the  ^use  'of  methods  that  all  civilized  nations  had  solemnly  agreed  not  to 
employ. 

These  forbidden  methods  employed  by  Germany  to  wear  out  her  opponents 
and  turn  a  threatened  defeat  into  a  deadlock  or  a  partial  victory,  found  their 
climax  not — as  had  at  first  been  expected — in  the  use  of  the  Zeppelin  aircraft, 
but  in  the  use  of  submarines  against  the  world's  merchant  shipping.  England 
had  entered  the  war  with  a  vast  navy,  but  with  a  very  small  army.  She  had 
used  her  navy  to  drive  German  merchant  shipping  from  the  seas  and  to 
"  bottle  up  "  the  German  navy  itself  in  the  German  harbours.  Quickly  gaining 
full  control  of  the  ocean  highways  of  trade,  England,  with  the  consent  and  as- 
sistance of  France,  determined  to  make  the  largest  possible  use  against  Ger- 
many of  the  means  at  her  command.  Germany  was  carrying  on  a  vast  com- 
merce in  all  the  ports  of  the  world.  And  her  own  ports  were  visited  by  thou- 
sands of  neutral  ships. 

Though  England  was  not  prepared  for  war  with  large  land  forces,  her 
navy  was  ready  and  it  was  decided  by  the  British  Government  that  Germany 
must  derive  no  military  benefit  from  imports  by  way  of  the  high  seas.  So  far 
as  contraband  articles  were  concerned,  there  was  no  question  of  Britain's  right 
to  interfere  with  neutral  traffic  for  Germany's  benefit.  There  arose,  however, 
certain  questions  of  construction  as  regards  the  application  of  the  principles  of 
contraband  to  food  and  materials  alleged  to  be  for  civilian  use.  There  also 
arose  questions  regarding  the  principles  and  methods  of  blockade.  For  a 
considerable  time  the  United  States  Government,  in  diplomatic  notes  ex- 
changed with  Great  Britain,  took  the  ground  that  the  Orders  in  Council  went 
beyond  the  bounds  of  international  law  as  previously  recognized.  Great 
Britain,  however,  held  firmly  and  resolutely  to  her  positions,  and  the  United 
States  took  no  steps  beyond  the  filing  of  legal  arguments  which  might  have 
a  certain  bearing  upon  the  subsequent  settlement  of  claims.  Fundamentally, 
Germany  had  adopted  the  methods  of  an  outlaw  on  land  and  of  a  pirate 
at  sea,  and  Great  Britain  made  her  appeal  to  the  common  opinion  of  man- 
kind. 

It  is  true  that  Germany's  submarine  policy  purported  to  be  one  of  reprisal. 
The  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  with  hundreds  of  women  and  children  on  board, 
was  one  of  the  most  abhorrent  crimes  in  all  the  annals  of  warfare.     Such  an 


xlvi  INTRODUCTION 

act  bore  no  relation  to  anything  that  could  have  been  recognized  in  inter- 
national law  as  within  the  sphere  of  retaliation.  As  a  result  of  the  diplomatic 
controversy  that  ensued,  Germany  changed  her  submarine  methods,  and  the 
United  States  postponed  belligerent  action.  But  subsequent  events  indicated 
that  Germany  had  temporarily  modified  her  submarine  policy  chiefly  because 
she  had  found  that  it  was  not  sufficiently  effective.  In  the  first  place,  she 
did  not  wish  America  drawn  into  the  war;  and,  in  the  second  place,  she  desired 
to  build  a  great  many  more  submarines  in  order  ultimately  to  make  victorious 
use  of  that  dastardly  weapon.  When  subsequently  she  resumed  her  U-boat 
ravages  on  a  great  scale  and  with  results  that  for  a  time  were  gravely  menacing, 
the  United  States  was  compelled  to  enter  the  war.  Furthermore,  the  perspec- 
tives had  wholly  changed.  The  magnitude  of  Germany's  preparations  had 
become  more  evident.  It  was  seen  that  the  neutrals  also  had  been  in  real 
danger,  and  that  the  British  navy  had  represented  the  principles  of  justice  and 
security  on  the  oceans.  Under  these  conditions,  the  arguments  regarding  the 
earlier  British  Orders  in  Council  as  affecting  the  rights  of  neutrals  lost  their 
interest  and  importance  as  pertaining  to  the  major  facts  of  the  war,  and  re- 
mained merely  as  a  part  of  the  historical  record  for  students  of  maritime  in- 
ternaticnal  law. 

I  The  G'enr.ans  had  counted  upon  a  short  war,  and  after  two  years  they 
became  intensely  anxious  for  a  negotiated  peace  that  would  have  left  them 
V/ith  their  military  strength  intact  and  with  some  very  substantial  gains  es- 
pecially in  the  completeness  of  their  domination  over  the  Balkans  and  Turkey. 
The  Allies  were  not  willing  to  consider  any  such  compromises,  and  an  attempt 
on  Presiden*  Wibon's  part  to  bring  about  an  end  of  hostilities  by  mediation 
proved  to  be  unavailing.  It  was  plain  that  the  opposing  views  could  not  be 
reconciled. 

With  a  vastly  increased  fleet  of  standard-built  and  improved  submarines, 
to  which  new  boats  were  being  added  weekly,  Germany  decided  to  resume  her 
unrestricted  attack  upon  commerce,  and  declared  a  blockade  zone  around 
the  British  islands  and  the  Mediterranean  coasts  of  France  and  Italy.  It  was 
hoped  in  vain  by  Americans  that  Germany  would  modify  this  announced 
policy  before  putting  it  into  effect.  But  our  prompt  breaking  off  of  diplomatic 
relations,  as  a  first  step,  led  to  no  results.  Germany  did  not  believe  that  the 
United  States,  in  the  status  of  a  belligerent,  could  render  the  Allies  any  greater 
aid  than  she  was  already  rendering  them  in  sending  them  munitions  and 
supplies.  Germany  believed  that  if  she  could  greatly  check  this  flow  of  sup- 
plies to  England  and  France,  by  a  new  submarine  campaign  of  tenfold  greater 
efficiency  than  the  campaign  of  two  years  before,  she  might  hope  to  frighten 
neutral  ships  away  from  the  British  coasts  and  to  terrorize  England  into  a  will- 
ingness to  enter  a  peace  conference  in  the  course  of  the  summer  of  1917. 
This  determination  on  Germany's  part,  interpreted  logically,  seemed  to  be 


INTRODUCTION  xlvii 

equivalent  to  the  fixing  of  a  status  of  belligerency  as  between  Germany  and 
the  United  States.  President  Willson  so  regarded  it  and  declared  himself  to 
that  effect  in  a  message  to  Congress  on  April  2.  Four  days  later  America's 
transition  from  neutrality  to  belligerency  had  been  accomplished. 

Meanwhile,  the  war  itself  had  steadily  progressed  from  its  earlier  character 
and  objects,  to  a  struggle  in  which  the  security  and  the  future  of  all  nations, 
in  all  parts  of  the  world,  were  clearly  concerned.  Two  or  three  years  had  not 
sufficed  to  transform  equivalent  numbers  of  people  in  other  industrial  countries 
into  military  organizations  capable  of  withstanding  the  superb  war  machine 
of  Germany.  And  while  the  Allied  nations  were  trying  to  prepare  themselves, 
Germany's  previous  preparation  was  shown  to  have  put  her  enemies  at  a  deadly 
disadvantage.  If  Germany  could  not  win  a  clear  and  decided  victory,  neither 
could  France  and  England,  except  by  unspeakable  sacrifices  and  with  ever- 
increasing  aid  and  support  from  the  rest  of  the  world. 

This  situation  had  become  intensified  in  its  dangers,  through  the  failure  of 
Russia  to  meet  the  early  expectations  of  France  and  Great  Britain.  Ger- 
many understood  the  Russian  situation  far  better  than  did  Russia's  alHes. 
There  were  dynastic  and  political  influences  in  Russia  relatively  favorable  to 
Germany,  and  in  any  case  opposed  to  a  prolonged  war.  At  a  time  when  Rus- 
sia's vigorous  action  was  most  needed,  on  the  east  front,  to  support  the  pre- 
dominance that  France  and  England  were  gaining  on  the  Hne  extending  across 
France  from  Flanders  to  Switzerland,  Russia  had  virtually  ceased  to  fight. 
Many  causes  that  for  a  time  will  remain  obscure  were  operating  in  Russia  to 
bring  about  stupendous  changes.  Revolutionary  movements  that  had  been 
arrested  after  the  war  with  Japan  now  began  to  assert  themselves  in  new  forms. 
The  world  was  startled  by  the  news  that  Petrograd  was  in  the  control  of  a  revo- 
lution which  the  army  had  joined,  that  the  Czar  had  been  forced  to  abdicate, 
and  that  a  provisional  government  was  in  temporary  authority. 

It  was  the  paralysis  of  Russia  for  all  immediate  aid  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  war  against  Germany,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  submarine  issue, 
that  compelled  the  United  States  to  enter  the  war.  The  history  of  the  sub- 
marine issue  was  such  as  to  lead  the  United  States,  on  behalf  of  all  neutrals, 
to  take  part  in  a  war  for  the  upholding  of  civilization.  The  failure  of  Russia 
to  develop  strength  in  what  had  been  her  own  war  against  the  Teutonic  Powers 
was  changing  the  issues,  so  that  the  world  was  entering  upon  a  war  for  demo- 
cratic freedom.  Not  to  have  supported  France  and  the  British  Empire 
might  have  made  possible  a  series  of  swift  disasters  by  reason  of  which  America 
would  have  become  deeply  involved  in  the  near  future.  This  would  have 
meant  extreme  danger  to  the  United  States,  with  almost  no  military  prepara- 
tion to  meet  such  danger,  and  with  no  strong  friends  capable  of  lending  a  help- 
ing hand. 

America  entered  the  war  primarily  to  defend  herself  in  a  situation  in  which 


xlviii  INTRODUCTION 

her  rights  were  involved  and  her  future  was  becoming  seriously  endangered. 
She  also  entered  it  in  support  of  the  rights  of  neutrals,  which  had  been  increas- 
ingly menaced  from  the  very  beginnings  of  the  conflict.  In  doing  this  she 
was  the  champion  of  all  neutrals,  and  was  without  qualification  entitled  to 
their  sympath}^  and  to  such  measure  of  their  physical  support  as  they  were  in 
position  to  render.  The  welfare  of  the  world  required  prompt  sacrifice  upon 
the  part  of  the  United  States,  in  the  interest  of  all  self-governing  nations,  and 
ultimately  in  the  interest  of  Germany  herself. 

The  nature  and  extent  of  the  part  that  America  was  to  play  in  the  war  could 
not  be  known  at  the  moment  when  the  fact  of  war  was  accepted.  Great 
Britain  and  France  had  been  making  very  large  purchases  of  military  and 
general  supplies  in  the  United  States,  and  it  was  immediately  arranged  to 
furnish  material  aid  in  the  form  of  large  financial  credits,  thus  making  it  possi- 
ble to  marshal  American  resources  of  food,  steel,  copper,  and  all  sorts  of  prod- 
ucts for  the  support  of  the  armies  that  were  already  in  the  field. 

The  American  Navy,  though  not  as  large  as  that  of  Germany  and  far 
smaller  than  that  of  Great  Britain,  was  of  the  very  best  quality;  and  it  was 
sent  at  once  to  support  the  Allies  in  the  deadly  struggle  against  the  German 
submarines.  Army  enlargement  by  volunteer  methods  soon  gave  way 
to  a  draft  system  that  ultimately  registered — inclusive  of  those  already  en- 
rolled as  members  of  the  armj^  and  navy — about  twenty-five  million  names. 
Armies  were  organized  and  trained  with  surprising  rapidity  in  great  camps,  and 
about  three  months  after  war  was  declared  American  troops  began  to  arrive  in 
Europe. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  Revolution,  from  which  at  first  the  Allies  had 
hoped  to  derive  military  benefit,  had  degenerated  into  socialistic  anarchy; 
and  Germany  had  secured  control  of  great  areas  formerly  belonging  to  Russia, 
sweeping  from  Finland  to  the  Black  and  Caspian  seas  and  including  also  the 
conquest  of  Rumania.  Great  masses  of  German  troops  had  been  released 
from  the  eastern  front  for  the  culminating  struggle  in  France.  British  and 
French  losses  through  1917  had  been  heavier  than  Americans  had  known; 
and  the  season  had  ended  with  a  great  reverse  to  the  Italian  army  that 
had  been  fighting  Austria.  American  forces  were  steadily  accumulating  in 
France,  with  a  view  to  giving  assistance  when  the  campaign  of  191 8  should 
open. 

An  unprecedented  attack  upon  the  British  lines  in  March  and  April,  191 8, 
followed  by  a  series  of  offensive  movements,  represented  the  high-water  mark 
of  German  military  power.  The  Channel  Ports  were  threatened,  and  Paris 
was  subjected  to  greater  peril  than  at  any  time  since  the  battle  of  the  Marne  in 
1914.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  arose  in  a  supreme  effort  to  help  meet  the  crisis.  The  Allies  united 
their  forces  under  the  leadership  of  Marshal  Foch;  ships  were  chartered  from 


INTRODUCTION  xHx 

the  ends  of  the  earth,  principally  from  the  British  merchant  marine;  American 
troops  began  to  cross  the  sea  through  submarine-infested  waters  at  the  rate 
of  300,000  a  month;  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  took  fresh  courage  as  America 
supplied  the  needed  reserves. 

And  so  the  tide  was  turned,  and  the  culmination  came  with  surprising 
rapidity.  The  surrender  of  Bulgaria  was  inevitably  followed  by  the  collapse 
and  withdrawal  of  Turkey.  Then  came  the  disintegration  of  Austria  and  the 
acceptance  of  an  armistice  by  the  authorities  of  Austria-Hungary  that  gave 
the  Allies  every  advantage  for  a  flank  attack  upon  Germany.  Meanwhile, 
the  British,  French,  and  American  armies  had  for  several  months  been  fighting 
a  continuous  battle — the  greatest  in  world  history — which  ended  in  complete 
victoiy  with  the  signing  of  the  armistice  of  November  11,  and  the  abdication 
of  the  German  Emperor. 

Not  only  had  the  aggressor  who  had  staked  everything  on  the  assertion  of 
force  been  humbled  and  subdued,  but  the  larger  principles  at  stake,  involving 
the  liberties  of  all  peoples,  had  been  fully  vindicated.  The  peace  that  was 
assured  by  the  signing  of  the  armistice  was  avowedly  conditioned  upon  a 
series  of  noble  principles  and  specific  aims  that  President  Wilson  had  set  forth, 
and  that  the  AUied  governments  in  conference  at  Versailles  had  made  their 
own.  It  was  agreed  that  the  common  efforts  of  the  Allies  and  America  were 
to  result  in  the  forming  of  a  society  of  nations  that  would  protect  each  self- 
governing  people  in  the  exercise  of  its  rightful  liberties,  and  would  end,  for 
this  century  at  least,  the  menace  of  militarism  and  autocracy. 

VIII 

Thus  our  history  of  the  war,  of  which  Mr.  Frank  H.  Simonds  is  the  author — 
being  supported  by  many  other  contributors  who  write  upon  various  topics  and 
episodes — recognizes  the  conflict  as  in  many  respects  the  greatest  turning  point 
in  human  history.  Histories  of  this  war  will  be  written,  we  may  believe,  from 
time  to  time  in  the  future,  and  men  will  be  writing  them  a  thousand  years 
hence.  Posterity  will  have  its  own  perspectives  and  make  its  own  estimates. 
But  contemporaries  may  also  make  valuable  surveys,  of  which  posterity  will 
gladly  avail  itself.  Events  have  crowded  one  another  with  such  bewildering 
and  tumultuous  speed  that  even  now  the  best-informed  minds  require  a  careful 
and  winnowed  narrative  in  order  to  hold  in  mind  the  events  of  each  half-year 
beginning  with  the  last  half  of  the  year  1914. 

Of  the  current  writers  upon  the  war  as  it  progressed,  no  one  in  America 
had  attained  such  eminence  as  Mr.  Frank  H.  Simonds.  Besides  his  constant 
newspaper  interpretations  of  the  military  and  political  aspects  of  the  war  from 
day  to  day  or  from  week  to  week,  he  had  become  even  more  widely  known 
through  his  extended  monthly  installments  of  current  war  history  which  he 
contributed  to  the  American  Review  of  Reviews.     He  had  not  been  content 


I  INTRODUCTION 

with  passing  judgments  upon  military  movements  or  events,  based  upon  the 
hmited  information  available  at  the  time,  but  he  insisted  upon  revising  his 
own  opinions  as  more  complete  knowledge  could  aid  in  forming  truer  esti- 
mates. He  did  not  hesitate,  at  risk  and  hardship,  to  visit  the  scenes  cf  war 
more  than  once,  where  he  studied  afresh  the  greatest  battles  which  dwarf  in 
m.agnitude  those  of  former  wars. 

This  history  of  the  war,  which  is  to  be  carried  through  a  series  of  volumes  of 
which  the  present  is  the  opening  one,  is  in  no  sense  a  re-publication  or  revision 
of  any  of  Mr.  Simonds's  previous  writings.  It  is,  rather,  a  completely  new 
presentation,  upon  a  scale  of  its  own,  based  upon  fresh  first-hand  study,  to- 
gether with  the  official  reports  and  the  various  writings  of  many  experts  and 
observers.  He  has  had  the  advantage  of  intimate  conversations  with  military 
leaders  at  the  French  and  British  fronts,  as  well  as  with  governmental  authori- 
ties at  Paris,  London,  Washington,  and  elsewhere. 

Through  his  lifetime  Mr.  Simonds  has  been  a  student  of  political  and 
military  history,  with  a  remarkable  aptitude  for  physical  geography  and  for 
topographical  conditions  as  affecting  military  campaigns.  He  had  studied  the 
Balkan  wars  by  personal  visitation,  so  that  when  the  attack  on  Serbia  was  made 
in  1914  he  was  already  possessed  of  exceptional  knowledge  of  the  complex  con- 
ditions in  southeastern  Europe,  He  had  long  been  a  close  student  of  the  mili- 
tary history  of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  of  the  Napoleonic 
campaigns,  and  his  acquaintance  with  the  wars  of  the  Bismarckian  period 
and  with  Russo-Japanese  military  and  political  affairs,  had  all  contributed  to 
his  preparation  for  an  intense  and  continuous  study  of  this  greatest  of  wars, 
from  its  first  movements  in  the  summer  of  1914.  The  intelligence  and  the 
brilliancy  of  his  work  were  immediately  recognized,  and  the  public's  confidence 
in  it  has  steadily  increased. 

Thus  I  may  express  the  assured  belief  that  the  history  of  the  great  war  as 
presented  in  Mr.  Simonds's  graphic  pages  will  prove  not  only  a  valuable  aid 
to  present-day  readers,  but  will  have  a  permanent  place  in  the  historical 
libraries,  to  be  consulted  for  many  decades  to  come.  Mr.  Simonds  is  not 
merely  a  military  historian,  but  he  has  also  a  profound  appreciation  of  the 
moral  issues  that  are  involved  in  the  struggles  between  nations  and  in  the 
political  problems  of  empires  and  democracies.  His  plans  for  the  full  work,  of 
which  this  is  the  initial  volume,  propose  to  carry  the  reader  through  the  mili- 
tary campaigns  to  the  broadening  aspects  of  the  struggle  as  it  involved  the 
world  at  large,  until  finally  there  had  arrived  the  period  of  settlement  and 
reconstruction. 

Each  volume  will  be  supplemented  by  the  briefer  work  of  many  special 
contributors,  and  will  be  embelHshed  with  numerous  photographic  illustrations. 
Already  the  inquiring  reader  must  turn  to  books  for  an  analysis  and  an  inter- 
pretation, as  well  as  for  a  narrative  account  of  the  earlier  period  of  the  war. 


INTRODUCTION  li 

Since  there  is  manifest  need  of  such  books,  it  is  desirable  that  the  reader  should 
be  able  to  secure  the  help  and  guidance  of  those  students  and  writers  who  are 
the  best  trained  and  the  most  competent.  By  an  almost  unanimous  consen- 
sus of  opinion,  such  students  and  writers  would  accord  Mr.  Simonds  not  only 
an  honoured  place  but  the  very  first  place  among  them  all. 


PART  ONE 
HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

BY 

FRANK  H.  SIMONDS 


CHAPTER  ONE 

THE  NEW  PHASE 

I 
RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT 

From  August,  1914,  to  the  closing  days  of  April,  1915,  the  history  of  the 
World  War  is  the  history  of  the  German  attack  upon  France  and  of  the 
consequence  of  the  failure  of  this  attack  in  that  great  battle  of  arrest,  the 
struggle  at  the  Mame.  The  gigantic  conflicts  in  France,  in  Belgium,  the 
struggles  in  Poland,  East  Prussia,  Galicia,  these  were  but  logical  con- 
sequences of  the  decision  of  the  German  General  Staff  to  stake  all,  risk  all, 
win  or  lose  all,  on  the  narrow  front  between  the  Straits  of  Dover  and  the 
Swiss  frontier. 

When  the  German  General  Staff  made  this  decision,  sweeping  away 
all  moral  and  political  considerations  involved  in  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality,  there  was  a  clear  perception  by  them  that  if  they  failed,  a 
thing  unthinkable  of  itself,  it  was  conceivable  that  Russia  would  destroy 
Austrian  military  power  and  in  addition  invade  East  Prussia.  Six 
weeks  of  immunity  from  attacks  in  the  east,  six  weeks  in  which  Paris 
might  be  taken  and  the  French  military  establishment  destroyed,  this 
was  the  calculation  of  the  German  military  power,  a  calculation  that  at 
moments  seemed  almost  realized,  but  in  the  end  escaped  all  realization, 
when  Kluck  turned  back  from  Paris  for  Soissons. 

Thenceforth  the  war  became  a  confused  and  involved  series  of  bat- 
tles, great  in  themselves  but  indecisive  in  their  character,  and  inex- 
plicable to  a  world  public  still  seeking  a  Sedan  or  a  Waterloo  and  far  from 
realizing  that  Europe  was  just  on  the  threshold  of  one  of  the  long  com- 
plicated wars,  in  which  exhaustion  rather  than  military  decision  might  in 
the  end  terminate  the  fighting. 

Actually,  what  occurred  in  these  months  is  unmistakable.  The  fail- 
ure of  Russia  at  Tannenberg  permitted  the  Germans  to  ignore  the  eastern 

3 


4  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

battle  ground  for  many  months,  the  lack  of  men  and  munitions  on  the 
part  of  the  French  and  of  the  British  enabled  the  Germans  to  seek  from 
October  to  December  to  reopen  the  decision  of  the  Marne.  But  in  the 
end  the  complete  breakdown  of  Austrian  military  power  under  Russian 
assault  necessitated  the  transfer  of  German  activity  to  the  east  and  Ger- 
many accepted  a  defensive  war  on  the  west,  while  she  sought,  first  to  re- 
organize Austrian  armies  and  then  to  dispose  of  Russia  as  decisively  as 
she  had  sought  to  dispose  of  France  in  the  Marne  campaign. 

This  is  the  story  of  the  eastern  campaign  from  December,  1914,  to 
the  autumn  of  the  following  year,  from  the  Battle  of  the  Dunajec  to  the 
escape  of  the  Russians  about  Vilna.  Germany  endeavoured  to  eliminate 
Russia  as  she  had  tried  to  dispose  of  France.  Austria's  necessities  com- 
pelled her  to  go  east  while  there  was  still  hope,  even  real  possibility,  of  a 
decision  in  the  west.  The  slender  force  that  held  the  Allied  line  in  Fland- 
ers was  all  but  blotted  out  when  Germany  at  last  gave  over  her  assaults 
at  the  Yser  and  about  Ypres.  The  British  army  had  not  been  broken, 
but  it  had  been  well-nigh  annihilated.  And  many  months  were  to  pass 
before  the  first  considerable  contributions  of  the  new  British  armies  were 
to  be  made  to  Field  Marshal  French's  skeleton  battalions. 

But  perforce  Germany  was  condemned  to  the  defensive  on  the  west 
and  in  Artois  in  May  and  June,  and  again  in  Champagne  and  Artois  in 
September,  she  had  to  endure  great  attacks,  which  all  but  opened  a  road 
through  her  trench  lines  and  nearly  brought  to  an  end  the  deadlock  in  the 
west.  Yet  in  the  end  her  lines  just  held,  her  troops  in  the  west  by  their 
tenacious  and  successful  defensive  enabled  those  in  the  east  to  win  the 
most  spectacular  European  victory  since  Sedan  and  to  conquer  more 
territory  than  had  fallen  to  victorious  European  armies  in  any  campaign 
since  the  days  of  the  great  Napoleon. 

Nor  was  this  all.  A  feeble  and  amateur  venture  into  higher  strategy 
on  the  part  of  the  Allies  at  Gallipoli,  the  eff^ort  to  prosecute  an  under- 
taking which  could  not  succeed  and  was  as  much  beyond  Allied  re- 
sources as  a  promenade  to  Berlin,  drew  German  attention  to  the  Balkans 
and  prompted  German  and  Austrian  commanders  to  resolve  on  a  cam- 
paign which  was  to  open  the  corridor  from  Berlin  to  Stamboul  and  to 


THE  NEW  PHASE  5 

Bagdad,  thus  consolidating  German  power  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Persian 
Gulf. 

Between  May-day,  1915,  and  New  Year's,  1916,  German  soldiers  were 
to  overturn  the  political  situation  of  Central  Europe  and  to  modify  the 
markings  of  the  map  as  only  the  soldiers  of  the  Revolution  and  the  First 
Empire  had  modified  them  in  the  thousand  years  separating  Otto  the 
Great  from  William  H.  Actually,  they  were  to  transfer  from  the  realm 
of  hope  and  dream  to  the  world  of  accomplished  fact  all  the  visions  and 
aspirations  of  those  German  patriots,  poets,  and  soldiers  who  had  longed 
to  see  the  restoration  of  the  ancient  German  Empire  of  the  remoter 
centuries. 

II.      MIDDLE  EUROPE 

In  this  new  phase  which  we  are  now  to  examine  we  are  to  see  the 
creation  of  one  more  of  those  mighty  empires  which  from  Charlemagne  to 
Napoleon  have  been  constructed  upon  the  soil  of  Old  Europe.  But  this 
new  empire  was  in  one  respect  markedly  different  from  all  that  had  pre- 
ceded since  the  days  of  Rome  itself.  It  was  not  primarily  built  about 
or  by  one  great  man.  William  II  was  neither  a  Napoleon  nor  a  Charle- 
magne. In  certain  respects,  indeed,  he  did  not  differ  from  the  least  of  his 
subjects — all  were  servants  and  workers  in  a  system  and  in  a  machine 
which  was  itself  the  genesis  of  this  new  empire. 

It  is  to  Rome  that  one  must  turn  for  a  parallel  to  this  new  German 
phenomenon  which  now  filled  Europe  and  carried  its  influence  to  the 
remotest  corners  of  the  world.  Before  the  war,  German  influence  in 
Constantinople  had  become  supreme.  When  Russia  turned  from  the 
Balkans  to  Asia  in  the  last  century,  the  British  had  ceased  to  concern 
themselves  with  the  Sublime  Porte;  they  had,  quite  unconsciously  to  be 
sure,  evacuated  Constantinople,  and  in  their  place  the  German  came. 
The  army  of  the  Osmanli  had  been  reorganized  by  the  soldiers  of  the 
Kaiser.  Far  down  in  Asia  Minor,  by  the  famous  Cilician  Gates  through 
which  Alexander  the  Great  had  passed  In  his  mighty  invasion,  German 
engineers  had  pushed  the  Bagdad  Railway,  which  was  first  to  enable 
German  civil  administrators  to  reorganize  Turkey  while  German  soldiers 
reconstituted  the  Turkish  army,  and  eventually  to  permit  a  German- 


6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

led  attack  upon  Egypt  from  Syria  and  upon  India  by  the  Persian  Gulf, 
along  the  road  trod  by  the  soldiers  of  Alexander. 

All  this  was  before  the  war.  When  the  war  came,  Turkey  responded 
to  German  impulse  and  the  Osmanli  entered  the  conflict  as  the  ally  of  the 
Teuton.  Even  more  impressive  was  the  penetration  of  Austria-Hungary 
by  the  German  influence.  Austro-Hungarian  military  power  had  been 
broken  at  Lemberg;  it  had  suff^ered  defeats  humiliating  and  complete  at 
the  hands  of  the  Serbs  on  two  fatal  fields.  Reorganized  in  part  by  the 
Germans,  Austrian  and  Hungarian  armies  had  gone  to  new  defeats  which 
lost  Galicia  well-nigh  completely  and  included  the  impressive  capitula- 
tion of  Przemysl,  where  an  army  almost  as  large  as  that  of  Napoleon  III 
at  Sedan,  laid  down  its  arms. 

It  was  then  that  Germany  was  led,  by  force  of  circumstances  but 
doubtless  with  a  full  recognition  of  the  ultimate  possibilities,  to  assume 
the  mastery  of  the  whole  military  establishment  of  Austria-Hungary. 
Austrian  generals  disappeared,  even  archdukes  vanished  or  accepted 
honorific  positions  which  only  partially  concealed  their  subservience  to 
German  generals. 

Austrian  armies  were  stiffened  by  German  contingents,  German  di- 
visions were  introduced  in  Austrian  armies,  and  the  interpenetration  ex- 
tended to  smaller  units.  Here,  in  a  restricted  period  of  time,  was  a  con- 
quest more  complete  than  had  been  expected  in  France  or  realized 
subsequently  in  Russia.  First  his  military  establishment  and  then  his 
political  independence,  so  far  as  the  making  of  war  policies  was  con- 
cerned, passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Austrian.  Vienna  gave  way  to 
Berlin;  Austrian  diplomacy,  like  Austrian  strategy,  was  made  in  Ger- 
many; and  Austrian  ambassadors  the  world  over,  and  conspicuously  in 
Washington,  became  only  the  agents  and  servants  of  German  policy. 

From  this  there  was  no  escape.  Under  the  assault  of  Russia,  Austria 
had  almost  collapsed.  Her  Slav  populations  had  disclosed  a  disloyalty 
which  threatened  extinction  of  Hapsburg  imperial  unity.  The  attack  of 
Italy,  soon  to  come,  was  to  open  one  more  deadly  peril.  Rumania,  still 
neutral,  continued  to  look  over  into  Hungarian  provinces  with  unmis- 
takably growing  appetite.     The  Austrian  German  and  the  Hungarian 


THE  NEW  PHASE  7 

Magyar,  the  elements  which  had  ruled  although  they  were  a  minority 
in  the  Austrian  Empire,  could  only  preserve  the  semblance  and  shadow 
of  their  ancient  power  by  the  aid  of  the  German,  and  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  German,  called  upon  to  make  greater  and  greater  contributions 
of  men  and  of  money  to  the  Austrian,  should  demand  the  right  to  super- 
vise the  expenditure  of  both. 

Thus,  in  the  period  between  the  Dunajec  and  Verdun,  we  are  to  see 
the  conquest  of  Austria  and  of  Hungary  by  the  German ;  peaceful,  logi- 
cal, ineluctable;  stirring  heartburnings  and  jealousies  in  Vienna  and  ap- 
prehensions in  Budapest,  but,  despite  all  this,  meeting  no  real  opposition 
since  none  was  possible,  for  if  the  eventual  extinction  of  Hapsburg  in- 
dependence was  plainly  forecast,  yet  to  resist  it  was  to  invite  Russian 
armies  to  the  Hungarian  plains,  Italian  hosts  to  the  Istrian  and  Dalma- 
tian littoral,  and  Rumanian  divisions  to  the  Transylvanian  marches. 

III.      BERLIN  TO  BAGDAD 

To  the  political  and  military  assimilation  of  Austria-Hungary  by 
pacific  penetration  there  was  soon  added  the  similar  absorption  of 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  Turkey,  assailed  by  Allied  troops  at  the  Darda- 
nelles, and  facing  Russian  invasion  at  the  Armenian  frontier,  inevitably 
turned  to  Berlin  for  aid.  And  when  that  aid  came,  when  the  slender 
Serbian  barrier  was  demolished  and  the  road  from  Berlin  to  Con- 
stantinople was  open,  it  was  natural  that  the  liberator  should,  in  turn, 
become  the  master,  and  Turkish  policy,  like  Austrian,  become,  in  fact,  of 
German  making. 

Nor  was  the  Bulgarian  case  different.  Ferdinand  had  made  his  bar- 
gain with  the  German.  He  had  his  reward  when  German  and  Austrian 
troops  joined  his  in  Serbia  and  the  Bulgarian  people  saw  the  odious 
Macedonian  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  abolished.  Monastir, 
Uskub,  Ochrida,  received  his  garrisons.  Southern  Serbia  was  joined  to 
the  Bulgar  Czardom  and,  under  German  driving,  even  the  obstinate  Turk 
levelled  the  fortifications  of  Adrianople  and  ceded  to  Ferdinand  that 
strip  along  the  Maritza  which  gave  Bulgaria  a  railroad  to  the  iEgean  on 
her  own  territory. 


8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

But  in  accepting  this  long-sought  boon  at  German  hands,  Ferdinand 
had  invited  new  and  deadly  perils.  He  had  made  a  foe  of  Russia ;  he  had 
involved  himself  in  war  with  Great  Britain  and  with  France;  he  had 
assumed  responsibility  for  the  destruction  of  Serbia  and  had  thus  made  it 
inevitable  that  the  Allies  should  henceforth  make  Serbia  their  soldier  in 
the  Balkans  to  the  utter  ignoring  of  all  Bulgarian  aspirations  and  In- 
terests. Against  the  new  powerful  enemies  Germany  was  the  sole  bar- 
rier and  bulwark.  Actually  Bulgaria  had  bartered  her  freedom  against 
certain  provinces  and  cities.  These  she  could  hold  only  with  the  aid  of 
their  donor,  and  while  she  held  them  she  was  exposed  to  all  the  dangers 
incident  to  the  hostilities  of  the  nations  fighting  Germany — above  all,  to 
the  hostility  of  Russia,  always  the  nearest  and  the  deadliest  peril  to  the  Bul- 
gar  State.  Thus,  in  gaining  provinces,  Bulgaria  had  lost  independence. 
And,  in  the  nature  of  things,  the  Bulgarian  army,  like  the  Turkish  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian,  passed  under  German  control;  its  strategy,  its  high 
command  were  no  more  its  own ;  it  marched  and  fought  at  the  dictation 
of  Berlin. 

The  fall  of  Serbia  completed  the  creation  of  this  vast  empire  which 
tardily  but  emphatically  claimed  the  attention  of  the  statesmen  of  the 
nations  fighting  Germany.  Uninterruptedly  German  will  and  German 
purpose  ruled  from  Berlin  to  Bagdad.  On  the  western  front  the  Ger- 
mans erected  against  France  and  Britain  a  wall  of  trenches  like  to  that 
which  the  Romans  had  in  their  later  days  stretched  between  the  Danube 
and  the  Rhine  to  hold  back  the  Germanic  hordes.  Eastward,  behind  the 
marshes  of  the  Pinsk  and  the  Dwina,  broken  Russian  armies  held  the 
field.  But  these  lines  and  the  sea  were  the  frontiers  of  the  new  central 
empire. 

To  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  Turkey — united  to  Germany  vol- 
untarily, through  the  pressure  of  their  necessities  or  the  urgings  of  their 
ambitions,  at  the  outset— there  was  added,  in  the  period  we  are  now  to 
examine,  a  vast  area:  Russian  Poland,  Lithuania,  a  fraction  of  the 
Courland,  and  Volhynia,  on  the  east;  Serbia  and  Albania  on  the  south. 
In  addition,  tragic  Belgium  was  still  under  the  German  heel,  as  were  most 
of  the  industrialized  and  mineralized  districts  of  northern  France. 


THE  NEW  PHASE  9 

At  the  apex  of  his  power.  Napoleon  had  never  ruled  over  an  empire 
comparable  with  this  vast  region  which  was  now  under  the  domination  of 
the  German.  And  at  all  times  the  Napoleonic  edifice  was  founded  upon 
the  genius  of  the  man  who  had  made  it.  Those  who  most  hated  and 
feared  Napoleon  could,  even  in  the  midst  of  their  sufferings  and  dis- 
comforts, confidently  believe  that  the  death  of  the  Emperor  would  see 
the  passing  of  his  empire,  as  that  of  Alexander  the  Great  had  crumbled 
when  the  great  Macedonian  came  to  his  inglorious  end. 

But  this  new  empire  was  not  even  remotely  connected  with  the  per- 
sonality of  William  H.  It  was  the  product  of  a  system,  not  of  a  man;  it 
was  the  product  of  a  system  that  for  more  than  a  century  had  been  grow- 
ing in  efficiency  and  in  power,  without  regard  to  kings  or  generals. 
Kaiser,  Field  Marshal,  Chancellor,  all  Germans  were  but  the  agents  and 
servants  of  this  centralizing  spirit  and  this  vitalizing  efficiency.  The 
soldier  had  not  completed  his  victory  before  the  functionary  appeared 
to  begin  the  organization  of  conquered  ground  and  the  absorption  of  this 
new  district  into  the  great  central  unity. 

Such,  in  the  large,  was  the  great  Middle  Europe,  which  grew  up,  fol- 
lowing the  most  marvelleous  military  successessincetheNapoleonic  era — 
which  took  shape  in  the  period  we  are  now  to  review. 

IV.      THE  GERMAN  CONCEPTION 

How  much  of  this  grandiose  work  was  deliberate,  how  far  this  em- 
pire was  constructed  according  to  preconceived  designs,  how  far  it  re- 
sulted from  the  accidents  of  military  necessity,  one  may  not  say.  Yet 
it  is  true  that,  long  before  the  war,  the  German  patriots  had  dreamed  a 
new  German  Empire  whose  frontiers  should,  in  fact,  include  the  regions 
which  were  under  German  direction  when  the  year  191 5  closed. 

One  may  look  backward  into  the  yellow  files  of  Pan-German  docu- 
ments and  find  maps  strangely  prophetic  of  the  Europe  that  is  disclosed 
in  the  war  maps  of  1915  and  1916.  Northern  France  and  western 
Russia,  Belgium  and  Russian  Poland,  together  with  Holland  and  Den- 
mark, were  included  in  the  frontiers  thus  drawn,  and  the  expansion  of 
German  influence  through  the  Balkans  to  Anatolia  and  Mesopotamia  was 


10  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

unmistakably  foreshadowed.    A  German  place  in  the  sun  meant  just  this 
to  the  men  whose  policies  and  purposes  had  made  the  war  inevitable. 

But  the  fact  is  far  more  important  than  the  dream  which  preceded. 
Whatever  the  dreamers  of  the  past — whose  visions  were  neither  idle  nor 
divorced  from  industrious  effort,  by  Christmas,  1915,  Germany  had 
created  this  empire  and  by  this  date  there  had  crystallized  in  Germany  a 
determination  to  make  the  war  map  permanent.  Minor  modifications 
of  frontiers,  retrocessions  to  France,  more  remotely  conceivable  an 
evacuation  of  Belgium,  these  were  possible;  but  the  essential  integrity  of 
this  Middle  Europe  from  the  Meuse  to  the  Beresina  and  the  Niemen, 
from  the  Belt  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  this  was  the  fixed  war  aim  of  the  Ger- 
man mind. 

In  this  vast  empire,  with  its  millions  of  people,  German  order  and 
German  system  were  to  prevail,  and  the  achievement  of  Rome  was  to 
be  repeated.  Slavs,  Hungarians,  Bulgars,  Osmanli  Turks,  Arabs,  all 
were  to  be  organized  in  the  German  fashion;  endowed  with  the  real 
blessings  born  of  German  system,  order,  efficiency;  the  willing  were  to 
become  partners,  at  least  in  a  limited  sense;  the  rebellious  were  to  be 
crushed.  Such  was  the  German  conception,  Augustan  in  its  character, 
such  was  the  fixed  idea  of  thousands  and  hundreds  of  thousands,  the  idea 
of  the  leaders  and  makers  of  a  Nation,  not  the  personal  ambition  of  a 
single  individual. 

This  empire,  comprising  not  less  than  150,000,000  inhabitants,  geo- 
graphically compact,  possessing  within  its  boundaries  enormous  wealth 
in  minerals,  beyond  the  reach  of  sea  power  to  threaten  its  internal  com- 
munications, touching  on  the  one  hand  the  bleak  north  and  on  the  other 
the  deserts  and  tropics  of  Arabia  and  the  once-flourishing  region  of 
Mesopotamia,  pausing  only  temporarily  at  Suez  and  at  the  door  of  India, 
became,  in  the  period  between  the  Dunajec  and  Verdun,  a  solid  fact.  It 
was  the  fact  that  the  German  perceived  in  all  the  time  when  the  Allied 
press  talked  of  his  failures  in  Russia  and  its  victories  in  France.  It 
was  the  grandiose  reality  beside  which  trench  losses  in  Champagne  and 
Russian  escapes  along  the  Dwina  were  insignificant. 

When  this  empire  had  been  completed,  there  was  in  the  German  mind 


THE  NEW  PHASE  ii 

but  one  more  step  necessary.  Russia  was  for  long  months  incapable 
of  offensive  campaigning,  might  in  fact  lapse  to  revolution  or  make  a 
separate  peace.  Italy  had  been  checked  definitively.  Britain  was  still 
unready.  France  only  remained,  and  if  there  could  be  delivered  against 
France  one  more  blow,  a  blow  as  heavy  as  that  which  had  been  parried 
at  the  Marne,  France  might  now  fall,  at  the  least  might  make  a  separate 
peace  on  terms  which  would  not  be  too  onerous.  With  France  out, 
the  safety  and  permanence  of  Mitteleuropa  would  be  assured.  Such 
was  the  spirit  and  reasoning  of  Germany  when  the  period  now  under  con- 
sideration came  to  an  end.  Such  was  the  purpose  in  the  German  mind 
when  she  again  turned  westward  to  seek  once  more  to  reopen  along  the 
Meuse  the  decision  of  the  Marne. 

To  understand  this  period  nothing  is  more  necessary  than  to  dis- 
miss those  Allied  notions  which  prevailed  in  that  time— notions  of  a  de- 
feated Germany,  conscious  of  its  own  impending  ruin  and  already  seized 
with  madness  and  desperation.  Nothing  could  be  more  false.  Weary 
of  the  war  the  Germans  were,  but  no  more  weary  than  the  French  people 
after  Wagram  and  before  Moscow.  But  victorious  they  certainly  felt 
themselves  to  be,  and  the  proof  of  their  conclusion  was  for  them  written 
over  the  map  of  Europe  in  colours  that  were  unmistakable.  The  Allies 
were  taking  trenches,  the  Germans  were  conquering  provinces.  The 
Allies  were  regaining  hectares  of  lost  France.  The  Germans  were  over- 
running cities  and  districts  so  remote  as  to  have  only  a  vague  meaning 
for  the  resident  of  Berlin  or  the  peasant  of  Bavaria. 

v.      THE  OTHER  SIDE  OF  THE  PICTURE 

Another  side  of  the  picture  there  certainly  was.  In  this  period  Ger- 
many failed  toget  an  immediate  decision  in  theeast  asshehad  failed  at  the 
Marne  to  dispose  of  France.  A  British  army  and  a  British  nation  were 
gathering  strength  each  hour  and  each  day,  and  this  strength  was  to  be 
exerted  in  unsuspected  violence  in  a  time  that  was  to  come.  France 
was  not  broken  in  spirit  and  was  stronger  in  reserves  than  the  Germans 
suspected.  Russia  was  to  deal  rude  blows  in  a  campaign  further  in  the 
future  than  Germany  could  believe  the  war  would  extend. 


12  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Indeed,  the  very  magnitude  of  the  German  success,  coupled  with  the 
manner  in  which  it  had  been  won  and  the  fashion  in  which  German 
methods  had  aroused  the  hostile  nations,  had  made  it  inevitable  that  the 
war  should  continue  until  there  was  an  absolute  German  success,  a  con- 
quest of  Europe  that  deprived  the  conquered  of  all  power  of  resistance, 
or  a  dissolution  of  this  enormous  empire  and  a  restoration  of  the  balance 
of  power.  France  perceived  clearly  that  without  this  dissolution  she 
would  pass  to  the  rank  of  a  vassal  of  Germany.  Italy  saw  that  her 
position  would  be  exactly  the  same.  Britain  recognized  that  her  im- 
perial edifice  was  doomed  and  her  domestic  security  abolished  if  German 
power  ruled  on  the  Egyptian  frontier  and  on  the  Belgian  coast. 

The  magnitude  of  German  victories  in  1915,  together  with  the 
brutality  and  violence  of  German  methods  in  1914  and  191 5,  at  one  time 
aroused  the  apprehensions  and  steeled  the  determination  of  her  enemies. 
But  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1915  the  Allies  were  still  incapable  of 
freeing  France  or  saving  Serbia.  They  felt  themselves  victorious  be- 
cause they  knew  they  were  not  beaten,  but  with  the  same  spirit  the  Ger- 
man was  able  to  look  upon  unmistakable  conquests  and  undeniable 
victories. 

We  see  then,  in  all  this  period,  Allied  weakness.  We  shall  see  in- 
eptitude and  folly  which  made  the  German  success  possible.  We  shall 
see  a  total  inability  to  grasp  the  idea  of  Middle  Europe  which  permitted 
British  armies  to  be  wasted  at  Gallipoli,  when  these  armies  might  have 
saved  Serbia  at  the  Danube  and  prevented  the  opening  of  the  road  from 
Berlin  to  Bagdad.  Serbia  was  sacrificed,  Bulgaria  lost,  Greece  alienated 
by  Allied  blindness;  the  people  of  the  Allied  countries  themselves  were  left 
in  the  dark  as  to  the  real  nature  of  this  new  German  Empire  which  was 
building,  and,  having  long  had  their  attention  fixed  upon  trench  lines  and 
the  most  insignificant  of  local  successes,  woke  suddenly  to  find  a  victor- 
ious Germany  at  Suez  and  in  Bagdad,  in  Warsaw,  Lemberg,  and  Bel- 
grade, while  despite  their  own  desperate  efforts,  Lille,  St.  Quentin, 
and  Laon  contained  Teutonic  garrisons,  and  German  shells  still  fell  in 
Rheims,  Soissons,  Arras,  and  Ypres. 

More  than  this;  at  the  moment  they  perceived  these  things,  the 


THE  NEW  PHASE  13 

peoples  of  the  Allied  nations  were  to  feel  the  weight  of  one  more  German 
offensive,  more  terrible  than  all  that  had  preceded,  and  realize  that,  so 
far  from  approaching  victory,  they  were  still  in  danger  of  defeat. 

Such  briefly  is  the  period  which  lies  between  the  Battle  of  the 
Dunajec  and  the  German  attack  upon  Verdun;  the  period  in  which  Ger- 
many— lacking  a  Napoleon  in  the  field  or  a  Bismarck  in  the  cabinet,  by 
virtue  of  the  collective  strength  of  its  people,  through  the  efficiency  of 
its  political  system,  and  served  always  by  the  devotion  of  its  sons — 
marched  from  conquest  to  conquest  and  from  victory  to  victory  until  the 
German  will  was  law  alike  in  the  capitals  of  Hohenzollern  and  Haps- 
burg,  in  the  seats  of  power  of  the  rulers  of  the  ancient  Caliphate  and  of 
the  contemporary  Osmanli  Empire. 


CHAPTER  TWO 

THE  TRANSFORMATION 

I 

IN  THE  BEGINNING 

The  first  months  of  the  war  were  marked  by  such  desperate  fighting, 
by  battles  unequalled  in  the  magnitude  of  the  numbers  engaged  and  the 
losses  incurred — battles  upon  whose  issue  hung  the  fate  of  continents  and 
the  destiny  of  nations — that  all  mankind  looked  upon  the  amazing 
cycle  of  events,  the  early  French  defeats  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  Belgium, 
and  northern  France;  upon  the  Marne,  the  Aisne,  and  the  Yser,  with 
breathless  attention,  having  little  thought  for  the  larger  questions  in- 
volved or  the  permanent  meaning  of  this  conflict  in  human  history. 

No  one  who  lived  through  the  days  from  the  German  attack  upon 
Liege  to  the  final  defeat  of  the  assault  before  Ypres,  who  read  day  by 
day  the  bulletins  reporting  battles  greater  than  Austerlitz,  Gettysburg, 
or  Leipzig,  can  forget  the  tension  and  the  strain  of  those  hours,  hours 
which,  regard  being  had  for  modern  means  of  communication,  were 
probably  the  most  interesting  and  the  most  crowded  in  all  human  his- 
tory. Africa,  Asia,  the  remote  Pacific,  and  the  little-known  Indian 
Ocean  furnished  daily  some  new  glory  of  heroism  and  some  fresh  horror 
of  destruction. 

From  the  moment  when  the  army  of  Kluck  emerged  out  of  the  cloud 
of  official  darkness,  almost  within  sight  of  Paris,  to  the  time  when  the 
Flanders  struggle  descended  to  a  deadlock  amidst  fog  and  mud,  the  whole 
world  viewed  the  German  eruption  as  a  super-Napoleonic  drama.  All 
the  memories  of  the  great  struggles  of  a  century  before  were  translated 
into  fact  and  familiar  history  repeated  itself  upon  the  pages  of  the  daily 
newspaper. 

But  when  at  last  winter  and  exhaustion  had  temporarily  stayed  the 
conflict,  when  artillery  alone  continued  the  battle  from  Switzerland  to 


THE  TRANSFORMATION  15 

the  North  Sea,  and  the  contest  was  transferred  to  the  remote  Car- 
pathians and  to  Poland,  there  came  a  transformation  in  the  aspect  of  the 
war  to  the  minds  of  mankind  generally.  It  no  longer  seemed  one  more 
of  the  struggles  familiar  in  modern  history — a  struggle  like  those  Europe 
fought  against  Charles  V,  against  Louis  XIV,  against  Napoleon — a 
struggle  for  the  preservation  of  the  balance  of  power  and  the  prevention 
of  European  supremacy  by  a  single  state  or  monarch.  Rather,  it  took  on 
the  character  of  the  remoter  struggles  of  the  Latin  world  against  the  bar- 
barians coming  down  out  of  the  North;  of  a  struggle  between  savagery 
— this  time  equipped  with  all  the  weapons  of  science— and  unor- 
ganized civilization.  First  for  the  belligerents,  directly  assailed  by  Ger- 
many, then  for  the  greater  neutrals,  and  finally  for  more  distant  nations, 
the  war  assumed  the  appearance  of  a  struggle  for  existence — a  struggle 
against  a  common  peril — until  the  roll  of  nations  fighting  Germany  be- 
came a  score,  and,  at  the  moment  these  lines  are  written,  countries  as 
remote  and  little  concerned  with  European  rivalries  as  Siam  and  Liberia 
have  declared  war  against  the  German  Empire. 

II.       BELGIUM 

This  transformation  was  due  exclusively  to  the  spirit  disclosed  by  the 
German  people  in  making  war  and  the  methods  employed  by  them  in 
prosecuting  It ;  and  the  revelation  of  this  spirit  and  this  method  had  be- 
gun with  the  Invasion  of  Belgium. 

The  Invasion  of  Belgium  had  been  a  profound  shock  to  the  whole 
world  beyond  the  German  frontiers.  The  phrase  of  the  Chancellor, 
describing  the  German  guarantee  to  observe  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
as  a  "scrap  of  paper,"  Instantly  gained  and  steadily  held  a  place  in  the 
memory  of  all  the  observers  of  a  world  conflagration.  It  was  naturally 
coupled  with  his  other  assertion  that  the  Invasion  was,  in  itself,  a 
wrong,  but  that  Germany  stood  In  the  state  of  necessity,  and  German 
necessity  knew  no  law. 

And  had  there  been  no  subsequent  horrors,  no  crimes  against  hu- 
manity and  civilization ;  had  the  German  armies  conducted  themselves  In 
Belgian  territory  with  every  regard  for  the  rights  and  personal  safety  of 


i6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Belgian  people,  the  invasion  of  Belgium  would  still  have  stood  as  a 
reproach  and  a  blot,  because  it  was  everywhere  recognized  as  a  violation 
of  a  national  pledge  and  the  invasion  of  a  weak  state  by  a  powerful 
empire,  not  as  an  act  of  self-defence,  but  as  a  detail  in  a  plan  for  the 
conquest  of  France. 

With  the  invasion  of  Belgium  a  whole  system  of  thought  and  of 
policy  fell.  To  neutralize  the  weak  nations,  to  give  them  the  opportun- 
ity to  preserve  their  independence  and  to  live  their  own  lives,  withdrawn 
from  the  quarrels  of  the  great,  had  been  a  part  of  Nineteenth-Century 
political  morality.  The  maps  of  the  ante-bellum  period,  solemnly  shad- 
ing Switzerland  and  Belgium  in  neutral  gray  as  areas  withdrawn  from 
European  strife,  were  not  merely  accepted  as  foundations  of  the  new 
international  doctrine,  but  as  half-way  marks  on  the  road  to  a  complete 
neutralizing  of  all  states  by  the  mutual  accommodation  of  all  old 
jealousies  and  the  construction  of  a  new  confederation  of  the  nations  of 
the  world.  It  was  accepted  as  a  beginning  of  the  era  of  world  peace  by 
world  consent. 

When  Germany  invaded  Belgium  all  this  edifice  went  instantly  to 
dust  and  ashes.  Of  a  sudden  the  world  stepped  back  into  the  Eigh- 
teenth Century,  to  the  age  of  Napoleon,  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Anew 
there  was  formulated  the  doctrine  that  force  was  the  sole  consideration, 
that  small  states  had  no  rights  when  great  nations  were  on  the  march, and 
that  the  lesser  nationalities  must  again  bow  before  the  will  of  the  strong 
nation  armed. 

In  all  neutral  nations  the  invasion  of  Belgium  deprived  Germany  of 
any  moral  advantage  at  the  outset  of  the  war.  Her  agents  might  pro- 
test, her  champions  argue,  her  statesmen  explain;  to  all  these  explana- 
tions the  world  turned  a  deaf  ear.  The  attack  upon  Belgium  was  per- 
ceived the  world  over  to  be  an  act  of  violence,  not  merely  breaking  down 
Belgian  integrity,  but  also  opening  a  breach  in  that  wall  which  recent 
decades  had  sought  to  erect  to  prevent  a  relapse  to  the  old,  unhappy 
times  of  other  centuries.  There  was  a  sense  that,  at  a  single  bound,  by 
reason  of  German  policy,  the  world  had  leaped  backward  to  the  age  of 
wars  of  conquest. 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE 
WAR    IN    PICTURES 


Copyright,  1895,  by  Ilfnry  Cra:rs  ■.£'  Co.  I'^-.n:  >:  ;,.;'■'■'  ,■  '   ■  StatiUy  Berkeley 

NAPOLEON'S  CUIRASSIERS  AT  WATERLOO 

Waterloo  (June  18,  1815)  marked  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon's  ambition  to  dorninate^ 
Europe.     Germany  was  the  next  nation   to  cherish  the  dream  ot  world  dommion 


THE   RISE  OF   GERMANY 

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THE  MAN  WHO  BUILT  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 
'  Prince  Bismarck,  the  Germans'  "Iron  Chancellor,"  had  a  large  part  in  the  bmlding  of  the  German 
Empire  and  the  creation  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  in  the  days  of  the  present  kaiser  s  father  and  grand- 
father He  did  not  realize  the  need  for  colonial  expansion,  otherwise  Germany  might  have 
secured  her  "place  in  the  Sun"  while  the  other  Powers  were  securing  theirs.  But  Germany  came  in  o 
the  colonial  field  toojate  to  get  her  share  peacefully.^Th.s  was  one  deep-lying  cause  of  the  World 
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THE  TRANSFORMATION  25 

While  there  was  no  other  question  than  that  of  abstract  right,  while 
men  were  still  thrilled  with  the  reports  of  Belgian  resistance  and  not  yet 
aware  of  what  German  soldiers  were  doing  in  the  Belgian  Kingdom,  the 
judgment  of  the  world  ran  on  the  German  attack  upon  Belgium,  and  in 
the  Americas,  as  elsewhere,  public  sentiment  turned  against  Germany. 
This  revulsion  of  feeling  was  to  have  a  profound  effect  in  the  future.  It 
was  to  prove  the  first  in  the  long  series  of  steps  by  which  the  American 
nation  marched  toward  conflict  with  Germany,  because  it  felt  that  Ger- 
many had  become  the  common  danger  for  all  democratic  nations  and 
equally  the  enemy  of  all  nations  which  served  republican  ideals. 

It  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  German  General  Staff,  when 
it  decided  to  ignore  moral  considerations  and  invade  Belgium,  insured 
the  verdict  of  mankind  against  Germany — a  verdict  possibly  of  no  im- 
mediate weight  if  Germany  won  the  war,  but  a  verdict  bound  to  have 
material  as  well  as  spiritual  consequences  if  the  gamble  turned  out 
badly  and  the  passage  of  Belgium  were  not  followed  by  the  arrival  in 
Paris.  Thus  we  must  recognize  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium  the  first  and 
the  most  important  in  that  long  series  of  events  which  were  to  end  by 
alienating  from  Germany  the  sympathy  of  nearly  the  whole  civilized 
world  and  enlisting  one  after  another  of  the  nations  against  her,  until  the 
United  States,  one  of  the  most  remote  and  the  least  materially  interested 
of  all,  should  draw  its  sword  and  send  an  expeditionary  army  to  fight  the 
German  hosts  upon  European  soil. 

III.       LOUVAIN 

But  the  invasion  of  Belgium  promptly  became  a  minor  episode. 
Soon  the  press  of  the  world  was  filled  with  the  stories  of  what  German 
armies  were  doing  in  Belgium  and  northern  France.  Tales  of  cities 
burned,  women  and  children  murdered,  women  outraged,  civilians  ex- 
ecuted; reports  of  the  reign  of  terror  wherever  German  armies  pene- 
trated, became  the  common  property  of  all  educated  men  and  women  the 
world  over. 

As  a  culmination  to  these  horrors  there  came  presently  the  tragic 
story  of  the  massacre  and  burning  at  Louvain.     Of  itself,  Louvain  is  in- 


26  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

teresting  and  significant  only  as  a  larger  and  more  clearly  perceived  ex- 
ample of  what  took  place  in  scores  of  French  and  Belgian  villages,  towns, 
and  cities. 

The  origin  of  the  Louvain  crime  remains  obscure.  Apparently  Ger- 
man troops,  returning  from  a  fight  with  the  Belgians  to  the  north,  were 
mistaken  by  other  German  troops  for  the  enemy  and  fired  upon.  This 
firing  was  attributed  to  Belgian  civilians  and  thereupon  began  a  re- 
prisal worthy  of  the  best  achievement  in  infamy  of  any  age. 

In  the  slaughter  that  followed  either  age  nor  sex  nor  condition  was 
respected.  Women  were  turned  over  to  the  soldiers  to  wreak  their  will 
as  a  matter  of  discipline,  children  were  slain,  old  men  and  young  mas- 
sacred, while  whole  quarters  of  the  town  were  consigned  to  flames. 

What  was  now  done  in  Louvain  had  already  been  done  in  many  other 
Belgian  communities.  What  was  sought  was  not  to  be  mistaken.  Bel- 
gium had  resisted,  the  Belgian  soldiers  had  fought  instead  of  dispersing 
when  German  armies  had  sought  passage  through  their  country.  A  re- 
volt in  Belgium,  barely  possible  now  that  the  mass  of  the  German  armies 
had  passed  on,  might  threaten  the  German  cause.  The  remedy  was 
found  in  resort  to  a  system  of  terrorism,  to  that  peculiarly  German 
method  which  has  been  identified  by  all  other  races  as  "Ruthless- 
ness." 

Louvain  was  only  a  symbol.  Actually  the  same  spirit  was  disclosed 
in  scores  of  places  and  upon  many  thousands  of  men  and  women.  Al- 
though Louvain  was  long  closed  to  the  inquiring  witnesses  of  neutral 
nations,  the  German  retreat  after  the  Marne  permitted  the  investiga- 
tion of  other  towns  where  the  method  had  been  employed.  In  Lorraine, 
in  Champagne,  wretched  survivors  and  smoking  ruins  of  Sermaize,  of 
Gerbeviller,  of  a  score  of  villages  and  towns,  equally  testified  to  Ger- 
man presence  and  German  method. 

When  the  German  armies  crossed  the  French  frontiers  they  were 
preceded  by  hosts  of  fleeing  Belgians,  already  crazed  by  the  knowledge 
of  what  had  taken  place  in  towns  the  Germans  had  occupied.  All  during 
the  Marne  campaign  the  roads  behind  the  battle  lines  were  filled  with 
the  women  and  children,  with  old  men  and  young,  fleeing  as  the  Latin 


THE  TRANSFORMATION  27 

world  had  fled  before  another  barbarism  which  also  had  a  Teutonic 
origin  and  similarly  employed  the  system  of  ruthlessness. 

Nor  were  brutality  to  helpless  human  beings  and  violence  to  women 
the  sole  characteristics;  not  only  were  towns  burned  to  terrorize  dis- 
tricts, to  impress  upon  the  French  mind  the  power  and  the  force  of  an 
unconquerable  Germany;  but  where  the  invaders  did  not  destroy  they 
defiled.  The  homes  of  the  poor,  the  bedrooms  of  the  insignificant,  quite 
as  much  as  the  chateaux  of  the  rich  and  the  residences  of  the  prosperous, 
were  made  the  depositories  of  filth;  and  the  most  high-placed  officers 
found  pleasure  in  committing  offences  against  common  decency  which  in 
children  are  cured  by  corporal  punishment. 

In  all  this  there  was  only  in  minor  part  the  evidence  of  that  lack  of  re- 
straint which  belongs  to  soldiery  and  has  made  invasion,  even  in  civil- 
ized warfare,  a  curse  and  a  horror.  The  worst  crimes  committed  were 
committed  not  by  brutes  escaping  from  discipline,  but  by  soldiers  obey- 
ing orders.  They  were  not  accidents  of  war,  but  details  in  a  carefully 
compiled  plan  of  making  war.  They  expressed  the  conclusion  of  the 
German  mind  that  the  way  to  conquer  a  foe  was  to  terrify  him,  that  the 
way  to  rob  his  arm  of  strength  and  his  spirit  of  determination  was  to 
burn,  to  rape,  to  rob,  and  to  murder,  until  the  spirit  broke  and  the  soldier 
laid  down  his  arms  to  escape  a  continuation  of  horrors  wreaked  upon  his 
women  and  children. 

It  was  but  another  manifestation  of  the  same  spirit  which  prompted 
the  Germans,  when  the  Mame  was  lost  and  the  retreat  had  come,  to 
turn  their  artillery  against  the  cathedral  at  Rheims  and  begin  the  sys- 
tematic destruction  of  this  glorious  monument  of  an  ancient  world, 
a  destruction  which  was  to  continue  more  than  three  years.  To  murder 
the  weak,  to  dishonour  the  helpless,  to  destroy  the  beautiful;  such,  it 
seemed,  were  to  the  German  mind  necessary  steps  in  conquering  a  foe 
in  the  field  and  destroying  an  army  and  a  nation. 

IV.    The   "Lusitania" 

The  reports  of  German  "terribleness"  in  Belgium  and  France  were 
not  immediately  accepted  by  the  outside  world.     Even  England  long 


28  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

remained  incredulous,  and  not  until  the  Bryce  Report  set  forth  the  full 
and  duly-proven  evidence  did  the  British  public  accept  the  testimony  of 
its  Belgian  and  French  Allies,  confirmed  by  the  reports  of  British 
soldiers  in  Belgium. 

Even  this  testimony  might  have  been  rejected  by  neutral  nations  had 
not  the  invasion  of  Belgium  undermined  German  credit  in  the  world  and 
the  subsequent  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  served  to  confirm  in  the  minds 
of  men  all  the  worst  that  had  been  alleged  against  German  soldiery  in 
Belgium  and  France.  The  narration  of  the  Lusitania  Massacre  belongs 
to  the  discussion  of  America's  relation  to  the  war,  but  the  moral  effect 
must  be  emphasized  in  any  discussion  of  the  transformation  of  the  war 
due  to  German  methods. 

This  murder  of  some  hundreds  of  women,  children,  and  non-com- 
batants, many  of  them  citizens  of  neutral  nations;  their  slaughter  in  the 
open  sunlight  of  the  whole  world,  was  an  off"ence  that  could  neither  be 
concealed  nor  explained.  The  echo  of  German  songs  wherever  Germans 
gathered,  celebrating  this  Lusitania  killing,  served  to  demonstrate  how 
wide  was  the  gulf  opening  between  German  and  non-German  mankind. 

When  to  this  crime  against  the  laws  of  humanity  and  of  nations  there 
was  promptly  added  that  of  Ypres,  where  the  Germans  employed  poison 
gas,  forbidden  by  every  convention  of  civilized  warfare,  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  war  for  the  British  people  and  for  a  great  and  growing  fraction 
of  the  American  public,  was  accomplished.  Zeppelin  raids  on  London, 
the  bombardment  of  unoffending  and  open  sea  resorts,  ultimately  the  en- 
slavement and  deportation  of  the  Belgian  people  into  Germany,  were  but 
natural  and  logical  extensions  of  the  German  method.  They  merely 
gave  new  force  to  the  argument  that  the  war  was  a  war  of  moral,  not 
material,  interests — a  war  for  civilization  and  against  barbarism. 

Stripped  of  all  else,  the  German  spirit,  as  it  revealed  itself  in  these  and 
other  incidents,  seemed  to  contemporary  mankind  unmistakably  the 
assertion  of  the  doctrine  that  all  conventions  of  humanity,  all  pledges 
of  national  faith,  all  restrictions  of  international  law,  became  null  and 
void  when  they  conflicted  with  a  German  policy  or  interfered  with  a 
German  purpose.    Crimes  which  should  have  put  the  guilty  beyond  the 


THE  TRANSFORMATION  29 

pale  of  human  society,  became  meritorious  acts  when  performed  by 
German  soldiers  and  sailors  in  obedience  to  orders  and  in  conformity 
with  German  plans.  Deeds,  inhuman  beyond  all  palliation,  took  on  an 
heroic  aspect  for  the  German  public  when  they  served  to  terrorize 
occupied  districts,  thereby  releasing  fighting  men  for  the  front.  The 
murder  of  women  and  children,  the  violation  of  women,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  homes  of  the  poor  and  the  insignificant,  the  slaughter  of 
neutral  women  and  children  at  sea;  all  means  and  methods  included  in 
the  German  term  of  "ruthlessness"were  justified,  defended,  exalted,  when 
they  served  a  German  end,  and  at  rare  intervals  when  the  offence  itself 
passed  the  ample  German  powers  of  justification,  imaginary  offences 
were  alleged,  after  the  fact,  to  explain  outrages  which  were  indefensible 
even  on  the  basis  of  the  invented  provocations. 

The  consequences  of  this  German  spirit  and  method  were  patent 
when  the  period  we  are  now  to  examine  opened.  A  host  of  German 
agents,  spies,  servants,  the  ablest  of  German  diplomats  and  the  most 
astute  of  German  ministers,  aided  by  German  residents  and  fortified  by 
every  resource  of  corruption,  were  unable  permanently  to  combat  the 
opposition  and  the  hostility  aroused  in  neutral  nations.  The  German 
policy  compelled  neutral  governments  to  act  in  defence  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  their  citizens.  The  agents  of  the  German  Government  at- 
tacked these  governments,  seeking  to  destroy  them  at  home  and  with 
their  own  people.  And  in  the  end  the  governments  were  driven  into 
open  war  with  Germany,  alike  to  preserve  unity  at  home  and  to  defend 
the  lives  and  rights  of  their  citizens  abroad. 

A  monstrous  German  propaganda  was  conducted  in  Italy  and  the 
United  States.  Politicians  were  bought,  all  the  resources  of  German 
commerce  and  finance  were  invoked,  but  again  and  again  German  in- 
trigue abroad  was  confounded  by  German  action  in  Europe.  Italy 
entered  the  war  on  the  very  morning  of  the  Liisitania,  the  German  case 
was  destroyed  in  America  by  this  and  succeeding  crimes  which  steadily 
brought  America  to  a  realization  of  the  actual  character  of  the  war  and 
an  acceptation  of  the  European  view. 

In  Europe  the  German  methods  nerved  the  French  people  to  a 


30  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

heroism  and  endurance  unsuspected  even  of  this  briUiant  people. 
Zeppelin  raids,  submarine  slaughter,  the  poison  gas  of  Ypres,  wakened  a 
sluggish  Britain,  first  to  unexpected  response  to  the  call  for  voluntary  en- 
listment and  then  to  conscription  itself.  Canadian  survivors  of  the  "gas 
attack"  brought  to  America  new  and  veracious  reports  of  German  meth- 
ods, which  found  slow  but  sure  credence  as  the  meaning  of  the  Lusitania 
Massacre  carne  to  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

V.      THE  CONSEQUENCES 

The  consequences  of  the  transformation  of  the  war  were  not  early 
perceived  or  justly  appraised.  It  was  not  until  Germany — victorious  in 
the  contemporary  situation  but  palpably  war  weary — made  the  first  peace 
gesture  in  the  winter  of  1916,  that  it  became  apparent  how  completely 
the  war  differed  from  preceding  conflicts  and  how  utterly  Germany  had 
become,  for  the  peoples  at  war  with  her,  an  outlaw  nation  with  whom  it 
was  impossible  to  negotiate  in  accordance  with  time-honoured  usage,  be- 
cause peace  by  negotiation  would  permit  Germany  to  escape  from  the 
consequencesof  her  evil  deeds  and  even,  conceivably,  to  profit  by  methods 
which  had  roused  the  indignation  and  abhorrence  of  all  civilized  beings. 

As  the  war  progressed  and  more  nations  were  drawn  into  the  whirl- 
pool, agreements  were  made  between  Germany's  foes  to  right  old 
wrongs,  liberate  subject  peoples,  remake  the  map  of  Europe.  Utopian 
schemes  were  proposed,  and  schemes  which  were  selfish.  But  when  the 
Russian  Revolution  and  the  consequent  restatement  of  Russian  aims 
destroyed  many  of  these  arrangements,  there  still  endured  the  determina- 
tion to  fight  onward  until  this  German  purpose  was  obliterated,  this 
German  method  discredited  in  the  eyes  of  the  German  people,  and  either 
a  German  renunciation  of  "terribleness"  or  a  German  military  defeat 
should  put  a  term  to  a  common  peril  of  all  civilized  peoples. 

To  analyze  the  German  spirit,  to  explain  the  use  of  these  methods  by 
a  people  which,  before  the  war,  had  seemed  substantially  at  one  with  all 
othercivilizednationsinrespectof  humanity  and  international  faith, must 
be  the  work  of  the  psychologist  and  historian  of  the  future.  Certainly 
it  is  beyond  contemporary  power,  as  it  is  outside  of  the  resources  of  the 


THE  TRANSFORMATION  31 

present  writer  who  has  stood  amidst  the  ruins  of  Gerbeviller  and 
Sermaize  and  heard  from  eyewitnesses  and  participants  the  shameful 
story  of  German  deeds  in  Belgium  and  France. 

And  yet  despite  the  passions  of  the  present  hour  one  must  perceive 
elements  of  grandeur  amidst  all  that  is  repugnant  and  hateful  in 
the  German  idea.  The  German  people  as  a  whole  seemed  to  the  world 
to  have  been  seized  with  a  vision  of  a  magnified  and  glorified  Germany — 
an  ideal  Germany  for  which  they  gave  their  blood  and  treasure  with- 
out stint  and  without  hesitation.  Something  of  the  spirit  of  the  succes- 
sors of  Mohammed  certainly  shone  through  the  achievements  of  German 
soldiers  and  teachers,  who  went  forth  to  conquer,  sword  and  torch  in  hand. 
They  sacrificed  life,  liberty,  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  They  gave  up  all 
to  serve  that  ideal  German  State,  and  they  performed  great  deeds  and 
mean  deeds  with  equal  self-abnegation.  And  however  terrible  in  de- 
tail was  this  German  conception,  however  regardless  of  the  lives  and  the 
rights  of  other  races,  however  contemptuous  of  the  conventions  of  other 
generations,  it  still  acquired  a  measure  of  dignity  through  the  devotion 
it  inspired. 

Yet  since  this  German  ideal  actually  aimed  at  German  supremacy  In 
the  world,  the  possession  of  Central  Europe,  the  control  of  the  land 
routes  to  Asia  and  Africa;  since  it  assailed  the  existence  of  Frenchman, 
Belgian,  Russian,  Serbian;  since  it  aimed  at  the  ultimate  destruction  of 
the  British  Empire  and  the  extinction  of  Italian  aspirations;  since,  in  the 
pursuit  of  German  ends,  It  assailed  the  lives  and  property  of  neutrals  and 
denied  their  right  to  sail  the  seas;  since  it  employed  methods,  abhorrent 
to  all  mankind,  to  obtain  ends  dangerous  to  most  nations,  the  whole 
world  gradually  took  alarm  and,  one  by  one,  nations  far  removed  from  the 
scene  of  actual  conflict,  and  little  concerned  with  European  questions, 
took  up  arms  against  Germany. 

All  through  the  period  which  we  are  now  to  examine  this  process  goes 
forward.  All  through  this  period  German  methods  make  new  enemies, 
and  the  German  people,  on  the  morning  of  great  victories,  arc  faced  with 
great  combinations  of  nations,  and  hand  in  hand  with  this  goes  the  ever- 
constant  widening  of  the  gulf  between  the  German  people  and  the  rest 


32  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  mankind,  between  the  German  and  the  non-Teutonic  mind.  Actually 
the  transformation  of  the  character  of  the  war  was  accomplished  for 
Europe  by  the  spring  of  1915.  The  invasion  of  Belgium,  Louvain,  the 
devastation  of  northern  France,  Rheims,  the  Lusitania  Massacre,  the 
*' poison  gas"  attack  of  Ypres;  these  are  the  stages.  By  May,  1915,  the 
transformation  is  complete  and  the  consequences  still  endure  at  the 
opening  of  the  fourth  year  of  the  World  War,  which  sees  the  United 
States  among  Germany's  foes. 

And  even  if  it  were  conceivable  that  history  should  hereafter  destroy 
the  contemporary  judgments  and  Germany  find  justification  for  all 
her  deeds  in  the  eyes  of  the  future,  this  would  not  change  the  fact  that  the 
transformation  of  the  characterof  the  war  for  the  nations  fighting  in  191 5, 
and  for  those  nations  which  were  to  enter  it  in  1916  and  1917,  was  one  of 
the  dominating  and  controlling  influences  in  the  first  three  years  of  the 
contest.  It  was  with  the  memory  of  Louvain,  Rheims,  and  of  the  newly 
lost  provinces  in  mind  that  the  French  people  fought  on  to  and  through 
Verdun ;  it  was  with  the  Lusitania  in  mind  and  the  Zeppelin  raids  in  their 
eyes  that  the  British  people  created  their  volunteer  armies;  it  was  with 
Belgium  and  the  Lusitania  in  their  thoughts  that  the  United  States  first 
endured  the  British  Interference  with  its  commerce  and  remained  the 
magazine  of  the  enemies  of  Germany  and,  at  a  later  date,  broke  with  its 
oldest  tradition  and  entered  a  European  war. 


CHAPTER  THREE 

NAVAL  HISTORY 

I 

THE  TEACHINGS  OF  THE  PAST 

Long  before  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  Admiral  Mahan  had  laid 
down  the  value  of  sea  power  in  the  wars  of  the  past  and  estimated  its 
prospective  influence  in  the  next  war.  For  Britain  and  for  Germany 
Admiral  Mahan's  volumes  had  become  the  law  and  the  gospel  in  naval 
history,  and  to  the  first  volume  of  this  American  sailor  is  ascribed  the 
change  of  policy  of  the  German  Emperor,  the  decision  to  seek  Ger- 
many's future  on  the  sea,  which  led  inexorably  to  the  conflict  between 
Teuton  and  Briton. 

Sea  power,  in  all  the  great  conflicts  of  the  past,  had  not  been  im- 
mediately decisive.  Admiral  Mahan  had  pointed  out  at  great  length 
and  with  a  wealth  of  detail  how  the  French  were  able,  both  under  Louis 
XIV  and  Napoleon,  to  win,  not  alone  campaigns,  but  temporary  Con- 
tinental supremacy,  only  to  lose  it  in  the  end  because  they  were  unable 
to  come  to  grips  with  sea  power  and,  thereafter,  on  British  soil,  to  crush 
their  one  implacable  enemy. 

In  our  own  War  of  Independence  the  conclusive  victory  of  York- 
town  came  when  Britain  had  temporarily  lost  control  of  the  waters  of 
the  American  seaboard.  Yet,  by  contrast,  absolute  supremacy  at  sea  in 
1870  did  not  avail  to  save  the  French  because  the  decision  on  land  was 
immediate  and  complete.  In  our  own  Civil  War  the  North  used  its  sea 
supremacy  to  the  uttermost  and  the  isolation  of  the  South  by  blockade 
was  the  most  potent  single  factor  in  the  ultimate  collapse  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy. 

And  with  the  British  declaration  of  war,  in  August,  1914,  Germany 
became  an  isolated  nation,  so  far  as  sea  communication  was  concerned. 
First,  her  merchant  marine  was  swept  from  the  sea.     Neutral  harbours 

33 


34  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

became  the  haven  of  the  great  liners  which  had  carried  German  com- 
merce and  German  prestige  to  the  ends  of  the  earth.  The  German  flag 
disappeared  from  the  ocean  and  the  great  ports  of  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
became  as  deserted  as  Charleston  or  Savannah  in  the  Civil  War  epoch. 
All  the  vast  trade  in  raw  materials  and  in  manufactured  articles,  the 
enormous  export  and  import  trade,  which  were  the  foundation  of 
the  prosperity  of  the  new  Germany  and  which  had  been  created  by  the 
generation  following  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  were  paralyzed 
almost  in  an  hour  and  remained  paralyzed  in  the  years  of  war  that 
followed. 

Next,  within  a  time  that  was  relatively  brief,  such  German  squad- 
rons and  cruisers  as  were  at  sea  when  the  storm  broke  were  methodically 
"mopped  up."  The  Emden,  the  Konigsherg,  the  Karlsruhe  won  fleeing 
fame  and  rivalled  in  destruction  the  exploits  of  the  Alabama,  but  they 
were  in  turn  remorselessly  hunted  down  and  destroyed,  in  the  Indian 
Ocean,  in  the  Rufigi  River  on  the  African  coast,  and  in  the  South 
Atlantic.  Admiral  von  Spec's  squadron,  escaping  from  a  Japanese  fleet 
and  sweeping  across  the  Southern  Pacific,  won  a  momentary  success  at 
Coronel,  only  to  perish  gloriously  at  Falkland  Islands,  in  a  fight  that  did 
honour  to  German  seamanship  and  valour  but  revealed  the  hopeless  in- 
feriority of  German  naval  strength.  When  this  process  of  sweeping  the 
seas  was  completed  the  oceans  lay  open  to  Allied  commerce  and  were 
closed  to  German  vessels  of  war  and  of  commerce  alike. 

Never  had  a  victory  been  more  complete  than  that  of  the  British 
navy  in  this  first  phase  of  the  war,  at  sea.  The  old  apprehension  of  a 
German  raid  upon  British  coasts,  the  idle  but  familiar  legend  of  a  con- 
templated German  invasion  of  Britain,  was  revealed  in  its  full  absurdity. 
The  accident  of  the  mobilization  of  the  whole  British  fleet  at  the  moment 
of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  for  its  annual  mancEuvres;  the  rare  good 
judgment  of  Winston  Churchill,  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  in  counter- 
manding the  orders  for  demobilization  and  retaining  the  fleet  in  being 
during  the  critical  days  from  July  25  to  August  4,  gave  Britain,  on  the 
water,  precisely  that  advantage  Germany  enjoyed  on  land,  and  abolished 
not  merely  the  remote  chance  of  a  German  attack  upon  Britain,  but  the 


NAVAL  HISTORY  35 

very  real  danger  that  German  cruisers  might  escape  from  their  naval 
ports  to  the  high  seas  and  carry  on  a  long  and  costly  war  upon  British  and 
Allied  commerce. 

In  this  phase  of  the  war  the  British  fleets  accomplished  what  had  been 
impossible  a  century  before.  Villeneuve's  fleet  had  eluded  Nelson  on  a 
famous  occasion,  Napoleon  had  taken  an  army  to  Egypt  and  himself 
escaped  to  France  at  a  critical  moment  in  European  history.  But  under 
the  new  conditions  of  steam  navigation  the  command  of  the  sea  by  the 
supreme  naval  power  had  attained  a  degree  of  the  absolute,  unknown  in 
history.  And  so  far  as  German  commerce  and  German  sea  power  were 
concerned  this  power  was  to  remain  absolute,  even  when  the  submarine 
began  to  take  its  toll  of  belligerent  and  neutral  merchant  marine. 

II.      THE  CONSEQUENCES 

The  first  consequence  of  this  assertion  of  sea  power  was  the  suc- 
cessful despatch  of  the  British  army  to  France.  While  the  Grand  Fleet 
moved  majestically  out  of  the  vision  of  the  world  and  took  its  station  in 
northern  Scotland,  there  to  keep  watch  and  ward,  to  take  and  retain  a 
silent  but  remorseless  grip  upon  the  throat  of  German  commerce,  the 
lighter  craft  assured  the  safe  passage  of  the  Channel  by  Field  Marshal 
Sir  John  French's  army,  transported  with  a  speed  and  a  success 
which  established  new  records  in  this  department  of  war.  From  the 
outbreak  of  war  to  the  end  of  the  First  Battle  of  Ypres  not  much  less 
than  200,000  troops  were  thus  ferried  across  the  Channel,  and  their 
presence  in  France  was  essential  to  the  safety  of  the  whole  Allied  cause. 
Had  these  troops  not  arrived,  France  would  have  fallen.  At  the  moment 
when  the  western  battle  was  reaching  a  crisis,  the  arrival  of  an  Indian 
Army  Corps  brought  from  the  Far  East  saved  the  day.  Thus,  in  a  very 
real  sense,  the  war  on  land  was  made  possible  for  the  Allies,  and  defeat 
was  avoided,  not  merely  by  the  valour  of  the  troops  at  the  front,  but 
equally  by  the  service  of  the  British  fleet. 

Later  the  tide  of  Colonial  support  was  in  turn  brought  to  Europe. 
Asia,  Africa,  Australia,  Canada  were  able,  as  they  had  been  always  willing, 
to  take  their  place  beside  the  Mother  Country  on  the  French  and  Belgian 


36  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

fronts  and  elsewhere,  when  the  flood  of  war  turned  to  the  Near  East. 
In  th€  first  three  years  of  the  war  not  less  than  three  million  men  were 
thus  carried  from  all  over  the  world  to  France  and  Belgium,  and  this 
mighty  task  was  accomplished  without  the  loss  of  a  transport,  while  the 
passage  from  Boulogne  to  Folkestone,  from  Calais  to  Dover,  continued 
as  safe  from  German  attack  as  the  ferries  In  the  North  and  East  rivers 
of  New  York  City. 

Once  more,  as  in  the  days  of  Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon,  Britain  sat 
safe  behind  the  silver  ribbon  of  the  Channel.  Zeppelins  and  airplanes 
might  at  intervals  reach  her  cities  and  exact  their  toll  of  lives,  mainly 
of  children  and  women;  an  occasional  German  raider  might  come  down 
Channel  or  bombard  a  seacoast  resort;  but  despite  these  hostile  mani- 
festations, Britain  remained  secure  in  her  islands  and  gathered  up  her 
millions  to  strike  her  great  foe. 

Nor  was  the  second  consequence  of  supremacy  at  sea  less  important 
to  the  Allied  cause.  Germany  had  struck  at  her  own  hour  and  after  full 
preparation.  Her  first  blow  had  given  her  possession  of  the  industrial 
districts  of  Belgium  and  northern  France,  the  iron  mines  of  Lorraine, 
the  coal  regions  of  Mons  and  Lens.  She  had  in  her  grip  the  factories  of 
Liege,  of  Lille,  of  Tourcoing,  and  of  Roubaix.  St.  Quentin  all  the  great 
manufacturing  districts  of  the  valleys  of  the  Scarpe,  the  Deule,  the 
Scheldt,  and  the  Sambre  were  at  her  disposal. 

Thanks  to  the  British  fleet,  however,  this  enormous  initial  advantage 
was  promptly  counterbalanced  by  the  transformation  of  industrial 
America  Into  the  workshop,  the  arsenal,  the  granary  of  the  Allies.  In  a 
few  short  months  all  the  vast  machinery  of  the  great  plants  of  the 
Western  Republic  were  working  for  the  Allies.  Ammunition,  guns,  all 
the  necessary  implements  and  munitions  of  war  were  manufactured  and 
transported  across  the  ocean,  until  the  whole  western  front  met  German 
attack  with  American  rifles,  American  ammunition.  The  vast  new 
armies  of  Britain  were  equipped  In  considerable  part  by  America,  and, 
thanks  to  this,  were  able  to  take  their  place  upon  the  western  front- 
months  in  advance  of  the  hour  that  they  could  have  arrived  save  for 
American  factories.   What  the  British  factories  had  done  for  the  Nori-h  ip 


NAVAL  HISTORY  37 

the  Civil  War,  those  of  the  United  States  did  for  Britain  and  France  in 
the  new  world  struggle. 

Nor  was  the  food  supply  less  important.  When  the  mobilization  of 
an  ever-growing  percentage  of  the  manhood  of  the  warring  nations 
brought  with  it  diminishing  food  supplies,  the  United  States,  with  Can- 
ada and  Australia,  supplied  the  Allied  deficit.  Thanks  to  the  British 
fleet  and  the  American  wheat  fields,  the  French  people  could  still  procure 
white  bread  long  months  after  it  had  disappeared  in  Germany,  and  pro- 
cure it  at  the  ante-bellum  price.  When  want  invaded  Germany,  and 
privation,  if  not  starvation,  arrived;  when  the  sufi^erings  of  the  masses 
due  to  the  blockade  were  very  great,  Britain  still  was  well  fed,  and 
France  had  not  ^'  et  begun  to  feel  that  need  of  economy  in  food  which 
came  only  with    iie  third  winter  of  the  war. 

III.   THE  NAPOLEONIC  PRECEDENT 

Because  of  this  situation;  because  the  sea  power  of  Britain  enabled 
America  to  feed  and  arm  the  Allies  and  thus  deprive  Germany  of  most  of 
the  advantage  due  to  superior  preparation  and  early  military  successes; 
because  the  people  of  Britain  and  France  escaped  hunger,  while  it  al- 
ready threatened  the  German  people;  because  sea  power,  in  fact,  made 
all  neutral  nations  the  allies  of  the  enemies  of  Germany,  the  sources  of 
the  arms  and  munitions  employed  to  destroy  German  armies,  Germany 
was  in  the  end  led  to  imitate  the  Napoleonic  policy,  which  led  to  the 
downfall  of  the  First  Empire. 

At  Jena,  Austerlitz,  Wagram,  Friedland,  Napoleon  won  victories 
which  brought  Prussia,  Austria,  Russia,  the  Continent  to  his  feet.  But 
ever  and  again  British  money  and  British  Influence  roused  a  new  coalition 
and  compelled  a  new  war.  And  it  was  the  effort  to  get  at  Britain  which 
led  him  to  Egypt,  to  Warsaw,  at  last  to  Moscow.  It  was  his  effort  to 
compel  the  nations  of  the  Continent  to  join  France  In  closing  their  ports 
to  British  ships  and  British  commerce,  thus  to  destroy  commercial 
Britain,  that  was  his  undoing. 

We  are  accustomed  to  think  that  it  was  the  insatiable  ambition  of 
Napoleon  which  led  him  to  seize  Hamburg  and  Danzig,  to  establish^ 


38  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

French  rule  along  the  Adriatic,  and  deprive  Austria  of  her  lUyrian  coast. 
But  the  purpose  of  the  great  Emperor  was  rather  to  lay  hands  upon  all 
the  doors  by  which  British  goods  reached  continental  ports.  His  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees  were  provoked  by  British  hostility  and  in  these  lay  the 
seeds  of  his  downfall.  To  get  at  Britain,  he  had  to  deprive  the  German 
and  Austrian  States  of  their  sea  front;  it  was  because  of  Russian  refusal 
to  accept  the  Napoleonic  policy  that  the  Moscow  campaign  was  pro- 
voked. The  long  and  deadly  wastage  of  the  war  in  Spain  was  alike  the 
consequence  of  a  desire  to  close  Spain  and  Portugal  to  British  ships,  and 
of  the  ability  of  the  British  themselves  to  transport  armies  to  the  Iberian 
peninsula. 

Seeking  to  isolate  Britain,  Napoleon  was  led  from  campaign  to  cam- 
paign, from  annexation  to  annexation.  He  was  brought  to  the  necessity 
of  destroying  the  commercial  life,  not  merely  or  primarily  of  France,  but 
of  Russia,  of  Prussia,  and  of  Austria;  and,  as  a  consequence,  Austria,  Rus- 
sia, and  Prussia  were  driven  inexorably  into  alliance  with  Britain.  And 
ultimately,  such  an  alliance,  at  Leipzig  and  Waterloo,  destroyed  Napoleon. 

In  precisely  the  same  fashion  the  German  situation  led  to  a  similar 
policy.  The  neutral  nations  had  become  the  arsenal  and  the  granary 
of  the  Allies.  It  was  Impossible  for  Germany,  acting  in  accordance  with 
International  law,  to  prevent  this.  It  was  the  unquestioned  right  of 
neutral  nations  to  trade  with  belligerents— it  was  not  their  fault  that  the 
British  fleet  had  closed  German  ports.  No  law,  no  conception  of  inter- 
national law,  warranted  Germany  In  asking  them  to  declare  an  embargo 
upon  munitions,  to  abandon  the  policy  Germany  had  pursued  as  recently 
as  during  the  South  African  War. 

And  Germany  could  not  blockade  Britain.  Her  sole  weapon  was  the 
submarine;  but  to  employ  the  submarine  necessitated  the  sinking  of 
neutral  as  well  as  belligerent  ships,  whether  carrying  contraband  or 
merely  engaged  In  lawful  trade  allowed  by  all  the  rules  of  civilized  war- 
fare. German  necessity,  which  had  led  German  armies  Into  Belgium  to 
strike  at  France  and  thus  insured  British  entrance  Into  the  war,  now  con- 
fronted a  new  obstacle,  which  carried  with  It  an  even  deadlier  peril,  since 
it  involved  the  ultimate  defeat  of  Germany,  so  her  statesmen  and 


NAVAL  HISTORY  39 

soldiers  reasoned,  if  Britain  in  security  could  arm  her  millions  and  feed 
her  population  with  American  meat  and  wheat. 

Thus  we  shall  see  Germany,  in  this  present  period,  led,  through  the 
direct  influence  of  British  sea  power,  to  one  deed  after  another,  to  one 
policy  after  another,  designed  to  interrupt  the  flow  of  munitions  and 
food  to  Britain,  provoked  by  the  shadow  of  hunger  at  home  while  her 
great  enemies  still  had  plenty,  but  calculated  to  rouse  the  neutral 
nations  of  the  earth,  and  destined,  in  the  end,  to  bring  the  United  States 
and  a  whole  powerful  group  of  other  neutrals  into  the  war  on  the  Allied 
side  and  thus  transform  neutrals  into  enemies.  By  adopting  a  course 
designed  to  deprive  Britain  and  France  of  the  benefits  flowing  from  inter- 
course with  these  neutrals,  Germany,  in  the  end,  made  war  with  neutrals 
inevitable. 

This  was  the  achievement  of  British  sea  power.  It  was,  ultimately, 
a  decisive  influence  in  the  progress  of  the  war.  It  did  produce  conditions 
which  led  Germany  to  attack  neutrals ;  it  did  bring  other  nations  into  the 
war  as  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium  had  mobilized  British  sentiment 
for  war.  But  it  was  not  until  a  later  phase  that  the  real  importance  of 
this  consequence  became  clear  to  the  world. 

Yet,  at  the  outset,  it  is  essential  to  see  the  German  conception.  Only 
by  a  rapid  dash  through  Belgium  could  Germany  hope  to  win  her  war 
as  she  meant  to  win  it.  Since  this  was  the  plain  fact,  Germany  disre- 
garded her  pledge,  ignored  the  rights  and  liberties  of  Belgium,  and  made 
her  progress  from  Liege  to  Mons  and  thence  to  the  very  gates  of  Paris. 
Her  necessity  justified,  to  German  minds,  that  wrong  to  Belgium  which 
was  incidental. 

When  the  end  of  the  first  land  campaign  had  failed  to  bring  a  German 
victory,  and  a  long  war  was  certain,  German  defeat  became  a  possibility 
if  the  United  States  and  the  other  neutrals  were  to  remain  the  sources  of 
Allied  munitions  and  weapons.  Germany  might  not  starve,  but  she  was 
sure  to  be  outgunned,  outmunitioned,  outnumbered,  if  she  failed  to 
achieve  a  decision  before  British  and  French  and  Russian  armies  could 
be  equipped  from  America,  while  British  and  French  millions  were  fed 
from  American  food  sources. 


40  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  sole  alternative  was  a  "ruthless"  submarine  war,  which  would 
destroy  British  merchant  marine  engaged  in  American  commerce  and 
so  terrify  neutral  and  particularly  American  shipping  that  it  would  re- 
frain from  entering  British  and  French  waters  and  bringing  food  and 
munitions  to  the  enemy.  And  as  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  Germany 
made  her  decision.  In  the  case  of  Belgium  she  risked  British  entrance 
into  the  war.  In  the  case  of  the  submarine  she  risked  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  and  of  other  states.  Again  the  German  people  and  the 
German  rulers  argued  themselves  into  the  belief  that  they  would  derive 
the  profit  without  encountering  the  peril  of  such  a  course.  Again  they 
deceived  themselves. 

The  submarine  war  upon  commerce  belongs  to  another  chapter,  but 
Its  genesis  is  In  the  successful  assertion  by  the  British  of  sea  power  In  the 
first  phase  of  the  war.  Inexorably  this  led  William  II  Into  the  fatal 
pathways  of  Napoleon  I.  Inevitably,  as  In  the  case  of  the  French  Em- 
peror, William  II  found  himself,  on  the  morrow  of  great  victories,  com- 
pelled to  deal  with  fresh  coalitions  of  foes.  Thus,  though  the  British 
armies  were  long  In  arriving,  though  France  had  to  bear  two  years  of 
agony  before  the  new  British  hosts  could  begin,  British  sea  power  exerted 
an  influence  quite  as  great  as  Mahan  had  forecast,  and  without  this 
British  aid  the  French  and  Russians  would  have  succumbed  almost  at 
the  start,  and  thereafter  whenever  it  had  been  withdrawn.  This  was 
Britain's  great  contribution  over  two  years  and  Its  value  cannot  be 
exaggerated. 

IV.      NAVAL  ENCOUNTERS 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  saw  the  British  fleet  take  Its  post  in  Scotch 
waters,  facing  the  German  ports.  For  the  first  days  and  weeks  the  whole 
world  awaited  a  Trafalgar  or  a  Salamis  at  sea,  as  it  watched  for  a  Water- 
loo or  a  Sedan  on  land.  But  the  German  fleet  was  too  Inferior  In 
strength  to  challenge  the  British  armada,  and  the  Grand  Fleet  under 
Jellicoe  dominated  the  North  Sea,  Not  until  the  still-remote  day  of 
Jutland  was  the  German  High  Seas  Fleet  to  venture  forth  within  range 
of  British  first-line  squadrons.  German  strategy  was  from  the  outset  to 
disclose  Itself  as  a  strategy  of  waiting,  a  strategy  which  had  for  its  chief 


BACKGROUND  OF  THE 
WAR    IN    PICTURES 


KAISER  GREETS  KAISER 

Germany  and  Austria,  the  two  faithful  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  salute  each 
other  in  the  persons  of  their  sovereigns,  Wilhelm  and  Franz  Joseph. 


THE   TWO   KAISERS 

DROPPING   THE   PILOT 

GROWTH    OF   THE   ENTENTE 

THE   CRIME   OF   SERAJEVO 


DROPPING  THE  PIL0T-TENNIP:L'S  FAMOUS  CARTOON 

A  clash  was  Inevitable  between  two  such  masterful  natures  as  those  of 
William  II  and  Bismarck.  The  ideas  of  the  old  man  had  been  principally 
confined  to  building  and  buttressing  the  strength,  first  of  Prussia,  then  of 
Germany,  within  her  own  borders.  The  young  man,  of  broader  vision, 
looked  beyond  the  seas  and  sought  in  other  lands  for  Germany's  place  in 
the  sun.     Bismarck  was  retired  in  1890,  two  years  after  William's  accession 


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TWO  STAUNCH  FRIENDS  AND  PROMOTERS  OF  THE  ENTENTE  CORDIALE 

President  Fallieres  of  France,  and  King  Edward  VH  of  England — father  of  the  present  King  and  uncle 
of  the  Kaiser.  "More  than  any  man  of  his  time  Edward  VII  feared  the  German  danger  and  more  than 
any  man  he  contributed  to  resolving  the  difficulties  between  France  and  his  own  country.  Many  Germans 
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CZAR  NICHOLAS  AND  PRESIDENT  POINCARE 


This  picture  is  evidence  of  a  political  friendship  warmly  cherished  between  the  Powers  to  the  east  and  west  of 
Germany.  Even  while  the  diplomatic  interchanges  of  the  Twelve  Days  (in  August,  1914)  were  in  progress,  President 
Poincare  of  France  was  returning  from  a  visit  to  the  Russian  Czar. 


THE  KAISER  WITH  A  FORMER  FRIEND-ALBERT  OF  BELGIUM 

i^The  Kaiser  in  former  years  took  such  delight  in  visiting  other  monarchs  that  he  was  sometimes  criticized  at  home 
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in  the  following  terms.  "On  my  travels  I  design  not  only  to  make  myself  acquainted  with  foreign  countries  and  in- 
stitutions, and  to  foster  friendly  relations  with  neighboring  rulers,  but  these  journeys,  which  have  often  been  misin- 
terpreted, have  high  value  in  enabling  me  to  observe  home  affairs  from  a  distance  and  submit  them  to  a  quiet  examina- 
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ARCHDUKE  FRANCIS  FERDINAND  (HEIR  TO  THE  AUSTRIAN  THRONE)- 

WITH  HIS  MORGANATIC  WIFE 

Both  wcie  killed  by  an  assassin's  bomb  at  Sarajevo,  Bosnia,  June  :8,  1914 


THE  ARREST  OF  THE  ASSASSIN 
Austria  asserted  that  his  act  was  inspired  by  the  Pan-Slavic  propaganda  in  Serbia  and  declared  war.     Russia  stood 
behind  Serbia      Germany  stood  behind  Austria.     Then  came  Armageddon. 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  49 

end  completely,  the  crime  slipped  from  the  headHnes  of  the  newspapers 
and  the  minds  of  the  public.  On  the  surface,  European  politics  seemed 
in  the  most  tranquil  state  in  the  long  and  troubled  decade  that  had 
passed.  A  British  fleet  visited  Kiel;  the  French  President  set  out  for 
Petrograd;  there  was  not  a  ripple  on  the  surface  of  the  diplomatic 
waters.  This  was,  however,  only  the  calm  before  the  storm.  On  July 
23d  Austria  sent  to  Serbia  the  most  formidable  ultimatum  that  one 
state  had  ever  addressed  to  another. 

The  ultimatum  itself — in  addition  to  prescribing  rules  and  regulations 
with  reference  to  anti-Austrian  propaganda  and  propagandists  in  Ser- 
bia; in  addition  to  calling  for  the  disbanding  of  patriotic  societies  with 
aims  inimical  to  Austria  and  the  punishment  of  their  leaders,  who  were 
also  servants  of  the  Crown  in  the  army  and  in  the  civil  service — demanded 
that  Austrian  officials  should  be  associated  with  the  Serbian  in  the  car- 
rying out  of  the  tasks  that  were  set.  To  this  ultimatum  there  was  added 
a  time-limit  of  forty-eight  hours. 

Here,  then,  on  July  23  d,  was  a  new  crisis,  graver  than  the  three 
that  had  preceded,  because,  instead  of  abstract  questions  of  territory 
and  commerce,  there  were  now  raised  the  concrete  questions  of  national 
honour  and  dynastic  interest  which  were  involved  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo. 
Ostensibly  seeking  to  punish  agitators,  whose  activities  had  led  to  the 
killing  of  the  heir  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  thrones;  ostensibly  aiming  to 
put  an  end  to  an  agitation  injurious  to  Austrian  safety,  the  Government 
of  Vienna  had,  in  fact,  challenged  Russia,  the  avowed  protector  of  Serbia. 

If  Russia  did  not  now  step  forward  to  defend  Serbia  it  was  plain 
that  the  kingdom  would  fall  under  the  weight  of  Austrian  arms,  or  if  it 
bowed  to  Austrian  demands  would  pass  actually,  if  not  nominally,  under 
the  influence  of  Vienna.  If  Russia  stood  aside  and  permitted  this  to  hap- 
pen, then  her  own  prestige  In  the  Balkans  and  among  the  Slav  peoples 
of  Europe  was  gone.  It  was  Bosnia  over  again,  but  Bosnia  with  a 
new  and  still-more-disturbing  set  of  complexities,  for  in  annexing  Bosnia 
Austria  had  only  transformed  the  name  under  which  she  exercised 
authority  In  Bosnia,  but  now  she  would  transform  the  actual  condition 
under  which  Serbia  lived  from  independence  to  servitude. 


50  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

And  if  Russia  did  step  forward  to  protect  Serbia,  then  she,  by  this 
act,  asserted  that  she  claimed  the  right  to  exercise  an  actual  protec- 
tion over  Serbia;  she  claimed  the  right  to  speak  for  Serbia;  she  extended 
Russian  influence  and  Russian  power  to  the  very  shores  of  the  Danube, 
and  from  Belgrad,  as  from  the  Galician  frontier,  threatened  the  integ- 
rity of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  If  Austrian  will  prevailed, 
Serbia  would  become  a  Hapsburg  appendage,  but  not  less  clear,  once 
the  issue  was  raised,  was  the  fact  that  if  Russia  intervened  and  prevailed, 
Austrian  safety  was  compromised  and  her  prestige  destroyed. 

II.    THE   AUSTRIAN   CASE 

Stripped  of  all  detail  the  fact  was  that  Serbia,  If  not  through  direct 
governmental  action  at  least  by  general  popular  agitation  and  with 
the  benevolent  blindness  of  the  government,  had  plotted  to  undermine 
Austrian  unity.  To  be  sure  the  movement  had  its  origin  in  the  fact  that 
Austria  contained  some  million  of  Slavs,  who  were  Serb  by  race,  and 
perhaps  desired  to  become  subjects  of  King  Peter.  It  was  a  situation 
on  all  fours  with  that  which  existed  In  Italy,  before  the  Austrian 
war  with  France.  But,  whatever  the  moral  title  of  a  nation  to  Its  own 
territories  and  subjects,  no  nation  can  permit  Itself  to  be  destroyed  by 
outside  intrigue  and  no  nation  will  voluntarily  surrender  provinces  and 
citizens. 

When  France  undertook  to  assist  In  the  liberation  of  northern  Italy 
from  Hapsburg  rule,  war  resulted,  as  It  was  bound  to  result.  If  Russia 
now  asserted  on  behalf  of  Serbia  the  same  doctrine  that  Napoleon  III 
had  practised  with  regard  to  Sardinia,  Austria  would  have  to  fight.  The 
only  difference  was  that  Austria  now  raised  the  Issue  herself.  She  did 
not  raise  the  Issue  until  the  heir  to  the  Hapsburg  throne  had  been 
murdered,  although  she  had  proposed  to  raise  It  ten  months  before  the 
crime ;  but,  having  raised  it,  her  own  safety,  her  own  integrity,  her  own 
existence  as  a  Great  Power  were  at  stake. 

And  if  one  look  squarely  at  the  facts,  there  Is  little  question  that  she 
was  bound  to  raise  the  Issue,  because  this  Pan-Slav  agitation  was 
destroying  the  very  foundations  of  her  national  existence.     The  right 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  51 

of  ten  million  Germans  and  as  many  Magyars  to  rule  twenty-five  million 
Slavs  may  be  questioned  on  the  moral  side,  but  the  legal  and  inter- 
national right  of  a  nation  to  preserve  itself  cannot  be  questioned,  save 
on  the  basis  of  some  law  higher  than  that  recognized  by  nations  in  their 
common  intercourse. 

Austrian  treatment  of  the  Slavs  within  her  boundaries,  and  her 
treatment  of  the  neighbouring  Slav  states,  had  been  brutal  and  stupid. 
She  had  gained  their  hatred  and  she  had  deserved  it.  She  had  sought 
in  the  Balkan  wars  to  thwart  their  growth  and  her  policy  had  gone 
bankrupt.  But  if  her  mistakes  had  gained  her  deserved  hatred,  and 
her  failures  had  enabled  the  very  state  that  hated  her  most  to  menace 
her  existence,  it  was  not  less  true  that  she  was  bound  to  defend  her 
existence  and  her  unity. 

In  the  minds  of  many,  Serbia  has  come  to  share  the  glory  of  Belgium 
and  to  occupy  the  niche  of  a  martyr  quite  as  completely.  But  the 
idea  is  fallacious.  Belgium  threatened  no  one,  plotted  injury  to  no 
one  of  her  neighbours,  permitted  no  propaganda  of  sedition  which 
menaced  the  security  and  order  of  either  France  or  Germany,  for  example, 
to  be  conducted  from  within  her  boundaries.  Serbia  did  all  these  things. 
She  did  them  as  Sardinia  carried  on  the  risorginiento;  she  did  them 
in  the  name  and  in  the  fact  of  patriotism;  she  sought  to  liberate  and 
unite  the  mass  of  her  race,  but  this  liberation  was  predicated  on  the 
collapse  of  Austria. 

If  there  had  been  no  crime  at  Serajevo,  it  was  inevitable  that  Austria 
would  presently  take  the  sword  against  Serbia,  because  only  by  taking 
the  sword  could  she  defend  herself.  But  it  was  equally  inevitable 
that  Russia,  bound  by  race  and  religion  to  the  Serbs,  animated  as  she 
had  always  been  by  the  keenest  race  sympathy  for  her  fellow  Slavs, 
would  defend  Serbia,  who  had  become  her  soldier  on  the  Danube,  her 
ally  against  Austria's  dreams  of  an  advance  to  the  ^gean.  Actually 
Serbia  was  only  a  detail  in  the  rivalry  between  Romanoff  and  Hapsburg, 
which  was  several  centuries  old. 

Bismarck  himself  had  hesitated  in  making  an  alliance  with  Austria, 
because  he  foresaw  that  this  meant  to  inherit  the  rivalry  between  the 


52  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

two  nations  in  the  Balkans.  His  influence  at  Vienna  had  sufficed  to 
keep  peace,  but  his  support  of  Austria  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  had 
made  a  Franco-Russian  alliance  inevitable.  For  the  moment,  for  his 
own  time,  he  had  met  this  by  expanding  his  alliance  to  include  Italy, 
by  keeping  on  friendly  terms  with  Britain,  and  by  executing  a  "treaty 
of  reassurance"  with  Russia.  But  it  had  needed  the  skill  of  Bismarck 
to  keep  the  balance  true  and  the  successors  of  Bismarck  had  neither  his 
skill  nor  his  resources.  Italy  and  Austria  were  natural  enemies  and 
he  had  made  them  allies,  Russia  and  Austria  were  natural  rivals  and  he 
had  kept  them  at  peace  with  each  other.  But  less  than  two  decades 
after  he  laid  down  the  reins,  natural  tendencies  had  overcome  fortuitous 
circumstances. 

The  peril  of  the  Balkan  situation  was  no  longer  the  peril  of  a  war 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  or  between  Austria  and  Germany  on  the 
one  hand  and  France  and  Russia  on  the  other,  with  Italy  a  possible 
ally  of  the  Central  Powers.  The  challenge  of  the  Kaiser  to  Britain 
had  brought  Britain  back  to  the  Continent.  France  herself  would  have 
hesitated  in  the  early  nineties  to  fight  on  the  Serbian  issue  for  her  Russian 
ally.  But  the  French  spirit  had  undergone  a  new  birth  since  Tangier 
and  Agadir. 

Since  the  war  came,  volumes  have  been  published  devoted  simply  to 
proving  upon  which  of  the  several  nations  the  responsibility  for  the 
conflict  rests  and  to  demonstrating  that  one  or  the  other  of  the  nations, 
during  the  fateful  twelve  days  before  the  storm  broke  in  its  full  fury, 
actually  desired  war,  or  served  the  cause  of  peace  more  loyally,  than  its 
neighbours. 

Yet  it  seems  probable  that,  in  the  long  time  hereafter,  those  details 
will  be  forgotten  by  the  historian,  who  will  perceive  that  the  twelve  days 
were  of  little  meaning,  that  they  marked  a  period  after  real  hope  of 
peace  had  expired,  that  the  whole  system  under  which  Europe  had 
lived  for  so  long  had  been  destroyed,  and  that  the  statesmen  who  laboured 
so  frantically  in  the  closing  hours  were  actually  as  impotent  as  medicine 
men  who  hurl  incantations  and  invoke  charms  to  check  the  approach 
of  a  cyclone. 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  S3 

III.    SIR  EDWARD  GREY 

In  the  Albanian  time  Europe  liad  permitted  Sir  Edward  Grey  to 
act  as  its  agent.  He  had  passed  from  one  group  to  the  other,  persuading 
Russia  to  resign  Scutari  to  the  new  Kingdom  of  Albania,  wheedling 
Austria  into  consenting  that  Dibra  should  be  Serbian.  Austria  and  Italy 
for  once  were  agreed,  both  seeking  to  preserve  from  Serb  and  Greek  alike 
that  Albania  each  hoped  to  inherit.  Neither  Russia  nor  Germany  was 
in  a  state  of  readiness  for  war,  and  France  was,  as  she  continued  through 
the  critical  days  of  19 14,  willing  to  serve  the  cause  of  peace  to  her  limit, 
provided  it  did  not  interfere  with  her  duty  as  an  ally  of  Russia. 

When  the  Serbian  crisis  came.  Sir  Edward  Grey — still  under  the  in- 
fluence of  his  success  over  Albania,  still  convinced  that  he  had  to  deal 
with  a  question  that  could  be  adjusted  as  the  Albanian  had  been — 
began  that  earnest  and  industrious  campaign  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
the  world,  which  remains  the  admiration  of  the  Briton — and  the  target 
of  the  German.  From  first  to  last  he  had,  in  this  campaign,  the  sup- 
port of  the  French  and  the  Italian  statesmen;  he  had  the  assent  of 
Russia  to  all  the  propositions  which  he  made;  but  never,  to  the  closing 
hour,  does  he  seem  to  have  grasped  the  fact  that  he  was  in  the  presence 
of  a  question  which  could  not  be  settled  by  discussion  about  the 
green  table,  since  it  involved  the  safety  of  Austria  and  the  honour  of 
Russia. 

The  whole  burden  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  words,  messages,  explana- 
tions, discloses  his  conviction  that  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe  it 
was  necessary  to  persuade  Austria  to  withdraw  her  ultimatum,  to  sus- 
pend her  action  against  Serbia,  to  consent  to  submit  to  the  Concert 
of  Europe  the  question  between  Serbia  and  herself,  which  was  the 
question  of  her  own  integrity  aggravated  by  the  new  problem  raised 
by  the  murder  of  the  Archduke. 

In  the  very  nature  of  things  Russia  was  prepared  to  consent  to  any 
arrangement  that  spared  Serbia,  but  any  arrangement  that  spared 
Serbia  and  submitted  the  Austro-Serbian  question  to  the  Concert  of 
Europe  vindicated  Russia's  assertion  of  a  right  to  protect  Serbia  and 


54  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  bound  to  constitute  a  moral  victory  for  Russia  and  a  new  blow  to 
Austrian  safety.  Nor  could  Austria,  remembering  the  experience  of 
Germany  at  Algeciras,  anticipate  a  victory  in  any  new  international 
gathering. 

To  Germany  Sir  Edward  Grey  continued  to  address  appeals  to 
intervene  to  restrain  Austrian  action.  Conceivably  it  had  been  Ger- 
many who  had  moved  Austria  to  action,  to  the  despatch  of  the  ulti- 
matum, but  of  this  there  is  as  yet  no  sufficing  proof.  Unmistakably  it  lay 
within  the  power  of  the  German  Government  by  a  word,  by  a  gesture, 
to  deprive  Austria  of  the  assurance  German  support  gave.  But  this 
would  have  been  in  fact  a  desertion  of  her  one  faithful  ally  at  the 
moment  of  deadly  peril,  and  it  would  have  foreshadowed  the  collapse 
of  the  Austro-German  Alliance,  if  it  had  not  been  but  the  prelude  to  the 
collapse  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  already  shaken  by  Slav  intrigue  within 
and  without. 

Unless  Russia  abandoned  her  championship  of  Serbia,  or  Austria 
consented  to  recall  her  ultimatum  and  leave  to  Europe  the  task  of 
disciplining  her  little  neighbour — a  task  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  fragile 
Concert — war  was  bound  to  follow.  And  there  never  was  any  chance 
that  either  Austria  or  Russia  would  surrender.  When  Sir  Edward 
Grey  asked  Germany  to  restrain  Austria,  Germany  with  perfect  justice 
retorted  by  asking  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  restrain  Russia.  Always  the 
British  Minister  seems  to  have  been  obsessed  with  the  immediate 
present,  always  the  action  of  Austria  in  issuing  the  ultimatum  seems 
to  arouse  his  indignation  and  awaken  his  protest,  but  to  the  fatal 
chain  of  events  that  had  made  Serbia  a  deadly  peril  to  Austrian  existence 
he  gave  no  thought. 

Actually  he  accomplished  nothing  for  good  or  for  evil,  actually  he 
sought  peace  by  suggesting  temporary  devices  that  were  of  no  value 
and  could  be  of  no  avail  in  the  presence  of  the  storm  that  was  rising. 
When  the  storm  broke  he  found  himself  without  a  policy,  so  far  as  his 
own  Government  was  concerned,  but  bound  by  honour,  if  not  by  treaty, 
to  stand  with  France  and  with  Russia.  Nor  was  he  alone  bound  by 
honour.     He  had  failed  beyond  all  forgiveness,  together  with  his  as- 


LORD  ROBERTS  OF  KANDAHAR 

As  the  last  Gurman  attacks  before  Ypres  were  failing,  there  died  within  the  British  lines  the  one  British 
soldier  who  had  foreseen  what  was  now  happening,  whose  words  had  been  greeted  with  sneers,  whose  voice 
had  been  almost  silenced  by  the  cheap  and  empty  optimism  of  Liberal  and  Radical  politicians.  An  old 
and  broken  man  he  had  gone  to  France  at  the  moment  of  the  crisis,  to  cheer  on  his  well-loved  Indian  troops. 
Lord  Roberts  died  on  the  eve  of  a  great  victory  which  saved  his  own  country  trom  the  worst  he  had  feared 
for  it 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  57 

sociates,  in  not  warning  the  British  people  of  the  danger  that  had  for  ten 
years  been  growing,  but  he  now  saw  with  utmost  clarity  that  a  Germany 
victorious  over  France  would  be  a  Germany  which  Britain  could  not 
resist  and  could  not  expect  would  refrain  from  attack. 

German  invasion  of  Belgium  saved  Sir  Edward  Grey,  it  saved  Eng- 
land, because  it  supplied  a  moral  issue  and  a  moral  impulse  which  served 
to  enlist  British  effort  until  the  nation  at  last  perceived  the  material 
interests,  the  national  existence,  that  were  at  stake.  But  if  the  successor 
of  Bismarck  will  hereafter  have  to  answer  to  his  own  people  and  in  history 
for  having  involved  Germany  in  a  war  against  three  great  nations  at 
once,  the  successor  of  Pitt  and  Beaconsfield  will  be  indicted  for  having 
brought  Britain  to  the  edge  of  Armageddon  without  permitting  the  Brit- 
ish people  to  suspect  that  their  life  and  their  Empire  were  in  jeopardy. 

Having  entered  into  an  arrangement  with  France,  by  which  the 
French  fleet  was  to  guard  British  interests  in  the  Mediterranean  while 
the  British  fleet  concentrated  against  the  German  menace  in  the  North 
Sea,  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  not  desert  France  at  the  opening  of  the  war, 
even  if  there  were  no  written  alliance.  But  if  the  British  people  had  not 
been  aroused  by  the  invasion  of  Belgium  it  may  be  questioned  whether 
Sir  Edward  Grey  could  have  persuaded  his  Government  to  make  good 
its  obligations  or  his  fellow  countrymen  to  honour  their  Government's 
commitments. 

It  is  difficult  to  find  any  warrant  in  Sir  Edward's  course  for  the  storm 
of  abuse  that  Germans  have  directed  at  him  as  a  monster  of  bad  faith, 
but  equally  difficult  is  the  task  for  one,  writing  with  such  facts  as  are 
now  at  hand,  to  escape  the  belief  that  he  acted  with  a  blindness  and  a 
fatuity  almost  passing  human  comprehension.  His  party  associates 
had  kept  Britain  blind  to  the  truth  of  world  affairs  for  a  decade,  and 
when  the  storm  arrived  there  was  lacking  any  national  understanding 
which  could  give  force  to  the  decisions  of  a  Minister,  at  last  aware  of 
the  deadly  peril  of  his  country.  He  knew  England  must  stand  with 
France  to  save  her  own  life,  but  until  Germany  invaded  Belgium,  he  was 
destitute  of  any  resource  by  which  he  could  reveal  to  his  fellow  country- 
men the  imminence  and  the  magnitude  of  their  peril. 


58  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Those  who  saw  Sir  Edward  in  the  closing  hours,  when  the  World 
War  had  become  inescapable,  think  of  him  as  one  who  revealed  in  every 
word  and  act  the  emotion  of  a  man  who  had  seen  the  hope  and  the  work 
of  a  lifetime  gone  suddenly  to  dust  and  ashes.  He  had  believed  that  a 
settlement  with  Germany,  which  would  lay  forever  the  peril  of  what  was 
now  to  occur,  was  possible.  In  the  Bosnia  time,  in  the  Agadir  crisis, 
at  the  Conference  of  London,  he  had  not  only  striven  to  avoid  war,  but 
had  found  cause  for  hope  that,  since  war  had  been  avoided  on  these 
three  occasions,  the  cloud  that  had  hung  over  Europe  so  long  might  be 
finally  dissipated. 

His  optimism  had  led  him  far  afield.  It  had  persuaded  him  to  sacri- 
fice the  Balkan  Alliance  at  the  Conference  of  London,  when  he  accepted 
the  Austro-German  programme  for  Albania.  It  was  to  cost  his  own 
country  dearly  in  the  first  years  of  the  war,  which  found  her  unprepared, 
because  a  Liberal  Government,  under  Sir  Edward's  influence,  had  turned 
a  deaf  ear  to  all  the  warnings  of  those  who  saw  Europe  as  it  was  and 
not  through  the  golden  haze  of  lofty  but  insubstantial  dreams  of  world 
peace.  Yet  complete  as  had  been  his  failure,  absolute  as  had  been  his 
misreading  of  the  essential  facts  of  his  own  time,  when  he  occupied  a 
post  of  honour  and  responsibility,  no  one  could  doubt  the  sincerity  of  his 
purposes  or  the  tragedy,  the  personal  tragedy,  that  came  with  the  de- 
struction of  all  his  lifework. 

IV.    THE  AUSTRIAN  ULTIMATUM 

The  Austrian  ultimatum  was  despatched  to  Serbia  on  July  23d,  and 
it  carried  a  time-limit  of  forty-eight  hours.  When  it  was  sent,  the 
President  of  France,  with  the  important  members  of  the  French  Cabinet, 
were  on  the  sea,  returning  from  Russia.  The  Irish  crisis  in  Britain 
seemed  to  be  about  to  end  in  civil  war.  The  Kaiser  was  in  Norwegian 
waters.  There  was  no  Russian  ambassador  in  Vienna.  The  Caillaux 
trial  was  dominating  French  attention  and  a  French  senator,  speaking 
in  his  place,  had  just  called  attention  to  grave  defects  in  French  military 
organization. 

In  only  one  detail — but  this  a  vitally  important  one — did  chance 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  59 

favour  the  Triple  Entente.  The  British  fleet  had  been  mobiHzed  for  its 
annual  manoeuvres  shortly  before  the  crisis  came  and,  on  a  hint  from 
Italy,  received  in  the  third  week  of  July,  demobilization  was  post- 
poned. Thus  British  sea  power  was  on  a  war  footing  at  the  crucial 
moment.  If  Germany  had  ever  planned  a  raid  on  British  shores  in  the 
first  days  of  an  Anglo-German  conflict,  as  British  naval  authorities 
believe — such  a  dash  as  the  Japanese  made  at  Port  Arthur  in  the  opening 
hours  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War — the  scheme  was  frustrated  by  the 
accidental  posture  of  British  fleets  and  the  timely  Italian  hint. 

On  Friday,  July  24th,  Austria  informed  Russia  that  she  did  not 
have  any  intention  to  annex  Serbian  territory,  and  Russia  replied  by 
asking  an  extension  of  the  time-limit  attached  to  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia. 
This  was  refused  by  Austria  on  Saturday,  the  day  on  which  Russia  issued 
her  first  warning  note,  published  in  the  Petrograd  press,  an  official 
assurance  that  Russia  would  not  remain  indiff^erent  to  the  fate  of  Serbia, 
which,  through  its  Crown  Prince,  now  acting  as  Regent,  had  appealed 
to  the  Czar  on  the  preceding  day. 

On  this  same  day,  Saturday,  July  25th,  just  within  the  time-limit, 
Serbia  sent  a  reply  to  Austria,  which  contained  a  surrender  on  most 
points  and  an  agreement  to  submit  the  rest  to  arbitration.  Austria 
forthwith  declared  the  Serbian  response  to  be  unsatisfactory  and  with- 
drew her  minister  from  Belgrad. 

On  Sunday,  July  26th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  began  his  task  of  accom- 
modating the  world  crisis.  He  suggested  that  the  case  between  Russia 
and  Austria  be  left  to  the  mediation  of  the  four  Great  Powers  not  di- 
rectly concerned,  acting  through  their  ambassadors  in  Vienna  and 
Petrograd.  These  nations  were,  of  course.  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
and  Germany.  Russia,  having  first  suggested  conversations  directly  be- 
tween Vienna  and  Petrograd,  a  suggestion  subsequently  rejected  by  Aus- 
tria, accepted  Sir  Edward's  proposal  but  Germany  rejected  it  on  the 
next  day. 

On  Monday,  July  27th,  when  Germany  had  rejected  his  proposal, 
Sir  Edward  invited  the  German  Government  to  present  a  formula  of 
mediation  of  its  own.    This  elicited  no  response  from  Berlin,  because 


6o  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Germany  had  already  on  July  25th  invited  France  and  Great  Britain  to 
restrain  Russia,  that  is,  to  urge  Russia  to  stand  aside  and  permit  Aus- 
tria to  punish  Serbia.  This  proposal,  described  by  the  Germans  as 
"localization"  of  the  disturbance,  was  rejected  both  by  France  and  by 
Great  Britain. 

A  collapse  of  all  preliminary  efforts  of  Sir  Edward  follows  the  decla- 
ration of  war  upon  Serbia,  by  Austria,  on  Tuesday,  July  28th,  as  fighting 
commenced  forthwith.  Meantime  the  Kaiser,  having  returned  from 
Norway  on  Sunday  night,  now  addressed  his  first  message  to  the  Czar 
urging  him  to  permit  Austria  to  discipline  Serbia.  To  this  the  Czar 
responded  the  next  day  by  urging  that  the  whole  matter  be  submitted 
to  The  Hague,  a  suggestion  never  answered  by  the  Kaiser. 

Meantime  the  question  of  mobilization  had  become  acute.  Aus- 
tria had  been  partially  mobilizing  against  Serbia,  and  as  early  as  July 
25th  the  Russian  Council  had  considered  partial  mobilization  against 
Austria,  at  the  same  time  informing  the  German  Government  that 
there  was  no  hostile  meaning  for  Germany  in  the  approaching  mobili- 
zation. 

Now  on  the  29th,  Germany  for  the  first  time  began  to  sound  Great 
Britain  on  the  possibility  of  British  neutrality  if  war  should  come. 
Her  proposals  were  promptly  rejected  by  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

By  Friday,  July  30th,  general  Russian  mobilization  was  proclaimed, 
but  at  the  eleventh  hour  Sir  Edward  Grey  suggested  that  the  operations 
of  Austria  against  Serbia  should  be  recognized  as  a  punitive  expedition 
and  that  Austria,  having  reached  a  point  within  Serbian  territory  fixed 
by  agreement,  should  permit  her  future  course  to  be  submitted  to  a  con- 
ference of  Powers.  Austria  assented  to  a  portion  of  this  suggestion  and 
for  the  first  time  manifested  a  decided  change  in  spirit.      Russia  agreed. 

But  on  July  31st  Germany  addressed  an  ultimatum  to  Russia  de- 
manding that  Russia  desist  from  her  mobilization  within  twelve  hours. 
This  was  naturally  ignored  by  Russia  and  on  Saturday,  August  ist,  Ger- 
many declared  war  upon  Russia.  A  general  war  now  became  inevitable 
and  the  only  question  that  remained  was  as  to  the  course  of  Britain  and 
Italy. 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  6i 

V.  Germany's  course 

In  all  this  period  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  British  and  German  states- 
men, alike,  pursued  a  course  aimed,  ostensibly  and  probably  honestly, 
at  averting  a  general  war.  But  Germany  insisted  that  the  war  could 
only  be  averted  by  action  of  Britain  and  France  in  restraining  Russia 
from  intervening  in  the  quarrel  between  Serbia  and  Austria,  while 
Britain  insisted  that  Austria  should  be  compelled,  by  her  German  ally, 
to  submit  her  dispute  with  Serbia  to  a  European  conference  and  asked 
Germany  to  restrain  Austria. 

Such  purposes  were  irreconcilable  from  the  start  and  failed  as  they 
were  bound  to  fail  unless  one  of  the  two  great  nations  involved  was 
prepared  to  yield  everything,  as  France  had  yielded  at  Tangier,  and 
Russia  in  the  Bosnia  time.  Action  by  the  German  Emperor,  in  the 
sense  requested  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  would  have  brought  down  upon 
him  far  more  criticism  at  home  than  had  beaten  upon  him  in  the  Agadir 
time.  Peace  was  no  longer  to  be  preserved  by  a  compromise  between 
the  two  groups  of  nations;  the  sole  chance  of  avoiding  war  from  July 
23d  onward  was  by  the  surrender  of  one  of  the  groups  and  this,  possible 
in  1905  and  1909,  was  unthinkable  in  1914. 

Germany's  course  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  her  relation  to 
the  efforts  to  preserve  peace  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  has  suffered 
naturally  from  the  odium  that  justly  attaches  to  the  manner  in  which 
she  acted,  once  the  conflict  had  begun,  both  in  invading  Belgium  and  in 
the  manner  in  which  she  conducted  operations  on  Belgian  and  French 
soil,  as  well  as  on  the  high  seas.  This  was  inevitable  if  not  entirely  logical. 
But  certainly  she  was  as  fully  entitled  to  support  Austria  as  was  France 
to  support  Russia.  France  never  considered  demanding  that  Russia 
should  abandon  Serbia,  and  it  was  equally  unreasonable  to  expect  Ger- 
many to  compel  Austria  to  refrain  from  abolishing  the  Serbian  menace, 
once  Austria  had  so  admirable  an  issue  as  the  assassination  of  the  Arch- 
duke furnished. 

The  fact  that  Germany  alone  was  ready  when  the  war  came  has  con- 
tributed to  creating  the  conviction  that  she  alone  wished  it.     It  is 


62  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

unmistakable  that  for  twenty  years  she  had  proclaimed  her  purpose, 
through  her  acts,  to  modify  the  status  quo;  she  had  challenged  Britain 
on  the  sea,  she  had  assailed  France  through  Morocco,  and  backed  Austria 
against  Russia.  Her  teachers  and  soldiers  had  proclaimed  that  only 
through  a  victorious  war  could  Germany  attain  her  rightful  place  in  the 
sun.  This  was  strange  doctrine  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  but  familiar 
doctrine  in  the  preceding  centuries  that  had  seen  the  rise  of  France 
and  Britain.  What  is  essential  is  that  it  be  recognized  that  millions 
of  Germans  held  this  doctrine.  It  was  a  doctrine  that  Europe 
had  resisted  over  years  when  Napoleon  applied  it,  when  Louis  XIV 
asserted  it,  when  Charles  V  employed  it.  Europe  was  bound  to 
oppose  it  now,  but  in  the  larger  view  of  history  it  will  doubtless  take 
its  place  beside  the  other  efforts  of  great  races  to  revive  the  Roman 
tradition  and  use  their  superior  organization  and  unity  to  dominate 
a  continent. 

That  Germany  actually  procured  the  war,  in  the  critical  days  of 
July,  is  as  yet  a  mere  unsupported  allegation ;  that  her  whole  course  since 
the  present  Kaiser  came  to  the  throne  had  made  the  war  Inevitable,  Is 
hardly  to  be  mistaken.  That  the  language  of  her  teachers  and  her 
scholars,  the  words  of  her  Emperor,  and  the  frequent  utterances  of  her 
official  spokesmen  had  ended  by  convincing  the  statesmen  and  several  of 
the  peoples  of  Europe  that  Germany  was  seeking  world  power — thereby 
bringing  together  nations  whose  unity,  once  achieved,  threatened  her 
interests,  her  legitimate  interests,  perhaps  all  her  hopes  and  ambitions — ■ 
certainly,  Is  manifest. 

But  in  all  this  the  Incidents  of  the  days  preceding  the  war 
are  of  minor  consequence.  We  may  see  and  believe  that  the 
war  was  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  new  visions  and  pur- 
poses of  the  German  people,  but  it  Is  difficult  not  to  see  and  to 
believe  that  the  actual  occasion  of  the  outbreak  was  accidental  and 
that  the  decision  for  war  rather  than  surrender  had  already  been 
reached,  not  by  one  but  by  all  nations  before  Sir  Edward  Grey  under- 
took to  perform  that  task  at  which  Mrs.  Partington  had  failed  with 
equal  honour  to  herself. 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  63 

VI.    BRITAIN   AND    GERMANY 

Something  less  than  a  hundred  hours  separate  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war  upon  Russia  from  the  British  declaration  despatched  to 
Germany  after  midnight  on  August  4th.  In  this  time  the  real  drama 
concerns  only  Britain  and  Germany,  for  Italy  in  due  course  proclaimed 
her  neutrality  while  France  affirmed  her  fidelity  to  her  Russian  ally. 

In  these  momentous  hours  the  whole  play  of  German  diplomacy  was 
to  keep  Britain  out  of  the  conflict,  for  reasons  too  obvious  to  need  men- 
tion. And  it  should  be  remarked  that  not  only  did  Germany  have  good 
reason  to  believe  that  she  would  succeed,  but  also  that  she  came  desper- 
ately near  to  accomplishing  her  purpose,  as  will  be  disclosed  when  the 
history  of  what  took  place  in  London  on  August  2d  at  last  sees  the  light 
of  day. 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  role  in  this  period  is  also  plain.  He  knew  that, 
not  because  of  Belgium,  not  because  of  sympathy  for  Albert's  kingdom  or 
responsibility  for  its  integrity,  not  because  of  unwritten  but  potent 
claims  of  honour  binding  Britain  to  France,  must  his  country  enter  the 
war.  Now  at  last  he  perceived  that  it  had  become  a  matter  of  life  or  death 
for  his  own  nation  and  that  a  German  victory  and  the  destruction  of 
France  would  leave  Germany  an  enemy  greater  than  Napoleon  had  been, 
and  more  menacing  than  any  foe  England  had  known  in  her  long  his- 
tory. Unmistakably  his  course  was  to  find  the  cause  on  which  his  na- 
tion could  enter,  just  as  Germany  sought  to  abolish  all  causes. 

In  this  situation  Sir  Edward's  position  was  excessively  difficult. 
The  Cabinet  in  which  he  sat  was  by  no  means  resolved  to  fight.  Some 
of  its  members  were  frankly  opposed  to  standing  with  France;  others 
were,  to  say  the  least,  doubtful.  Strong  Liberal  newspapers,  on  which 
the  majority  party  relied  for  support,  openly  proclaimed  that  there  was 
no  reason  for  British  participation.  The  country  at  large  had  no  inkling 
of  the  actual  European  situation  and,  thanks  to  Liberal-Radical  rule 
for  nearly  a  decade,  had  been  taught  to  regard  all  discussion  of  the  Ger- 
man menace  as  without  other  warrant  than  domestic  political  exigency 
might  supply.     In  the  critical  hour  Britain  was  asleep  and  Sir  Edward's 


64  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

associates  divided  as  to  their  duty  and  paralyzed  by  the  lack  of  any 
popular  emotion  which  might  supply  a  warrant  for  Governmental 
action. 

From  this  terrible  dilemma  Germany  rescued  Sir  Edward  by  her  de- 
cision to  strike  at  France  through  Belgium.  But  no  one  can  read  the  va- 
rious documents  without  feeling  that  for  him  Belgium  was  a  pretext  rather 
than  a  policy.  The  right  and  the  duty  of  Britain  to  defend  Belgium  were 
manifest,  but  it  was  always  as  essential  to  British  interest  and  policy 
that  France  should  be  saved  and  only  a  sacrifice  of  British  safety  could 
have  resulted,  if  Sir  Edward,  lacking  the  Belgian  issue,  had  been  unable 
to  find  some  other  on  which  he  could  bring  his  nation  to  the  point  of 
war.  Nor  is  it  less  plain  that  the  moment  France  was  involved  in  the 
war,  the  commitments  of  the  British  Government  in  the  matter  of  the 
fleets  bound  Britain  to  stand  by  the  Republic,  no  matter  what  course 
Germany  should  take — short  of  guaranteeing  to  respect  the  integrity 
of  France,  her  colonies  and  her  coasts,  and  to  refrain  from  attacking 
France. 

This  was  clearly  perceived  by  Lord  Lansdowne,  who  had  negotiated 
the  Anglo-French  Convention  of  1904  and,  on  the  "black  Sunday," 
when  British  Liberalism  stood  aghast  and  shaken  before  the  abyss, 
he  joined  with  Mr.  Balfour  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Asquith  affirming  the  belief, 
which  was  the  opinion  of  the  whole  Tory  party,  that  France  could  not 
be  deserted.  Conceivably  this  was  the  decisive  gesture.  But  it  was 
not  until  the  invasion  of  Belgium  became  a  fact  that  there  was  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  resolved  policy  disclosed  in  the  words  or  the  actions  of  Sir 
Edward  or  his  associates. 

It  remains  now,  rapidly  to  summarize  the  events  of  the  closing  days 
from  August  ist,  the  date  of  the  German  declaration  of  war  upon  Rus- 
sia, until  the  expiration  of  the  time-limit  of  the  British  ultimatum  ad- 
dressed to  Berlin. 

Meantime  it  should  be  recalled  that  Germany,  in  addition  to 
declaring  war  upon  Russia,  had  demanded  of  France  information  as  to 
what  the  French  attitude  would  be;  had  been  informed  that  France 
would  follow  the  course  dictated  by  her  own  interests ;  and  that  in  due 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  65 

course  she  declared  war  upon  the  French  Republic  on  August  3d,  alleging 
certain  acts  by  French  aviators  over  German  soil  that  were  too  ridiculous 
to  obtain  even  passing  credence. 

VII.  SIR  Edward's  dilemma 

On  July  24th,  following  the  Austrian  ultimatum  by  twenty-four 
hours,  Sazonof,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  asked  the  British  Am- 
bassador in  Petrograd  to  use  his  influence  to  have  Britain  declare  that 
she  would  stand  with  France  and  Russia.  The  conviction  of  Russian 
oflficials,  held  consistently  by  Russian  and  French  diplomacy  alike,  was 
that  the  sole  hope  for  peace  was  to  be  found  in  the  chance  that  Germany 
would  not  care  to  fight  if  she  knew  she  would  have  Britain  in  the  field. 
This  view  was  steadily  rejected  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  on  July  25th 
informed  the  British  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  that  Great  Britain 
could  give  no  assurance  as  public  sentiment  would  not  warrant  a  de- 
cision to  participate  in  a  war  over  Serbia. 

This  attitude  endured  right  down  to  the  time  of  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war  upon  Russia.  On  July  30th  the  President  of  the  French 
Republic  made  an  appeal  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris  and  on 
July  31st  he  addressed  a  letter  directly  to  King  George,  asking  for  an 
assurance  of  British  support.  Both  applications  were  rejected.  But 
it  is  fair  to  say  for  Sir  Edward  that  at  the  same  time  he  spoke  with 
far  more  explicitness  to  Germany,  and  as  early  as  July  29th  warned  the 
German  Ambassador  in  London  that  he  must  not  mistake  the  pacific 
tone  of  British  diplomacy  for  any  assurance  that  Britain  would  stay 
out.  This  warning  was  totally  ignored  in  Berlin,  where  the  ruling 
statesmen  pinned  their  faith  to  the  weakness  of  British  foreign  policy 
and  the  division  in  the  British  Cabinet. 

On  this  same  day  the  German  Government  made  a  clear  bid  for 
British  neutrality  by  oflFering  to  respect  Dutch  neutrality,  to  guarantee 
Belgian  integrity  and  independence,  provided  Belgium  did  not  stand  out 
against  Germany,  and  to  give  assurance  not  to  annex  French  territory 
in  Europe  if  the  war  turned  in  Germany's  favour.  But  Germany  thus 
tacitly  declined  to  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  or  to  give 


66  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

any  pledge  not  to  annex  French  colonies  after  the  war.  This  was  the 
"shameful"  proposal  to  quote  Sir  Edward  Grey,  which  was  rejected 
upon  July  30th. 

On  this  same  day,  too,  the  French  Ambassador  in  London  reminded 
the  British  Government  of  letters  exchanged  by  France  and  Britain  in 
191 2,  after  the  Agadir  crisis,  which  provided  that,  if  the  peace  of  Europe 
should  be  endangered,  the  two  nations  should  proceed  to  a  discussion  of 
what  they  proposed  to  do.  Actually  this  meant  a  discussion  of  combined 
land  and  sea  operations.  Still  Sir  Edward  remained  "unresponsive  and 
King  George,  on  Friday,  July  31st,  could  give  only  the  vaguest  of  reas- 
suring words  to  the  appeal  made  to  him  directly  by  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic. 

And  yet  on  this  same  day,  the  situation  began  to  clear,  for  on  this 
day  Sir  Edward  Grey  addressed  to  France  and  to  Germany  an  identic 
note  asking  their  purposes  with  regard  to  Belgian  neutrality.  By  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  reaffirmed  by  that  of  1870,  Britain  had  declared  her 
purpose  to  defend  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  an  engagement  made  also 
by  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  France  promptly  agreed  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality,  but  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  was  unable 
to  get  any  response.  The  next  day  the  German  Ambassador  inquired 
in  London  whether  a  German  pledge  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium would  insure  British  neutrality.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declined  such 
a  bargain  at  once. 

But  on  August  ist  a  new  problem  arose.  By  virtue  of  an  arrangement 
made  long  before  1914,  and  probably  after  Agadir,  French  fleets  had 
taken  over  the  British  task  in  the  Mediterranean  that  the  British  might 
concentrate  their  fleets  in  the  North  Sea.  The  French  Atlantic  coast  was 
therefore  undefended.  Wherefore  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  moved  on  this 
day  to  give  to  the  French  Ambassador  a  promise  to  ask  the  Cabinet,  which 
met  that  afternoon,  to  agree  that  if  the  German  fleet  undertook  to  attack 
the  coasts  of  France,  the  British  fleet  would  intervene.  This  assurance 
was  given  by  the  British  Cabinet  and  the  French  were  informed  of  it  on 
August  2d. 

On  August  3d   Germany  on  her  part  agreed  to  refrain  from  an 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS 
(AUGUST    4-16,    1914) 


KING  PETER  OF  SERBIA 

In  the  Twentieth  Century,  one  does  not  expect  to  see 
a  king,  clad  in  velvet  and  ermine,  riding  through  the 
streets  of  his  capital  on  a  snow-white  steed,  with  his 
golden  crown  upon  his  head.  But  King  Peter  is  quite 
the  old-fashioned,  fairy-book  monarch.  In  December, 
1914,  when  his  troops  were  about  to  begin  their  suc- 
cessful etfort  to  retake  Belgrade,  he  rode  along  the 
front  of  his  line  and  harangued  them,  even  as  their  chiefs 
of  remoter  centuries  were  accustomed  to  do. 


PORTRAITS   OF   PERSONS 
THEN   PROMINENT 


WILLIAM  II,  GERMAN  EMPEROR 

"The  Soldier  and  the  army,"  he  said  in  1891,  "not  parliamentary  majorities  and  decisions,  have  welded 
together  the  German  Empire.  My  confidence  is  in  the  army."  In  1900,  he  added,  "  If  one  wishes  to  decide 
something  in  this  world,  it  is  not  the  pen  alone  that  will  do  it  if  unsupported  by  the  power  ol  the  sword." 
And  in  1906,  "  My  first  and  last  care  is  for  my  fighting  foxces  on  land  and  sea." 


THE  LATE  EMPEROR  FRANCIS  JOSEPH  OF  AUSTRIA  HUNGARY 

When  he  came  to  the  throne  in  1848,  more  than  one  revohition  was  in  progress  in  his  dominions.  Dur- 
ing his  reign  his  army  was  badly  beaten  by  the  Germans  and  there  was  much  dissension  among  the  many 
races  over  which  he  ruled.  His  domestic  troubles  were  numerous  and  heartrending.  They  included  the 
assassination  of  his  wife  and  the  suicide  of  his  son.  Yet  he  lived  on  through  a  record-breaking  reign  of  almost 
seventy  years,  and  died  leaving  his  people  engulfed  in  the  greatest  disaster  of  history. 


THE  RULERS  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 

Nicholas,  once  Czar  of  all  the  Russians  (Iffl),  the  only  autocrat  among  the  Allies,  was  a  weak  ruler,  much  under  the 
influenceof  his  German  wife  and  of  wonder-working  priests.  But  when  revolution  threatened  he  is  said  to  have  indignantly 
repudiated  the  traitorous  suggestion  of  one  of  his  generals,  to  overcome  "the  canaille"  by  letting  in  the  Germans. 

King  George  of  England  {right)  is  more  fortunate.  A  sovereign  in  name  only,  he  occupies  a  secure  position  in 
the  hearts  of  his  countrymen,  as  the  focussing  point  and  symbol  of  their  patriotic  but  self-respecting  loyalty. 


THE  RULERS  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 

M.  Raymond  Poincare,  President  of  France,  hurried  back  to  France  from  Petrograd  during  the  fateful  Twelve 
Days  in  1914  and  set  to  work  on  diplomatic  correspondence  with  England.  On  July  30th,  he  made  an  appeal  to  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Paris,  and  the  following  day  addressed  a  letter  directly  to  King  George  asking  for  an  assurance 
of  British  support.  Both  applications  were  rejected.  England  refused  to  commit  herself  till  she  was  sure  that  Ger- 
many was  to  invade  Belgium,  and  that  the  Belgians  meant  to  resist. 


MR.  ASQUITH,  BRITISH  PREMIER  AND  SIR  EDWARD  GREY,  BRITISH  FOREIGN  MINISTER 
Sir  Edward  Grey  never  grasped  the  inevitability  of  the  World  War.     Consequently  he  was  driven  to  a  tempor- 
izing policy  as  the  great  catastrophe  drew  near.     In  the  clear  light  of  retrospect  it  is  evident  his  position  demanded 
that  he  should  have  warned  the  British  people  of  the  danger  which  had  for  ten  years  been  steadily  increasing 

Mr.  Asquith,  like  Sir  Edward  Grey,  seems  to  have  been  simply  bewildered  in  the  crisis.  They  felt  that  they  ought 
to  stand  by  France,  but  the  invasion  ot  Belgium  was  needed  to  stir  the  Hntisli  public  to  action.  Only  after  that  event 
was  a  definite  settled  policy  disclosed  by  the  words  and  acts  of  the  Members  of  the  Government. 


DR.  VON  BETHMANN-HOLLWEG— GERMAN  IM- 
PERIAL CHANCELLOR 

For  nearly  forty  years — he  was  born  in  1856 — the 
German  Chancellor  has  held  public  office.  He  is  a  Brand 
enburger,  that  is  to  say,  a  Prussian  of  the  Prussians. 
Before  becoming  Chancellor  in  1909,  he  was  the  Prussian 
Minister  of  the  Interior  (1905),  and  Imperial  Secretary  ot 
State  for  the  Interior  (1907).  His  was  the  hard  task  of 
confessing  to  the  world  on  August  4,  1914,  that  Germany 
was  in  "a  state  of  necessity"  which  "knew  no  law,"  and 
had  therefore  invaded  Belgium. 


COUNT  BERCHTOLD,  AUSTRLAN  PREMIER, 
1914 

After  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  Archduke, 
Europe  waited  In  the  keenest  anxiety  for  a  sign  from 
Vienna.  But  no  sign  came  and  the  crisis  seemed  to 
have  passed  when,  nearly  a  month  after  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo,  Count  Berchtold  sent  to  Servia  the  most  formid- 
able ultimatum  that  one  state  had  ever  addressed  to  an- 
other. To  this  ultimatum  was  added  a  time-limit  of 
forty-eight  hours.  One  wonders  what  was  secretly  going 
on  during  these  weeks  of  apparent  inaction. 


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THE  TWELVE  DAYS  75 

attack  upon  France  by  sea,  if  Britain  would  remain  neutral,  but  de- 
clined, to  give  any  commitment  as  to  Belgium.  This  occasioned  no  sur- 
prise because  on  the  previous  day  Germany  had  informed  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment of  its  intention,  provoked  by  alleged  French  activities,  to  enter 
Belgian  territory  and  to  advance  up  the  Meuse  Valley  to  attack  France. 
On  this  same  day  Belgium  addressed  an  appeal  to  Britain  for  diplo- 
matic support  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  told  the  Belgian  Minister  that  a 
German  invasion  would  mean  war  with  Great  Britain.  France  offered 
Belgium  five  army  corps,  which  were  declined.  But  the  British  assur- 
ance sent  to  Belgium  arrived  only  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  of 
August,  when  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium  had  begun. 

VIII.    BELGIUM  DECIDES  TO  FIGHT 

On  Monday,  August  3d,  Belgium  reached  its  heroic  decision  to 
defend  its  own  neutrality  and  responded  to  the  brutal  German  ulti- 
matum with  a  declaration  of  purpose,  contained  in  moderate  language, 
which  will  remain  memorable.  In  declaring  that  she  purposed  to 
defend  her  soil  against  German  violation  she  asserted  that  she  had  at 
all  times  been  equally  prepared  to  defend  herself  against  France  or  Britain 
and  thus  demolished  the  whole  German  edifice  of  allegation,  that  France 
was  planning  to  attack  Germany  through  Belgium. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  getting  on  firm  ground  now.  An  invasion  of 
Belgium,  unless  Belgium  were  willing  to  defend  herself,  might  still  have 
left  his  Cabinet  cold,  but  once  Belgium  had  made  up  her  mind  to  fight 
he  was  assured  that  there  would  be  little  more  hanging  back  in  England. 

August  4th  is  the  last  day.  King  Albert,  now  in  the  presence  of 
actual  invasion,  appealed  to  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France  to  help  him 
defend  his  country.  Great  Britain  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany,  which 
expired  at  midnight,  demanding  that  satisfactory  assurances  be  furnished 
of  German  determination  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality. 

Notable  on  this  last  day,  also,  was  the  speech  of  the  German  Chan- 
cellor in  which  he  told  his  countrymen  and  the  world  that  Germany  was 
in  "a  state  of  necessity"  which  "knew  no  law,"  and  had  therefore 
invaded  Belgium.     It  is  in  this  speech,  too,  that  he  made  the  frank 


76  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

admission  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium  was  in  violation  of  the  rules  of 
international  law.  He  went  further  and  openly  conceded  that  what  was 
being  done  was  "  a  wrong  that  we  will  try  to  make  good  again  as  soon  as 
our  military  ends  have  been  reached.  When  one  is  threatened  as  we 
are,  and  all  is  at  stake,  he  can  only  think  of  how  he  can  hack  his  way 
through." 

When  the  public  indignation  of  the  world  had  become  manifest, 
the  German  Government  endeavoured  to  find  post-mortem  warrant  for 
its  course  in  Belgium  by  the  "discovery"  of  documents  in  Brussels 
alleged  to  disclose  a  conspiracy  of  Belgium  with  Britain  and  France. 
Such  devices  were  as  futile  as  the  efforts  to  find  excuse  for  a  declaration  of 
war  upon  France  in  imaginary  aeroplane  raids  by  French  craft  dropping 
bombs  over  German  cities.  Whatever  effect  they  may  have  had  upon 
German  opinion,  these  fictions  have  long  been  dismissed  by  neutral  pub- 
lics, which  have  accepted  as  final  the  blunt,  brutal,  but  at  least  honest 
words  of  the  German  Chancellor  spoken  at  the  moment  when  the 
decision  had  been  made. 

Not  less  memorable  is  the  incident  that  marked  the  final  interview 
between  the  British  Ambassador  and  the  German  Chancellor.  To  Sir 
Edward  Goschen,  calling  to  take  his  leave  of  the  Chancellor,  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  made  his  famous  inquiry  as  to  the  purpose  of  Great  Britain 
to  make  war  upon  Germany  merely  for  the  sake  of  "a  scrap  of  paper." 
The  "scrap  of  paper"  was  the  British  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  Bel- 
gium, contained  in  the  Treaty  of  1839  and  reaffirmed  in  the  document 
of  1870.  The  full  extent  of  German  surprise,  apprehension,  and 
anger,  provoked  by  the  decision  of  Great  Britain,  was  revealed  in  this 
interview  for  the  first  time. 

Meantime,  as  Von  Jagow  had  already  told  the  British  Ambassador, 
the  invasion  of  Belgium  had  become  an  accomplished  fact  and  there 
could  be  no  drawing  back  for  Germany.  Accordingly,  with  expiration 
of  the  time-limit  of  the  British  ultimatum  at  midnight  on  August  4th, 
Great  Britain  declared  war  upon  Germany.  Thus  the  triple  Entente  in  the 
presence  of  the  fact  of  war  became  a  triple  alliance  at  the  precise  moment 
when  the  Triple  Alliance  was  facing  the  defection  of  Italy,  who  promptly 


THE  TWELVE  DAYS  77 

announced  that  the  terms  of  her  aUiance  with  Austria  and  Germany, 
which  were  for  action  in  a  defensive  war  only,  did  not  require  her  to 
participate  in  a  war  which  she  considered  aggressive  on  their  part, 
and  that  she  therefore  proclaimed  her  neutrahty.  This  prompt  dec- 
laration of  Italian  neutrality  was  of  incalculable  military  advantage  to 
France,  since  it  automatically  released  for  service  on  the  German  fron- 
tier several  army  corps  stationed  along  the  Alps. 

August  4,  19 14,  therefore,  marks  the  complete  ruin  of  the  whole  ed- 
ifice that  Bismarck  had  erected;  his  alliance  had  collapsed;  the  union  of 
all  the  rivals  of  Germany,  which  he  had  feared  and  in  his  life  time  pre- 
vented, had  come  to  pass.  All  of  this,  too,  German  statesmen  might 
have  perceived  would  inevitably  occur,  had  they  been  guided  by 
British  tradition  rather  than  contemporary  British  policy.  Such,  across 
the  centuries,  had  been  the  unfailing  answer  of  Britain  to  a  challenge  to 
her  supremacy  at  sea. 


CHAPTER  FOUR 

THE  GERMAN  ATTACK 

I 

THE  TWO  STRATEGICAL  CONCEPTIONS 

From  the  morrow  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  the  German  General 
Staff,  like  the  French,  had  been  engaged  in  formulating  the  plans  by 
which  they  would  act  in  the  next  war.  With  the  lapse  of  years  it  had 
come  to  be  accepted  as  inevitable  that  the  superior  organization  and 
the  largely  increased  population  of  Germany,  together  with  her  central 
position,  would  enable  her  to  take  the  offensive  at  the  outset  of  opera- 
tions. The  alliance  of  France  with  Russia  and  of  Germany  with  Austria 
and  Italy  had  broadened  the  scope  of  the  plans  without  changing  the 
essential  fact  that  Germany  would  have  the  initiative.  And  as  Italy 
yearly  moved  farther  away  from  her  partners,  her  assistance  was  pres- 
ently eliminated  as  a  factor  both  by  Germany  and  her  enemies. 

Having  the  offensive,  the  German  problem  was  to  decide  whether 
to  attack  France,  leaving  to  Austria,  reinforced  by  a  few  German  covering 
troops  in  East  Prussia  and  Posen,  the  task  of  containing  Russia  until 
France  was  disposed  of,  or  to  detain  France  at  the  strongly  fortified  and 
easily  defensible  Alsace-Lorraine  frontier,  and  level  the  main  blow  at 
Russia.  The  decision  was  made  for  the  attack  upon  France.  Since  it 
failed,  and  perhaps  before,  the  alternative  has  been  strongly  advocated, 
but  it  is  easy  to  understand  and  accept  the  reasons  that  controlled  the 
decision  for  France. 

These  reasons  were  various.  As  to  Russia  it  was  recognized  that 
her  mobilization  would  be  slow,  it  was  known  that  in  organization  and 
equipment  her  troops  were  inferior  to  the  German.  But  it  was  equally 
notorious  that  Russian  strategy  did  not  include  an  immediate  offensive; 
that  the  Russian  plans  for  mobilization  were  to  be  carried  out  behind  the 
Bug  and  far  east  of  Warsaw;  that  Russian  strategy,  in  fact,  rested  upon 

78 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  79 

the  conception,  enduring  from  the  Napoleonic  Era,  of  a  retreat,  without 
decisive  engagement,  into  the  vast  regions  to  the  east,  where  Napoleon's 
army  had  perished,  where  roads  were  few,  transport  difficult,  and  the 
machinery  of  the  German  army  would  work  at  the  least  advantage. 
Finally,  this  meant  not  a  quick  decision  but  a  long  delay;  it  meant 
also,  in  a  war  opening  in  August,  that  Germany  would  meet  winter 
on  the  road  to  Moscow  or  Petrograd. 

Speed,  too,  was  the  very  essence  of  German  strategy.  Napoleon 
had  been  defeated  In  the  Waterloo  campaign  in  less  than  a  week  after 
he  took  the  field.  Six  weeks  had  sufficed  to  dispose  of  Austria  in  1866, 
and  the  decisive  battles  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  were  not  divided 
by  a  longer  span  from  the  date  of  mobilization.  German  finance,  the 
whole  nature  of  Germany's  economic  fabric,  was  not  adjusted  to  a  long 
war.  What  was  to  be  sought  was  a  quick  decision.  This  might  also 
serve  to  keep  Britain  out  of  the  war  as  a  French  defeat  might  lead 
Russia  to  abandon  the  struggle,  when  Paris  had  fallen. 

A  quick  decision  could  only  be  obtained  in  the  west,  but  such  a 
decision  there  might  be  expected  to  settle  the  war.  At  all  events,  the 
French  army  beaten  and  flung  back  behind  the  Loire,  Paris  and  northern 
France  conquered,  the  Germans  could  send  their  best  troops  east  and 
rely  upon  reserves  to  meet  the  French  efforts,  while  the  costs  of  the 
war  would  already  be  saddled  upon  a  France  which  would  no  longer  be 
able  to  avoid  paying  the  huge  indemnity  Germany  had  reckoned  on  in 
her  calculations  before  the  war. 

All  German  calculations  had  arrived  at  the  same  point  that  France 
could  be  crushed  within  six  weeks  after  the  war  broke  out,  that  in  this 
time  Russian  activities  would  not  become  too  serious  for  Austria  to 
deal  with  alone,  or  aided  by  a  few  German  corps  In  the  north.  But 
the  success  or  failure  of  the  German  strategy  would  be  measured  by  the 
success  or  failure  of  the  German  army  In  bringing  France  to  a  decisive 
battle  early  in  the  second  month  of  the  war,  destroying  the  French  field 
armies  in  that  battle  and,  thanks  to  the  German  heavy  artillery,  taking 
Paris  and  all  the  barrier  fortresses  from  Luxemburg  to  Switzerland. 

Unhappily  for  Germany,  the  question  of  Belgium  was  involved  by 


8o  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

reason  of  the  manner  in  which  French  strategy,  in  the  years  following  the 
great  French  disaster  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  had  undertaken  to 
guard  against  the  blow  German  strategy  was  preparing. 

II.    THE  BELGIAN  PROBLEM 

Recognizing  the  growing  superiority  of  Germany  in  numbers, 
France  had  sought  to  meet  this  by  the  erection  on  her  eastern  frontier 
of  a  splendid  system  of  forts,  based  upon  the  four  great  fortresses  of 
Verdun,  Toul,  Epinal,  and  Belfort  and  buttressed  by  many  other 
detached  forts  connecting  the  larger  strongholds.  Actually  a  wall  of 
steel — with  but  one  gap,  southwest  of  Nancy — opposed  itself  to  Ger- 
man advance  across  the  whole  extent  of  Franco-German  frontier. 

Given  German  superiority  in  heavy  artillery,  these  forts  were  likely 
to  fall,  but  defended  by  the  whole  field  army  of  France,  they  would  in  all 
probability  hold  out  far  beyond  the  six  weeks'  period  and  knowing 
as  we  now  know,  that  trench  war  was  bound  to  come,  there  is  no  escape 
from  the  conclusion  that  the  decision  of  the  German  General  Staff  against 
attempting  to  force  this  barrier,  given  their  time  limitation,  was  wise. 

There  was,  then,  only  the  road  through  Belgium,  since  the  Swiss 
route  was  unsuitable  for  use  by  great  masses  of  men  and  Switzerland 
had  an  army  far  more  formidable  than  the  Belgian.  The  decision, 
therefore,  was  for  the  Belgian  route  and  it  was  made  many  years  before 
the  war.  The  proof  of  this  is  found  in  the  strategic  railroads  built  to 
the  Belgian  frontier  and  signalled  by  military  writers  as  early  as  1909. 
Well-built  double-track  lines  led  through  the  comparative  wilderness 
of  the  eastern  Ardennes  and  ended  exactly  on  the  Belgian  frontier. 
They  had  no  commercial  value  and  served  no  peaceful  purpose.  But 
they  did  enable  Germany  to  mobilize  vast  masses,  far  more  rapidly  than 
any  one  suspected  would  be  the  case,  squarely  on  the  Belgian  frontier. 

Once  across  the  Ardennes,  the  road  by  the  Meuse  and  Sambre  val- 
leys led  straight  into  the  plains  of  northern  France.  This  road  was 
not  barred  by  any  French  forts.  The  sole  obstacles  were  the  Belgian 
fortresses  of  Liege  and  Namur,  both  out  of  date,  both  unprovided  with 
modern  equipment,  and  both  lacking  in  subsidiary  defences.     Germany 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK 


8i 


reckoned,  wisely,  as  the  event  showed,  that  these  would  prove  no  con- 
siderable obstacle  and  would  fall  to  her  great  howitzers  with  a  minimum 
of  delay.  As  for  the  Belgian  army,  German  High  Command  could  hope 
that  it  would  not  intervene.  But  if  it  did,  it  was  too  small  and  too  poorly 
organized  to  offer  serious  resistance.     The  event  proved  this  to  be  true. 


WHY  THE  GERMANS  WENT  THROUGH  BELGIUM 

"A  wall  of  steel,  with  but  one  gap,  southwest  of  Nancy,  opposed  itself  to  German  advance 

across  the  whole  extent  of  Franco-German  frontier  " 

With  the  political  aspects,  as  well  as  the  moral  problems,  involved  in  the 
invasion  of  Belgium,  German  High  Command  did  not  concern  itself. 
It  could  hope  again,  that  Britain,  like  Belgium,  would  not  interfere 
with  the  march  of  Teutonic  hosts  against  France  by  the  Belgian  road. 
It  could  believe  that,  even  if  Britain  entered  the  war,  she  would  not 


82  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

send  her  scanty  army  to  the  Continent  in  time  to  intervene  (another 
calculation  almost  justified  by  the  event).  But  it  was  satisfied  that 
even  if  this  should  take  place,  it  still  possessed  a  margin  of  superiority  in 
numbers  and  material,  which  would  insure  the  victory,  even  at  the  very 
worst. 

It  is  impossible  not  to  believe  that  German  High  Command  over- 
bore German  diplomacy  in  the  matter  of  Belgian  neutrality,  and  that  the 
soldier  imposed  his  will  upon  the  statesman.  The  conviction  of  the 
soldier  was  that,  using  Belgium  as  a  highway,  he  could  destroy  France 
in  the  time  at  his  disposal  and  that  no  other  method  would  avail.  He 
came  so  near  to  absolute  success  that  it  is  impossible  to  criticize  his  de- 
cision, on  the  military  side. 

Here  then,  in  brief,  is  the  whole  German  strategical  conception  for 
the  first  thrust  of  the  war.  It  was  broken  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne, 
but  it  was  not  until  after  the  battles  of  Flanders  had  made  the  western 
deadlock  absolute  that  it  was  finally  abandoned.  It  supplies  the  clue  to 
all  of  the  first  phase  of  the  war.  In  this  conception  all  was  foreseen 
except  the  possibility  of  a  French  retreat  without  a  decisive  battle, 
until  the  conditions  of  contest  should  have  turned  against  the  Germans 
and  the  balance  of  numbers,  rightly  reckoned  certain  to  be  heavily  with 
the  invader  at  the  outset,  should  be  partially  restored. 

in.    FRENCH    STRATEGY 

French  High  Command  had  based  its  course  upon  the  lessons  of  1870. 
It  knew  the  purpose  of  Germany  to  risk  all  on  a  single  throw  and  seek  a 
decisive  victory  in  the  opening  weeks.  It  knew  that  Germany  might 
come  through  Belgium,  but  it  could  never  be  certain  of  this  and  it  was 
compelled  to  base  its  initial  concentration  upon  the  more  probable  ob- 
jective of  German  attack,  which  remained  the  eastern  frontier.  But  it 
had  made  its  plans  to  meet  the  Belgian  thrust.  What  it  could  not  foresee 
was  the  number  of  troops  Germany  would  send  through  Belgium,  the 
rapidity  with  which  Belgian  forts  would  fall,  and  the  extraordinary 
mobility  of  German  troops,  due  to  the  unexpected  use  of  motor  trans- 
port. 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  83 

It  was  understood  between  France  and  Russia  that  if  the  German 
blow  was  directed  at  France,  Russian  troops  would  enter  East  Prussia 
in  the  third  week  of  the  war,  as  they  did.  It  was  beheved  that  this  would 
compel  the  Germans  to  return  east  and  weaken  their  armies  in  France 
before  the  decisive  battle.  The  terrible  defeat  of  the  Russians  at 
Tannenberg  partially  wrecked  this  hope,  but  the  Russian  victories  in 
Galicia  ultimately  compelled  the  Germans  to  give  over  their  efforts  in 
the  west  and  go  to  the  rescue  of  their  Austrian  ally. 

It  was  the  hope  of  the  French,  by  taking  the  offensive  in  Lorraine 
and  Alsace,  as  well  as  in  the  Ardennes,  if  the  Germans  came  through 
Belgium,  to  win  such  successes  as  to  imperil  the  German  armies  in  the 
north  and  force  them  to  return  to  the  Rhine  to  defend  their  own  coun- 
try. This  hope  expired  in  the  heavy  defeats  of  the  French  at  Mor- 
hange  and  Neufchateau  in  the  first  three  weeks  of  the  war.  It  was  the 
hope  of  the  French,  if  they  were  beaten  in  these  opening  contests,  to 
stand  on  their  own  frontiers,  before  Nancy,  behind  the  Meuse  from 
Verdun  to  Charleville  and  thence  to  Lille  and  break  the  fury  of  the  Ger- 
man assault  on  lines  long  foreseen.  This  hope  was  realized  absolutely 
before  Nancy,  momentarily  behind  the  Meuse,  but  fell  when  the  Ger- 
mans succeeded  in  sending  unexpected  masses  far  west  and  over- 
whelming the  British.  It  was  the  further  hope  of  the  French,  if  all 
these  plans  failed,  that  it  would  be  possible  to  make  a  successful  stand 
behind  the  Aisne,  the  Oise,  and  the  Somme.  But  the  collapse  of  the 
British  and  the  unforeseen  rapidity  of  Kluck's  advance  defeated  this 
hope  also. 

But  beneath  all  these  conceptions  lay  the  fundamental  purpose  not 
to  risk  the  fate  of  the  whole  French  field  force  until  the  chances  of  vic- 
tory were  unmistakable.  There  was  to  be  no  repetition  of  the  blunders 
of  1870,  the  defeat  of  French  armies  in  detail,  the  isolation  of  Bazaine, 
the  sacrifice  of  MacMahon  to  political  and  dynastic  considerations. 
French  High  Command  was  even  prepared  to  evacuate  Paris,  if  neces- 
sary, but  it  did  not  mean  to  risk  a  decisive  battle,  while  the  odds  were 
against  It.  This  was  the  conception  that  dominated  the  whole  French 
campaign  and  led  to  the  supreme  victory  of  the  Marne,  which  wrecked 


84  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  whole  German  strategy  and  obtained  a  tactical  triumph  on  the 
battlefield  as  well. 

Thus,  while  the  various  French  armies  suffered  local  defeats,  none 
was  ever  routed,  none  was  ever  captured,  and  all  retained  their  form 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  campaign.  This  purpose,  and  not 
the  local  reverses  suffered  by  the  French  in  the  opening  days  of  the  war, 
explains  the  great  retreat,  which  at  the  moment  seemed  to  the  world 
the  promise  of  French  ruin  and  long  deluded  the  German  commanders 
into  believing  that  they  had  achieved  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
acting.  But  for  the  Russian  disaster  at  Tannenberg,  the  whole  French 
fundamental  conception  might  have  prevailed,  and  after  the  Marne 
the  Germans  might  have  been  compelled  to  go  back  to  their  own  frontier, 
because  of  the  Russian  pressure  in  East  Prussia  and  along  the  lower 
Vistula. 

The  second  phase  of  the  war  came  with  the  German  attack  upon 
Russia  in  May,  191 5.  At  this  time  Germany  definitely  adopted  the 
plan  of  crushing  Russia,  while  holding  France  and  Britain  in  the  west. 
She  was  able  to  do  this  because,  with  all  her  successes,  Russia  had  not 
quite  succeeded  in  performing  her  part  of  the  Franco-Russian  plan;  she 
had  not  been  able  to  invade  East  Prussia  and  make  good  her  hold  there. 
But  to  understand  the  first  months  of  the  war,  it  is  simply  necessary  to 
see  the  rival  plans  working  out,  to  observe  Germany  endeavouring  to 
crush  France  while  holding  back  Russia,  with  Austrian  aid ;  France  seek- 
ing to  avoid  disaster  and  strike  back  at  the  favourable  moment;  Russia 
trying  to  take  advantage  of  the  despatch  of  German  troops  to  the  west 
and  sweep  through  East  Prussia  to  the  Vistula,  while  defeating  Austrian 
troops  in  Galicia  and  Volhynia. 

Having  been  defeated  at  the  Marne,  Germany  was  able,  by  reason 
of  her  heavy  artillery  and  machine  guns,  instruments  that  she  had  ex- 
pected to  win  for  her  the  decisive  battle,  to  take  a  defensive  position  in 
France  and  hold  it,  but  she  never  was  able  again  to  win  ^y  considerable 
ground  on  the  offensive,  even  in  her  tremendous  Verdun  drive  in  1916, 
and  she  was  unable  to  prevent  her  western  foes  from  ultimately  passing 
to  the  offensive.     All  her  conceptions  for  forty  years  had  been  of  a  swift. 


THE  GERMAN  ATTACK  85 

tremendous  thrust,  a  colossal  battle,  and  a  victory  that  should  settle  the 
fate  of  France  for  the  period  of  the  war,  probably  forever.  When  the  de- 
cision at  the  Marne  was  made  absolute  in  Flanders,  the  whole  character 
of  the  war  and  the  nature  of  the  outcome  were  changed.  That  is  the 
reason  why,  in  the  minds  of  military  writers,  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
remains  the  most  important  incident  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  war. 

Tannenberg  was  only  less  important  than  the  Marne,  since  it 
brought  about  the  ruin  of  the  original  Franco-Russian  conception,  gave 
Germany  the  necessary  time  to  make  good  her  hold  in  France  and  to 
make  her  final  effort  in  Flanders.  Russian  pressure  in  the  east  ulti- 
mately became  effective,  precisely  as  French  and  Russian  General 
Staffs  had  expected,  but  it  became  effective  in  November,  instead  of 
September,  in  Galicia,  not  in  East  Prussia.  When  it  became  effective 
Germany  had  to  abandon  her  western  campaign,  turn  her  attention  to 
the  east,  undertake  a  number  of  more  or  less  limited  efforts,  and  at 
last  organize  her  great  drive  against  Russia,  which  began  in  late  April, 

1915- 

If  Joffre  had  been  defeated  at  the  Marne  the  whole  German  plan 
would  have  succeeded  precisely  as  Germany  had  calculated.  If  Hin- 
denburg  had  been  defeated  at  Tannenberg,  the  whole  German  plan 
would  have  collapsed  as  French  and  Russian  strategy  had  expected. 
But  Tannenberg  was  relatively  a  small  affair,  and  Russia's  losses,  al- 
though large,  were  insignificant  compared  with  her  main  strength. 
Hence  she  was  able  to  keep  on  with  Galicia  and  ultimately  to  force  Ger- 
many to  abandon  the  west.  On  the  other  hand,  the  whole  German  plan 
was  defeated  at  the  Marne  because  the  bulk  of  German  military  strength 
was  used  there. 


CHAPTER  FIVE  , 

BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE 

I 

LifiGE 

In  the  event  of  an  attack  coming  from  Germany,  the  main  reliance 
of  Belgian  defence  was  the  fortress  of  Liege,  situated  some  twenty  miles 
west  of  the  German  frontier,  commanding  the  crossings  of  the  Meuse 
River  and  the  railroad  coming  from  the  Rhine  at  Cologne  to  Brussels 
and  Antwerp,  the  great  trunk  line  from  Germany. 

Liege  was  surrounded  by  twelve  isolated  forts,  the  work  of  the  cele- 
brated Brialmont.  It  had  ranked  in  its  day  as  one  of  the  finest  of 
European  fortresses,  but  it  had  been  allowed  to  fall  into  disrepair  and  no 
effort  had  been  made,  as  in  the  case  of  the  French  fortresses  of  Verdun  and 
Belfort,  to  strengthen  its  works  as  the  improvement  in  heavy  artillery 
became  pronounced.  These  forts  were  isolated  and  they  were  neither 
connected  by  any  field  works  nor  had  there  been  any  care  taken  to  keep 
their  field  of  fire  free  by  forbidding  the  construction  of  buildings. 

The  forts  had  permanent  garrisons  of  trained  artillerymen,  but  the 
city  itself  was  without  any  sufficient  garrison  and  it  had  been  calcu- 
lated that  it  would  take  7S,ooo  men  to  defend  its  wide  circle.  Still  it 
was  the  general  expectation  of  Europe  that  Liege,  however  insufficient 
as  a  permanent  barrier  to  German  advance,  would  serve  as  a  suflScient 
obstacle  to  permit  the  arrival  of  French  and  British  troops  to  the  west 
of  the  town  and  their  junction  with  the  Belgian  field  army.  This 
army,  actually  in  process  of  reconstruction,  had  been  organized  and 
trained  with  the  idea  that  it  would  take  its  position  west  of  Liege,  be- 
hind the  Geete  River,  its  right  resting  on  Namur,  its  left  upon  the  Diemer 
at  Diest.  Here  it  was  expected  that  it  would  be  able,  thanks  to  the 
resistance  of  Liege,  to  hold  a  solid  front  and  prevent  the  overflow  of 
German  masses  into  the  plain  east  of  Louvain  until  aid  came. 

86 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE    87 

Belgian  mobilization  was  ordered  on  August  ist;  it  was  completed 
by  August  6th.  Something  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  men,  the 
field  army  of  the  nation,  were  then  concentrated  behind  the  Geete. 
The  King  took  command,  establishing  his  headquarters  at  Louvain. 

Meantime,  there  had  been  very  striking  developments.  On  August 
4th,  twelve  regiments  of  German  cavalry  had  crossed  the  frontier  from 
the  direction  of  Aix-la-Chapelle ;  moved  rapidly  west  to  the  Meuse,  which 
they  reached  at  Vise,  just  south  of  the  Dutch  frontier  and  north  of  Liege; 
forced  the  crossing  of  the  river,  driving  in  a  weak  Belgian  force,  which 
recoiled  upon  Liege;  and  thus  gained  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

On  August  5th  the  Tenth  German  Army  Corps  under  Emmich 
reached  the  front  of  the  eastern  forts  of  Liege,  demanded  permission 
to  pass  unopposed  and,  this  permission  being  refused,  undertook  to  take 
the  town  by  assault,  seeking  to  penetrate  between  the  forts. 

At  this  time  the  whole  3d  Division  of  the  Belgian  field  army,  and 
two  brigades  of  the  4th,  occupied  the  ground  between  the  forts  and, 
supported  by  their  fire,  successfully  repulsed  the  German  attacks  through 
the  days  of  August  5th  and  6th.  On  this  latter  day,  however,  the  arrival 
of  masses  of  German  troops,  which  began  to  cross  the  river  above  and 
below,  threatened  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  field  forces  and  General  Le- 
man,  the  commander  of  Liege,  ordered  these  to  retire  upon  the  main 
Belgian  army  concentrated  behind  the  Geete.  This  retreat  was  suc- 
cessfully conducted. 

On  August  7th  the  German  infantry  penetrated  between  the  forts, 
occupied  the  city  and  the  citadel,  but  were  unable  to  take  the  forts. 
These  maintained  their  fire  until  German  and  Austrian  heavy  guns  were 
brought  up,  but  under  this  attack  they  crumbled  almost  instantane- 
ously. The  last  fort  fell,  accepting  the  Belgian  official  report,  on 
August  1 6th,  but  the  German  reports  place  it  much  earlier.  Actually, 
as  an  obstacle  to  German  advance,  Liege  lost  its  importance  by  August 
loth  and  the  city  itself  was  in  German  hands  on  the  7th. 

As  German  mobilization  and  concentration  were  hardly  completed 
before  August  12th,  and  the  great  advance  did  not  begin  until  several 
days  later,  it  may  be  fairly  said  that  Liege,  despite  the  common  belief 


88  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

at  the  time,  actually  did  not  delay  the  Germans  materially.  It  gave  a 
great  moral  impulse  to  French  and  British  peoples,  it  earned  a  place  in 
history  through  the  devotion  of  its  defenders.  It  was,  however,  taken 
with  no  great  loss,  in  spite  of  contemporary  reports.  But  it  was  not 
taken  by  a  coup-de-main  as  the  Germans  had  hoped. 

II.    BELGIAN  "battles" 

Meantime  the  Belgian  field  army,  having  completed  its  concentra- 
tion, was  standing  behind  the  Geete  between  Diest  and  Namur,  that  is 
between  the  Meuse  and  the  Diemer.  Against  it  there  now  began  to 
beat  the  first  waves  of  German  advance,  the  screen  of  cavalry,  which 
preceded  the  advance  of  the  infantry.  On  August  12th  there  was  a 
very  sharp  skirmish  at  Haelen,  in  which  German  cavalry  were  hand- 
somely repulsed.  This  "battle"  filled  the  press  of  the  world  at  the  time, 
and,  with  the  grotesque  reports  of  the  resistance  at  Liege,  then  current, 
gave  a  totally  inaccurate  impression  of  what  was  happening. 

From  August  12th  to  August  i8th  this  skirmishing  continued,  the 
Belgian  army  keeping  its  position.  Its  expectation  was  that  the  French 
and  British  troops  would  arrive  in  time  to  make  possible  the  defence  of 
Belgium  on  the  line  of  the  Geete,  or  at  the  least  on  the  lines  of  the 
Dyle,  famous  in  the  wars  of  Louis  XIV,  one  flank  resting  on  Antwerp, 
the  centre  covering  Bnissels,  and  the  line  continued  through  Namur 
and  prolonged  by  French  troops  behind  the  Meuse  to  the  forts  of  Givet 
in  France.  On  August  15th  the  first  German  attack  upon  the  line 
of  the  Meuse  south  of  Namur  at  Dlnant  had  been  repulsed  by  French 
troops,  which  had  just  entered  the  town. 

On  the  morning  of  August  i8th,  however,  the  King  of  the  Belgians 
at  last  realized  that  the  French  and  British  would  not  arrive  in  time. 
At  that  moment  he  was  faced  by  six  German  corps — three  advancing 
from  the  Meuse,  having  crossed  north  of  Liege;  three  from  the  south, 
which  had  forced  the  passage  of  the  river  at  Huy.  These  were  the 
advance  corps  of  the  armies  of  Kluck  and  Biilow  respectively.  Behind 
them  five  more  corps  were  known  to  be  advancing.  To  face  more  than 
500,ocx)  Germans  (eleven  corps),  the  Belgians  had  about  100,000,  the 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE    89 

value  of  two  big  corps.  At  this  moment  the  British  were  just  detraining 
near  Maubeuge,  and  the  French  army,  which  was  to  act  with  the  Bel- 
gians, was  just  south  of  Philippeville,  on  the  edge  of  French  territory. 

It  was  useless  to  wait  longer.  Belgian  resistance  had  been  prolonged 
to  the  last  moment  and,  unless  the  army  was  now  to  be  uselessly  sacrificed, 
a  retreat  was  inevitable.  Accordingly,  on  the  morning  of  August  i8th. 
King  Albert  ordered  a  retirement  upon  the  fortified  camp  of  Antwerp, 
which  had  been  constructed  with  the  idea  of  serving  as  a  place  of  asylum 
for  the  entire  field  army  of  Belgium  in  just  such  an  emergency  as  had 
now  arrived.  The  retreat  was  made  good  on  August  19th,  and  on 
August  20th,  the  entire  army,  less  a  division  detached  to  Namur,  was 
inside  the  Antwerp  defences. 

Meantime,  the  German  army,  now  beginning  to  display  that  mobil- 
ity which  was  due  to  an  enormous  train  of  motor  transport,  moved 
rapidly  forward,  occupied  Louvain  on  August  19th,  entered  Brussels 
on  August  20th,  and  then,  turning  half  left,  started  for  France.  This 
was  the  army  of  Kluck.  On  the  same  day  that  Louvain  was  occupied  the 
advance  guards  of  Billow  appeared  before  Namur,  which  was  defended 
by  a  weak  division  of  Belgians,  who,  four  days  later,  were  to  receive 
as  a  reinforcement  two  battalions  of  French  troops.  These  arrived 
just  in  time  to  retire,  thus  doing  precisely  what  Winston  Churchill's 
British  detachments  were  to  do  in  the  case  of  Antwerp,  less  than  two 
months  later. 

Namur,  like  Antwerp  and  Liege,  was  defended  by  a  circle  of  detached 
forts,  which  were,  however,  in  much  worse  condition  than  those  of  either 
of  the  other  fortress  towns.  Against  these  forts  the  Germans  now 
brought  up  the  heavy  artillery  which  had  demolished  the  forts  of  Liege. 
The  bombardment  began  on  August  21st,  the  day  after  Brussels  fell; 
by  the  next  day  most  of  the  forts  were  in  ruins.  The  following  day  the 
situation  was  hopeless  and  almost  all  the  forts  had  been  silenced.  Ac- 
cordingly the  garrison,  some  12,000  Belgians,  together  with  the  French 
who  had  come  so  tardily,  slipped  out,  just  avoiding  envelopment,  and 
retreated  south.  August  23d,  then,  saw  the  occupation  of  Namur, 
which  had  been  the  corner-stone  of  the  whole  Anglo-French  strategy 


90  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

in  the  Belgian  campaign.     Two  days  later  the  last  fort  fell,  but  by  this 
time  the  war  had  gone  south  into  France. 

The  fall  of  Liege  was  far  more  prompt  than  Allied  commanders  had 
expected,  but  it  did  not  gravely  injure  their  plans.  It  did  prevent  a 
junction  between  the  Anglo-French  and  the  Belgian  armies,  if  such  a 
junction  was  ever  contemplated.  But  this  is  not  certain,  for  there  were 
grave  dangers  apparent  in  any  campaign  in  eastern  Belgium.  The 
collapse  of  Namur,  under  two  days'  bombardment  on  the  other  hand, 
was  not  only  unexpected,  but  turned  out  to  be  a  real  disaster,  which  was 
the  prelude  to  many  that  were  now  to  follow. 

III.    THE  MORAL  VALUE 

Such,  briefly,  is  the  story  of  the  Belgian  campaign,  which  lasted 
from  August  4th  to  August  i8th,  the  date  when  the  Belgian  army  retired 
from  the  pathway  of  German  advance.  Belgian  resistance  continued 
at  Namur  for  five  more  days.  Actually  the  Belgian  army  was  only  able 
to  hold  back  the  cavalry  screen  of  German  advance  for  the  days  before 
the  infantry  had  concentrated  and  began  its  great  drive.  When  this 
began,  the  Belgian  army  had  no  choice  but  to  get  out  of  the  way. 

There  were  no  engagements  of  any  size  during  the  whole  period; 
there  was  no  battle,  and  the  forts  of  Liege  and  Namur  fell  as  the  Germans 
had  calculated  they  would  fall.  In  so  far  as  they  had  reckoned  on 
Belgian  submission  the  Germans  had  been  disappointed,  but  otherwise 
their  plans  had  worked  exactly  as  they  expected  them  to  work;  they 
had  brushed  the  Belgian  army  out  of  the  way  in  a  minimum  of  time 
and  with  inconsiderable  losses.  Having  now  contained  the  Belgian 
field  army  in  Antwerp,  they  turned  south  for  the  drive  at  Paris,  August 
20th,  the  date  of  the  occupation  of  Brussels,  marking  the  turn  of 
Kluck. 

The  surprises  of  this  brief  Belgian  campaign  were  supplied  by  the 
efficacy  of  German  heavy  artillery  and  the  number  of  troops  the 
Germans  had  been  able  to  mobilize  and  send  through  Belgium.  Mis- 
calculation on  the  first  point  had  wrecked  any  Allied  plan  to  join  the 
Belgian  field  army  on  the  Geete  or  the  Dyle.     Miscalculation  as  to  the 


BELGIUM    "THE    COCKPIT 
OF  EUROPE"  IN  PICTURES 


ALBERT  OF  BELGIUM  (BORN  1875,  ACCEDED 
TO  THRONE,  1909 

The  fighting  king  of  "the  Cockpit  of  Europe"  is  so  old-fashioned 
that  he  led  his  army  in  person  and  asked  no  better  fate  than  to  share 
the  hardships  and  dangers  ot  his  soldiers.  His  democratic  attitude 
toward  his  soldiers  he  himself  has  attributed  in  part  to  his  observation 
of  the  late  James  L  Hill's  attitude  toward  his  railroad  employees — 
for  King  Albert,  before  his  accession  to  the  throne,  paid  a  long  visit 
to  the  L'nited  States,  spending  a  large  part  of  the  time  studying 
American  railroading  as  Mr.  Hills  guest. 


'M  It 

'   '*^F^iP"^^"^HIIIi 

^^Bpm^^^^^n^ 

WflM' 

^H^H&Z^^^^^^H'i;^9L^iiiiSKJLJK 

M^b^M    « 

17 

Bm# 

7  fffiS' 

1      1 

jf^V 

BELGIAN  CAVALRY 


]''■  ■:-\-r^iph  by  Paul  Thompson 

ONE  SHOT  FROM  A  GERMAN  42-CENTIMETRE  GITN  PUT  THIS  BELGIAN  FORT  OUT  OF  COMNHSSION 

of  German  strategy  assert  that  tlie  Germans  long  ago  decided  to  strike  quickly  at  France  through  Bel- 
The  Day"  should  come.     The  French  frontier  was  strongly  fortified.     Switzerland  was  a  difficult  country 
defended.     There  remained — Belgium,  dangerously  peaceful   and   prosperous,  like  the  United  States, 
and  her  forts  were  easily  reducihie  by  the  terrible  CJerman  guns. 


Students 
gium  when 
and   strongly 
Her  little  arniv 


C;  _.:i^hi  by  the  American  Press  Associalwfi 

BELGIAN  BATTERY  ON  THE  MARCH 


Copyright  by  the  American  Press  Association 

WAR  ENTHUSIASTS  IN  BRUSSELS 

ShoiitinK,  flag-wayin);  crowds  in  the  cities  of  Belgium  enthusiastically  voiced  their  approval  of  the  Government's 
decision  to  resist  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory.  And  the  little  Belgian  army,  in  full  realization  that  the  day  of  fairy- 
tales was  past,  set  itself  to  play  the  role  of  Jack,  against  the  German  Giant. 


'    ■■  Copyright  by  the  American  Press  Association 

BELGIAN  SOLDIERS  AT  REST  DURING  A  LULL  IN  THE  FIGHTING 

Germans  under  Emmich  arrived  before  Liege  on  August  5,  1914.  For  two  days  of  almost  incessant  fighting  General 
Lehman  with  the  third  Division  of  the  Belgian  army  maintained  his  defence  of  the  city.  Then  fresh  masses  of  Cierman 
troops  arrived  and  to  save  his  exhausted  soldiers  Lehman  retired  upon  the  main  Belgian  army  concentrated  behind 
the  Geete.     The  Germans  occupied  the  city  on  the  7th,  but  the  nearby  forts  held  out  against  them  for  several  days. 


Copyright  by  the  hilernational  Nt'xs  Service 
A  typical  Belgian  soldier 


Co;yiifhl  hy  r,!.l,r:r /  '_-"  Undlril'Ood 

(leneral  Lchiuan,  deknder  of  Liege 


Awaiting  the  Uhlans 


Copyright  by  International  News  Service 


Copyright  by  the  International  News  Service 

THE  INVASION  OF  BELGIUM,  EPITOMIZED  IN   PICTURES 
The  German  hordes  invaded  the  land  which  was  open,  flat,  sea-girt,  seeming  to  invite  the  invader. 
The  little  Belgian  army  stood  its  ground  as  long  as  possible,  resisting  to  the  limit  of  its  strength. 
But  it  was  all  of  no  avail  and  the  Germans  marched  into  Brussels,  the  capital  city,  on  August  20th,  seventeen 
days  after  crossing  the  border. 


Cof-xrifi^hi  by  the  InUrnalional  News  Service 

RUINKU  TOWN  HALL  AL  Yl'RES 
About  the  sleepy  little  Flemish  town  of  Ypres  for  more  than  a  month  raged  one  of  the  most  intricate,  confused, 
and  indescribable  conflicts  in  all  the  history  of  the  war;  fought  by  men  of  more  races,  religions,  colours,  and  nationalities 
than  any  battlefield  in  western  Europe  had  known  since  the  onrush  of  the  soldiers  of  Islam  was  halted  on  the  field  of 
Tours.     Asia,  Africa,  and  even  America  and  Australia  shared  in  the  glory  and  the  slaughter. 


ai   -  S 


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BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE    99 

second  factor  was  shortly  to  lead  to  heavy  defeats  at  Mons  and  Charle- 
roi.  Nor  were  German  numbers  in  Belgium  to  be  measured  solely 
by  the  ten  corps  of  Billow  and  Kluck  (an  eleventh  was  detached  to 
watch  the  Belgians  in  Antwerp).  Still  a  third  army,  composed  of  three 
Saxon  corps  under  Hausen,  coming  west  through  the  Ardennes  and 
aiming  at  the  Meuse  crossings  south  of  Namur,  notably  at  Dinant,  was 
to  surprise  the  Allies  completely  and  further  contribute  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  all  their  plans.  By  August  21st  hardly  less  than  700,000  German 
troops  had  crossed  Belgium  and  were  approaching  the  French  frontier. 
In  addition  there  were  the  army  of  the  Grand  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg, 
five  corps  strong,  which  was  in  the  Belgian  Ardennes  north  of  Sedan,  and 
the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince,  also  containing  five  corps  that  had 
passed  through  Luxemburg  and  was  just  breaking  into  France  about 
Longwy.  Twenty-three  corps  were  then  employed  by  the  Germans — 
aside  from  two  cavalry  corps,  a  corps  left  in  Belgium,  and  twenty-one 
were  to  come  on  the  battlefield  of  the  Marne.  Eight  additional  corps 
were  presently  identified  in  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Even  the  briefest  military  summary  of  the  Belgian  episode  cannot, 
however,  completely  ignore  the  moral  value.  The  Belgians  had  failed, 
as  did  the  Spartans  at  Thermopylae.  A  dwarf  had  met  a  giant,  and,  as 
invariably  happens  outside  of  fairy  tales,  the  dwarf  had  been  beaten. 
Yet  the  decision  of  Belgium  to  resist,  transformed  the  character  of  the 
whole  war  in  the  minds  of  the  nations  which  were  now  fighting  Ger- 
many; it  contributed  materially  to  influencing  Italian  sentiment;  it 
gave  form  and  colour  to  the  world  conflict,  and  it  had  an  influence 
which  cannot  be  measured  cither  by  the  paltry  numbers  or  the  insig- 
nificant skirmishes,  the  very  names  of  which  were  forgotten  in  a  few 
days  by  a  world  that  was  to  see  a  Battle  of  the  Marne  within  a  fort- 
night after  Namur  fell. 

Had  Belgium  failed  to  resist  German  invasion,  the  whole  significance 
of  the  German  decision  to  disregard  the  Treaty  of  1839  would  have  been 
lost.  As  it  was,  Belgium  became  in  a  very  real  sense  the  issue  of  the  war, 
and  popular  sympathy  in  neutral  countries  all  over  the  world  was  lost 
to  Germany  at  the  outset  of  the  conflict.    This  would  have  been  of 


loo  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

minor  consequence  had  Germany  been  able  to  win  that  decisive  victory 
which  alone  could  justify  the  invasion  of  Belgium  even  in  her  own  eyes. 
But  when  the  decision  of  the  Marne  turned  against  her  and  the  war 
became  not  a  short  and  swift  triumph  but  a  long  and  terrible  agony, 
the  Belgian  incident  was  a  heavy  and  a  permanent  handicap. 

No  one  who  was  alive  in  the  August  days,  when  Belgian  resistance 
began,  and  dwelt  outside  of  German  or  Austrian  frontiers,  will  ever  for- 
get the  instant  and  enduring  impression  that  Belgian  heroism  created, 
and  nowhere  more  than  in  America  was  the  Belgian  incident  destruct- 
ive of  German  hopes  of  sympathy  and  even  of  more  practical  assistance 
in  her  tremendous  struggle.  But  for  Belgium  it  is  not  difficult  to  be- 
lieve that  American  neutrality  would  have  taken  a  very  different  charac- 
ter, and  it  is  far  from  improbable  that  the  Allies  would  have  failed  to 
find  in  America  that  source  of  munitions  which  was  to  contribute  so 
much  to  save  them  from  disaster  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  war. 

IV.    FRENCH  BEGINNINGS — MUHLHAUSEN 

Of  a  necessity,  French  mobilization  was  based  upon  the  assumption 
that  Germany  would  attack  from  Alsace-Lorraine.  Modifications  to 
follow  the  disclosure  of  a  purpose  to  use  Belgium  had  long  been  pre- 
pared. But  it  was  not  only  a  question  whether  the  Germans  would 
pass  through  Belgium  at  all ;  there  was  also  the  question  as  to  whether 
they  would  make  the  main  or  even  a  considerable  attack  from  this 
direction.  There  could  be  no  way  of  knowing  about  this  in  advance. 
Accordingly  the  French  had  always  assigned  five  army  corps  to  act 
between  the  Meuse  and  the  Sambre  and  relied  upon  the  British  expedi- 
tionary army  to  supply  the  balance  needed  to  hold  the  line  in  this 
region  should  the  Germans  come  this  way.  Presumably  they  also 
relied  upon  the  Belgian  army. 

French  mobilization  proceeded  with  extreme  regularity.  The  great 
masses  of  men  were  equipped  and  concentrated  within  the  time  set. 
There  was  nothing  of  the  disorder  and  confusion  of  1870,  although  a 
lack  of  guns  and  of  equipment  was  presently  signalled,  when  it  came  to  re- 
serves.    The  French  mobilization  was  slower  than  the  German,  of  which 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE       loi 

it  fell  far  short  in  the  numbers  it  prepared  for  the  first  shock,  but  it 
was  an  eminently  successful  operation. 

Meantime,  while  mobilization  was  proceeding,  the  French  undertook 
their  first  thrust.  A  large  garrison  had  been  maintained  in  peace  times 
in  the  fortress  of  Belfort,  commanding  the  gap  between  the  Vosges  and 
Switzerland.  This  garrison,  reinforced  by  the  first  troops  mobilized, 
stepped  out  and  over  the  frontier  on  August  7th,  the  day  the  Germans 
penetrated  Liege.  The  next  day  it  had  reached  Altkirch  and  defeated 
a  German  force.  On  August  9th  it  entered  Miihlhausen,  next  to 
Strassburg  the  largest  city  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  This  success  thrilled 
France  and  was  accepted  as  proof  of  the  approaching  deliverance  of  the 
"Lost  Provinces." 

But  on  the  night  of  August  9th  a  surprise  attack  by  the  Germans 
turned  the  French  out  of  Miihlhausen,  which  was  retaken  after  desperate 
street  fighting.  In  this  first  operation  French  commanders  began  to 
display  faults  which  were  to  prove  expensive  a  little  later.  New 
forces  had  now  to  be  sent  to  Alsace ;  General  Pau  took  command,  suc- 
ceeding the  general  that  had  failed.  By  August  19th  the  French  were 
back  in  Miihlhausen,  while  other  detachments  were  overflowing  from  all 
the  Vosges  crests  and  approaching  the  Rhine.  Unhappily  for  the  French 
this  campaign  was  to  come  to  a  sudden  end,  because  of  the  first  real 
disaster  not  far  away. 

v.    MORHANGE — THE  FIRST  DISASTER 

In  all  the  military  discussion  which  preceded  the  present  war  it  was 
fully  recognized  that  the  first  great  clash  between  the  French  and  Ger- 
man troops,  in  the  next  struggle,  would  come  east  of  Nancy  and  along 
the  frontier  which  had  been  created  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  No 
forts,  on  either  side  of  the  line,  barred  this  natural  gateway  between  the 
valleys  of  the  Rhine  and  the  Moselle.  Nancy  itself  was  but  eleven 
miles  from  the  frontier.  North  of  this  gateway  the  forts  of  Metz  and 
Thionville  in  Germany,  the  Verdun-Toul  barrier  in  France,  closed  the 
way;  south,  the  Vosges  and  the  forts  of  tpinal  forbade  any  general  oper- 
ation, as  far  as  the  Belfort  gap.     But  here  in  a  fairly  open  country  it  was 


I02  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

believed  that  the  first,  and  perhaps  the  decisive,  battle  of  the  war  would 
be  fought. 

French  mobilization  and  concentration  were  here  completed  behind 
the  Moselle  and  the  Meurthe,  while  the  covering  troops  occupied  their 
regular  post  upon  the  considerable  mass  of  hills,  known  as  the  Grand- 
Couronne  of  Nancy,  just  across  the  Meurthe,  and  extending  north  al- 
most to  Pont-a-Mousson.  Despite  a  few  early  skirmishes  at  the 
frontier,  the  Germans  seem  to  have  made  no  especial  effort  even  to 
disturb  the  French  concentration. 

But  about  August  12th  there  came  the  first  official  announcement 
of  French  operations.  These  seemed  to  push  steadily  forward;  by 
August  13  th  there  was  a  French  success  across  the  German  frontier. 
In  the  week  that  followed,  the  movement  swelled  into  something  ap- 
proaching a  real  invasion.  By  August  igth,  the  day  Miihlhausen  was 
reoccupied,  the  French  had  passed  the  line  of  the  Metz-Strassburg  rail- 
road and  were  in  Saarburg,  Dieuze,  and  Delme,  fifteen  or  twenty  miles 
from  the  frontier.     This  was  the  high-"water  mark. 

On  August  20th  the  French  army  at  last  came  in  contact  with  the 
main  German  force,  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  while 
a  second  German  army,  that  of  Heeringen,  was  signalled  west  of  Strass- 
burg  and  north  of  the  Donon  Mountain.  These  two  armies  faced 
respectively  the  armies  of  Castelnau  and  Dubail.  They  seem  to  have 
waited  for  the  French  attack  upon  positions  carefully  selected  and  pre- 
pared. 

The  battle  which  followed,  named  Morhange  by  the  French  and 
Metz  by  the  Germans,  is  noteworthy,  apart  from  its  local  value,  as  reveal- 
ing the  type  of  engagement  in  all  the  first  days  of  the  war.  The  French, 
advancing  to  attack,  displaying  much  impetuosity  and  some  lack  of 
discipline,  came  suddenly  under  the  fire  of  the  heavy  German  artil- 
lery— field  artillery,  not  the  sort  of  gun  that  had  already  levelled  the 
forts  of  Liege. 

This  heavy  artillery  outranged  the  French  field  gun,  the  famous 
"75,"  and,  unsupported  by  any  artillery,  the  French  infantry  were 
beaten  upon  by  a  storm  of  shells,  fired  from  a  distance  and  by  an  unseen 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE        103 

foe.  They  were  also  held  up  by  barbwire  entanglements  and  trenches. 
After  a  brief  engagement  a  French  corps — the  Fifteenth,  of  Marseilles 
—broke  and  fled.  Its  rout  compromised  the  whole  army  although  the 
Twentieth  Corps — the  famous  Iron  Corps,  commanded  by  Foch,  who 
here  won  his  first  laurels — now,  and  in  the  subsequent  retreat,  performed 
miracles.  At  the  same  time  the  Germans  passed  to  the  attack.  The 
end  of  the  invasion  of  Lorraine  had  come. 

In  the  next  days  the  French  retirement  was  rapid;  some  thousands  of 
prisoners,  some  guns,  and  several  flags  were  left  in  the  German  posses- 
sion. By  August  23d  the  Germans  were  well  within  French  territory, 
the)'  had  occupied  Luneville,  pressed  beyond  to  Gerbeviller,  were  at  the 
edge  of  the  Grand-Couronne,  hardly  eight  miles  from  Nancy.  They  had 
now  got  about  as  far  into  French  territory  as  the  French  had  been  in 
German  territory  at  the  Battle  of  Morhange.  But  this  was  another 
high-water  mark. 

With  great  rapidity  the  French  troops,  which  had  retaken  Miihlhau- 
sen,  were  drawn  out  of  Alsace  and  brought  back  to  the  Nancy  front. 
They  were  put  into  action,  while  many  French  batteries  were  massed  on 
the  Saffais  plateau,  a  few  miles  south  of  Nancy.  The  German  advance 
was  halted,  and  the  French,  passing  to  the  off'ensive,  pushed  the  Germans 
back  materially. 

Thus  the  German  victory  of  Morhange  was  without  real  conse- 
quence. It  was  a  severe  defeat  for  the  French  and  wrecked  their  off^en- 
sive.  But  the  defeated  troops  were  able  to  rally  and  save  Nancy.  In 
the  opening  days  of  September  and  during  the  time  of  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne  a  new  German  attack  on  this  front  was  beaten  down,  and  the 
French,  although  weakened  by  the  transfer  of  several  corps  to  the  Marne, 
were  still  able  first  to  repulse  a  new  and  heavier  attack  and  later  to  take 
the  ofi^ensive  and  push  the  Germans  back  to  the  frontier.  There  a  dead- 
lock ensued  which  endured  right  through  the  next  two  years.  But 
after  September,  19 14,  the  Nancy  front  became  inactive. 

Morhange  was  the  first  considerable  Franco-German  battle  since  the 
War  of  1870.  It  was  a  real  defeat  for  the  French  and,  taken  with  the 
defeats  that  followed,  it  unpleasantly  suggested  Worth  and  the  earlier 


I04  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

debacle.  But  the  French  rally  showed,  as  German  official  reports  later 
conceded,  that  French  armies  were  not  like  those  of  forty-four  years 
before. 

VI.  NEUFCHATEAU  AND  CHARLEROI 

At  the  moment  when  the  Battle  of  Morhange  was  opening,  two  more 
French  armies,  north  of  Verdun,  on  a  front  from  Luxemburg  to  the 
point  where  the  Meuse  quits  France,  were  also  taking  the  offensive. 
These  were  the  armies  of  Ruffey,  north  of  Verdun,  and  of  De  Langle  de 
Gary,  north  of  Sedan.  A  day  after  the  defeat  of  Morhange  these  ar- 
mies were  heavily  beaten  in  the  same  fashion.  In  the  difficult  region  of 
the  Ardennes  they  came  suddenly  in  contact  with  armies  of  the  Ger- 
man Crown  Prince  near  Virton,  south  of  Arlon  and  of  the  Duke  of 
Wiirtemberg  north  of  Neufchateau.  Once  more  the  German  heavy 
artillery  triumphed,  and  the  French,  caught  before  barbwire  entangle- 
ments, deprived  of  all  artillery  support,  were  repulsed  in  disorder,  lost 
flags  and  guns,  and  surrendered  the  offensive. 

Having  won  the  encounter,  the  German  troops  now  pressed  forward. 
The  French  retired,  first  behind  the  Othain  and  the  Semois  and  then  be- 
hind the  Meuse.  Their  retreat  was  more  orderly  than  that  of  their 
fellows  at  Morhange.  Behind  the  Semois  and  the  Othain  they  were 
able  to  inflict  heavy  losses  on  the  Germans  and  subsequently  made  good 
their  position  behind  the  Meuse,  as  Castelnau's  troops  had  made  good 
theirs  before  Nancy.  Henceforth  the  retirements  of  these  two  armies — 
Ruffey's  which  passed  to  the  command  of  Sarrail  shortly,  and  De  Langle 
de  Gary's — were  never  seriously  shaken.  They  shared  in  the  general 
retreat  because  they  were  compelled  to  keep  their  alignment  with  the 
other  armies.  But  as  late  as  August  28th  they  inflicted  heavy  losses 
on  the  Germans,  who  were  attempting  to  cross  the  Meuse  all  the  way 
from  Sedan  to  Dun. 

These  two  opening  engagements  were  French  defeats  and  they  con- 
tributed to  raising  German  hopes  and  expectations,  but  the  really  de- 
cisive action  was  elsewhere.  It  was  in  the  triangle  between  the  Meuse 
and  the  Sambre  and  westward  about  Mons  that  the  real  blow  was  now 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE        105 

about  to  fall.  Against  this  triangle,  in  which  four  French  regular  corps 
and  some  divisions  of  reserves  and  African  troops  were  standing,  their 
left  prolonged  by  the  British  army,  thirteen  German  corps,  the  armies 
of  Kluck,  Billow,  and  Hausen,  were  now  striking,  having  already  dis- 
posed of  the  Belgian  field  army. 


THE  FIRST  BATTLES,  AUGUST   I5TH-23D,   I9I4 

A-Belgians         C-Lanzerac  E-RufFey  G-Dubail 

B-British  D-De  Langle  de  Gary    F»-Castelnau       H-Pau 

On  August  22d,  two  days  after  Morhange  and  one  day  after  Neuf- 
chateau,  the  French  army  commanded  by  Lanzerac,  holding  the  cross- 
ings of  the  Sambre  about  Charleroi,  was  suddenly  attacked  by  Billow. 
A  terrific  battle  followed.  There  was  street  fighting  of  the  most  desper- 
ate character,  ground  was  taken  and  lost,  the  losses  on  both  sides  were 


io6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

very  heavy,  and  by  night  the  French  had  been  pushed  back  across  the 
Sambre  and  the  Germans  held  the  river  crossings.  Lanzerac  had  lost 
the  day  but  he  was  still  capable  of  renewing  the  conflict.  Unhappily 
at  this  time  he  learned  that  Namur  was  about  to  fall  and  that  the  army 
of  Hansen,  three  corps  strong  and  hitherto  unsuspected,  had  forced  the 
crossing  of  the  Meuse  at^Dinant  and  was  advancing  across  his  rear, 
seeking  to  cut  his  line  of  retreat  to  France. 

A  retreat  was  inevitable  and  the  French  drew  back  rapidly  until 
their  flanks  rested  upon  the  forts  at  Givet  and  Maubeuge.  By  the  next 
day  all  danger  of  envelopment  was  over,  but  the  superior  numbers  of 
the  enemy  necessitated  further  retreat.  The  following  day  the  misfor- 
tunes that  had  overtaken  the  British  involved  the  Lanzerac  army,  soon 
to  pass  to  the  command  of  Franchet  d'Esperey,  and  it  was  unable  to 
stand  again  until  it  had  reached  the  Oise.  There,  on  August  30th,  it 
inflicted  a  heavy  check  upon  the  Prussian  Guard  at  Guise.  But  by 
this  time  its  retreat,  due  to  the  British  situation,  had  involved  the  ar- 
mies of  De  Langle  and  Ruff"ey,  which  were  compelled  to  leave  the  Meuse 
and  retire  south. 

By  August  23d,  then,  four  French  armies  had  been  defeated  on  Bel- 
gian or  German  soil  and  driven  back  into  French  territory.  Two  had 
sufi^ered  something  like  routs  at  Morhange  and  at  Neufchateau;  a 
third  had  lost  a  considerable  battle  at  Charleroi  but  had  left  the  field 
in  order;  all  would  soon  be  restored  to  fighting  shape.  The  time  had 
promptly  passed  when  there  was  a  chance  that  the  first  German  vic- 
tories would  have  decisive  results.  Already  a  new  French  army,  under 
Foch,  was  ready  to  enter  the  line  at  the  north  between  De  Langle  and 
Lanzerac. 

To  understand  what  followed,  it  is  of  prime  importance  to  recognize 
that  all  the  French  armies  were  by  August  30th  in  shape  to  attack 
again,  and  from  the  Oise  to  the  Meuse  north  of  Verdun  the  French 
line  was  intact.  Only  by  grasping  this  fact  is  it  possible  to  under- 
stand how  the  French,  after  another  week  of  retreat,  were  able  sud- 
denly to  pass  to  the  off^ensive  and  win  the  decisive  Battle  of  the 
Marne 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE      107 

VII.    BRITISH    DISASTER 

In  his  original  conception,  it  seems  clear  that  Joffre  had  intended  to 
hold  the  army  of  Lanzerac  and  the  British  at  the  French  frontier  facing 
Belgium  until  the  magnitude  of  the  German  blow  through  Belgium  could 
be  measured.  During  this  time  he  relied  upon  his  armies  to  the  east, 
and  particularly  the  army  operating  from  Nancy  into  Lorraine,  to  deal 
heavy  blows  that  might  compel  the  Germans  to  draw  back  troops  from 
Belgium  to  reinforce  their  armies  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  In  this  plan 
the  British  and  Lanzerac's  armies  would  have  stood  from  the  Scheldt 
to  the  Meuse  resting  upon  Valenciennes,  Maubeuge,  and  Glvet. 

Yielding  to  the  appeals  of  the  Belgians,  and  apparently  to  the  urgings 
of  French  politicians,  however,  Joffre  changed  his  plan  and  sent  Lanzerac 
and  the  British  northward  to  Charleroi  and  Mons  just  before  the  defeat 
of  his  Lorraine  army  ended  all  chance  of  lessening  the  force  of  the  German 
blow  coming  from  Belgium.  This  change  in  plan  led  to  the  subsequent 
disasters,  for  it  threw  two  small  armies,  still  imperfectly  concentrated  and 
amounting  to  barely  seven  corps,  against  the  mass  of  Germans,  thirteen 
corps  strong.  We  are  bound  to  conclude,  too,  that  Joffre  had  no  concep- 
tion as  to  the  numbers  the  Germans  would  send  through  Belgium  or  as 
to  the  rapidity  of  their  movement,  thanks  to  motor  transport. 

These  miscalculations,  together  with  an  error  not  yet  explained,  were 
now  to  bring  the  British  to  the  edge  of  ruin.  On  Sunday,  August  23d, 
the  British  army,  two  corps  strong,  perhaps  80,000  men,  took  their 
positions  behind  a  canal,  extending  their  front  from  the  Scheldt  at 
Conde  to  a  point  of  junction  with  Lanzerac  north  of  the  Sambre  near 
Binche.  Mons  was  the  centre  of  their  position.  Here  they  were  at- 
tacked, before  they  had  time  to  entrenchj-by  masses  of  German  troops 
whose  approach  seems  to  have  been  almost  totally  unexpected. 

The  battle  which  followed  was  severe,  but  never  reached  a  decisive 
point.  At  some  places  the  British  retired  to  straighten  their  line,  and 
German  heavy  artillery  caused  material  but  not  excessive  losses.  All 
the  afternoon  the  British  held  on;  there  was  nothing  to  suggest  that  they 
were  facing  a  foe  overwhelmingly  superior  in  numbers,  and  not  the 


io8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

smallest  hint  that  they  were  threatened  with  envelopment  on  their 
left  flank.  At  this  moment  the  British  army  was  at  the  extreme  west 
or  left  of  the  whole  Allied  front,  extending  from  Switzerland  right  up  to 
Conde.  West  of  Conde  to  Lille  the  British  believed  their  flank  was  cov- 
ered by  French  reserves. 

But  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Field-Marshal  French  suddenly 
received  a  despatch  from  Jofi^re  informing  him  that  Namur  had  fallen, 
that  the  Lanzerac  army  had  been  in  full  retreat  for  many  hours,  and  that 
there  were  in  front  of  the  British  not  two  corps,  as  they  had  thought,  but 
four,  while  a  fifth  was  now  swinging  round  their  left  flank,  which  they  had 
believed  was  covered  by  French  reserves,  and  was  striking  for  their  rear. 

Why  the  message  came  so  late,  what  had  become  of  the  French  re- 
serves toward  Lille,  why  the  British  had  not  been  informed  earlier  of 
the  retreat  of  Lanzerac,  why  their  own  observation  corps  had  failed 
to  discover  the  size  of  the  German  army,  these  are  questions  that  must 
wait  until  the  end  of  the  war  for  answer.  But  with  this  despatch  the 
veil  is  lifted  from  German  purpose.  It  was  now  plain  that  Kluck,  who 
had  been  at  Brussels  on  August  20th,  had  swung  west  and  south;  that 
with  300,000  troops  he  was  now  rushing  forward  in  a  desperate  efi^ort 
to  get  around  the  end  of  the  whole  Allied  line,  interpose  between  it  and 
Paris,  and  produce  a  Sedan,  tenfold  magnified. 

In  his  front,  now,  he  had  less  than  80,000  British  troops.  His  fifth 
corps — four  were  facing  the  British — had  passed  through  Tournai  and 
was  moving  toward  Cambrai,  while  a  vast  horde  of  German  cavalry 
were  driving  through  northwestern  France  spreading  panic  and  dis- 
order and  reaching  for  the  British  line  of  communications  with  the 
Channel.  August  23d,  the  day  after  Charleroi,  two  days  after  Neuf- 
chateau  and  three  days  after  Morhange,  is  the  day  the  campaign  entered 
its  decisive  stage. 

On  this  day  we  see  very  clearly  that  unless  the  British  army  can  get 
away,  unless  its  retreat  can  be  efi^ected  and  its  left  flank  covered,  Kluck 
will  interpose  between  Paris  and  all  the  Allied  armies.  And  Kluck  is  to 
play  the  decisive  part  in  the  German  plan.  Not  until  two  weeks  later, 
when  he  comes  to  grief  in  the  opening  phase  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne, 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE         109 

is  he  to  lose  the  advantage  gained  through  his  appearance  in  an  over- 
whelmingly superior  force  on  the  extreme  flank  of  the  Allied  armies. 

VIII.    THE    GREAT    RETREAT 

In  the  presence  of  an  impending  calamity,  Field-Marshal  French 
displayed  that  slowness  of  action  which  so  long  marred  British  opera- 
tions in  the  war.  Not  for  many  hours  did  he  actually  begin  his  retreat; 
hours  that  were  precious  were  lost;  and  lost,  nearly  brought  ruin. 
By  seven  o'clock  the  next  night,  however,  his  army  was  back  in  France 
with  its  right  resting  on  the  forts  of  Maubeuge  and  the  centre  at  Bavay. 
At  this  point  French  recognized  the  peril  that  confronted  him.  It  was 
plain  that  the  Germans  were  endeavouring  to  drive  him  in  on  Maubeuge, 
as  Bazaine  had  been  driven  in  on  Metz  in  1870.  This  would  mean  the 
ultimate  capture  of  his  army  and  would  uncover  the  flank  of  all  the 
French  armies  to  the  east.  Accordingly,  despite  the  weariness  of  his 
troops,  French  ordered  the  retreat  to  be  continued  through  the  night. 

Now  begins  that  period  of  terrible  suffering  for  the  British  army, 
which  tried  the  temper  of  the  veterans,  resulted  in  the  loss  of  many 
prisoners  and  some  guns  but  in  the  escape  of  the  army.  On  the  night 
of  August  25th  the  two  corps  were  widely  separated:  one  was  south  of 
Cambrai  to  the  west,  and  the  other  at  Landrecies  to  the  east.  Here 
the  First  Corps,  about  Landrecies,  was  beaten  upon  by  a  terrific  night 
attack,  which  it  managed  to  repulse.  But  the  troops  were  becoming 
totally  exhausted.  August  26th  was  "the  most  critical  day  of  all." 
The  burden  was  borne  by  the  Second  Corps,  Smith-Dorrien's,  rein- 
forced now  by  a  fresh  division  just  arrived.  Ordered  to  resume  the 
retreat  at  daybreak,  Smith-Dorrien  found  it  impossible  and  was  com- 
pelled to  fight  until  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  before  he  could  break 
off  the  engagement,  which  was  fought  about  the  town  of  Le  Cateau  but 
better  known  as  the  Battle  of  Cambrai.  On  this  day  an  appeal  for 
help  made  to  Sordet,  of  the  French  cavalry,  could  not  be  answered,  and 
the  Second  Corps  stood  alone,  for  the  First  Corps  was  still  too  far  away 
to  render  any  assistance. 

But  late  in  the  afternoon  the  Germans,  on  their  side,  began  to  show 


no  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

weariness.  Smith-Dorrien  was  able  to  get  his  troops  on  the  road.  All 
through  the  night  and  through  the  next  day  and  night  the  retreat 
continued,  but  the  crisis  was  passed.  August  28th,  the  British  were  back 
at  the  Oise  from  Noyon  to  La  Fere  and  a  new  French  army  had  come  up 
on  their  left,  the  Army  of  Maunoury,  sent  by  Joffre  after  he  had  meas- 
ured the  extent  of  the  German  thrust  through  Belgium.  Five  days  of 
fighting  and  marching,  day  and  night,  separated  Mons  from  the  British 
arrival  at  the  Oise,  but  the  army  that  reached  the  Oise  was  no  longer  in 
shape  for  the  battle  that  Joffre  was  planning.  It  was  not,  in  fact,  to 
regain  its  confidence  or  its  cohesion  until  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
Nor  was  it  able,  in  that  struggle,  to  perform  the  allotted  task.  Yet 
it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  any,  save  a  veteran  army  of  professional 
soldiers,  could  have  endured  these  five  terrible  days  and  lived. 

In  this  whole  period  it  was  the  pluck  and  the  endurance  of  the 
individual  soldiers  that  saved  the  day.  Just  detrained,  these  men  had 
suddenly  been  flung  into  a  battle,  their  own  corner  of  which  was  bigger 
than  Waterloo,  and  their  immediate  enemy's  numbers  surpassed,  three 
times  over,  those  Napoleon  brought  on  to  his  last  battlefield. 

While  they  were  still  holding  their  ground  at  Mons,  the  British  were 
forced  to  retreat  because  the  defeat  of  the  French  army  at  Charleroi 
had  left  the  British  to  the  west  "in  air."  Magnificently  supported  by 
the  French  army  of  Lanzerac  on  their  right  at  Guise,  they  were  not 
supported  by  French  cavalry  on  their  immediate  left  until  the  critical 
day  of  Cambrai-Le  Cateau  had  passed. 

At  the  time,  British  public  opinion,  misled  by  grotesque  reports 
published  in  British  newspapers  and  fired  by  the  enthlisiasm  of  having  a 
fighting  army  on  the  Continent  for  the  first  time  in  sixty  years — for  the 
first  time  in  a  century  one  might  say,  for  the  Crimea  hardly  counted  in 
popular  imagination — fired  by  the  undoubted  rapidity  and  efficiency 
of  British  mobilization  and  transport,  gave  the  British  army  in  the 
retreat  and  at  the  Marne  a  role  which  it  did  not  play.  Not  only  was 
the  Marne  a  French  battle,  but  the  greatest  blow  struck  at  the  Germans 
in  the  retreat  was  struck  at  Guise  and  not  at  Le  Cateau,  and  by  the 
French  and  not  the  British.     In  point  of  fact  the  real  glory  of  the  British 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE   in 

army  in  the  opening  months  was  earned  at  Ypres,  where  it  died,  as  few 
armies  ever  have  died.  But  no  praise  can  be  too  high  for  the  manner 
in  which  the  private  soldiers  met  a  great  and  utterly  unforeseen  crisis. 

It  is  essential  to  point,  here,  the  difference  between  the  situation  of 
the  British  army  on  August  28th  and  that  of  the  French  armies  at  its 
right  and  left.  All  these  latter  were  not  only  intact  but  in  a  condition 
to  take  the  offensive.  Two  fresh  armies,  those  of  Foch  and  Maunoury, 
had  come  up  in  the  centre  and  at  the  left.  Joffre  had  now  been  able  to 
correct  the  errors  of  his  early  concentration  and  to  meet  the  unforeseen 
German  concentration.  But  the  necessarily  precipitate  retreat  of  the 
British  had  opened  a  gap  in  his  line.  This  and  the  condition  of  the 
British  army  now  combined  to  compel  him  to  take  the  great  decision, 
which  led  directly  to  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

IX.  joffre's  last  plan 

In  all  his  disappointments  Joffre  had  never  surrendered  the  idea  of 
taking  the  offensive  at  the  right  moment.  He  never  conceived  the 
opening  reverses  as  anything  but  incidental,  while  German  High  Com- 
mand wrongly  interpreted  them  as  evidences  of  complete  collapse. 
Having  been  beaten  at  all  points  in  his  first  attack,  Joffre  was  pre- 
pared to  fight  again  at  the  frontier.  This  became  impossible  when  the 
size  of  Kluck's  army  was  disclosed.  By  August  30th  Joffre  was  again 
ready  to  attack  along  the  lines  of  the  Somme,  the  Oise,  and  the  Aisne. 
He  did  attack  at  Guise  and  north  of  Rethel,  winning  a  pretty  little  suc- 
cess at  the  former  place. 

But  at  this  point  he  had  to  face  the  question  of  risking  the  decisive 
battle,  with  the  British  exhausted  and  in  retreat  far  south  of  the  Somme. 
He  chose  still  to  retreat,  calling  back  his  victorious  troops  from  Guise ; 
but  the  decision  was  not  due  to  the  early  defeats  the  French  had  suf- 
fered, it  was  due  to  the  collapse  of  the  British,  incident  to  the  unforeseen 
strength  of  the  armies  that  the  Germans  had  sent  through  Belgium, 
the  failure  of  French  reserves  to  cover  their  flank,  and  the  undreamed-of 
rapidity  with  which  Kluck,  thanks  to  motor  transport,  had  pushed  his 
advance  south  from  Mons  to  the  Somme. 


112  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

On  August  30th  Joffre  knew  that  Russian  armies  were  in  East 
Prussia  and  Galicia;  he  could  calculate  that  Russian  success  inside  of 
German  territory  would  promptly  compel  the  Germans  to  draw  back 
troops  from  his  front.  This  calculation  was  to  be  wrecked  on  the  next 
day,  when  the  Germans  began  the  conflict  at  Tannenberg  which  was  to 
destroy  Russian  pressure  in  Prussia.  Believing  that  Russia  would  be 
able  to  fulfil  her  part,  Joffre  could  afford  to  wait,  even  if  waiting  neces- 
sitated further  retreat.  But  by  August  30th  all  his  armies  were  re- 
stored to  fighting  condition,  had  indeed  been  reorganized  and  strength- 
ened, while  Sarrail  and  D'Esperey  had  replaced  Ruffey  and  Lanzerac. 

Between  August  20th,  the  date  of  Morhange,  and  August  30th,  Joffre 
had,  then,  rearranged  his  armies,  restored  their  cohesion,  prepared  the 
instrument  he  was  to  use.  On  the  latter  date  he  still  found  the  op- 
portunity lacking,  hence  he  ordered  a  new  retreat,  but  with  fixed  limits 
and  with  the  clear  purpose  to  attack  again  with  only  a  brief  delay.  He 
had  now  escaped  any  great  disaster,  he  knew  his  foe's  plans,  and  he  had 
the  resources  to  prepare  his  own  answer. 

By  September  ist  the  whole  French  line  from  Verdun  to  the  Somme 
is  in  retreat,  Maunoury's  army  is  to  come  back  on  the  entrenched  line 
of  Paris,  Sarrail's  is  to  swing  in  until  one  flank  rests  on  Verdun,  the 
other  on  the  Ornain  west  of  Bar-le-Duc,  the  remaining  armies  are  to 
draw  back  south  of  the  Marne,  with  the  Seine  as  their  southernmost 
limit  of  retreat.  Meantime  more  troops  are  to  be  brought  west  from 
the  Lorraine  front.  When  this  new  concentration  is  complete,  the 
French  will  have  overcome  all  the  handicaps  imposed  upon  them  by  the 
size  of  German  armies  sent  through  Belgium  and  will  have  survived  the  ini- 
tial defeats  with  only  incidental  losses.  The  morale  of  the  French  armies 
will  not  be  impaired,  their  ammunition  will  be  renewed,  and  the  Germans 
will  now  begin  to  show  the  strain  of  their  long,  forced  marches  and  begin 
to  outrun  both  their  ammunition  and  their  heavy  guns. 

To  understand  the  French  strategy  it  is  essential  to  remember  that 
the  French  Commander-in-Chief  necessarily  kept  in  mind  the  events  of 
1870.  Then  the  first  battles  had  resulted  in  heavy  defeats  for  the  French 
armies.     But  following  them  these  armies  had  been  separated,  Bazainc 


BELGIAN  DEFENCE  AND  FRENCH  OFFENCE        113 

had  been  shut  up  in  Metz,  and  MacMahon,  driven  by  political  pressure, 
had  led  his  army  to  the  disaster  of  Sedan.  In  1914  the  initial  defeats 
had  come,  all  the  offensive  plans  had  been  wrecked,  but  the  central 
idea  of  preserving  the  cohesion  of  all  the  armies  and  preventing  isola- 
tion or  envelopment  had  been  rigidly  adhered  to  from  the  outset. 


THE  SITUATION  OF  THE  FRENCH  AND  GERMAN  ARMIES  ON  AUGUST  30,   I914 

Between  August  20th,  the  date  of  Morhange,  and  August  30th,  JofFre  had  rearranged  his  armies, 
restored  their  cohesion,  prepared  the  instrument  he  was  to  use 

On  the  battlefield,  French  commanders  showed  themselves  gravely 
inferior  to  German  in  the  opening  engagements,  but  French  High  Com- 
mand was  never  shaken  by  the  first  reverses,  never  provoked  into  pre- 
mature offensives,  never  permitted  political  pressure  to  drive  it  to  risk  a 
decisive  engagement  under  unfavourable  conditions.    And  by  September 


114  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

1st  the  advantage  passed  sharply  to  the  French  side;  it  was  the  Ger- 
man strategy  that  now  began  to  break  down.  If  the  French  Com- 
mander was  totally  deceived  as  to  the  magnitude  of  the  German  thrust 
through  Belgium  and  as  to  the  efficacy  of  German  heavy  artillery,  the 
German  General  Staff  was  utterly  misled  as  to  the  condition  of  French 
armies  after  the  first  battles  and  soon  permitted  itself  to  be  led  into  a 
fatally  defective  position  and  thus  lost  the  decisive  battle  for  which  it 
had  been  planning  for  over  forty  years. 


CHAPTER  SIX 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 

I 

SEPTEMBER  5 

On  September  5,  1914,  at  noon,  a  French  battery  of  "75's"  leaving 
the  village  of  Iverny,  something  less  than  twenty  miles  due  east  of  Paris 
and  less  than  five  from  Meaux,  suddenly  came  under  the  fire  of  a  Ger- 
man battery  on  the  Monthyon-Penchard  hills,  a  little  to  the  east. 
The  captain  was  killed  and  the  battery  made  a  hasty  retreat.  These 
were  the  first  shots  fired  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  The  next  four  days 
saw  the  greatest  battle  of  modern  history,  fought  by  far  more  than  two 
million  men  over  a  front  of  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles — 
from  the  environs  of  Paris  to  the  forts  of  Verdun. 

In  this  battle,  a  German  army,  which  had  moved  from  victory  to 
victory,  whose  marching  flank  had  passed  from  Liege  through  Brussels 
almost  to  the  gates  of  Paris,  was  turned  back,  compelled  to  retreat, 
on  one  flank  not  less  than  seventy  miles,  leaving  behind  it  guns,  flags, 
and  prisoners.  More  than  this,  the  decisive  battle,  for  which  German 
military  men  had  been  preparing  for  forty  years,  was  lost;  the  promise 
of  a  swift,  short,  and  irresistible  blow,  which  the  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality held  out,  was  vitiated;  the  offensive  was  lost,  and  a  beaten  army 
was  compelled  to  dig  itself  into  trenches  from  which  it  would  be  able 
to  make  no  considerable  advance  during  the  next  two  years  of  the  war. 

This  is  what  the  French  call  the  "Miracle  of  the  Marne."  While  it 
was  going  forward,  no  detailed  accounts  were  possible.  After  it  was 
completed,  the  great  events  that  followed  robbed  it  of  public  interest. 
I  shall  endeavour  to  set  forth  briefly  the  story  of  the  decisive  phases  of 
this  battle  as  it  was  told  to  me  on  the  battlefields  by  French  officers, 
a  year  and  a  half  later,  or  as  it  is  disclosed  in  the  writings  of  French 
military  critics  unhappily  little  translated  as  yet. 

us 


ii6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

To  understand  the  course  of  this  gigantic  struggle  it  is  necessary 
first  to  dismiss  the  famiHar  legend  that  the  French  armies,  which  won 
the  battle — the  British  contribution  was  insignificant — were  ever 
routed.  The  battle  was  not  the  sudden  rally  of  thousands  and  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  soldiers,  who  had  been  for  days  fleeing  before  a  vic- 
torious enemy.  It  was  the  result  of  a  clear,  cool,  and  deliberate  plan, 
and  it  was  in  obedience  to  this  plan  that  the  several  French  armies, 
together  with  the  small  British  force  which  fought  at  the  Marne,  had 
been  drawn  back  from  the  frontier  to  the  field  of  the  conflict. 

The  sole  purpose  of  French  strategy  in  the  opening  days  of  the  war  had 
been  to  keep  these  armies  intact  until  the  direction  and  nature  of  the 
main  German  thrust  were  disclosed."'  Incident  to  this  plan,  and  not  for 
political  or  sentimental  reasons,  as  was  asserted  at  the  time,  Joff're  had  un- 
dertaken several  minor  ofi^ensives,  in  Alsace,  in  Lorraine,  and  in  Belgian 
Luxemburg.  These  had  resulted  in  the  defeats  of  Morhange,  Neuf- 
chateau,  and  the  useless  victory,  after  initial  defeat,  about  Miihlhausen. 

All  the  armies  engaged  in  these  battles  had  retired  to  their  earlier 
positions  and  made  good  their  lines,  repulsing  all  attacks.  But  the 
French  army  sent  north  toward  Belgium,  together  with  the  British 
expeditionary  force,  had  been  beaten  upon  by  an  unexpectedly  large 
German  mass  coming  in  three  armies  through  Belgium.  The  French 
army  had  suffered  defeat  at  Charleroi  and  had  retreated  in  good  order; 
the  British  army  had  almost  found  destruction,  because  upon  it  the 
full  force  of  the  German  blow  had  fallen. 

All  this  was  clear  to  Joffre  in  the  first  days  of  the  last  week  of  August. 
The  Germans,  having  the  initiative,  had  elected  to  send  a  huge  mass  of 
troops  through  Belgium,  and  the  troops  were  not  discovered  in  full 
numbers  until  they  had  reached  and  passed  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier. 

But  starting  about  August  25th,  Joffre  set  himself  to  the  task  of 
matching  his  troops  against  the  Germans,  of  reconcentrating  his  armies 
until  he  should  have  equal  or  superior  numbers  at  the  decisive  point; 
he  was  never  to  have  equal  numbers  at  all  points.  While  this  recon- 
centration  was  going  on  he  always  foresaw  a  new  French  offensive. 

About  September  ist  it  looked  as  if  the  moment  had  arrived.     He 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 


117 


had  assembled  two  new  armies,  one  in  the  centre  and  one  on  the  left, 
on  the  flank  of  the  British,  thus  abolishing  the  peril  that  Kluck's  army 
had  had  for  him  after  Mons.  On  the  line  of  the  Somme,  the  Oise,  and 
the  Aisne,  from  Amiens  to  Verdun,  the  French  armies  were  ready,  but 
unhappily  the   British   army,  having  suffered  disproportionately,  had 


USJILEj  GERMAN 


IXIIII  CAVALRY 


I-Kluck 
II-Biilow 


THE  GERMAN  ADVANCE  TO  THE  MARNE 

III-Hausen  V-The  Crovvn  Prince    VII-Heeringen 


IV-Wiirtemberg 


VI-The  Bavarians 


retreated  too  far.  Therefore,  despite  local  advantage  in  several  con- 
flicts, notably  at  Guise,  Joff^re  determined  on  a  new  retreat.  When  this 
was  accomplished,  his  line  would  rest  at  either  end  on  Paris  and  Verdun. 
His  centre  would  curve  south  almost  to  the  Seine.  From  this  point  he 
planned  to  attack  the  Germans. 


ii8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

This  retreat,  which  began  about  September  ist  and  ended  by  Sep- 
tember 4th,  placed  the  Germans  in  a  difficult  dilemma.  In  retreating 
south  of  Paris,  Joffre  offered  Kluck,  on  the  German  right,  the  chance 
to  attack  the  city.  It  was  a  tempting  bait,  but  Kluck  wisely  refused  it. 
Such  an  operation  would  consume  too  much  time  and  would  require 
weakening  the  line  elsewhere  to  get  necessary  numbers.  But,  having 
refused  it,  Kluck  had  no  choice — since  he  was  compelled  to  keep  in  touch 
with  Billow — but  to  turn  southeastward  and  march  straight  across  the 
face  of  the  forts  of  Paris.  His  objective  was  the  left  wing  of  the  French 
field  armies;  the  purpose  of  the  whole  German  host  was,  of  course,  to 
smash  the  field  forces  of  France. 

II.    KLUCK  TURNS  SOUTHEAST 

Kluck's  turn  southeast  was  safe  only  if  there  was  but  a  small  gar- 
rison in  Paris.  If  there  was  an  army,  then,  when  his  front  had  got 
south  of  Paris,  his  flank  and  rear  would  be  open  to  attack  from  this 
direction  and  he  would  be  in  exactly  the  position  that  the  British  had 
been  in  at  Mons  and  at  Cambrai.  And  as  the  British  were  on  the  end  of 
the  whole  Anglo-French  line  from  the  Vosges,  west,  and  it  was  thus 
exposed,  so  the  whole  German  line  would  now  be  exposed. 

We  now  touch  on  the  first  of  the  two  determining  circumstances  of 
the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  which  in  French  history  are  known  as  the 
Battle  of  the  Ourcq  and  of  La  Fere-Champenoise,  respectively.  Kluck, 
in  common  with  all  German  generals,  seems  to  have  been  satisfied 
that  the  opening  conflicts  of  the  war  had  been  decisive;  he  seems  to 
have  been  sure  that  he  had  before  him  only  beaten  troops,  and  he  had  no 
suspicion  of  the  fact  that  Joffre  had  concentrated  before  Paris  a  new 
and  strong  army,  that  of  Maunoury,  which  was  now  prepared  to 
strike  on  his  flank  as  he  had  struck  on  the  Anglo-French  flank  from  Mons 
to  the  Oise. 

It  was  in  the  evening  of  September  3d  that  General  Gallieni,  com- 
manding the  Paris  camp,  learned  from  his  observers  that  Kluck's  army 
had  begun  to  turn  away  from  Paris  and  was  marching  southeast  from 
Senlis  toward  Meaux  and  the  crossings  of  the  Marne.     He  communicated 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 


119 


the  fact  to  Joffre  by  telephone,  and  on  the  next  day  there  was  arranged 
the  plan  which  precipitated  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  The  credit  for 
this  plan  is  still  disputed  by  partisans  of  the  two  generals.  It  was  on  the 
day  following  (September  5th)  that  Joffre  published  his  famous  order  an- 
nouncing that  the  moment  to  attack  had  come,  thanks  to  the  blunders 
of  the  enemy;  that  failure  would  not  be  forgiven,  and  troops  that  could 
not  advance  must  die  on  their  positions. 

Actually,  it  was  planned  that  the  Maunoury  army,  emerging  from 
the  intrenched  camp  of  Paris  and  moving  due  east,  should  attack  the 
small  flank  guards  which  Kluck  had  left  facing  Paris;  drive  them  east 
across  the  Ourcq  River,  which  runs  from  the  north  down  into  the  Marne 
above  Meaux;  and,  passing  the  Ourcq,  cut  across  the  rear  both  of  Kluck's 
and  Billow's  armies.  The  mass  of  Kluck's  army  was  far  south  of  the 
Marne,  in  front  of  the  British  and  the  Fifth  French  Army,  under 
Franchet  d'Esperey.  A  very  good  parallel  for  Maunoury's  blow,  as 
planned,  is  that  delivered  by  "Stonewall"  Jackson  on  Hooker's  right  at 
Chancellorsville. 


KLUCK  S  CIRCLE 


About  Sept.  1st,  at  Senlis,  Kluck  began  to  move  east\vard  away  from  Paris.  On  Sept.  5th 
the  van  of  his  army  was  south  of  the  Marne  beyond  Coulommiers.  At  that  time  his  rear  and 
flank  guard  just  north  of  Meaux  was  attacked  by  Maunoury  coming  from  Paris.  Kluck  then 
drew  back  the  mass  of  his  troops  in  a  complete  circle  north  of  the  Marne  and  west  of  the  Ourcq. 
On  Sept.  9th,  following  the  reverse  of  Hausen,  he  began  his  retreat  upon  Soissons 


120  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

To  the  British  was  assigned  precisely  the  role  that  Napoleon  as- 
signed to  Grouchy  in  the  Waterloo  campaign.  Field-Marshal  French's 
army  was  expected  to  engage  and  hold  Kluck's  army  while  Maunoury 
struck  its  flank  and  rear.  Kluck  had  two  corps  south  of  the  Marne 
facing  the  British,  in  addition  to  cavalry;  the  British  had  three  corps 
facing  the  Kluck  army,  and  on  its  right  the  line  was  prolonged  by  Gen- 
eral Conneau's  cavalry  to  the  left  of  D'Esperey. 

III.    BRITISH    FAILURE 

In  this  particular  mission  the  British  failed  exactly  as  did  Grouchy, 
and  the  consequence  of  their  failure  was  the  escape  of  Kluck  and  the 
restriction  of  the  extent  of  the  Allied  victory.  The  failure  long  re- 
mained unknown  to  the  British  public,  which  was  early  informed  and 
generally  believed  that  the  British  had  won  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  and 
saved  France.  The  fact  was  quite  different.  Not  only  were  the  Brit- 
ish not  actively  engaged  at  the  Marne,  but  had  they  been  able  to  do  that 
which  had  been  hoped,  if  not  expected  of  them,  Kluck  might  have  been 
destroyed  and  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  might  have  been  as  immediately 
conclusive  as  Waterloo. 

The  story  of  the  British  failure  is  simply  told.  On  September  4th 
Generals  Gallieni  and  Maunoury  went  by  automobile  to  Field-Marshal 
French's  headquarters  at  Melun.  They  asked  the  British  commander 
to  change  front  and  attack  the  two  corps  of  Kluck's  army  facing  him ; 
this  attack  was  requested  for  the  following  day,  September  5th.  At  the 
same  time  Maunoury  was  to  attack  the  flank  and  rear  guards  of  Kluck 
along  the  Ourcq.  Such  an  operation  would  crush  Kluck  in  the  closing 
blades  of  a  scissors-like  movement.  Here  was  the  major  strategy  of  the 
Marne. 

But  Field-Marshal  French  declared  that  he  could  not  get  ready  to 
attack  in  less  than  forty-eight  hours.  He  did  not  get  ready  and  as  a 
result  Kluck  drew  his  two  corps  out  of  the  front  of  the  British,  put  them 
in  against  Maunoury,  totally  wrecking  the  whole  strategic  conception 
of  the  French  High  Command  and  coming  within  the  narrowest  margin 
of  destroying  the  Maunoury  army  under  the  walls  of  Paris. 


MARSHAL  FOCH 

This  is  the  man  whose  tremendous  thrust  routed  the  Prussian  Guard  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
Launched  at  exactly  the  right  moment  it  went  through  the  Guard  "as  a  knife  goes  through  cheese," 
routed  the  whole  army  of  Hausen,  and  earned  for  Foch,  Joffre's  verbal  decoration  as  "  the  first  strategist  in 
Europe."  A  few  weeks  later,  through  his  generalship  and  the  help  of  the  flower  of  the  British  Army,  P'och's 
troops  won  the  terrible  struggle  that  we  call  Ypres.  There  is  a  legend  that  this  time  he  won  commendation 
from  Lord  Roberts  who,  after  studying  his  plans,  is  said  to  h:;ve  remarked  to  officers  of  his  staff,  "You 
have  a  great  general."  His  appointment  as  Generalissimo  ot  the  Allied  forces  marked  the  beginning  of 
their  final  forward  drive  to  victory. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  123 

All  that  was  left  in  front  of  the  British  was  a  cavalry  screen,  but 
this  sufficed  to  hold  up  the  British  advance.  Field-Marshal  French's 
army  did  not  get  across  the  Marne  until  September  9th,  and  the  British 
left,  whose  aid  was  most  desired,  did  not  get  across  the  river  in  time  to 
help  Maunoury  at  all. 

Thus  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the  British  were  not  engaged  in  the 
Marne  at  all.  On  this  point  the  British  and  French  commentators  of 
any  authority  are  completely  in  agreement.  Here  is  the  end  of  the 
legend  that  the  British  saved  anything  at  the  Marne;  the  sole  question 
must  be  whether  what  was  lost  by  reason  of  their  failure  was  unavoid- 
ably lost.  Could  French  have  moved  more  swiftly .''  Did  he  let  the 
supreme  opportunity  of  the  war  slip  through  his  fingers?  Unmistak- 
ably this  is  the  view  of  the  French  military  commentators  and  to  this 
view  British  military  criticism  now  points  clearly. 

Field-Marshal  French's  apologists  insist  that  Maunoury  struck  too 
soon  and  that  the  responsibility  for  the  failure  was  his  and  not  the 
British  commander's.  But  will  such  a  defence  hold  ?  We  know  now 
that  the  decisive  blow  in  the  battle  was  struck  by  Foch  on  September 
9th  and  at  La  Fere-Champenoise.  We  know  that  it  was  struck  when 
his  army  was  in  a  critical  condition  and  that  it  succeeded  only  because 
Maunoury's  attack,  opened  on  September  5th,  had  just  produced 
that  dislocation  in  the  German  lines  which  opened  the  gap  through 
which  Foch  penetrated. 

We  may  say  without  hesitation,  then,  that  Maunoury  did  not  at- 
tack prematurely.  He  attacked  at  the  moment  fixed  by  Joffre,  who 
was  surveying  the  whole  battlefield  of  which  Field-Marshal  French 
saw  but  one  corner,  and  he  attacked  because  Jofi^re  perceived  that  the 
hour  had  come  beyond  which  it  was  dangerous  to  wait.  What  (hap- 
pened on  September  9th,  prior  to  the  moment  Foch  seized  the  chance  to 
save  himself  and  France,  completely  demonstrated  the  correctness  of 
Jofifre's  view. 

This  would  show  that  Maunoury's  attack  was  not  premature,  but 
it  would  not  prove  that  Field-Marshal  French  was  tardy,  or  "over 
cautious"  to  use  the  severe  words  of  one  British  commentator.     But, 


124 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


unfortunately  for  French,  his  whole  record  is  against  him.  He  delayed 
at  Mons;  he  procrastinated  in  the  retreat,  notably  at  the  moment  of 
Guise,  under  conditions  that  had  tragic  consequences  for  one  French 
commander;  he  was  late  in  sending  up  supports  at  Neuve-Chapelle 
and  Loos.  All  these  delays  were  fatal  to  success  at  the  moment,  and 
the  cumulative  effect  of  them  led  to  his  retirement  from  the  command 
of  the  British  army  in  France. 

On  his  own  record,  supported  as  it  is  by  a  wealth  of  testimony  with 


FRENCH 
1  BRITISH 
1  GERMAN 


IV-WiJrtemberg 
V-Cro'wn  Prince 


BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE,  SEPT.  fTH 

A-Maunoury  D-Foch         *  I-KIuck 

B-British  E-DeLangledeCary       II-Biilow 

C-Franchet  d'Esperey     F-Sarrail  III-Hausen 

NoU — The  small  black  and  white  square  above  Meaux  represents  the  Fourth  Reserve  Corps  left 

by  Kluck  to  cover  his  flank 


respect  to  his  actions  during  the  Battle  of  the  Mame — when  he  con- 
tinued to  appeal  to  the  hard-pressed  Maunoury  to  send  him  reinforce- 
ments, after  he  had  permitted  all  of  Kluck's  army  but  a  cavalry  screen 
to  escape  from  his  front  and  attack  Maunoury — it  is  difficult  to  escape 
the  conviction  that  Field-Marshal  French  failed  to  rise  to  the  greatest 
opportunity  of  the  war,  either  because  he  did  not  perceive  it  or  lacked 
the  necessary  energy  and  initiative. 

At  all  events,  as  to  the  main  fact  there  can  be  no  doubt.    The  British 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 


125 


t  FRENCH 
BRITISH 
GERMAN 


BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE,  SEPT.  8tH 

Armies  distinguished  by  same  symbols  as  on  previous  map.    The  small  square  north  of  the 

British  represents  the  cavalry  corps 


FRENCH 

I  BRITISH 

GERMAN 


BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE,  SEPT.  9TH 
Armies  distinguished  as  above.    The  arrow  shows  attack  by  Foch's  Forty-second  Division  which 

won  the  Battle  of  La  Fere-Champenoise 


126  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

were  never  seriously  engaged  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  and  did  not 
make  any  material  contribution  to  the  French  victory.  Field-Marshal 
French  failed  as  completely  here  as  did  Grouchy  in  the  Waterloo  cam- 
paign. Grouchy's  failure  cost  his  Emperor  a  throne;  French's  failure 
did  not  have  anything  like  so  grave  consequences,  but  it  did  deprive 
France  of  the  maximum  of  possible  profit  from  a  magnificently  con- 
ceived stroke,  and  it  almost  infallibly  saved  the  army  of  Kluck  from 
destruction. 

IV.    THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    OURCQ 

On  September  5th  Maunoury's  army  was  on  the  move,  one  half  ad- 
vancing straight  against  Kluck's  flank  guard,  the  Fourth  Reserve  Corps, 
the  other  circling  round  from  the  north  and  aiming  at  the  flank  and  rear  of 
that  corps.  Maunoury  had  considerably  less  than  100,000  men  at  the 
outset;  his  army  was  doubled  as  the  engagement  proceeded,  but  it  was 
made  up  of  very  heterogeneous  elements,  Algerian  and  Moroccan  troops, 
reservists,  and  only  a  few  first-line  units.  It  had  before  it  on  September 
5th  not  many  more  than  40,000  Germans. 

The  battlefield  of  the  Ourcq  is  a  broad,  level  plateau,  stretching 
north  from  the  Marne  and  ending  on  the  east  abruptly,  where  it  falls 
down  into  the  deep  Ourcq  Valley.  To  the  eye  it  seems  perfectly  level, 
save  for  two  wooded  hills,  a  few  miles  east  of  Meaux,  the  hills  of  Mon- 
thyon  and  Penchard.  It  is  cut  by  several  brooks,  contains  a  number  of 
small  villages,  but  is  without  walls,  hedges,  or  anything  that  would  ofi^er 
great  obstruction  to  troops,  or  artillery  fire.  Several  large  farm  build- 
ings, recalling  the  Chateau  of  Hougoumont  at  Waterloo,  played  a  sim- 
ilar role  in  the  battle. 

In  the  afternoon  of  September  5th  this  army.of  Maunoury  advanced 
and  came  in  contact  with  the  German  troops  on  the  hills  of  Monthyon 
and  Penchard.  These  hills  were  taken  in  the  evening  hours.  By  the 
morning  of  September  6th  the  Germans  were  recoiling  toward  the  very 
edge  of  the  plateau,  with  the  Ourcq  Valley  at  their  backs.  A  number  of 
villages  were  taken  by  storm,  notably  Barcy  and  Etrepilly,  and  the 
French  from  the  north  were  able  to  threaten  a  flanking  movement 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  127 

which  promised  to  turn  the  Fourth  Reserve  Corps  out  of  their  posi- 
tion. 

But  now  comes  the  change.  Kluck  seems  to  have  appreciated 
the  full  extent  of  the  peril  incredibly  swiftly.  By  September  6th  he 
was  drawing  his  troops  from  the  front  of  the  British.  Actually  he  was 
able  to  withdraw  first  the  Second  (active)  Corps  and  then  the  Fourth 
(active)  Corps,  leaving  only  cavalry  under  Marwitz  to  hold  the  British. 
With  these  troops  he  counter-attacked  Maunoury,  threw  him  back 
materially  on  September  8th,  and  on  the  next  day  bent  the  northern  flank 
of  the  French  army  back  until  it  stood  at  right  angles  to  the  rest  of  the 
line,  and  on  this  day  seemed  destined  to  drive  Maunoury  back  into  Paris. 
On  the  night  of  September  9-10,  the  Paris  garrison  stood  to  arms  and 
Maunoury's  troops  waited  anxiously  for  daybreak,  still  with  orders  to 
attack,  but  expecting  to  be  attacked  and  destroyed.  After  three  and 
a  half  days  of  fighting  they  were  at  the  end  of  their  strength. 

When  daylight  came  on  September  loth  the  Germans  were  gone. 
For  Kluck  the  retreat  to  the  Aisne  had  begun,  but  it  was  not  a  retreat 
due  to  his  own  defeat.  The  first  blow  of  the  French  had  been  parried; 
the  failure  of  the  British  to  retain  even  one  corps  of  Kluck's  army  before 
them,  their  extreme  slowness  of  movement,  had  permitted  Kluck  to 
recojicentrate  his  army,  escape  from  the  vicious  position  in  which  he 
stood  when  battle  began,  had  enabled  him  to  throw  back  Maunoury's 
army,  insure  his  retreat,  and  to  come  within  an  ace  of  winning  a  deci- 
sive battle. 

V.    LA    FfeRE-CHAMPENOISE 

If  it  had  failed  in  its  chief  purpose,  still  the  effect  of  Maunoury's 
attack  had  been  to  dislocate  not  only  Kluck's  army,  but  that  of  Billow 
to  the  east,  the  army  which  had  won  Charleroi  and  now  faced  the  Fifth 
French  Army  along  the  Grand  Morin,  south  of  Montmirail  and  east  to 
the  marshes  of  St.  Gond.  This  army  drew  back  to  keep  its  alignment 
with  Kluck,  heavily  pursued  and  fighting  many  minor  engagements 
right  across  the  battlefields  of  the  famous  Napoleonic  campaign  of  1814. 
Montmirail,  Vauchamps,  and  Champaubert  woke  from  a  century  of 


128  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

peace  to  new  carnage.  But  the  fight  between  D'Esperey  and  Billow 
was  not  to  the  finish,  because  Billow  was  steadily  compelled  to  retire  to 
keep  his  contact  with  Kluck.  Hence  this  part  of  the  whole  Battle  of  the 
Marne  is  of  relatively  minor  importance.  Had  Kluck  attacked  Paris, 
D'Esperey's  army  might  have  played  another  and  decisive  role,  for 
Joffre  had  also  prepared  for  this  consequence. 

To  the  east  of  D'Esperey  was  the  army  of  Foch,  which  now  played 
the  decisive  part.  This  army  stood,  at  first,  with  its  advance  guards 
on  the  north  side  of  the  famous  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  a  strange  swamp 
full  of  stagnant  ponds  and  crossed  by  only  a  few  highways.  This  was  a 
considerable  military  obstacle.  Behind  it  ran  a  line  of  hills,  north  of 
the  town  of  Sezanne  and  dropping  away  to  the  southeast,  looking  down 
on  La  Fere-Champenoise  from  the  Plateau  of  Euvy  and  losing  them- 
selves in  the  monotonous  plain  of  the  Camp  de  Mailly. 

When  Maunoury's  attack  compelled  the  immediate  retreat  of  Kluck's 
troops  south  of  the  Marne  and  the  ultimate  retrogression  of  Billow,  the 
German  High  Command  resolved  to  seek  victory  by  a  redoubled  pres- 
sure upon  Foch,  who  held  the  French  centre.  In  a  word,  the  Germans 
undertook  to  break  the  French  line,  the  whole  line  from  Paris  to  Verdun, 
and  to  break  it  at  the  exact  centre,  which  was  where  Foch  stood.  Foch 
was  heavily  outnumbered,  and  although  he  began,  on  September  7th,  a 
brave  offensive,  he  was  steadily  driven  south  and  suffered  great  losses. 
The  fighting  here  was  the  most  sanguinary  of  the  whole  engagement, 
and  there  are  ten  thousand  graves  in  the  little  town  of  La  Fere-Cham- 
penoise alone. 

Nor  was  this  the  worst.  Not  only  was  Foch  driven  south,  but  his  right 
or  eastern  flank  was  driven  very  far  south,  until  his  army,  instead  of  facing 
north,  faced  nearly  east,  and  a  wide  gap  began  to  open  in  the  whole  French 
line  between  Foch  and  the  French  army  of  De  Langle  de  Cary  to  the  east. 

September  9th  is  here,  as  at  the  Ourcq,  the  decisive  day.  On  this 
day  Franchet  d'Esperey,  having  cleared  Billow  from  the  banks  of  the 
Petit  Morin  and  finding  his  Tenth  Corps  freed  by  Billow's  withdrawal 
to  the  northwest,  toward  Kluck,  lends  this  corps  to  Foch,  and  it  now 
begins  to  act  on  the  western  flank  of  the  German  centre. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  129 

This  aid  assures  the  safety  of  Foch's  western  flank  and  he  now  with- 
draws his  42d  Division  from  this  flank,  transports  it  eastward  to  Linthes, 
and  very  late  in  the  afternoon  suddenly  launches  it  in  a  terrific  drive 
at  the  Prussian  Guard  between  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond  and  La  Fere- 
Champenoise. 

At  this  point  the  German  line  has  been  thinned  as  a  result  first  of 
the  withdrawal  of  Biilow  toward  Kluck  and  secondly  in  consequence  of 
the  eagerness  of  the  Germans  to  press  their  advantage  to  the  south,  where 
they  were  at  the  point  of  piercing  the  whole  French  line  about  Gourgan- 
^on.  These  two  movements,  going  on  at  the  same  moment,  stretch  the 
lines  of  the  Prussian  Guard — which  is  charged  with  preserving  the  con- 
tact between  Biilow's  army  on  the  west  and  Hausen's  in  the  centre 
facing  Foch — as  an  elastic  is  stretched  by  pulling  both  ends.  The  42d 
Division  goes  through  the  Guard  as  a  knife  cuts  through  cheese,  as  the 
French  afterward  explained;  it  throws  the  Saxons  in  and  about  La 
Fere-Champenoise  into  disorder  which  becomes  a  rout,  for  Foch  at  the 
same  moment  launches  a  general  attack. 

This  tremendous  thrust  earned  for  Foch  Joffre's  verbal  decoration 
as  "the  first  strategist  in  Europe."  It  routed  the  Prussian  Guard, 
which  lost  most  of  its  artillery;  it  crumpled  up  the  flank  of  the  two 
Saxon  corps;  it  routed  the  entire  army  of  Hausen,  who  was  forthwith 
retired  in  disgrace.  It  resulted  in  the  wild  retreat  of  the  whole  Hausen 
army  as  well  as  that  of  the  Prussian  Guard.  Here,  and  only  here,  was 
there  anything  approaching  a  great  battlefield  triumph.  Biilow  had 
retired  with  little  or  no  disorder;  Kluck  had  retrieved  his  earlier  reverses, 
and,  at  the  moment  when  Foch  struck  his  blow,  was  winning  the  Battle 
of  theOurcq. 

But  the  retirement  of  Kluck  and  Biilow  and  the  disaster  which  had 
overtaken  the  German  centre,  under  Hausen,  together  decided  the  fate 
of  the  battle.  It  was  on  the  receipt  of  news  of  this  disaster  that  Kluck 
started  his  rapid  retreat  to  the  Aisne;  that  Biilow  at  last  gave  over  his 
effort  to  regain  control  of  the  north  bank  of  the  Marne,  which  he  had 
too  hastily  abandoned ;  and  from  Paris  to  Vitry-Ie-Franfois  the  German 
armies  all  took  the  homeward  roads. 


I30  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


VI.    DE    LANGLE    DE    GARY   AND    SARRAIL 

It  remains  very  briefly  to  mention  the  incidents  to  the  east.  Here, 
behind  the  Ornain,  the  army  of  De  Langle  de  Gary  stood  for  three  days 
rigidly  on  the  defensive,  beating  off  German  attacks  made  by  the 
army  of  Wiirtemberg  on  a  front  from  Vitry-le-Francois  to  Revigny. 
More  physical  destruction  was  done  here  than  anywhere  along  the  battle- 
field, and  the  ruins  of  Sermaize  supply  evidence  of  the  wanton  fury  of  the 
Bavarians.  But  like  the  battles  around  Montmirail,  these  contests  were 
without  issue,  because  the  decision  at  La  Fere-Champenoise  ultimately 
compelled  the  Bavarians  to  retire. 

As  for  the  army  of  Sarrail,  standing  from  Revigny  north  to  Souilly, 
where  it  touched  the  positions  held  by  the  garrison  of  Verdun,  it  resisted 
all  attacks  of  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince,  operating  east  of  the  Ar- 
gonne,  to  penetrate  its  front  and  isolate  Verdun.  It  had  a  bad  moment 
when  its  rear  was  threatened  along  the  Meuse  at  Forts  Tryon  and 
Liouville  by  a  drive  coming  from  Metz,  but  the  garrisons  of  these  forts 
held  out  until  aid  came,  and  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  of  the  Meuse 
proved  sufllicient  to  bar  the  Germans. 

For  the  armies  of  Kluck,  Biilow,  and  Hausen  the  day  of  September 
9th  was  decisive,  and  as  early  as  September  6th  the  first  two  were  in 
partial  retreat.  But  both  the  Wiirtemberg  army  and  that  of  the  Crown 
Prince  held  on  for  several  days  more  and  retired  in  good  order  in  the 
end,  when  the  recoil  of  the  armies  to  the  west  made  their  retreat  neces- 
sary to  keep  the  alignment.  Of  the  five  German  armies  only  those  of 
Kluck  and  Hausen  actually  put  forth  their  whole  strength,  and  of  these 
only  that  of  Hausen  was  decisively  beaten.  Of  the  French  armies, 
only  those  of  Maunoury  and  Foch  were  engaged  to  the  limit,  and  Maun- 
oury  failed  to  accomplish  his  purpose  because  he  did  not  get  the  help 
from  the  British  that  was  expected. 

Had  the  plan  conceived  by  Joff^re  or  Gallieni,  or  by  both  together, 
been  realized,  the  Germans  would  have  suffered  a  decisive  defeat  and 
would  have  been  unable  to  remain  in  France.  Had  Hausen  been  able 
to  break  the  French  centre,  even  after  Maunoury's  attack  and  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  131 

retreat  of  Kluck  and  Biilow,  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  would  have  ended 
in  a  decisive  victory  for  the  Germans  and  the  French  army  would  have 
been  cut  in  two,  one  fragment  driven  in  on  Paris,  the  other  on  the  bar- 
rier fortresses  to  the  east. 

There  was  a  time  when  It  was  generally  believed  that  the  Battle  of 
the  Marne  was  won  by  the  operations  near  Paris,  and  there  is  a  legend 
of  a  victory  won.  by  the  transport  of  troops  through  Paris  in  taxicabs. 
The  troops  were  transported  in  taxis,  but  they  arrived  not  in  time  to 
win  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  but  only  in  time  to  save  the  Battle  of  the 
Ourcq.  Equally  fallacious  is  the  story  of  the  British  part  in  the  battle. 
The  British  were  never  actively  engaged  in  the  battle  at  all;  they 
never  had  anything  but  rearguards  to  deal  with,  and  these  rearguards 
held  them  up  until  the  chance  for  a  supreme  success  had  totally  dis- 
appeared. 

It  is  open  to  question  whether  Foch  would  have  been  able  to  deal 
his  decisive  blow  if  Maunoury's  thrust  had  not  compelled  the  retirement 
of  Biilow,  by  making  Kluck  draw  his  corps  north  of  the  Marne  and  west 
of  the  Ourcq,  thus  dislocating  the  whole  German  front.  But  it  is  not 
open  to  question  that  the  blow  of  Foch  was  decisive.  It  was  delivered 
by  a  beaten  army  almost  at  the  last  gasp,  an  army  which  had  been 
recoiling  under  pressure  for  three  days  and  had  suffered  losses  that 
amounted  to  extermination  in  the  case  of  some  of  Its  units.  American 
army  officers  who  visited  the  battlefield  before  the  bodies  had  been 
removed  will  some  day  supply  conclusive  evidence  of  the  bitterness  of 
the  conflict  as  measured  by  the  carnage. 

VII.    THE    CONSEQUENCES 

No  estimate  of  total  losses,  of  prisoners,  of  booty,  has  ever  been  pub- 
lished. But  it  seems  conservative  to  estimate  that  of  the  2,250,000  men 
engaged  between  Verdun  and  Paris  there  were  more  than  300,000 
killed  or  wounded.  The  French  loss  was  not  less  than  the  German; 
It  may  have  been  more,  for  the  French  In  many  fields  did  the  attacking. 
Certainly  between  the  opening  of  the  campaign  and  the  end  of  the 
German  retreat  after  the  Marne  the  French  losses  exceeded  the  German 


132  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

— the  losses  in  killed  and  wounded — while  the  total  of  prisoners  taken 
by  the  Germans  in  the  various  fortified  positions,  Maubeuge,  Longwy, 
etc.,  were  very  much  greater. 

It  is  reasonably  certain  that  the  Germans  outnumbered  the  French 
on  the  battlefield,  but  owing  to  faults  of  German  concentration  and  de- 
ploying the  French  certainly  got  much  more  out  of  their  inferior  num- 
bers, while  the  Germans  seem  to  have  handled  their  masses  badly  and  to 
have  suffered  from  an  excess  of  numbers  at  certain  unimportant  points. 

The  consequences  of  the  battle  were  wholly  misunderstood  at  first 
by  both  the  French  and  the  Germans.  The  French  believed  that  they 
had  won  a  victory  which  would  turn  the  Germans  out  of  France.  The 
Germans  believed  that  they  had  merely  suffered  a  minor  reverse  and 
that  after  a  new  concentration  they  would  be  able  to  take  the  offensive 
again  and  renew  their  bid  for  a  decision.  Both  illusions  perished  at  the 
Aisne.  Here  the  Germans  were  able  to  repulse  the  French  and  dig  in, 
but  on  their  side  they  never  were  able  to  get  on  their  feet  and  advance 
again. 

Actually  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  broke  the  German  offensive, 
wrecked  their  whole  strategy,  which  was  to  bring  the  French  to  a  decisive 
battle  in  the  first  six  weeks  of  the  war,  win  that  battle,  and  put  the  French 
out  of  the  war.  They  advanced  to  the  Marne  seeking  a  second  Sedan, 
and  the  French  there  won  an  Antietam.  All  the  original  German  con- 
ceptions were  definitely  defeated  in  this  battle;  they  were  compelled  to 
retreat,  to  give  over  the  offensive,  to  accept  a  long  war.  But,  save  for 
the  Prussian  Guard  and  the  Saxons  of  Hansen,  they  were  nowhere  routed, 
and  they  were  able  within  a  week  after  the  decisive  day  of  the  Marne, 
September  9th,  to  halt  the  Allies  along  the  Aisne,  establish  their  front 
unbroken  from  the  Aisne  to  the  Meuse,  and  even  to  undertake  a  new 
attack.     But  this  failed  almost  instantly. 

It  is  essential — as  has  been  said  before  and  cannot  be  said  too  often — 
to  keep  in  mind,  in  examining  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  the  story  of  the 
opening  weeks  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War.  The  two  conflicts  began  in 
much  the  same  way.  In  both  cases  German  mobilization  put  more 
troops  and  better-equipped  troops  into  the  field.     In  both  cases  all  the 


NOVEL  PHASES  OF 
MODERN  WARFARE 
SHOWN   IN   PICTURES 


A  HIDDEN  AND  DEFENDED  MACHINE  GUN 

Except  fur  the  noise,  which  resembles  a  pneumatic  rivetting  machine,  this  gun  gives  the 
cneniv  no  indication  of  its  whereabouts.     It  fires  through  a  painted  net  curtain. 


Copyright  by  Underwood  l^  Undenvood 


THE  "AGENT  DE  LIAISON" 


This  French  soldier's  official  designation  is  as  sinister  as  his  appearance.  He  is  an  agent  de  liaison.  It  is  a  relief 
to  know  that  this  means  simply  telephone  operator.  He  wears  his  mask  as  a  protection  against  poison-gas  bombs. 
A  hand  grenade  is  in  the  pouch  suspended  from  his  belt. 


""<%trim; 


■■"$'   i"^ 


.  •fi*^"-^- 


Photograph  by  Paul  'J'hompsoii 


'POISON  GAS"  IN  THE  WAR 


The  upper  picture  shows  rhe  cylindrical  containers  from  which  the  poison  gas  emanates.  The  Austria.-is  left 
them  behind  when  the  Russians  drive  them  from  this  position.  Trenches  have  to  be  dug  sometimes  when  gas-bombs 
and  shells  are  exploding  close  at  har.d.  These  British  "Tommies"  are  wearing  respirators  as  a  protection  against 
poisonous  fumes. 


MAC111\E-GUN   POSITIUX   IN  THE  Ul'KN 

Where  guns  and  men  are  priitcctcd  only  by  small  ilunonts  and  shell-craters — conditions 
which  obtain  during  an  advance 


I'LRISCOI'K  AXU  Ml-.TAL  HKI.MKT 

The  French  soldiers  soon  bowed  to  grim  necessity  and  gave  up  the  blue  tunics  and  red  trousers  endeared  to  them 
by  a  romantic  and  glorious  tradition.  These  entrenched  poilus  are  sensibly  making  themselves  as  safe  and  comfortable 
as  they  can.  Clad  in  serviceable  and  inconspicuous  "horizon"  blue  uniforms  with  metal  helmets,  one  man  is  trying 
a  pot-shot  with  his  rifle,  which  is  equipped  with  a  periscope  so  that  he  need  expose  himself  no  more  than  is  necessary, 
while  his  comrade  is  solacing  himself  with  a  glance  at  his  favorite  Paris  newspaper. 


THIS  IS  THE  RESULT  WHEN  A  FOREST  BECOMES  A  BATTLEFIELD 


Copyright  by  Underwoud  ly  Underwood 

BUCKLER,  HAND-GRENADE    AND  HELM 

History  repeats  itself  in  war  as  in  other  human  relationships  In  1913  the  world  thought  the  day  of  warriors  with 
steel  helmets  and  shields  had  passed  forever.  But  here  is  one  very  much  alive.  He  is  a  grenadier,  too,  in  the  original 
sense  of  the  term,  for  he  stands  ready  to  throw  a  hand-grenade  in  the  face  of  his  enetnv. 


Photograph  by  the  hitemational  Ntti 


BARBKD  WIRE  ENTANGLEMENTS 

Barbed  wire  has  been  used  in  the  World  War  on  an  unprecedented  scale.  These  troops  (upper  picture)  are  advanc- 
ing upon  an  abandoned  fort  by  the  side  of  a  formidable  entanglement  which  has  been  firmly  anchored  by  stout  posts. 
The  French  have  invented  a  gun  (loarr  picture)  which  fires  into  the  midst  of  the  wire  entanglement  a  hook  attached 
to  a  cable.     The  hook  is  then  hauled  back,  supposedly  bringing  with  it  large  masses  of  the  wire. 


THE  GASOLINE  ENGINE 

The  gasoline  engine  has  greatly  increased  the  mobility  of  modern  troops.  The 
lower  picture  shows  a  little  British  fortress  that  can  be  moved  at  the  rate  of  twenty-five 
or  thirty  miles  an  hour,  wherever  there  is  a  decent  road.  The  upper  and  middle  pictures 
show  one  method  the  Germans  have  adopted  for  increasing  the  mobility  of  their  artillery. 
The  armoured  car  atfords  protection  to  the  gun-crew  while  in  transit  to  the  point  at  which 
they  are  needed.  Arrived  on  the  ground  the  car's  armour  is  removed  (as  shown  in  the 
tentre  picture  and  the  gun  cleared  for  action  in  two  or  three  minutes. 


V\(_)RK  AND  PLAY  AT  THE  KRUNT 
These  FieiK-h  gunners  (upf'-r  picturr)  arc  working  to  excellent  purpose  in  a  dugout  carefully  concealed  from  the 

'''"'Thi^seent'aTtranke  place  for  a  candy-shop,  yet  it  is_domg  a  big  Injsiness  The  Young  Men's  Chnstian  Association 
maintains  manv  little  booths  like  this,  just  back  of  the  hrmg  line  The  soldier  s  small  change  >^JP^ ,«  ^  ^n  a  hole  ,n 
his  pocket,  and  he  highly  appreciates  such  opportunities  to  get  rul  ot  it  in  exchange  for  sweets  and  other  little  luxuries. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  141 

opening  battles  were  won  by  the  Germans.  But  at  this  point  the  par- 
allel stops  short.  Instead  of  Mars-la-Tour  and  Sedan,  with  their  fatal 
terminations,  you  have  an  orderly  retreat  of  all  French  armies  until  a 
new  concentration  permits  a  fresh  offensive,  and  when  this  happens  you 
have  a  German  retreat  followed  by  a  German  rally,  which  ends  in  a 
deadlock  and  more  than  three  years  of  trench  war. 

This,  after  all,  is  the  "Miracle  of  the  Marne."  The  German  High 
Command  said:  "We  have  more  men,  better  guns,  better  troops;  we 
will  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  turn  the  French  fortresses  and, 
arriving  in  the  plains  of  northern  France,  we  will  destroy  the  French 
armies,  take  Paris,  and  then  turn  east  and  dispose  of  Russia.  We  shall 
win  the  war  in  six  weeks  and  take  Paris  in  seven.  We  shall  hold  France 
to  ransom  and  dispose  of  the  French  danger  for  all  time." 

Not  one  detail  of  this  grandiose  plan  was  realized.  Not  one  detail 
has  been  realized  after  three  years  of  war.  We  all  see  that  if  France 
had  failed,  Russia  would  have  been  conquered,  and  even  the  British 
Empire  would  have  come  to  the  edge  of  ruin.  But  France  did  not  fail. 
She  won  her  greatest  victory  in  a  wonderful  history  with  but  the  least 
possible  support  from  Britain;  she  saved  herself,  Britain  and  Russia, 
and  after  the  Marne  the  war  had  new  horizons  and  different  possibilities. 
Thus  in  every  sense  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  one  of  the  few  truly 
decisive  battles  in  all  human  history,  a  battle  whose  consequences, 
though  we  may  not  yet  accurately  measure  them,  seem,  at  the  distance 
of  nearly  three  years,  incomparably  greater  than  on  the  day  when  the 
world  first  learned  that  the  German  invasion  would  not  reach  Paris. 

VIII.    THE    SECOND    BATTLE    OF   NANCY 

During  the  whole  of  the  first  week  of  September,  ending  before  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne  reached  its  decisive  stage,  another  contest  was  going 
forward  on  the  front  which  had  been  successfully  maintained  by  the 
French  after  their  defeat  at  Morhange.  Coordinating  their  movements 
with  those  of  the  armies  to  the  west,  eight  German  corps  under  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria  and  General  Heeringen,  in  the  decisive  hours, 
acting  under  the  eyes  of  the  Kaiser  himself,  undertook  to  cut  their  way 


142  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

through  the  gap  in  the  French  barrier  forts  between  Toul  and  Spinal 
and  thus  arrive  on  the  flank  and  rear  of  all  the  French  armies  fighting 
from  Verdun  to  Paris. 

Had  this  drive  succeeded,  the  decision  of  the  Marne  would  have  been 
reversed,  and  German  strategy  would  have  triumphed  despite  the 
checks  elsewhere.  It  did  not  succeed,  because,  although  his  armies 
were  heavily  depleted  to  reinforce  armies  to  the  west,  General  de  Castel- 
nau  was  able  to  repulse  all  attacks  in  fighting  which  was  unquestionably 
the  most  costly  to  the  Germans  in  the  whole  period  of  the  war  preceding 
the  struggles  in  Flanders.  Unfortunately  the  larger  issues  at  the  Marne, 
the  proximity  of  the  western  battlefield  to  Paris,  have  served  to  obscure 
these  operations.  Thus,  precisely  as  the  victory  of  Foch  at  La  Fere- 
Champenoise  is  little  known  save  to  military  men;  although  it  did,  in 
fact,  decide  the  Marne,  the  success  of  De  Castelnau,  which  permitted 
the  victory  of  the  Marne  and  held  the  whole  eastern  line  of  the  French 
field  armies,  has,  as  yet,  no  place  in  current  history. 

When  the  German  attack  began,  De  Castelnau  stood  thus:  his  left 
or  northern  flank  rested  on  the  Moselle  south  of  Pont-a-Mousson  and  on 
the  Plateau  of  Ste.  Genevieve,  a  gentle  hill,  which  is  the  northern  ex- 
tremity of  the  Grand-Couronne.  Thence  it  followed  the  Grand-Cour- 
onne,  facing  the  little  Seille  River,  to  the  Plateau  d'Amance,  at  the 
southern  end  of  the  Grand-Couronne.  Here  the  ground  falls  sharply 
and  the  French  line  passing  through  the  Forest  of  Champenoux  and  a 
dozen  little  towns,  scenes  of  desperate  fighting,  still  unknown,  crossed  the 
Meurthe  at  the  foot  of  the  Plateau  of  Safi"ais-Belchamps,  due  south  of 
Nancy,  and  extended  along  the  ridge  between  the  Meurthe  and  the 
Moselle,  south  toward  the  Vosges. 

This  was  a  position  long  ago  surveyed  as  the  final  line  of  French  re- 
sistance if  the  German  attack  came  from  Alsace-Lorraine.  Every 
higher  officer  in  France  knew  it.  Here,  if  anywhere,  the  French  could  be 
expected  to  make  a  successful  resistance — and  they  did. 

The  first  attack  came  upon  Ste.  Genevieve.  The  Germans  advanced 
south  on  both  sides  of  the  Moselle,  took  Pont-a-Mousson,  entered  the 
Forest  of  the  Advance  Guard,  and  opened  a  cross  fire  upon  the  French 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  143 

a.t  Ste.  Genevieve.  Despite  orders  to  retire,  the  French,  only  a  bat- 
tahon  strong,  held  on  and  repulsed  massed  attacks,  after  which  the 
Germans  left  4,000  bodies  in  the  Bois  de  Facq.  Finally,  just  as  he  was 
withdrawing  in  obedience  to  peremptory  orders,  the  French  Com- 
mander perceived  that  the  Germans  were  also  drawing  out,  whereupon 
he  returned  to  his  lines. 

The  second  and  main  attack  came  at  the  other  end  of  the  Grand- 
Couronne  on  the  edge  of  the  Plateau  d'Amance  and  through  the  large 
Forest  of  Champenoux.  No  more  desperate  fighting  in  the  whole  war 
has  occurred  than  here.  Heavily  outnumbered,  the  French  were  driven 
back  to  the  western  edge  of  the  forest;  the  Germans  for  a  brief  hour 
seized  a  small  farm  at  the  foot  of  the  Plateau  D'Amance  but  were 
driven  out.  Terrific  fighting  and  enormous  losses  marked  the  engage- 
ments to  the  south,  notably  about  the  little  village  of  Corbessaux.  In 
front  of  the  Plateau  of  SafTais-Belchamps  the  Germans  were  slaughtered 
in  masses,  attempting  to  cross  the  Meurthe. 

A  final  attack,  around  Amance  and  the  Forest  of  Champenoux — 
currently  believed  to  have  been  made  while  the  Kaiser,  surrounded  by  his 
guard  in  white  uniform,  waited  at  Eply  to  enter  Nancy — ^was  rolled  back. 
Before  Foch  had  won  his  great  struggle  at  La  Fere-Champenoise,  the 
drive  through  Lorraine  was  over  and  the  Second  Battle  of  Nancy  had 
saved  the  eastern  barrier  to  France.  Afterward,  as  the  Germans 
began  to  draw  troops  out  of  this  line  to  meet  the  new  situation  in  the 
west,  the  French  pushed  out,  retook  Pont-a-Mousson  and  Luneville, 
and  reestablished  their  front  along  the  frontier  from  the  Vosges  to 
Pont-a-Mousson. 

The  Second  Battle  of  Nancy  was  a  defensive  battle  to  save  the  main 
French  operation,  westward  at  the  Marne.  It  was  really  a  vital  phase  of 
the  Marne  itself,  the  foundation  on  which  Joffre  built  his  whole  strategy; 
it  was  probably  bloodier  than  any  fight  at  the  Marne,  and  its  relative 
value  must  be  recognized  to  appreciate  the  whole  picture  of  the  Marne 
campaign.  It  was  won  by  the  army  that  had  been  defeated  at  Mor- 
hange,  but  by  only  a  fraction  of  the  force  that  fought  in  that  disastrous 
engagement,  for  Joffre  had  long  ago  depleted  it  to  supply  troops  for  his 


144  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

new  armies  and  to  reinforce  the  others,  while  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
was  still  in  progress. 

IX.    TANNENBERG 

To  complete  the  story  of  the  Marne,  it  is  necessary  to  recount  now 
the  disaster  that  overtook  the  Russian  army,  which  had  invaded  East 
Prussia  from  Warsaw.     In  the  general  Franco-Russian  plan,  it  was 


BALTIC     SEA 


rest  Lilovsk 


FIRST  RUSSIAN  INVASION  OF  EAST  PRUSSIA,  CHECKED  BY  HINDENBURG  AT 
TANNENBERG,    AUG.  3I,   I914 

Two  Russian  armies  were  sent  into  East  Prussia,  one  from  the  Niemen  front  and  the  other 
north  from  Warsaw.  Hindenburg  defeated  the  Warsaw  army  decisively  at  Tannenberg  and  the 
other  army  then  drew  back 

A-Rennenkampf  B-SamsonofF 

agreed  that  Russia  should  promptly  invade  East  Prussia  if  Germany 
sent  her  masses  through  Belgium  and  against  France.  It  was  believed 
that  such  an  operation  would  mean  that  Germany  would  have  to 
leave  her  eastern  front  insecurely  guarded  and  that  a  Russian  inva- 


HINDENBURG,  VICTOR  OF  TANNENBERG 

When  tlie  Russians  surprised  rhe  Germans  by  their  quick  mobilization  and  invasion  of  East  Prussia, 
in  August,  1914,  the  German  Emperor  summoned  General  Hindenburg  from  retirement  and  gave  him  com- 
mand in  the  region  which  he  had  made  a  life  study.  He  concentrated  most  of  his  forces  about  the  Russian 
Warsaw  army  in  the  region  he  knew  so  well.  Having  drawn  a  net  about  his  victims  he  nias.sed  his  heavy 
artillery  and  practically  annihilated  the  Russian  army,  which  lost  about  100,000  troops  with  guns  and  flags 
innumerable.     This  was  the  victory  of  Tannenberg,  which  made  Hindenburg  the  idol  of  the  German  people. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  147 

sion  would  promptly  force  her  to  withdraw  troops  from  France  in 
advance  of  the  decisive  engagement. 

Accordingly  two  Russian  armies  were  at  once  sent  into  East  Prussia, 
one  from  the  Niemen  front  and  the  other  north  from  Warsaw.  Both 
won  immediate  and  considerable  successes,  and  the  Germans  on  the 
day  they  reached  Brussels  learned  that  Russian  armies  were  carrying 
the  whole  eastern  frontier  and  advancing  after  victories  at  Gumbinnen 
and  Insterburg,  toward  Konigsberg  and  toward  the  east  bank  of  the 
Vistula  north  of  Thorn.  Refugees  fleeing  before  the  storm  were  flowing 
into  Berlin  at  the  precise  moment  that  French  and  Belgian  exiles  were 
reaching  Paris. 

So  far  the  Allied  plan  had  worked  amazingly  well  and  the  promptness 
of  Russian  invasion  had  taken  the  Germans  by  surprise. 

Now,  however,  the  Emperor  summoned  Hindenburg  from  retire- 
ment and  gave  him  command  in  the  region  which  he  had  made  a  life 
study.  Hindenburg  acted  promptly.  Leaving  only  a  screen  of  troops 
in  front  of  the  Russian  army  advancing  from  the  east,  he  concentrated 
his  forces  about  the  Russian  Warsaw  army  in  the  difficult  swamp 
region  he  knew  so  well.  Having  drawn  a  net  about  his  victims,  he 
massed  his  heavy  artillery  and  practically  annihilated  the  Russian  army, 
which  lost  more  than  100,000  troops  with  guns  and  flags  innumerable. 
This  was  the  victory  of  Tannenberg,  celebrated  on  Sedan  Day  by  all 
Germany  as  a  deliverance  from  deadly  peril. 

After  Tannenberg,  the  other  Russian  army  drew  back  safely  and 
Hindenburg  still  lacked  the  numbers  to  press  it  hard,  but  he  was  able 
to  clear  German  territory,  and  the  mass  of  German  armies  in  France 
were  permitted  to  go  forward  to  their  decisive  battle  without  fear  for  this 
eastern  front.  Half  the  Franco-Russian  strategic  conception  had  been 
wrecked.  After  the  Marne  the  Germans  would  not  be  forced  to  face 
immediate  peril  in  the  east  as  well  as  the  west.  They  could  still  con- 
centrate their  energies  on  retrieving  the  situation  at  the  Aisne. 

The  French  victory  at  the  Marne  and  the  great  Russian  triumph 
at  Lemberg  obscured  the  Allied  mind  and  the  mind  of  the  neutral  world 
as  to  the  value  of  Tannenberg.     It  has  not  even  now,  outside  of  Ger- 


148  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

many,  received  its  just  appraisal.  Yet,  to  judge  it  rightly  it  is  only 
necessary  to  consider  what  would  have  been  the  German  situation  if, 
at  the  moment  the  Marne  had  been  lost,  Russian  troops  had  occupied 
all  of  Prussia  east  of  the  Vistula.  This  would  have  happened  but  for 
Tannenberg;  it  would  have  happened  infallibly  if  the  action  of  the  two 
Russian  armies  had  been  properly  coordinated,  for  their  combined 
strength  was  far  greater  than  Hindenburg's. 

For  this  disaster  Lemberg  was  no  counterweight,  because  Germany 
and  not  Austria  was  the  true  enemy  and  German  disaster  might  have 
ended  the  war.  Had  the  Germans  been  driven  behind  the  Lower  Vistula 
all  their  later  and  successful  campaigns  would  have  been  impossible  and, 
taken  with  the  collapse  of  Austria  at  Lemberg  and  the  defeat  of  the 
Marne,  the  Central  Powers  would  have  found  themselves  at  the  close 
of  the  second  month  of  war  in  a  situation  difficult  in  the  extreme,  if  not 
well-nigh  desperate. 

All  this  was  avoided  by  Hindenburg's  amazing  victory,  one  of  the 
most  complete  in  history  and  rivalling  any  Napoleonic  combination  in 
skill  and  efifectiveness.  More  than  all  else  this  German  victory  at  the 
other  end  of  Europe  robbed  the  Marne  of  its  greatest  possible  fruits 
and  condemned  northern  France  to  a  German  occupation  which  still 
persists.  The  victory  on  the  eastern  front  enabled  Germany  to  go 
forward  to  the  Marne  without  hesitation;  it  did  not  enable  her  to  win 
this  battle,  but  after  the  retreat  to  the  Aisne  it  permitted  her  to  concen- 
trate her  energies  and  her  resources  in  new  attacks  upon  the  west  which 
did  not  terminate  until  the  Battle  of  Flanders  in  mid-November. 

Therefore,  just  as  the  Marne  deprived  Germany  of  any  chance  to 
get  a  quick  decision  on  her  main  front,  the  disaster  of  Tannenberg 
deprived  the  Allies  of  any  similar  chance  for  a  prompt  victory.  Later 
historians  will  certainly  do  fuller  justice  to  the  importance  and  service 
of  Tannenberg  to  Germany.  It  was  not  the  greatest  German  victory 
of  the  war,  but  certainly  it  was  the  most  useful,  and  as  such  it  can  rank 
only  second  to  the  Marne  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  contest.  It  is 
hardly  too  much  to  say  that  it  saved  Germany  almost  as  unmistakably 
as  the  Marne  saved  France. 


CHAPTER  SEVEN 

DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST 

I 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  AISNE 

On  the  morrow  of  the  victory  of  the  Marne,  French  purpose  is  clear. 
A  great  strategic  victory  has  been  won,  the  whole  German  conception 
has  been  broken.  All  the  German  armies  are  in  retreat.  It  is  essen- 
tial to  pursue  these  armies;  to  turn  the  retreat  into  a  rout,  if  possible; 
in  any  event,  to  prevent  the  Germans  from  taking  root  in  France  and 
from  presently  stepping  out  in  a  new  general  offensive,  reopening  the 
decision  of  the  Marne.  In  all  save  the  last  of  these  purposes  French 
strategy  failed. 

This  failure,  although  materially  affected  by  the  condition  of  the 
French  army  after  its  long  struggle  and  the  disorganization  of  French 
cavalry,  was  due  primarily  to  the  fact  that  only  one  German  army,  and 
that  the  smallest,  Hansen's,  had  actually  been  beaten  on  the  battlefield. 
German  armies  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  drawn  into  a  hopelessly 
bad  position;  they  had  suffered  heavy  losses  and,  in  the  case  of  the 
Saxon  army,  a  real  rout;  but  they  had,  in  the  main,  seen  the  danger  in 
time;  drawn  themselves  out  of  the  trap  with  great  skill  and  speed;  and 
begun  a  retreat,  which  if  rapid  was,  in  the  main,  orderly,  and  successful. 
In  justice  to  the  British,  it  should  be  added  that  if  their  share  in  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne  was  insignificant,  their  part  in  the  pursuit  was  con- 
siderable and  they  not  only  did  exceedingly  well  but,  having  recovered 
from  the  disorganization  incident  to  their  long  retreat,  came  into  this 
operation  relatively  fresh  and  thus  in  condition  to  do  what  would  have 
been  beyond  the  strength  of  their  exhausted  allies  had  they  been  unaided. 

In  this  same  time  the  purpose  of  German  strategy  was  to  take  a  new 
position  in  France;  reestablish  contact  between  the  various  armies  sepa- 
rated by  the  movements  of  the  battle;  and  then  seek,  in  a  new  contest,  to 

149 


ISO  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

win  that  decisive  battle  which  they  had  lost  at  the  Marne.  The  Ger- 
man official  statements  did  not  admit  the  loss  of  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne.  From  September  3d  to  September  13th  they  preserved  a 
complete  silence  on  western  operations.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  German 
High  Command,  even  as  late  as  September  25th,  did  not  regard  the  Marne 
as  the  decisive  action,  and  remained  confident  that  a  new  battle  would 
win  whatever  had  been  temporarily  lost. 

And  in  this  time  German  High  Command  lost  forever  the  chance  to 
seize  the  French  and  Belgian  seacoasts,  which  lay  open  to  their  occupa- 
tion from  the  moment  that  they  passed  the  Somme  until  their  new  efforts 
from  the  Oise  to  the  Meuse  had  been  checked.  We  shall  see,  a  few  weeks 
later,  a  frantic  effort  to  repair  this  great  error,  when  it  was  too  late. 
For  this  blunder,  together  with  rumoured  mistakes  in  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne  not  yet  established,  the  younger  and  lesser  Moltke  was  pres- 
ently to  lose  his  great  position  as  master  of  the  German  General  Staff, 
turning  over  his  office  to  the  Kaiser's  favorite,  Falkenhayn,  whose  star 
was  to  set  before  Verdun  as  Moltke's  set  on  the  road  to  Calais. 

German  armies  were  able  to  realize  many  of  the  hopes  and  concep- 
tions of  their  commanders  in  the  weeks  following  the  Marne.  They 
did  make  good  their  position  in  France,  behind  the  deep  Aisne,  resting 
on  the  hills  from  Noyon  to  the  Craonne  Plateau.  They  did  restore 
contact  between  all  their  armies  and  they  were  able,  within  ten  days 
after  the  decisive  day  of  the  Marne,  to  renew  the  offensive.  But  they 
were  not  able  to  reopen  the  decision  of  the  Marne,  because,  while  they 
were  beginning  a  new  offensive  between  Noyon  and  Verdun  and  striking 
a  heavy  blow  south  of  Verdun,  at  St.  Mihiel,  French  High  Command 
opened  a  great  turning  movement,  west  of  the  Oise,  which  compelled 
the  Germans  to  displace  their  armies,  sending  masses  from  Lorraine 
and  Champagne  to  Picardy  and  Artois,  and  thus  resigning  their  plans 
farther  east. 

All  these  operations,  very  complex  when  read  in  official  bulletins 
and  utterly  confusing  to  the  public  at  the  time  they  took  place,  become 
perfectly  simple  if  the  main  purposes  are  kept  in  mind.  You  have  first 
the  French  and  British  pursuit,  begun  on  September  loth.     You  have 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST 


151 


next  the  complete  check  of  this  pursuit,  after  September  13th,  when 
Kluck  stands  behind  the  Aisne,  digs  himself  in  and,  reinforced  by  the 
troops  and  guns  which  are  freed  by  the  capture  of  Maubeuge  on  Septem- 
ber 7th,  stops  Field-Marshal  French,  Maunoury,  and  D'Esperey.     By 


THE     GERMAN     RETREAT    TO    THE     AISNE,     SEPT.     IOTH-I5TH,     I9I4 

The  purpose  of  German  strategy  was  to  take  a  new  position  in  France,  reestablish  contact 
between  the  various  armies,  and  then  seek,  in  a  new  contest,  to  win  that  decisive  battle  which  they 
had  lost  at  the  Mame 

September  i8th  Kluck  is  able  to  take  the  offensive  and  drive  the  British 
and  French  out  of  some  of  the  ground  they  have  taken  north  of  the 
Aisne. 

Meantime  to  the   east,   Biilow,  Einem   (who  succeeds   Hansen), 
Wiirtemberg,  and  the  Crown  Prince,  have  retired  slowly,  save  for  the 


152  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Saxons,  who  disappear  soon  as  an  army.  The  German  line  curves 
around  Rheims  and  through  the  Argonne.  By  the  third  week  in 
September,  Biilow,  who  has  held  up  Foch  just  outside  of  Rheims,  at- 
tacks, takes  the  forts  of  Brimont  and  Nogent-l'Abbesse,  bombards  the 
cathedral  at  Rheims,  but  is  checked.  Wiirtemberg  and  the  Crown  Prince 
make  a  considerable  advance  west  and  east  of  the  Argonne,  but  are 
stopped  in  turn.  Troops  from  Metz  make  a  sudden  and  successful 
attack  upon  the  barrier  forts  south  of  Verdun,  and  take  St.  Mihiel. 

No  one  of  these  three  attacks  had  immediately  important  military 
consequences,  yet  all  three  are  of  permanent  interest — that  of  Biilow, 
because  of  the  bombardment  of  the  Cathedral  of  Rheims,  which  had  a 
greater  moral  effect  upon  the  French  nation  than  anything  but  the  vic- 
tory of  the  Marne;  that  of  the  Crown  Prince  because,  taken  together 
with  the  operations  about  St.  Mihiel,  it  had  a  very  great  value  in  a  later 
phase  of  the  war,  when  the  Germans  attacked  Verdun. 

The  Crown  Prince  was  checked  after  a  few  days.  But  he  got  for- 
ward sufficiently  on  the  road  along  which  he  had  recently  retreated  to 
occupy  the  town  of  Varennes,  and  from  this  and  other  points  was  able, 
with  his  heavy  artillery,  to  cut  the  Paris-Verdun  railroad  by  indirect 
fire.  Even  more  complete  was  the  success  to  the  south,  where  the 
Germans,  by  taking  Fort  Camp  des  Romains  and  occupying  the  west 
bank  of  the  Meuse,  facing  St.  Mihiel,  were  able  to  cut  the  Commercy- 
Verdun  line.  There  was  a  moment  when  it  seemed  possible  that  they 
might  actually  penetrate  through  the  breach  they  had  opened  in  the 
French  barrier  and  join  hands  with  the  Crown  Prince.  This  danger 
passed;  Verdun  was  not  enveloped,  but  it  was  left  practically  without 
rail  communication  with  the  rest  of  France,  a  circumstance  which  con- 
tributed gravely  to  its  danger  when  the  Germans  returned  to  the  at- 
tack in  February,  1916. 

About  September  20th  Joffre,  now  assured  that  he  cannot  break  the 
German  lines,  which  have  become  a  wall  of  trenches  from  the  Vosges 
to  the  Oise,  begins  to  send  troops  to  work  around  the  German  right, 
which  does  not  extend  west  of  the  Oise.  These  troops  come  east  from 
Amiens  and  aim  at  St.  Quentin  and  the  whole  network  of  railroads  on 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  153 

which  the  German  armies  depend  for  their  supplies.  So  confident  are 
the  French  of  the  success  of  this  thrust  that  at  this  time  Millerand,  the 
French  Minister  of  War,  forecasts  the  immediate  retirement  of  the 
Germans  from  France,  and  London  has  a  rumour  that  Kluck  has  sur- 
rendered. 

Nothing  Hke  this  happens.  Instead,  the  Germans  begin  to  answer 
the  French  flanking  operation  by  bringing  troops  of  their  own  from  their 
main  front  and  putting  them  in  west  of  the  Oise.  These  troops  very 
quickly  put  an  end  to  the  first  French  flanking  operation;  they  retake 
Peronne,  Roye,  Lassigny,  and  win  an  action  at  Bapaume,  establishing 
in  this  sector  that  front  which  will  endure  up  to  the  time  of  the  great 
Battle  of  the  Somme  in  the  summer  of  1916. 

II.    THE    RACE    TO   THE    SEA 

But  Joffre  sticks  to  his  plan.  He  has  brought  De  Castelnau  from 
Lorraine  with  much  of  the  army  which  had  defended  Nancy.  Oddly 
enough  the  army  of  De  Castelnau,  which  has  long  faced  the  army  of 
Rupprecht  of  Bavaria  east  of  the  Moselle,  arrives  west  of  the  Oise  just  in 
time  to  meet  the  same  German  army.  A  general  dislocation  of  French 
and  German  armies  is  going  forward.  General  Mand'huy,  brought  from 
the  Aisne  and  put  in  command  of  anew  army,  encounters  Biilow,  brought 
over  from  before  Rheims.  Finally  the  Grand  Duke  of  Wiirtemberg 
arrives  from  the  Argonne  and  faces  Foch  but  recently  commanding  the 
army  which  had  reconquered  Rheims. 

And  with  this  general  dislocation  the  German  hope  of  resuming  the 
off^ensive  between  the  Oise  and  the  Moselle  expires.  The  campaign 
enters  the  second  phase.  The  front  from  Noyon  to  Nancy  becomes 
relatively  unimportant  and  the  deadlock  of  trench  war  along  this 
line  becomes  absolute.  Now  the  field  of  operations  is  between  the  Oise 
and  the  sea  and  the  centre  of  conflict  mounts  day  by  day  to  the  north. 
The  French  and  the  Germans  are  exactly  in  the  situation  of  two  boys 
building  rival  towers  out  of  blocks  and  each  trying  to  build  the  higher 
structure.  Jofi^re  puts  De  Castelnau  in  about  Roye  and  he  encounters 
Rupprecht  of  Bavaria.     He  puts  Mand'huy  in  and  he  meets  Biilow 


154 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


east  of  Arras.  He  puts  Foch  in  and  Foch  encounters,  not  merely  Wiir- 
temberg  come  from  the  Argonne  but  Besseler,  striking  south,  when  the 
Antwerp  episode  is  completed.  Even  Field-Marshal  French,  quitting 
his  trenches  near  Soissons,  will  presently  arrive  at  Ypres. 


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THE  RACE  TO  THE  SEA 
Now  the  field  of  operations  is  between  the  Oise  and  the  sea,  and  the  centre  of  conflict  mounts 
day  by  day  to  the  north.     The  French  and  the  Germans  are  exactly  in  the  situation  of  two  boys 
building  rival  towers  out  of  blocks  and  each  trying  to  build  the  higher  structure 

The  French  strategy  begins  to  reveal  itself.  As  the  French  line 
mounts  to  the  north  it  points  first  toward  Lille,  lost  in  the  first  hours  of 
the  invasion  and  subsequently  retaken,  then  toward  Antwerp,  where 
the  Belgian  army  still  stands,  with  a  line  of  retreat  open  to  the  south, 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  Scheldt. 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  155 

What  this  means  the  German  High  Command  at  last  perceives.  It 
can  no  longer  continue  its  effort  to  advance  between  the  Oise  and  the 
Meuse,  it  has  been  compelled  to  draw  off  troops  in  Lorraine  and  Cham- 
pagne to  meet  the  new  thrust  in  Picardy  and  Artois.  Already  the  ac- 
tive front  has  mounted  into  Flanders.  Unless  a  change  comes  promptly 
the  French  line  will  extend  until  it  reaches  Belgium,  joins  with  the 
Belgian  front  behind  the  Scheldt,  and  not  only  will  there  ensue  a  trench 
deadlock  from  Holland  to  Switzerland,  but  the  Germans  will  be  per- 
manently excluded  from  the  Belgian  seacoast.  If  such  a  deadlock  ensues, 
then  there  is  an  end  to  all  hope — and  already  this  hope  is  becoming 
remote — of  a  quick  decision  over  France,  and  a  short  war. 

There  remains  in  late  September  only  a  gap  forty  miles  wide  be- 
tween the  French  lines  in  position  from  Lille  southward  and  the  Chan- 
nel. Unless  German  troops  can  penetrate  this  gap  and  come  south, 
sweeping  behind  the  Channel  ports  of  Calais  and  Boulogne,  the  whole 
western  campaign  will  have  ended  In  a  stalemate  and  the  French,  Brit- 
ish, and  Belgians  will  hold  an  unbroken  line  from  Antwerp  to  Bel- 
fort. 

Hence  in  the  latter  half  of  September  begins  the  new  and  final 
German  concentration.  German  strategy  has  now  three  purposes:  to 
take  Antwerp  and  capture  the  Belgian  army,  thus  preventing  a  junction 
of  the  Belgians  with  their  allies;  to  move  south  through  the  gap  between 
Lille  and  the  Channel,  taking  the  Channel  ports  and  finally,  if  possible, 
thus  regaining  the  initiative ;  to  reopen  the  decision  of  the  Mame  and 
win  a  real  victory  north  of  Amiens.  Even  if  this  last  object  is  not 
realized  the  Germans  can  hope  to  shorten  their  front  by  establishing 
their  western  flank  on  the  sea  near  the  mouth  of  the  Somme  and  at  the 
same  time  complete  the  occupation  of  northern  France  and  that  sea- 
coast  which  would  be  the  logical  base  for  operations  against  Britain. 
And  for  the  German  people  this  last  phase  is  summed  up  by  the  word 
"Calais,"  as  the  earlier  drive  was  comprehended  in  the  magic  term 
"Paris." 

For  clarity  and  convenience  we  may  regard  the  Battle  of  the  Aisne 
as  covering  all  the  operations  between  Soissons  and  St.  Mibiel  in  the 


156  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

time  in  which  the  Germans  endeavoured  to  regain  the  initiative  and  ad- 
vance over  the  ground  they  had  covered  on  the  road  to  the  Marne.  We 
may  regard  the  "Race  to  the  Sea"  as  describing  the  compHcated  opera- 
tions following  the  effort  of  the  French  to  outflank  the  Germans  be- 
tween the  Oise  and  the  Channel,  which  resulted  in  extending  the  dead- 
lock of  trench  warfare  at  right  angles  to  the  old  front  nearly  as  far  north 
as  the  city  of  Lille. 

Then  comes  the  German  effort  to  destroy  the  Belgian  army  in  Ant- 
werp and  drive  south  through  the  open  gap  between  Lille  and  the  sea, 
which  results  In  the  capture  of  Antwerp  and  the  advance  south  as  far  as 
the  Yser  and  Ypres,  the  occupation  of  most  of  the  Belgian  seacoast,  and 
finally  the  bloody  defeats  at  the  Yser  and  Ypres,  where  the  French  and 
British  close  the  last  gap  In  the  line  from  the  sea  to  Switzerland  and  thus 
checkmate  German  strategy. 

In  capturing  Antwerp  the  Germans  won  a  moral  not  a  military  vic- 
tory, since  the  Belgian  army  escaped.  But  the  occupation  of  the  Bel- 
gian seacoast  was  a  considerable  material  advantage  and  it  was  due 
primarily  to  the  fatal  interposition  of  Winston  Churchill,  who  made  his 
celebrated  entrance  into  Antwerp  after  King  Albert  and  the  French 
General  Staff  had  agreed  upon  an  evacuation,  Inevitable  by  reason  of 
German  progress  through  the  Belgian  defences.  Yielding  to  the  im- 
portunities of  Churchill,  King  Albert  delayed  his  evacuation  for  two 
days.  When  he  did  leave  he  lost  a  whole  division,  crowded  into  Dutch 
territory  by  the  Germans ;  his  army  was  disorganized  by  its  pressed  re- 
treat; It  was  no  longer  possible  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Scheldt;  and  the 
Germans  were  not  only  able  to  take  Ostend  and  the  Belgian  seacoast, 
but  also  to  seize  Lille,  the  greatest  manufacturing  city  of  northern 
France,  which  they  still  hold  after  two  years  and  a  half. 

Only  by  a  narrow  margin  did  the  Intervention  of  Churchill  miss  caus- 
ing the  capture  of  King  Albert's  whole  army  and  a  great  Allied  dis- 
aster. Never  was  there  a  better  example  of  the  folly  of  political  inter- 
ference with  military  operations,  no  single  blunder  In  the  whole  opening 
days  of  the  war  was  more  costly  to  the  Allies  than  this  grotesque  ven- 
ture of  a  British  Cabinet  Minister  into  the  realms  of  higher  strategy. 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  157 


III.    ANTWERP 


It  was  the  Siege  of  Antwerp  which  supplied  the  single  unmistakable 
circumstance  of  the  October  fighting  and  on  the  human  side  the  only- 
dramatic  incident  in  a  war  which  had  now  become  a  bewildering  tangle 
of  operations  obscure  to  the  contemporary  observer  and  without  im- 
mediately apparent  result.  From  the  attack  on  Liege  to  the  Battle  of 
the  Aisne  the  world  had  looked  eagerly  for  a  Sedan  or  a  Waterloo.  But 
in  October  it  was  plain  that  the  time  for  Sedans  and  Waterloos  was  pass- 
ing. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  first  shots  of  the  German  cannon  before  Ant- 
werp on  September  29th  instantly  drew  the  attention  of  the  world  to 
an  action  which  was  easily  comprehensible,  and  already  promised  to  be 
promptly  decisive.  More  than  this,  there  was  in  the  final  stand  of  Bel- 
gian patriotism  an  appeal  to  American  admiration,  lacking  in  all  else 
in  a  war  between  rival  cultures,  ambitions,  races.  For  a  nation  whose 
own  history  began  at  Lexington,  the  resistance  of  the  weak  to  the  strong, 
the  defence  of  liberty  by  the  few  against  the  many  at  the  cost  of  life,  of 
all  that  men  could  hold  dear,  was  a  moving  spectacle.  For  Americans 
there  was  bound  to  be  in  the  final  tragedy  of  the  Belgians  a  claim  on 
sympathy.  Already  to  the  neutral  eyes  beyond  the  Atlantic  the  Bel- 
gian resistance  had  taken  on  the  character  of  that  of  Holland  to  Spain, 
of  the  Greeks  to  the  Persians. 

On  the  military  side  the  German  attack  upon  Antwerp  was  easily 
explicable.  German  attempts  to  force  a  short  road  into  northern 
France  by  taking  Verdun  had  failed.  West  of  the  Oise  and  the  Scheldt 
the  Allied  advance  was  pushing  north  toward  Antwerp.  If  the  Allies 
and  the  Belgians  should  join  hands,  German  hold  on  Belgium  would  be 
precarious,  for  Antwerp  was  now  like  the  citadel  of  a  captured  fortress, 
vi'hich  still  held  out.  But  far  more  serious  was  the  fact  that  such  a  junc- 
tion would  close  the  last  open  gap  on  the  western  front  and  rob  Ger- 
many of  her  only  remaining  chance  not  merely  to  reverse  the  decision  of 
the  Marne,  but  also  to  reach  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea,  facing  the 
British  coast. 


iS8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Already  Belgian  resistance  had  contributed  seriously  to  impeding 
German  plans.  In  the  days  when  every  German  soldier  was  needed 
in  France,  an  army  corps  had  to  be  kept  in  Belgium  to  protect  the 
German  lines  of  communication  and  contain  the  Belgian  field  army  in 
Antwerp.  At  the  moment  of  the  Battle  of  Charleroi  the  Belgian  army 
had  made  a  sortie,  in  the  course  of  which  it  had  almost  reached  Louvain. 
The  destruction  of  this  city  followed  this  fighting,  and  was  an  act  of  re- 
prisal by  the  Germans,  who  ruthlessly  executed  many  men  and  women. 
This  deed  promptly  filled  the  civilized  world  with  horror  and  awakened 
protest  in  all  lands.  Again,  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  a  second  Belgian 
sortie  had  detained  troops  which  were  starting  south  and  held  them 
until  the  critical  days  of  the  retreat  to  the  Aisne  were  passed. 

To  rid  themselves  of  this  annoyance,  to  clear  their  flanks,  to  prepare 
the  way  for  a  final  attack  to  the  south,  the  Germans  now  resolved  to 
have  done  with  King  Albert  and  his  gallant  little  army.  The  closing 
days  of  September,  therefore,  saw  Belgium  approaching  her  final  agony. 

In  all  military  history  of  the  future  the  capture  of  Antwerp  must 
necessarily  be  a  landmark.  Here,  briefly,  terribly,  the  superiority  of 
the  gun  over  the  fort,  of  the  mechanic  over  the  engineer,  was  demon- 
strated. Aside  from  Paris,  there  was  no  city  believed  to  be  as  strongly 
fortified  as  Antwerp,  and  the  fate  of  Antwerp  gave  a  new  value  to  the 
French  for  the  recent  deliverance  of  Paris.  Unlike  Paris,  however, 
its  position  on  the  neutralized  Scheldt  and  near  the  Dutch  frontier 
prevented  complete  investment.  Along  its  southern  front,  ten  miles 
distant,  the  Nethe  flowed  through  deep  marshes,  forming  a  natural 
moat,  strengthened  by  forts  once  held  to  be  impregnable. 

Before  these  forts,  in  trenches  long  ago  prepared,  stood  the  whole 
Belgian  field  army,  reinforced  in  its  last  days  by  British  marines.  AH 
that  the  art  of  the  engineer,  all  that  the  courage  of  brave  men  fighting 
with  their  backs  to  the  wall  could  contribute  to  making  a  fortress  im- 
pregnable, were  to  be  found  in  the  ancient  Flemish  city. 

Yet  before  the  German  artillery,  Antwerp's  defences  crumbled  with 
incredible  rapidity.  What  the  42-centimetre  gun  and  the  Austrian 
"305"  had  accomplished  at  Liege,  at  Namur,  at  Maubeuge,  but  hith- 


"ST.  GEORGE  FOR 
ENGLAND!" 

FRANCE  AND  ENGLAND 
STAND  TOGETHER 


Copyright  hy  V nder-:vood  i^  Underzvood 

BRITISH   HIGHLANDERS  LANDIMS  AT  BOULOGNE 


"VIVE   LA    REPUBLIQUE!" 


Copyright  by  tkt  Jnumaiional  .\'c-::'s  Service 

GENERAL  JOFFRE  GENERAL  GALLIENI 

General  Joffre  commanded  the  French  during  the  first  seventeen  months  of  the  war,  was  then  retired  as  Mar- 
shal of  France,  and  in  April,  1917,  came  to  America  as  a  member  of  the  French  War  Commission.  He  was  the  idol  of 
the  soldiers  who  spoke  of  him  affectionately  as  "Grand-papa"  and  "Our  Joffre."  His  ringing  message  to  the  army 
before  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  will  long  be  remembered:  "Cost  what  it  may,  the  hour  for  the  advance  has  come;  let 
each  man  die  in  his  place,  rather  than  fall  back." 

General  Gallieni  was  the  defender  of  Paris.  On  the  evening  of  September  3d,  he  learned  from  his  observers 
that  Khick's  army  had  begun  to  turn  away  from  Paris  and  was  marching  southeast  toward  Meaux  and  the  Marne.  He 
telephoned  this  news  to  Joffre  and  the  next  day  the  plan  for  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  arranged. 


THREE  FRENCH  GENERALS 


Photograph  by  Paul  Thompson 


These  generals  were  all  active  during  the  first  year  of  the  war.  "Grand-papa  Joffre"  stands  in  a  characteristic 
attitude  with  field-glasses  "mobilized."  At  Joffre's  right  and  left  are  Castclnau  and  Pau.  All  three  are  good-naturedly 
quizzing  the  orderly  who  stands  at  attention  while  the  man  at  the  extreme  left  enjoys  seeing  his  comrade  "on  the 
carpet" 


LORD  KITCHENER  AND  SIR  JOHN  FRENCH 

There  were  persistent  rumors  of  clifFerences  between  Lord  Kitchener,  British  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  Sir 
John  French,  Commander  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Army.  General  French  was  relieved  of  his  command  six  months 
before  Lord  Kitchener's  tragic  death  at  sea,  June  5,  1916. 

_  The  British  believed  for  some  time  that  their  help  enabled  the  French  to  win  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  But  to 
all  intents  and  purposes  the  British  were  not  engaged  in  the  Marne  at  all.  When  Joffre  asked  for  instant  action.  Field 
Marshal  Jrench  replied  that  he  needed  forty-eight  hours  in  which  to  get  ready.  He  failed  to  rise  to  the  greatest  oppor- 
tunity of  the  War,  cither  because  he  did  not  perceive  it  or  because  he  lacked  the  necessary  energy  and  initiative.  That 
is  the  verdict  ot  French  criticism  and  British  students  of  the  war  arc  being  driven  to  the  same  conclusion. 


Copyright  by  ].  liiissfl  'J  Sons  Copyright  hy  U ndrrirood  t3'  U ndgrzvood 

GENERAL  SIR  DOUGLAS  HAIG  AND  GENERAL  SIR  HORACE  LOCKWOOD  SMITH-DORRIEN 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  succeeded  Sir  John  French  in  command  of  the  British  forces  in  France.  He  is  a  more  active 
man  than  his  predecessor  and  nearly  ten  years  younger,  having  been  born  in  1861.  Throughout  his  military  career  he 
has  been  concerned  chiefly  with  cavalry,  and  he  possesses  all  the  cavalryman's  traditional  fire  and  dash. 

General  Smith-Dorrien  commanded  the  Second  Corps  of  the  British  Army  during  the  terrible  days  of  the  retreat 
which  preceded  the  Marne. 


Copyright  by  Undfraood  U  Underwood 

FRENCH  ARMY  JOINS  BELGIANS 
The  advance  guard  of  the  F"rench  Army  on  their  way  to  join  the  Belgians. 
French  marines,  welcomed  hv  the  residents  of  Ghent. 


British  Artillt-ry  in  a  Rcjrmnird  .\crion  In  Belgium. 


Copyright  by  Underwood  l^  Undencood 
When  the  British  Marines  disembarked  at  Ostend  they  received  a  rousing  welcome  from  the  Belgians. 


BRITISH  ARTILLLRY  IN  ACTION 

When  the  average  British  soldier  actually  gets  to  work 
he  IS  happy.  Even  life  m  the  trenches  then  becomes  "a 
little  bit  of  all  right,"  as  he  expresses  it. 


Copyright  by  the  Avteriean  Press  Aswciation 

THE  PRINCE  OF  WALES  WITH  HIS  REGIMENT 

The  Prince  has  seen  service  abroad  and  many  anec- 
dotes are  current  illustrative  r)f  his  good-humor  and  demo- 
cratic ways. 


JLJ 


Photograph  by  Paul  Thompson 

ON  THE  MARNE  FRONT 
These  men  are  constructing  a  series  of  caves — called  "Robinson  Crusoes"  in  militan,'  slang. 


Photograph  by  the  Inurnational  News  Service 

FRENCH  DRAGOONS  WITH  CAPTIVE  UHLANS 

This  is  what  happened  to  some  of  the  German  Uhlans,  who  figured  so  prominently  in  newspaper  hcadhnes  during 
the  first  days  of  the  War.  They  were  captured  by  French  dragoons  who  have  seized  their  caps  to  send  olF  as  souvenirs 
to  French  wives  and  sweethearts.  General  Joffre  aftenvards  forbade  this  practise  by  an  explicit  command  couched  in 
very  severe  terms. 


Copyright  by  Und:rzvood  U  Undirzvood 

THE  ADVANCE  OF  FRENCH  MACHINE  GUNNERS  AND  RIFLEMEN 

Some  types  of  machine  guns  may  be  carried  by  one  man.     Others  are  carried  piecemeal  by  two  or  more.     In  this 
case  the  second  man  has  the  gun  itself  on  his  shoulder  while  the  third  man  follows  with  the  tripod. 


Copyright  by  Lavoy 


A  BIG  FRENCH  GUN  ON  THE  RAILROAD  AT  VERDUN 


The  big  German  42-centimetre  guns  seemed  in  the  early  days  of  the  War  to  be  irresistible  and  incomparable, 
.with  the  appearance  of  such  creations  as  this  the  French  artillery  regained  its  traditional  superiority. 


But 


TWO  REMARKABLE  AIRPLANE  PHUlUGRAPHS  ON  THE  ERENCH   ERON  , 
f  'Ibo-^e)      The  devastated  citv  of  Clermont,  in  the  Argonne  region.     It  was  burned  by  the  Germans  at  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne.     Roofless  ruined  walls  are  all  that  remain  in  the  foreground.     Up  the  road  toward  the  top  of  the  pic- 
ture a  cluster  of  buildings  is  seen  which  must  have  been  just  beyond  the  zone  of  hre.         ....  ...  ,_^^ 

(Belozv  )  The  French  aviation  camp  near  \'erdun.  One  can  plamly  see  the  hangars  with  the  insect-hke  war-planes 
in  front  of  them.  Behind  the  hangars  motor  trucks  are  parked,  and  behind  these  are  tents,  the  living  quarters  ot  the 
aviators. 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  167 

erto  behind  a  veil,  they  now  did  in  the  full  sight  of  the  whole  world.  In 
less  than  a  week  these  forts  which  had  been  pronounced  impregnable  were 
heaps  of  dust  and  ashes,  and  German  troops  had  forced  the  river  defences 
and  the  field  trenches,  driving  the  Belgians  before  them.  By  October 
7th  the  Krupp  shells  were  falling  about  the  noble  tower  of  the  Antwerp 
Cathedral.  The  city  and  the  suburbs  were  breaking  out  in  flames.  The 
end  was  in  sight. 

The  next  day  the  field  army  of  Belgium,  commanded  by  its  still- 
undaunted  King,  crossed  the  Scheldt  on  pontoons,  moved  west  along  the 
Dutch  frontier,  accompanied  by  the  British  contingent,  and  made  good  its 
escape  to  join  the  Allied  armies,  still  moving  up  from  the  south,  although 
20,000  Belgians  forced  across  the  Dutch  frontier  were  disarmed  and  in- 
terned. Meanwhile,  by  every  ship,  train,  road,  thousands  of  refugees, 
fleeing  from  the  shells  that  were  falling  in  Antwerp,  flowed  out  to  Hol- 
land, to  England,  to  France.     A  new  migration  of  a  people  had  begun. 

The  end  came  on  October  9th,  when  the  city  surrendered,  the  re- 
maining Belgian  forces  escaping  to  Holland  and  there  laying  down  the 
arms  they  had  wielded  so  valiantly.  Not  a  city,  but  a  nation,  had 
fallen.  For  England  only  less  than  for  Belgium,  the  fall  of  Antwerp 
had  been  a  terrible  blow.  The  "  pistol  pointed  at  the  heart  of  England," 
as  Napoleon  had  described  the  city,  was  now  in  the  hands  of  William  II. 

With  the  fall  of  Antwerp  and  that  of  Ostend,  which  promptly  fol- 
lowed on  October  15th,  British  public  opinion  at  last  recognized  that  a 
new  Napoleonic  war,  with  the  same  issues  and  many  of  the  same  cir- 
cumstances, was  before  them.  British  observers  already  foretold  ac- 
curately the  launching  of  German  submarines  and  German  Zeppelins 
from  Zeebrugge.  A  new  Napoleon  had  reached  the  Channel.  Once 
more  it  was  for  the  British  people  to  watch  the  narrow  strip  of  sea 
as  they  had  a  century  before.  But  now  it  was  necessary  also  to  watch  the 
skies  for  that  new  engine  which  had  added  so  much  to  the  terror  of  war. 

IV.    THE    BATTLES    OF    FLANDERS 

In  late  October  there  opened  between  La  Bassee  and  the  sea  the 
most  deadly  campaign  the  war  had  yet  seen.     For  the  next  six  weeks,  on 


i68  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

a  front  of  barely  forty  miles,  some  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  strug- 
gled by  day  and  by  night  for  the  possession  of  a  score  of  villages  lying 
straight  across  the  pathway  of  the  new  German  advance,  between  the 
Lys  and  the  mouth  of  the  Yser.  When  it  had  ended,  in  part  through  the 
exhaustion  of  both  combatants,  the  Germans  had  gained  a  few  parcels 
of  territory,  a  few  wrecked  villages,  but  in  the  main  the  line  stood  as  it 
had  stood  in  the  opening  hours  of  the  conflict,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
German  Emperor  had  come  himself  to  spur  on  his  brave  but  beaten  sol- 
diers and  that  the  whole  German  nation  had  set  its  heart  upon  Calais. 

The  purpose  of  the  German  strategy  was  plain.  Antwerp  taken, 
Ostend  captured,  there  was  an  apparent  opportunity  to  sweep  down  the 
coast  past  Calais  and  Boulogne;  to  seize  Dunkirk,  the  last  French  for- 
tress in  the  north;  to  take  root  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Straits  of 
Dover;  to  bring  by  canal  and  river  the  submarines,  already  so  fatal  to 
British  warships,  to  threaten  England  with  invasion  as  Napoleon  had 
threatened  it;  to  menace  London  by  Zeppelin  fleets;  by  heavy  artillery 
and  mines,  to  close  the  Straits  of  Dover  and  leave  the  port  of  London 
as  dead  as  that  of  Hamburg.  Underlying  all  these  magnificent  details, 
too,  was  the  dominant  determination  to  regain  the  ofi^ensive,  to  take 
up  again  the  road  to  France. 

Once  Antwerp  fell,  the  army  corps  released  from  this  operation 
drove  south  upon  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Belgians.  From  every 
corner  of  the  German  Empire  garrisons  and  artillery  were  gathered  up 
for  a  supreme  thrust,  a  thrust  through  France  but  in  part  aimed  at 
England,  the  nation  now  become  the  object  of  the  concentrated  hatred 
and  wrath  of  all  Germany. 

Not  less  rapid  was  the  concentration  of  the  Allies.  Coming  north 
across  the  French  frontier,  French  regular  troops,  British  forces  with- 
drawn from  the  Aisne  in  early  October,  Sikhs,  Ghurkas,  all  the  Indian 
contingent  now  to  have  their  baptism  of  fire,  Senegalese  and  Moroccan 
riflemen,  Turcos  and  Legionnaires — finally  the  retreating  remnant 
of  the  Belgians  reinforced  by  French  and  British  divisions — gathered 
around  the  sleepy  little  Flemish  town  of  Ypres,  on  the  shores  of  the 
North  Sea  at  Nieuport,  and  behind  the  Yser  River  and  the  canal  that 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  169 

joined  it  to  the  Lys,  to  meet  the  storm.  And  once  more  the  post  of 
honour  and  danger  fell  to  Foch  under  whose  supreme  command  the 
Britons  and  the  Belgians,  as  well  as  the  French,  fought. 

A  more  admirable  country  for  defence  than  the  Yser  front  it  is 
difficult  to  imagine.  Eastward  from  the  dunes  stretched  an  intricate 
maze  of  river,  canal,  and  ditch — much  of  the  land  subject  to  inundation, 
once  the  sluices  were  open ;  all  of  it  certain  to  become  a  swamp  when  the 
first  storms  of  winter  began.  On  this  front  a  dozen  large  and  small 
villages  and  hundreds  of  little  stone  farmhouses  offered  cover.  Trenches 
dug  to-day  might  be  flooded  to-morrow;  artillery  dragged  within  range 
over  level  fields  one  day  might  be  submerged  and  bemired  the  next. 

Such  was  the  country  between  the  Yser  and  the  sea.  Here  and 
about  Ypres  for  more  than  a  month  there  continued,  with  slight  inter- 
ruption, one  of  the  most  intricate,  confused,  and  indescribable  conflicts 
in  all  the  history  of  war,  fought  by  men  of  more  races,  religions,  colours, 
and  nationalities  than  any  battlefield  in  western  Europe  had  known 
since  the  onrush  of  the  soldiers  of  Islam  was  halted  on  the  field  of 
Tours.  Asia,  Africa,  and  even  America  and  Australia  shared  in  the 
glory  and  the  slaughter. 

The  first  blow  fell  along  the  seacoast  south  of  Ostend,  fell  upon  the 
remnant  of  Belgian  forces,  led  by  their  intrepid  King  standing  behind 
the  Yser  River  at  Nieuport,  where  it  enters  the  sea.  Here  for  days  the 
Belgians  maintained  an  unequal  combat.  At  the  critical  moment  a 
British  fleet  took  station  beyond  the  dunes  and  with  its  heavy  artillery 
beat  down  the  German  advance,  after  a  slaughter  which  was  terrible. 

Halted  here,  the  Germans  moved  inland  and  came  on  again  about 
Dixmude,  half  way  between  Ypres  and  Nieuport.  Here  once  more  they 
made  progress  until  the  Belgians  in  their  despair  opened  the  sluices  and 
the  water  flowed  over  fertile  fields  carrying  ruin  with  it,  turning  the 
whole  country  into  a  lake,  drowning  the  invaders  in  numbers,  creating 
an  obstacle  impassable  for  the  present,  repeating  the  exploit  of  the 
Dutch  in  their  glorious  fight  against  Alva. 

Eastward  from  Dixmude,  which  presently,  after  the  most  desperate 
of  struggles  and  after  changing  hands  many  times,  remained  with  the 


I70  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Germans — who  were  halted  in  its  ruin  by  the  ever-memorable  resistance 
of  the  famous  Fusiliers  Marins,  the  "Golden  Lads"  of  Brittany — the 
attack  was  directed  at  Ypres.  Here  the  British  stood.  Here  the 
Kaiser's  wish  was  gratified  and  the  troops  of  England  met  the  gallant 
Bavarians;  but  they  did  not  succumb.  At  points  the  line  bent  back. 
Such  real  gains  as  were  made,  were  made  by  the  Germans,  but  the  line 
held.  Day  and  night  the  slaughter  went  on.  Trenches,  hills,  farm- 
houses were  taken  and  retaken.  Villages  and  towns  were  transformed 
into  heaps  of  ashes. 

To  add  to  the  horror  autumn  began,  and  sleet  and  rain,  finally  snow, 
fell,  transforming  the  whole  country  into  a  swamp.  In  the  inextricable 
tangle  of  roads,  buildings,  and  ruined  towns,  the  bodies  of  men  lay  un- 
buried  for  days.  The  streams  and  ditches  were  choked  with  the  human 
wreckage.     All  semblance  of  strategy  vanished. 

Tactical  considerations  were  subordinated  to  the  simple,  single  pur- 
pose of  an  advance  by  the  mere  weight  of  numbers.  It  became  not  a 
struggle  based  on  the  application  of  modern  theories,  but  a  death  grapple 
between  thousands  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men,  transformed  by 
suffering,  by  deprivation,  by  the  misery  of  the  autumn  storms,  to  mere 
animals,  clad  in  clothes  reduced  to  rags  or  undiscoverable  beneath  the 
outward  layers  of  mud. 

Again  and  again  more  losses,  frightful  attrition,  seemed  to  bring 
the  German  effort  to  a  standstill.  Yet  always  in  a  few  hours  or  days 
new  thousands  returned  to  the  charge.  Always,  too,  they  came  forward 
fearlessly,  a  song  upon  their  lips.  Regiments  of  youths  took  the  place 
of  the  older  men  of  the  first  line,  but  the  boys  were  not  less  brave  than 
the  men,  the  recruits  than  the  veterans. 


v.    CHECKMATE 


Such  were  the  battles  of  Flanders,  the  Battle  of  the  Yser,  won  by 
the  Belgians  and  the  French,  the  Battle  of  Ypres  won  by  the  British 
and  the  French.  Never  was  a  race  more  closely  run.  Never  was  vic- 
tory nearer  to  the  Germans  than  in  the  early  days  of  November.  The 
jerry-built  dyke  that  Joffre  had  stretched  across  the  last  open  gap  on  his 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  171 

front  barely  held.  On  November  15th,  when  the  last  effort  of  the 
Prussian  Guard  failed,  the  British  Expeditionary  Army  had  become 
almost  a  memory  and  its  losses  had  passed  anything  in  British  history. 
At  Ypres  fifty  thousand  British  were  killed,  wounded,  or  captured — a 
third  of  the  whole  Expeditionary  Army.  On  the  same  field  the  French 
lost  seventy  thousand  and  the  Belgians  twenty  thousand.  As  for  the 
German  loss,  it  certainly  passed  a  quarter  of  a  million. 

Memorable,  hereafter,  will  be  the  fact  that  as  the  last  German  at- 
tacks before  Ypres  were  failing,  there  died  within  the  British  lines  the 
one  British  soldier  who  had  foreseen  what  was  now  happening,  whose 
words  had  been  greeted  with  sneers,  whose  voice  had  almost  been  si- 
lenced by  the  cheap  and  empty  optimism  of  Liberal  and  Radical  poli- 
ticians. Come  to  France  at  the  moment  of  the  crisis,  come  to  cheer  his 
well-loved  Indian  troops,  now  fighting  bravely  on  the  western  line, 
Lord  Roberts  died  on  the  eve  of  a  great  victory,  which  saved  his  own 
country  from  the  worst  he  had  feared  for  it.  Worth  repeating,  too,  is 
the  legend,  credited  to  De  Souza,  that  having  studied  the  maps,  having 
examined  the  plans  and  preparations  of  the  French  general,  who  held 
supreme  command  over  British  and  French  troops  alike,  Lord  Roberts 
said  to  staff  officers  of  Foch :  "  You  have  a  great  general." 

At  Ypres  the  British  troops  did  all  that  was  expected  of  them,  and 
more  could  not  be  expected  of  any  troops.  "Wipers"  of  the  English 
"Tommy"  deserves  a  place  beside  Waterloo  and  Blenheim  in  British 
military  history.  Yet  here,  as  elsewhere,  it  was  the  British  soldier  who 
shone,  for  the  generalship  was  French  and  the  victory  was  won  through 
the  genius  of  that  general  who  had  delivered  the  decisive  thrust  at 
the  Marne.  And  for  Foch  the  supreme  test  came  in  the  midnight 
hours  of  a  day  in  which  his  son  and  son-in-law  had  died  on  the  field  of 
honour. 

But  however  close  the  race,  the  decision  was  absolute.  The  whole 
German  conception  of  a  swift,  terrible,  decisive  thrust  at  France  had 
ended  in  the  bloody  shambles  of  the  Yser  and  Ypres.  Not  a  French 
army  had  been  destroyed,  not  a  French  army  had  been  captured. 
The  great  battle  that  was  to  come  six  weeks  after  the  declaration  of  war 


172 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


had  come;  it  had  been  a  French  victory,  not  a  Waterloo  or  a  Sedan,  but  a 
victory  compelling  a  general  German  retreat  dislocating  their  whole 
strategic  conception.  After  that  retreat  it  had  never  been  possible  to 
regain  the  offensive  and  renew  the  bid  for  a  decision.     Each  separate 


DEADLOCK.  IN  THE  WEST,  NOV.  I5,  19X4 
November  15th  sees  the  end  of  the  effort  that  began  on  August  5th  before  Liege.  Behind 
her  trench  Hnes  Germany  held  most  of  the  industrial  regions  of  France  and  the  larger  part  of 
French  machinery  and  minerals.  All  Belgium,  save  one  tiny  morsel,  was  in  her  hands.  France 
was  in  no  position  to  take  the  initiative,  and  almost  two  years  were  to  pass  before  Britain  could 
put  sufficient  forces  in  the  trenches  to  permit  the  beginning  of  a  considerable  offensive 

offensive  effort  from  St.  Mihiel  to  Nieuport  had  been  beaten  down  al- 
most where  it  had  started. 

Save  for  Russian  defeat  at  Tannenberg,  the  defeat  at  the  Marne 
might  have  necessitated  a  retreat  to  the  Rhine.     Hindenburg's  victory 


DEADLOCK  IN  THE  WEST  173 

had  given  Germany  two  more  months  in  the  west.  She  had  used  them 
up  and  now  the  eastern  situation  had  become  critical.  Russian  pressure 
in  East  Prussia  had  not  recalled  German  corps  from  the  Marne  or  before 
the  Marne.  But  Russian  victories  in  Galicia,  the  disasters  that  had 
overtaken  Austria  and  seemed  to  forecast  her  collapse,  the  crisis  in  Hin- 
denburg's  campaign  in  Poland  cried  out  for  attention. 

November  isth,  then,  sees  the  end  of  the  effort  that  began  on 
August  5th  before  Liege.  In  that  time  Germany  had  overrun  Bel- 
gium and  occupied  more  than  8,000  square  miles  of  France  and  devas- 
tated much  more;  she  had  approached  Paris,  and  on  September  5th 
its  suburbs  were  visible  where  her  armies  stood,  but,  within  sight  of  the 
prize,  she  had  been  compelled  to  recoil,  and  from  that  hour  until  the 
end  in  Flanders,  her  strategy  had  conformed  to  Joffre's  and  her  purposes 
had  all  wrecked  in  conflict  with  his  will. 

Behind  her  trench  lines  Germany  now  held  most  of  the  industrial 
regions  of  France  and  the  larger  share  of  French  machinery  and  minerals. 
All  Belgium,  save  one  tiny  morsel,  was  in  her  hands.  France,  after  her 
terrific  struggle,  was  in  no  shape  to  take  the  offensive,  and  almost  two 
years  were  to  pass  before  Britain  could  put  sufficient  forces  in  the 
trenches  to  permit  the  beginning  of  considerable  offensive.  Germany's 
prevision  in  the  matter  of  heavy  artillery  and  machine  guns  gave  her 
armies  a  real  and  long-enduring  advantage  in  trench  war. 

But  the  other  side  of  the  picture  was  unmistakable.  Germany  had 
staked  all  on  a  quick  decision;  she  had  become  involved  in  a  long  war. 
She  had  planned  to  dispose  of  her  enemies  in  detail,  destroying  first 
French  military  establishments  and  then  Russian;  she  had  failed  to 
destroy  France,  and  Russian  armies  were  now  pounding  down  to  the 
Carpathians. 

Despite  her  manifest  gains  and  her  brilliant  preliminary  victories, 
Germany  had,  then,  lost  the  first  round  of  the  war.  She  had  lost  It  at 
the  Marne  and  all  her  desperate  struggles  from  the  Marne  to  the  Yser  had 
availed  her  nothing.  Now  at  last  she  must  go  east  and  deal  with  Russia ; 
new  horizons  and  new  victories  beckoned;  but  while  she  turned  her  face 
east,  Britain  and  France,  behind  the  dyke  they  had  erected  in  the  west, 


174  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

began  to  gather  up  their  strength  for  a  renewal  of  their  offensive  in  a 
future  which  was  far  more  distant  than  they  could  dream. 

With  the  close  of  the  fighting  about  Ypres  the  western  battle  falls 
to  the  level  of  a  deadlock,  which  endured  until  March,  1917,  with  no 
material  change  in  the  battle  fronts. 


CHAPTER  EIGHT 

THE  EASTERN  FIELD 

I 

RUSSIAN  AND  GERMAN  PURPOSES 

With  the  failure  of  the  German  effort  at  Ypres,  the  western  field 
loses  its  importance  for  more  than  a  year  and  a  quarter.  It  is  not  until 
the  colossal  bid  for  Verdun  in  February,  1916,  that  the  events  on  the 
French  and  Belgian  front  take  on  that  importance  which  they  had  in  the 
opening  days  of  the  war.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that  long  before  the 
battles  of  Flanders  in  October  and  November  the  eastern  field  had 
been  the  scene  of  many  terrific  engagements,  and  of  campaigns  whose 
relation  to  those  in  the  west  is  not  patent,  yet,  for  the  purpose  of  nar- 
ration, it  is  simpler  to  deal  first  with  the  western  operations  right 
through  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  until  the  decision  there  had  been  made 
absolute  in  Flanders,  and  then  examine  in  detail  the  eastern  operations 
from  the  morning  of  hostilities. 

These  operations  were  seen  only  confusedly  and  understood  but 
little  in  the  early  days  of  conflict.  There  is  lacking  still  and  will  re- 
main wanting  for  many  years,  perhaps,  that  complete  detail  which  we 
already  possess  in  the  case  of  the  French  operations  in  the  west.  But 
it  is  possible  to  perceive,  upon  the  least  scientific  study,  that  from  the 
opening  days  of  the  eastern  struggle  until  the  German  victory  at  the 
Dunajec  transformed  the  whole  eastern  situation,  two  very  clear  and 
well-defined  plans  were  working  out. 

In  the  last  days  of  August,  acting  in  strict  conformity  with  a  pre- 
arranged plan  made  by  the  French  and  Russian  General  Staff's,  two 
Russian  armies  were  sent  into  East  Prussia,  where  one  found  disaster 
at  Tannenberg  and  the  other  was  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the  frontier 
and  assume  a  defensive  posture.  Despite  subsequent  ventures,  leading 
directly  to  a  second  disaster,  the  Battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes,  the 

»7S 


176  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

East  Prussian  field  was  thenceforth  of  secondary  interest  and  import- 
ance. 

On  the  other  hand,  concomitant  with  the  Russian  defeat  at  Tannen- 
berg  was  the  first  of  the  two  great  Russian  victories  about  Lemberg, 
which  exercised  a  permanent  influence  upon  the  eastern  campaign 
down  to  the  Battle  of  the  Dunajec.  In  these  battles  about  Lemberg  the 
military  establishment  of  Austria  was  temporarily  wrecked  and  Russian 
strategy  henceforth  was  concentrated  upon  the  efi^ort  to  make  absolute 
the  consequences  of  the  early  victories,  to  enforce  the  decision  of  Lem- 
berg, and  put  Austria  out  of  the  war. 

This  purpose  led  to  the  steady  pressure  upon  Austria  on  the  Galician 
front,  to  the  advance  to  the  San,  to  the  suburbs  of  Cracow,  and  finally, 
when  further  progress  in  this  direction  was  proven  impossible,  to  the 
gigantic  campaign  in  the  Carpathians,  which  aimed  at  passing  the  crests 
of  this  range  and  pouring  down  into  the  Hungarian  Plain.  In  the  course 
of  the  effort  many  battles,  most  of  them  Russian  victories,  were  fought, 
and  the  great  fortress  of  Przemysl,  with  a  huge  garrison,  was  captured. 
The  disaster  at  the  Dunajec  occurred  while  the  fighting  in  the  Carpathi- 
ans was  still  going  in  the  Russian  favour,  but  it  is  nevertheless  true  that 
Russia  had  failed  to  achieve  her  main  purpose,  when  she  was  forced  to 
give  it  over. 

By  contrast  with  the  Russian  campaign  and  purpose,  the  German 
efi^orts  in  the  east  were  directed  at  preventing  Russia  from  crushing 
Austria.  These  efforts  were  not  originally  or  mainly  confined  to  sup- 
porting Austria  in  Galicia;  rather  the  Germans  undertook,  by  a  cam- 
paign of  their  own,  to  compel  Russia  to  turn  her  attention  away  from 
Austria  and  give  the  Austrians  time,  under  German  direction,  to  get 
on  their  feet  again.  In  addition,  the  German  plan  had  the  local  object 
to  take  Warsaw,  seize  the  west  bank  of  the  Vistula  River,  one  of  the 
most  serious  military  obstacles  in  Europe,  and  thus  insure  their  own 
eastern  front. 

When  they  began  their  operations  in  Poland  in  October,  at  the  mo- 
ment they  were  also  attacking  Antwerp  and  preparing  for  their  final 
effort  to  break  the  decision  of  the  Marne,  the  Germans  had  only  small 


THE  EASTERN  FIELD  177 

effectives,  and  their  advance  to  the  outskirts  of  Warsaw  suggests 
Early's  dash  for  Washington  in  1864,  designed  primarily  to  shake  Grant's 
grip  on  Petersburg  and  Richmond.  Even  if  they  did  not  get  Warsaw, 
which  was  a  gamble,  the  Germans  expected,  justly,  to  compel  the  Rus- 
sians to  send  troops  from  Galicia  and  thus  give  Austria  respite.  In 
this  they  were  entirely  successful. 

The  second  drive,  begun  in  November  and  leading  promptly  to  the 
terrible  Battle  of  Lodz,  was  a  more  serious  undertaking.  This  time  the 
Germans  not  only  expected  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  Austrians  but 
also  to  get  Warsaw.  Temporarily  they  helped  the  Austrians,  but  they 
failed  wholly  in  the  attempt  to  get  Warsaw,  and  the  Austrians  were 
soon  in  danger  again. 

November  saw,  in  the  west,  the  final  surrender  of  the  German  pur- 
pose to  abolish  the  decision  of  the  Marne.  This  was  given  over,  not 
because  it  was  proven  hopeless — in  fact,  the  Germans  were  almost  at  the 
point  of  victory  when  they  stopped  at  Ypres — but  because  it  was  no 
longer  safe  to  attempt  to  deal  with  their  eastern  front  with  the  slender 
effectives  which  they  had  there.  Up  to  this  moment  the  Russian  cam- 
paign had  not  materially  affected  the  western.  It  had  drawn  two  Aus- 
trian corps  out  of  Alsace  at  the  perilous  moment  of  the  Marne,  but  it 
had  not  compelled  the  Germans  to  withdraw  troops  from  the  western 
front.  On  the  contrary,  they  had  sent  at  least  six  new  corps  to  Belgium 
for  the  Ypres  and  Yser  battles. 

Had  the  Russians  won  at  Tannenberg  their  pressure  would  have 
begun  to  affect  the  Germans  in  the  west  before  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
When  the  Russians  failed,  the  Germans  were  able  to  go  right  ahead  with 
their  western  campaign  until  November.  But  at  this  point  the  Battle 
of  Lemberg  began  to  have  consequences,  which  the  Battle  of  Tannen- 
berg would  have  had,  had  it  been  a  Russian  victory.  With  her  western 
campaign  unwon,  Germany  had  to  go  east  in  November.  So  far,  the 
Franco-Russian  strategy  had  prevailed  over  the  German,  but  the 
result  had  been  reached  so  tardily  that  German  armies  in  the  west 
had  been  able  to  dig  in  on  French  and  Belgian  soil  from  the  Vosges  to 
the  sea. 


178  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

After  Lodz,  Germany  turns  east  and  gives  her  main  attention  to  the 
Russian  front.  When  she  began  in  November,  it  is  clear  that  her  High 
Command  expected  to  take  Warsaw  and  beat  down  the  Russian  danger 
before  spring,  using  several  corps  borrowed  from  the  western  front, 
which  had  now  fallen  to  the  level  of  trench  war.  Her  High  Command 
obviously  had  expected  to  return  to  the  west  in  the  spring  and  try  again 
to  abolish  that  Marne  decision,  always  weighing  upon  Germany,  because 
if  this  decision  were  to  stand,  time  would  be  allowed  Britain  to  arm, 
equip,  and  munition  her  millions. 

Once  Germany  did  turn  east  she  began  a  tremendous  effort.  In 
December,  in  January,  and  in  February  there  are  terrific  attacks  on  the 
whole  Polish  front  facing  Warsaw  and  one  great  attempt  to  get  to  War- 
saw and  behind  Warsaw  from  East  Prussia.  But  all  these  fail.  The 
February  failure  establishes  the  fact  that  Warsaw  cannot  be  taken  from 
the  north  or  from  the  west  and  new  Russian  victories  in  Galicia  make  it 
clear  that  the  Germans'  effort  to  relieve  Austria  by  her  campaign  for 
Warsaw  has  failed. 

Sometime  in  February  at  the  latest,  Germany  discovers  that  it 
will  not  be  possible  to  shake  Russia  off  in  time  to  go  back  west  and  re- 
new her  effort  to  get  France,  still  her  main  foe,  out  of  the  war  in  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1915.  Instead,  it  is  clear  that  Austria  must  be 
kept  in  the  war  by  a  major  effort  directed  against  Russia.  It  is  then 
become  essential,  since  Russia  must  be  attacked,  that  the  blow  shall  be 
sufficiently  heavy  to  put  Russia  out  of  the  war  altogether  and  leave 
German  hands  free  V6  deal  with  France,  reinforced  by  Britain,  before 
Britain  has  reached  the  point  in  her  preparation  where  she  will  be 
strong  enough  to  lend  France  the  necessary  aid. 

Here  is  the  genesis  of  the  great  German  campaign  of  the  summer 
of  1916,  which  begins  in  Galicia  and  ends  far  in  Russian  territory.  With 
this  campaign  we  are  not  concerned  now.  But  what  it  is  necessary  to 
recognize  is  that  Russia  succeeded  in  defending  Warsaw  and  holding 
back  Germany,  while  beating  in  upon  Austria,  just  long  enough  to  pre- 
vent Germany  from  returning  to  the  western  field  in  191 5.  In  doing 
this  she  gave  France  and  Britain  fifteen  months  to  prepare.     The  ser- 


THE  EASTERN  FIELD  179 

vice  was  invaluable.  In  performing  it,  Russia  invited  that  German 
attack  which  brought  her  to  the  edge  of  ruin.     But  she,  also,  escaped. 

Here,  then,  is  the  whole  story  of  the  eastern  campaign  in  the  period 
which  we  are  now  to  examine.  In  this  time  Russia  is  crowding  more 
and  more  steadily  in  upon  stricken  Austria,  pushing  her  back  from  Lem- 
berg,  from  the  San;  coming  close  up  to  Cracow  and  then,  checked  here, 
turning  toward  the  Carpathians  and  struggling  up  and  in  places  over 
summits.  And  in  the  same  time  Germany  is  attempting,  with  ever- 
diminishing  success,  to  compel  Russia  to  let  up  on  Austria  by  attacking 
Russia  in  Poland.  German  pressure  is  great  enough  to  rob  Russia's 
blow  of  just  that  weight  which  would  have  made  it  completely  decisive, 
but  it  fails  to  divert  Russian  attention  sufficiently.  So  at  last  we  come 
to  the  decision  to  spend  the  summer  in  the  east  and  direct  the  main 
blow  in  the  spring  and  summer  against  the  eastern  enemy. 

While  all  this  is  happening  in  the  eastern  field,  Great  Britain  and 
France  are  making  every  effort  to  get  their  military  forces  into  shape 
to  take  the  pressure  off  their  Russian  ally  in  the  spring.  But  the  task 
is  far  too  great  and  too  long  for  the  British.  More  than  a  year  is  to 
pass  after  the  Battle  of  the  Dunajec  before  Britain  can  be  armed  or 
munitioned;  France,  after  the  sacrifices  of  the  Marne,  is  not  strong 
enough,  alone,  to  break  the  German  lines  in  the  west.  The  failure  of 
all  the  French  and  British  efforts  from  Alsace  to  Flanders  supplies  the 
German  High  Command  with  proof  that  their  campaign  against  Russia 
can  be  pushed  in  the  spring  without  danger  to  their  western  front.  It 
is  the  failure  of  Allied  efforts  in  the  west  straight  through  the  winter, 
that  makes  the  Russian  burden  so  great,  and  it  is  the  failure  in  the 
spring  that  precipitates  the  catastrophe  of  the  Dunajec. 

II.  turkey's  entrance 

The  whole  course  of  the  eastern  operations  was  affected  and  Russian 
disaster  finally  achieved  through  the  intervention  of  Turkey  on  the  side 
of  the  Central  Powers.  In  the  days  when  Antwerp  had  fallen  and 
Warsaw  seemed  on  the  point  of  yielding  to  Hindenburg,  the  Turk  sud- 
denly put  his  sword  at  the  service  of  the  two  Kaisers.     Conceivably  this 


i8o  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR  , 

Turkish  decision  could  not  have  been  prevented  either  by  Allied  diplo- 
macy or  Allied  naval  action,  but  the  event  is  the  first  in  a  long  series  of 
reverses  for  Allied  statesmanship  and  High  Command  in  the  Near  East, 
which  changed  the  whole  course  of  the  war  in  its  second  year. 

The  military  effect  of  Turkey's  decision  was  not  measured  by  the 
new  front  it  opened  on  the  Russian  Caucasus  or  the  British  lines  at 
Suez.  Turkish  military  operations  were  neither  fortunate  nor  influ- 
ential, aside  from  the  defence  of  Gallipoli.  But  when  Turkey  entered 
the  war,  Russia  was  automatically  cut  off  from  the  outer  world  for  many 
months  by  winter  on  the  north  and  by  Turkish  forts  at  the  Bosporus. 
The  result  was  that  her  munitionment  was  gravely  affected.  Before 
spring  she  had  exhausted  all  her  stocks  of  ammunition,  and  when  the 
German  blow  came  in  April  she  was  almost  without  heavy  shells.  This 
was  the  prime  cause  of  all  the  subsequent  reverses.  This  was  Turkey's 
real  service  to  her  allies  and  her  terrible  revenge  upon  her  hereditary 
enemy. 

The  political  causes  of  Turkey's  entrance  are  not  hard  to  fathom. 
With  the  rapprochement  of  Russia  and  Britain,  the  latter  resigned,  in 
fact  if  not  by  formal  engagement,  her  long-standing  role  of  the  defender 
of  the  Turk.  It  was  well  understood  in  Stamboul,  as  elsewhere,  that  the 
Persian  bargain  between  Russia  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  an  implied 
consent  to  eventual  Russian  possession  at  the  Straits.  Under  the  stress 
of  circumstances,  because  British  title  to  the  Suez  Canal  had  been  made 
.  absolute  by  the  French  withdrawal  from  Egyptian  ambitions — a  part  of 
the  1904  bargain — Constantinople  lost  its  old  value  for  the  British, 
England  resigned  her  position  as  the  first  friend  of  the  Sultan,  and  the 
Kaiser  Instantly  and  eagerly  replaced  his  rival  at  the  Golden  Horn. 

When  the  Balkan  States  attacked  Turkey,  Germany  and  Austria 
hoped  for  their  defeat.  Britain  and  her  Russian  and  French  friends 
hoped  for  their  victory,  and  Russia  and  France  contributed  materially 
to  training  and  munitioning  the  armies  that  won  at  Lule  Burgas,  Kum- 
anovo,  and  Yenidze-Vardar.  It  was,  too,  by  virtue  of  an  understanding 
with  France,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain,  that  Italy  attacked  Turkey  and 
took  Tripoli. 


THE  EASTERN  FIELD  i8i 

No  Turkish  statesman  could  mistake  the  fact  that  France  and 
Britain  had  abandoned  the  policy  which  produced  the  Crimean  War  and 
the  abrogation  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.  No  Turkish  statesman 
could  misunderstand  the  evidence  that  proved  that  Russia  would  never 
again  have  to  resign  Czarigrad  at  British  behest.  So  far  as  London, 
Paris,  and  for  that  matter  Rome,  were  concerned,  Russia  was  free  to 
take  Constantinople.  Therefore  a  victory  of  Russia  and  her  allies  in 
the  war  that  had  now  broken  out  meant  a  Russian  attack  upon  Turkey, 
with  the  consent  of  Russia's  allies. 

Turkey  could  have  no  illusion  as  to  German  ambitions.  An  Os- 
manli  Empire  administered  by  Prussian  officials  was  as  hateful  to  the 
Turk  as  a  lost  Constantinople,  but  this  peril,  if  patent,  was  not  immedi- 
ate; he  could  hope  that  the  outcome  of  the  war  would  leave  the  enemies 
of  Germany  strong  enough  to  prevent  this,  even  though  they  were  de- 
feated. He  could  hope  that  the  turn  of  events  might  save  him  as  it  had 
saved  him  for  so  many  decades.  But  the  Russian  danger  was  immedi- 
ate, unmistakable,  carried  with  it  a  death  sentence  for  him. 

Actually  the  Turkish  decision  was  procured  by  the  intervention  of 
two  German  warships,  the  Goehen  and  the  Breslau,  which  were  caught 
in  the  western  Mediterranean  at  the  moment  of  the  declaration  of  war 
and  fled  via  Palermo  to  the  Dardanelles,  escaping  the  whole  French 
and  British  fleets.  Had  British  and  French  warships  followed  them 
up  the  Straits,  sunk  them  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  Turkish  Govern- 
ment, the  course  of  events  might  have  been  altered  and  the  worst  of 
Allied  disasters  avoided.  But  Allied  purpose  had  not  yet  reached  this 
point;  Allied  admirals  lacked  the  courage  of  Nelson  in  the  case  of 
Copenhagen. 

With  the  safe  arrival  of  these  ships,  Turkey  was  lost  to  the  enemies  of 
Germany.  Aided  by  their  presence,  Enver  Pasha  was  able  to  throw  his 
government  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  More  than  this,  these 
same  ships,  at  last  issuing  forth  from  the  Bosporus  and  attacking  Rus- 
sian ports  and  shipping,  provoked  that  Russian  declaration  of  war 
which  placed  Turkey  definitely  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Count  d'Erlon's  blundering  march  and  countermarch  in  the  Waterloo 


i82  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

campaign  was  only  one  degree  more  disastrous  to  his  Emperor  than  was 
this  failure  of  British  naval  officers  to  the  Allied  cause— French  ships 
were  then  engaged  in  covering  the  transport  of  French  troops  from 
Morocco  and  Algeria  to  France — to  the  whole  Allied  cause  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1915. 


GLIMPSES  OF  THE 
SQUADRONS   OF  THE  AIR 


AMERICANS  WHO  FLKW   FOR   FRANCK 

This  picture  shows  some  ot  the  members  oi  the  Escadnlle  Lafayette,  an  organization 
made  up  of  American  aviators.  From  left  to  right:  Lieutenant  de  Laage  de  Mieux 
(the  French  instructor),  Johnson,  Rumsey,  McConnell,  Thaw,  Lufbery,  Rockwell, 
Masson,  Prince,  and  Hall.  Within  a  short  time  after  this  photograph  was  taken, 
McConnell,  Rockwell,  and  Prince,  had  been  killed  in  action. 


THE  DREADNOUGHT  OF  THE  AIR 

The  huge  Brequet  air  cruiser,  used  for  bombardment  purposes  and  carrying  machine 
guns  as  well  as  racks  for  launching  bombs. 


THE  BATTLE  CRUISER  OF  THE  AIR 

The  new  model  NIeuport  fighting  machine  mounts  at  great  speed,  rising  to  7,000  feet  in  six  minutes,  and  flies  as 
high  as  20,000  feet.     The  machine  gun  is  mounted  on  the  hood  and  shoots  through  the  rapidly  revolving  propeller. 


:«f*wicaefr' 


^.^-r-.'" 


.»^«^:f 


Copyright  by  the'  International  Film  Servit. 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  AIR 

This  giant  Zeppelin  was  brought  down  in  the  siihiirbs  of  London  by  anti-aircraft  guns.  The  envelope  burned  up 
but  the  gondola  was  barely  scorched.  The  whole  incident  afforded  the  British  an  excellent  opportunity  for  studying 
the  .secrets  of  German  Zeppelin  construction.     The  upper  picture  shows  a  German  dirigible  intact. 


WOMEN  VOLUNTEERS  FOR  THE  FRENCH  AERIAL  SERVICE 


i^opyrit^kl  by  L  ndfr:cood  e;"  U nderwood 

This  picture  rtminds  one  of  the  photographs  of  the  crater-pitted  face  of  the  moon.  But  in  reality  it  is  an  avia- 
tor's photograph  of  a  modern  hattlefield.  The  numerous  spots  are  the  craters  made  by  shell-explosions.  The  heavy 
lines  drawn  with  mathematical  precision  arc  fortifications;  and  the  lighter  lines,  more  or  less  wavering,  are  the  trenches. 


SOLDIERS  FROM 

ALL  THE 

SEVEN  SEAS 


A  PAIR  OF  ABLE-BODIED  ZOUAVES  FROM  THE  GOLD  COAST  OF  AFRICA 

Decent  Europeans  at  the  front  were  often  hard  put  to  it,  to  explain  the  horrors  of  war  to  half- 
civihzed  men  like  these,  who  were  familiar  with  such  scenes  among  savage  men  and  beasts  in 
the  African  jungles.  But  as  missionaries  had  assured  them  that  such  behaviour  was  abhorred 
by  civilized  men,  they  were  much  pir/.zled  by  the  "  frit;htfulness"  rampant  in  France  and  Belgium. 


Copyright  by  the  International  Nezvs  Service 


TURCOS 


In  this  war  of  many  nations,  men  and  costumes  of  all  sorts  were  to  be  met  with.     This  picture  shows  a  group 
of  French  Turcos  from  Algeria,  solicitous  as  to  the  manner  of  preparation  of  their  midday  cotfee. 


Copyright  by  the  InUTuational  AV:iJ  Service 


CANADIAN  TROOPS 

A  Iar);e  proportion  of  the  sparse  population  of  Canada  crossed  the  sea  to  fiyht  for  the  mother  country.  With 
them  went  many  Americans.  After  a  period  of  training  in  England  the  Canadians  and  the  Americans  stood  shoulder 
to  shoulder  in  the  trenches  in  France^ 


A    IkUL  WOKLD  WAR 

From  all  quarters  of  the  globe  men  come  together  to  resist  aggression  by  the  Hohenzollern  and  the  Hapsburg. 
Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  world— not  even  in  the  Crusades— were  men  of  such  diverse  and  wide-scattered  races 
banded  together  in  a  common  cause.  Here  are  Cossacks  from  Russia,  Sikhs  from  India,  and  English  Colonials  from 
New  South  Wales. 


A  sene(;alese  ineantryman 


Copyright  by  Underzvood  Is  Underuood 

annamese  soldiers 


MEN  OK  ASIA  AND  AFRICA 
Few  realize  that  there  were  troops  of  Mongolian  race  on  the  battlegrounds  of  Europe.     The  Japanese  have  taken 
a  hand  only   upon   the   sea   and    at   Kiao  Chau.     But   here   (upper   picture)    ^s   a   column  of  soldiery  from    French 
Cochin-China  marching  to  their  camp  near  Versailles.     The  lower  picture  shows  a  French  Senegalese  battalion  going 
forward  into  action  in  the  great  Somme  offensive. 


CHAPTER  NINE 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG 

I 
RUSSIAN  MOBILIZATION 

Russian  mobilization,  for  which  the  preHminary  orders  were  given 
as  early  as  July  25th,  was  conditioned  upon  circumstances  of  Russia's 
western  frontier.  Here  Poland  projects,  like  a  fist  against  a  pillow, 
to  use  a  familiar  figure,  deep  into  the  block  of  Teutonic  territories. 
Thus  Russian  armies  operating  about  Warsaw  or  to  the  west  of  Warsaw 
would  be  fatally  exposed  to  German  or  Austrian  attacks  coming  south 
out  of  East  Prussia  or  north  out  of  Galicia,  which  touches  the  longitude 
of  Brest-Litovsk,  more  than  a  hundred  miles  east  of  Warsaw. 

This  situation  Russia  was  in  the  process  of  remedying  when  the  war 
broke  out.  North  of  Warsaw  from  the  Vistula,  at  the  point  where  the 
Bug  enters  it,  to  the  Niemen,  the  Russians  had  stretched  a  line  of  forts, 
beginning  at  Novogeorgievsk  and  ending  at  Kovno  on  the  Niemen. 
This  was  the  famous  Bobr-Narew-Niemen  barrier,  but  it  derived  its 
main  strength  not  from  fortifications  but  from  the  swamps  and  from  the 
rivers  that  give  it  the  name  it  bears.  Westward,  Warsaw  had  once  been 
guarded  by  forts,  buc  these  had  been  demolished  and  Russian  armies 
had  planned,  when  the  scheme  of  fortifications  was  complete,  to  stand 
before  Warsaw,  on  the  Blonie  line,  a  system  of  field  fortifications  sug- 
gesting the  Chatalja  lines.  Thence  southward  the  Vistula  supplied  an 
admirable  defensive  position  being  in  itself  a  serious  military  obstacle,  a 
broad  deep  river  with  high  wooded  banks. 

But  Russian  preparation  had  only  begun,  and  south  of  the  Vistula, 

from  Ivangorod  to  the  Volhynian  province,  there  was  a  gap,  between 

Lublin  and  Cholm,  through  which  Austrian  armies  could  advance  upon 

Brest-Litovsk,  operating  far  in  the  rear  of  Warsaw  and  behind  the  line 

of  the  Vistula.     Until  this  gap  had  been  closed,  all  positions  to  the  west- 

191 


192  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ward  were  gravely  imperilled.  And  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  German 
advance  to  Warsaw,  when  it  came,  was  successful  because  of  this  gap. 

In  this  posture  Russia  was  compelled  to  mobilize  behind  the  Bug 
instead  of  the  Vistula,  using  the  Niemen  and  the  three  fortresses  of  the 
Volhynian  triangle,  Rovno,  Dubno,  and  Lutsk,  to  guard  her  flanks.  Only 
covering  troops  were  left  in  Warsaw,  and  it  was  not  until  the  strength 
of  German  numbers  going  west  and  the  weakness  of  the  army  left  in  the 
east  were  disclosed,  that  Russia  began  her  forward  movement  in  Poland, 
the  first  positive  evidence  of  which  was  the  army  pushed  north  out  of 
Warsaw  to  the  disastrous  Battle  of  Tannenberg. 

It  seems  now  unquestioned  that  Russian  mobilization,  slow  as  it  was 
because  of  the  vastness  of  Russian  area  and  the  paucity  of  Russian  rail- 
roads, took  both  the  Germans  and  the  Austrians  by  surprise  and  later 
led  them  to  make  angry  charges  about  Russian  preparations  before  the 
Serbian  crisis.  But  this  is  a  debate  for  the  future.  What  is  clear  is 
that,  by  the  middle  of  August,  Russian  armies  were  beginning  to  move. 
This  movement  was  in  two  distinct  areas.  Two  armies,  one  from  the 
Niemen  and  one  from  the  Vistula  at  Warsaw,  pushed  into  East  Prussia, 
met  with  considerable  success  in  the  third  and  fourth  weeks  of  August, 
and  were  then  brought  to  a  dead  halt  by  the  disaster  at  Tannenberg, 
which  destroyed  one  of  the  armies  and  eventually  forced  the  retirement 
of  the  other. 

The  second  group  of  armies  was  the  more  considerable  and  did  not 
number  less  than  a  million,  at  least  twice  the  strength  of  the  other  two 
armies  combined.  This  group  was  divided  into  three  armies  commanded 
by  IvanofF,  Russky,  and  Brusiloff,  names  that  were  to  become  famous  in 
the  history  of  the  war.  Ivanoff's  army  was  based  upon  Brest-Litovsk 
and  by  the  middle  of  August  was  moving  south  covering  Lublin  and  the 
gap  that  opened  toward  Brest-Litovsk.  His  mission  was  to  hold  any 
Austrian  invasion  south  of  Lublin,  but  the  main  thrust  was  to  be  made 
by  the  other  armies. 

Russky's  army  came  west  along  the  Kiev-Lemberg  railroad,  having 
Kiev  as  its  base,  and  advanced  directly  upon  Lemberg,  crossing  the  Ga- 
lician  frontier  about  Brody  in  the  fourth  week  of  August.      Brusiloff 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG 


193 


brought  his  army  up  along  the  Odessa-Lemberg  railroad,  taking  the  field 
only  when  it  became  clear  that  Roumania  intended  to  remain  neutral. 
The  original  mission  of  this  army  was  to  protect  Odessa  and  south- 
western Russia  from  Roumanian  attack,  if  Roumania  remained  faithful 
to  her  alliance  with  Austria  and  Germany.  The  release  of  this  army 
actually  made  the  victory  of  Lemberg  possible  and  in  this  way  Roumania 


THE  RUSSIAN  OFFENSIVE  ON  ALL  FRONTS,  SEPT.   1ST,   I914 

I-Rennenkampf  III-IvanofF  V-Brusiloff 

II-SamsonofF  IV-Russky 


194  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

served  her  old  allies  an  evil  turn  quite  comparable  with  that  served  them 
by  Italy,  when  her  proclamation  of  neutrality  released  French  troops  to 
fight  at  the  Marne.  Brusiloff  crossed  the  frontier  near  Tarnopol,  also 
east  of  Lemberg,  and  advanced  toward  this  city,  his  flank  along  the 
Dniester.  His  junction  with  Russky  was  completed  before  the  battle 
began  and  his  part  in  the  first  engagement  was  decisive. 

II.  Austria's  plans 

It  was  Austria's  mission  in  Austro-German  strategy  to  meet  the  main 
Russian  thrust  and  parry  it,  while  Germany  was  disposing  of  France. 
At  the  very  outset  it  is  plain  that  the  High  Command  of  the  Dual  Alliance 
fatally  underestimated  the  speed  and  the  force  of  the  Russian  blow. 
Thus  Germany  borrowed  two  of  the  best  Austrian  corps  for  her  western 
drive  and  was  putting  them  into  operation  in  Alsace  when  Austrian  dis- 
aster came.  In  addition,  three  or  four  more  corps  had  been  sent  south 
to  deal  with  Serbia.  This  latter  army  was  far  too  small  to  fight  an 
off^ensive  campaign  with  the  well-equipped  and  well-trained  veterans  of 
King  Peter  and  suff'ered  immediate  and  terrible  disaster  at  the  Jedar, 
while  Russia  was  still  just  beginning  to  get  across  the  frontier  into 
Galicia,  a  full  week  before  Tannenberg,  and  about  the  time  of 
Charleroi. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  Austria  actually  put  in  the  field  against 
Russia  many  more  than  600,000  troops  at  the  outset.  In  any  event,  she 
was  outnumbered  by  at  least  two  to  one.  She  further  invited  disaster 
by  dividing  her  armies.  One  (Auffenberg's)  she  stationed  across  Galicia 
from  north  to  south,  cast  of  and  covering  Lemberg;  its  right  or  southern 
flank  rested  on  Halicz  on  the  Dniester,  its  northern  flank  was  behind  the 
Bug,  and  its  centre  behind  the  Zlota  Lipa,  on  high  ground.  This  position 
was  excellent  and  it  had  been  protected  by  well-constructed  field  works, 
but  it  was  far  too  extended  for  the  number  of  troops  Austria  had  avail- 
able. 

The  second  Austrian  army  (Dankl'a),  leaving  railhead  at  the  San, 
moved  straight  north  into  the  Lublin  gap,  aiming  at  Brest-Litovsk  and 
having  for  its  ultimate  purpose  to  compel  the  Russians  to  evacuate  War- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG  195 

saw  and  all  of  Poland.  This  was  an  exceedingly  ambitious  thrust,  it  was 
entirely  beyond  the  capacity  of  the  army  and  the  generals  that  first  un- 
dertook it,  but  it  did  actually  succeed  less  than  a  year  later,  and  its 
success  demonstrated  the  weakness  of  the  Russian  position  and  the 
wisdom  of  the  original  Russian  strategic  conception,  which  called  for  an 
evacuation  of  all  the  territory  west  of  the  Bug. 

It  will  be  noted  that  neither  the  Russians  nor  the  Austro-Germans, 
in  the  opening  days,  undertook  any  operations  in  that  part  of  Poland 
west  of  Warsaw.  The  Germans  lacked  the  numbers  for  any  such  opera- 
tion; the  Russians  were  stopped  by  the  concentration  of  Austrian  armies 
opposite  Lublin,  which  had  a  deadly  menace  for  any  army  west  of  War- 
saw. It  is  only  after  the  German  thrust  at  Warsaw,  made  possible  by 
Tannenberg,  had  been  undertaken  and  failed,  that  Russia  ventures  into 
this  area,  resigning  the  Galician  field  for  the  moment,  and  then  she  comes 
within  a  hairsbreadth  of  a  crushing  defeat  at  Lodz  and  makes  no  further 
effort  in  this  field,  standing  stolidly  on  the  defensive. 

The  opening  of  the  last  week  in  August,  then,  sees  these  two  major 
efforts  on  foot.  Russia  is  advancing  with  her  two  armies  along  the  Kiev 
and  on  the  Odessa  railroads  and  standing  firm  with  her  Third  Army  about 
Lublin;  Austria  is  holding  one  army  before  Lemberg  and  sending  the 
other  north  into  Volhynia  and  actually  approaching  Lublin,  its  presence 
already  signalled  by  Austrian  reports  of  victories  about  Krasnik.  We 
may  calculate  that  the  Austrian  armies  are  outnumbered  about  two 
to  one  and  that  as  the  armies  before  Lemberg  begin  the  battle,  the 
Austrians  have  learned  that  the  Serbians  have  just  won  a  sweeping 
victory  at  the  Jedar  and  that  Austrian  invasion  of  Serbia  has  been 
abandoned. 

Meantime,  to  complete  the  eastern  picture,  one  Russian  army  is 
approaching  Konigsberg,  having  won  a  battle  at  Gumbinnen,  and  a  sec- 
ond is  approaching  Allenstein  in  East  Prussia,  while  Hindenburg  is 
already  preparing  his  amazing  counterthrust.  In  the  west  Namur  has 
fallen,  the  French  have  been  beaten  at  Morhange  and  Charleroi,  and  all 
the  Allied  armies  are  beginning  the  great  retreat  which  Berlin  and 
Vienna  interpret  to  be  the  collapse  of  French  military  power. 


196  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

in.    LEMBERG 

The  First  Battle  of  Lemberg  lasted  not  less  than  eight  days.  In  its 
earlier  stages  it  began  along  the  Zlota  Lipa,  but  the  Austrians  presently- 
retired  to  their  main  front  behind  the  Gnila  Lipa,  their  southern  flank 
still  at  HaHcz  and  their  centre  about  Krasne,  on  the  Brody-Lemberg 
railroad,  where  it  is  joined  by  the  Tarnopol-Odessa  railroad  there  left 
behind  the  Bug.  All  this  ground  was  again  to  be  fought  over  by  Brusi- 
lofif's  great  offensive  in  June,  1916. 

The  fact  that  the  Austrian  resistance  finally  collapsed  has  somewhat 
misled  the  world  as  to  the  nature  of  the  struggle.  It  was  exceedingly 
severe  and  for  many  days  the  Russians,  despite  heavy  losses,  were  able 
to  make  no  progress.  Finally  Brusiloff  broke  through  to  the  south  to- 
ward the  Dniester  and  about  Halicz,  which  he  took.  This  success  im- 
perilled the  whole  Austrian  line  and  it  retreated  through  and  beyond 
Lemberg — which  fell  on  the  first  days  of  September,  just  at  Tannenberg 
time — and  took  its  stand  behind  the  chain  of  Grodek  lakes,  a  few  miles 
west  of  Lemberg,  its  left  flank  reaching  and  passing  Rawaruska. 

This  time  the  decisive  thrust  is  made  by  Russky.  His  numbers  are 
so  much  superior  to  AufYenberg's  that  he  is  able  to  turn  his  flank,  and  the 
Austrian  line  swings  at  right  angles  around  Rawaruska  and  runs  east  and 
west ;  Russky  takes  Rawaruska,  breaks  the  whole  centre  of  the  Austrians 
and  throws  the  entire  force,  shaken  by  its  defeats  before  Lemberg,  into 
an  utter  rout. 

Meantime  Ivanofif,  having  at  first  retired  before  Dankl  and  permitted 
him  to  follow  deep  into  Russian  territory  and  become  separated  from 
Auff enberg,  turns  and  delivers  a  heavy  blow.  Dankl's  army  is  now  left  in 
air,  its  southern  flank  exposed  by  the  collapse  of  Auff  enberg,  and  he  is  com- 
pelled to  make  a  disorderly  retreat,  approximating  a  flight,  back  to  and 
across  the  San,  giving  up  Jaroslav  and  coming  back  behind  the  Wisloka 
and  approaching  Cracow.  Auff  enberg's  army  retires  over  the  Carpathian 
passes  into  Hungary.  Before  the  Austrian  flight  had  at  last  paused  the 
Russians  announced  that  they  had  taken  250,000  prisoners,  vast  num- 
bers of  guns,  and  an  enormous  store  of  munitions  and  material. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG 


197 


In  point  of  fact,  Lemberg  was  one  of  the  complete  disasters  of  military 
history;  it  brought  the  Austrian  war  establishment  to  the  edge  of  ruin 
and  disclosed  a  fundamental  weakness,  which,  despite  German  effort  and 
temporary  success  in  the  summer  campaign  of  1915,  could  not  be  quite 
cured  and  was  revealed  afresh  on  the  same  ground  in  the  campaign  that 
opened  the  summer  of  1916.     Differences  of  race,  the  manifest  lack  of 


J  # 


THE  RUSSIAN  INVASION  OF  GALICIA — BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG 
A-Russky  C-Ivanoff  E-Dankl 


B-BrusilofF 


D-Auffenberg 


sympathy  on  the  part  of  Slav  contingents  with  their  task  of  fighting  Rus- 
sians to  please  their  German  and  Magyar  masters,  defective  training 
and  insufficient  preparation,  above  all  inadequate  numbers  for  the  task 
assigned,  all  these  things  combined  to  make  Lemberg  an  Austrian  dis- 
aster of  first  magnitude. 

The  immediate  consequences  were  the  loss  of  all  of  Galicia  to  the 
San,  the  advance  of  Russian  troops  beyond  the  San  as  far  as  the  Wisloka, 
the  investing  of  Przemysl,  the  passage  of  the  Carpathians  by  Cossack  raid- 


198  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ing  parties,  and  the  first  arrival  of  the  invader  in  the  Hungarian  Plain. 
Austrian  troops  had  to  be  recalled  from  Alsace  and  from  Serbia  to  re- 
trieve the  lost  situation  and  the  first  demand  was  made  upon  Germany  to 
come  to  the  aid  of  her  Austrian  ally.  By  the  battle  Austria  lost  20,000 
square  miles  of  territory;  Lemberg,  a  city  of  more  than  200,000  people; 
the  great  oil  district  of  eastern  Galicia.  She  lost  also  not  less  than  half 
of  her  first-line  troops,  counting  the  Jedar  casualties,  and,  in  addition, 
material  of  war  which  could  only  slowly  be  replaced. 

Austrian  defeat  at  Lemberg  coincided  with  German  repulse  and  re- 
treat at  the  Marne.  But  for  the  unhappy  disaster  at  Tannenberg,  the 
second  week  in  September  would  have  seen  all  the  armies  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  retreat  or  rout.  Had  Tannenberg  not  released  Hindenburg's 
army,  it  would  have  been  from  the  western  armies  that  Germany  would 
have  had  to  draw  corps  to  repair  the  Galician  situation.  She  was  not 
now  compelled  to  do  this,  but  the  consequences  of  Lemberg  were  ulti- 
mately to  put  a  term  to  western  operations  for  a  year  and  a  half. 

The  decision  at  Lemberg  did  not  endure  so  long  as  did  that  of  the 
Marne;  the  Germans  abolished  it  at  the  Dunajec  in  April.  But  while 
the  decision  stood,  it  continued  to  hamper  and  embarrass  German  efi^ort. 
Russia  was  temporarily  compelled  to  withdraw  from  the  region  west  of 
the  San,  by  the  first  German  drive  at  Warsaw;  after  Lodz,  she  was  still 
before  Cracow,  and  it  required  a  new  eff^ort  in  Poland  to  compel  her  to 
abandon  her  thrust  for  Cracow.  Then  she  turned  to  the  Carpathians, 
and  the  immediate  demand  of  Hungary  compelled  Germany  to  send 
troops  to  guard  Hungarian  passes. 

In  the  end  Germany  had  to  give  over  the  attack  upon  Warsaw  through 
Poland  and  turn  her  main  attention  to  Galicia.  When  she  did  this  she 
reversed  the  decision  of  Lemberg  and  promptly  turned  the  Russians 
out  of  Galicia,  but  this  was  only  in  the  last  days  of  April,  and  the  Russian 
victory  had  begun  in  the  last  days  of  August.  Lemberg  is,  then,  the 
second  great  Allied  victory  of  the  war,  ranking  immediately  after 
the  Marne.  It  gave  the  world  its  first  evidence  of  the  new  character  of 
Russian  armies,  demonstrated  that  the  evils  of  the  Japanese  War  had 
been  remedied,  and  that  Russian  generalship  was  as  good  as  German  or 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LEMBERG  199 

French.  Disasters  due  to  the  failure  of  ammunition  somewhat  marred 
this  new  reputation,  but  in  1916,  when  munitions  had  been  supplied, 
Russian  armies  began  to  win  new  victories  of  an  impressive  character. 

It  is  fair  to  say  that  Lemberg  and  the  Marne  together  demonstrated 
that  Germany  had  terribly  underestimated  her  Continental  foes.  Two 
years  were  to  pass  before  she  was  to  reform  her  estimate  as  to  British 
troops.  But  by  the  middle  of  September  she  and  her  Austrian  ally  had 
fought  three  great  battles,  as  she  had  planned,  which  should  have  de- 
cided the  issue  of  the  war,  but  two  had  been  lost,  and  the  third  had  only 
saved  Germany  from  ruin  and  had  not  crushed  France  or  Russia. 


CHAPTER  TEN 

WARSAW 

I 
CONDITIONS  OF  THE  FIRST  BID 

About  October  ist  the  Russians  had  passed  the  San  in  Galicia  and 
were  moving  toward  Cracow,  the  first  investment  of  Przemysl  had  begun, 
and  Cossacks  were  pouring  through  the  still-unfortified  passes  of  the 
Carpathians  and  penetrating  the  Hungarian  Plain.  In  the  west  the 
Siege  of  Antwerp  was  approaching  its  promptly  decisive  stage,  and  the 
German  campaign  to  abolish  the  decision  of  the  Marne  by  a  final  of- 
fensive through  Flanders  was  taking  final  shape. 

It  was  now  necessary  to  aid  the  Austrians,  but  it  was  not  possible  to 
withdraw  troops  from  the  west,  unless  Germany  was  willing  to  accept 
a  deadlock  from  Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea,  and  she  was  far  from 
ready  to  do  this.  There  remained  the  possibility  of  using  the  larger 
portion  of  the  army  of  Hindenburg,  which  had  won  Tannenberg  and 
pursued  the  second  Russian  army  in  East  Prussia — that  of  Rennenkampf 
— from  the  very  gates  of  Konigsberg  across  the  frontier.  Gathering 
up  the  mass  of  this  army  and  leaving  the  balance  to  retreat  slowly  before 
the  Russians,  the  German  General  Staff  might  transport  it  rapidly, 
by  those  admirable  strategic  railroads  which  follow  the  frontier  in  a 
semicircle  from  East  Prussia  to  Cracow;  put  it  in  at  Lodz,  which  had 
fallen  into  German  hands  early  in  the  war;  call  upon  Austrian  troops, 
returning  from  Serbia  or  from  Alsace,  and  make  a  sudden  drive  at 
Warsaw. 

If  the  drive  achieved  the  maximum  of  success,  Warsaw  would  be 
captured,  together  with  Ivangorod  to  the  south,  the  objective  of  the 
Austrian  fraction  of  Hindenburg's  army;  Germany  would,  at  a  single 
thrust,  win  the  west  bank  of  the  Vistula,  an  enormously  strong  military 
position.     Behind  this  line  she  could  hope  to  stand  inexpugnably  and 


WARSAW 


20I 


devote  her  efforts  to  preparing  to  renew  the  conflict  in  the  west  in  the 
spring. 

But  if  this  maximum  was  not  realized,  there  was  a  minimum  that 
was  assured,  Russia  had  no  troops  of  material  consequence  between 
Lodz  and  Warsaw:  most  of  her  military  strength  was  now  in  Galicia 


RUSSIAN  INVASION  OF  GALICIA,  ABOUT  OCTOBER  I,   I914 
The  Russians  were  moving  toward  Cracow,  the  first  investment  of  Przemysl  had  begun, 
and  Cossacks  were  pouring  through  the  still-unfortified  passes  of  the  Carpathians  and  penetrating 
the  Hungarian  Plain 

pressing  against  the  Austrlans  and  moving  toward  Cracow.  Unques- 
tionably the  first  sign  of  a  German  thrust  for  Warsaw  would  compel  the 
Russians  to  give  over  their  Galician  operations,  draw  out  many  corps 
and  send  them  to  save  Warsaw,  and  thus  dislocate  their  whole  Gahcian 
concentration.  When  this  began  the  Austrlans  could  undertake  a  new 
offensive  in  Galicia,  designed  to  crush  the  weakened  Russian  armies, 
and  the  danger  to  Cracow,  as  well  as  the  menace  to  Hungary  through 
the  Carpathians,  would  be  abolished. 


202  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

This  was  the  main  purpose  of  the  offensive  toward  Warsaw.  Austria 
must  be  helped.  The  help  she  required  could  still  be  furnished  without 
any  draft  upon  the  western  lines,  but  such  help  would  not  be  sufficient 
to  win  a  decisive  battle,  if  Russia  made  a  prompt  concentration.  It 
could  only  get  Warsaw  if  speed  enabled  the  Germans  to  seize  that  strong 
position  before  Russian  numbers  could  be  brought  up.  It  was  a  serious 
bid  for  Warsaw,  but  it  was  a  bid  begun  with  the  full  recognition  that 
it  had  at  best  no  more  than  half  a  chance  of  success. 

In  the  Civil  War,  Lee  sent  Early  against  Washington  with  precisely 
the  same  purpose  in  view.  It  was  possible  that  Early  might  get  Wash- 
ington. If  he  did,  the  success  would  be  of  enormous  political  and  moral 
value;  but  even  if  he  failed  he  was  likely  to  compel  Grant,  hanging 
doggedly  to  his  footing  before  Petersburg,  to  weaken  his  front  to  relieve 
Washington,  and  this  would  give  Lee  a  respite.  It  might  lead  Grant  to 
abandon  his  whole  effort  to  get  Richmond,  from  his  position  south  of 
the  James.  Early  failed,  as  did  Hindenburg,  because  troops  from  the 
other  front  arrived  in  time.  But  unlike  Lee's  thrust,  that  of  Hinden- 
burg succeeded  in  dislocating  the  other  enemy  concentration,  that  in 
Galicia. 

There  was  further,  a  political  purpose  in  the  German  thrust.  The 
attitude  of  the  Poles  toward  the  conflicting  nations  was  obscure.  It 
was  possible  and  reasonable  for  the  Germans  to  hope  that  the  Poles, 
if  a  German  invasion  carried  Warsaw,  might  turn  from  their  Russian 
allegiance  and  become  the  allies  of  the  invader,  as  they  had  in  the 
Napoleonic  time  when  they  furnished  the  great  Emperor  with  at  least 
one  marshal  and  some  of  his  best  and  bravest  troops.  This  German 
hope  was  not  realized,  partly  because  the  failure  to  get  Warsaw  neces- 
sitated a  retreat,  in  which  Poland  was  laid  in  ashes  by  contending  armies, 
but  it  was  an  important  consideration  in  the  German  mind  and  it  was  a 
possibility  recognized  fully  by  the  Russians. 

II.    AT  THE  GATES  OF  WARSAW 

Under  these  circumstances  and  about  October  ist,  Hindenburg  began 
his  advance  in  two  columns — one  following  the  railroad  east  from  Kalisz 


WARSAW 


203 


to  Warsaw;  the  other,  mainly  composed  of  Austrians,  moving  north- 
east along  the  railroad  from  Cracow  to  Ivangorod.  Combined,  these 
armies  did  not  number  six  army  corps,  possibly  there  were  but  five; 
certainly  their  total  strength  was  less  than  that  of  Kluck's  army  in  the 
Marne  campaign.  These  armies  had  something  like  a  hundred  miles 
to  go;  they  had,  when  the  advance  began,  practically  no  Russian 


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HINDENBURG  S  FIRST  CAMPAIGN  FOR  WARSAW,  OCT.  20,  I914 

The  German  thrust  for  Warsaw  diverted  the  Russians  from  their  operations  in  Galicia. 
This  was  its  main  purpose.  In  the  Civil  War,  Lee  sent  Early  against  Washington  with  a  pre- 
cisely similar  object  in  view 

troops  before  them,  and  they  had  reasonably  good  roads  to  follow. 
They  began  with  the  full  expectation  of  taking  Warsaw  within  the  fort- 
night, and  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Antwerp  overtook  them  on  the  road 
and  gave  them  new  enthusiasm. 

With  little  or  no  fighting,  moving  with  almost  incredible  rapidity, 
these  two  armies  advanced  until,  on  October  14th,  one  army  stood  on  the 


204  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

outskirts  of  Warsaw,  in  the  suburb  of  Prushkow,  seven  miles  from  the 
centre  of  the  city,  while  the  other  had  cleared  the  west  bank  of  the 
Vistula  before  Ivangorod.  At  this  moment  German  shells  fell  within 
the  Polish  capital,  German  aeroplanes  bombed  the  city,  there  was  a 
general  exodus  of  the  population,  and  the  world  believed  that  Warsaw 
was  to  share  the  fate  of  Antwerp.  So  sure  did  German  victory  now 
seem  to  the  Turk  that,  under  German  pressure,  Enver  Pasha  chose 
this  moment  to  put  his  country  into  the  conflict. 

But  Russian  concentration  was  just  prompt  enough.  While  the 
Germans  were  in  the  suburbs  of  Warsaw,  Siberian  regiments  pushed 
through  the  town  and  began  to  defend  the  outskirts.  They  were  the 
advanced  guards  of  eight  corps,  which  came  to  Ivangorod  and  to 
Warsaw  in  the  next  few  days.  For  a  whole  week  there  was  sharp 
fighting  before  Warsaw,  where  Hindenburg  stood  checked  but  not  con- 
vinced. But  presently  the  Russian  reinforcements  crossed  the  Vistula 
about  Ivangorod  and  north  of  Warsaw  and  came  in  on  both  flanks  of  the 
Hindenburg  forces.  October  21st  Hindenburg  broke  off  the  engage- 
ment. He  had  never  fought  to  the  limit;  he  had  stood  before  Warsaw 
iong  after  the  possibility  of  taking  the  town  had  passed,  to  preserve 
the  threat  as  long  as  possible.  His  Austrian  allies  before  Ivangorod 
had  suffered  severely;  he  had  gotten  off^  far  more  lightly. 

Beginning  October  21st,  the  first  thrust  at  Warsaw  transforms 
itself  into  a  swift  and  orderly  retreat,  such  as  Frederick  the  Great  taught 
Europe  to  expect  from  his  Prussians,  and  in  trim  columns  Hinden- 
burg moved  back  to  the  frontier.  As  he  retreated,  the  fact  was  dis- 
closed that  he  had  constructed  fieldworks  along  his  route,  foreseeing 
retreat,  and  these  gave  his  rearguards  admirable  protection.  In  this 
retreat  he  destroyed  roads,  railroads,  bridges,  actually  abolishing  most 
of  the  means  of  communication  in  Poland. 

Meanwhile,  in  Galicia,  the  efi^ect  of  the  Warsaw  drive  had  been  ex- 
actly what  had  been  hoped.  The  Russians  had  come  out  of  the  Car- 
pathians and  retired  behind  the  San.  The  Austrians  had  rallied  and 
taken  the  offensive,  reaching  and  in  spots  passing  the  river.  Przemysl 
had  been  relieved ;  there  was  a  moment  when  the  recon quest  of  Galicia 


WARSAW  20S 

seemed  to  be  within  Austrian  possibilities.  But  this  moment  passed. 
As  the  Germans  retired  from  Warsaw  the  Russians  in  Galicia  retook  the 
offensive.  This  time,  passing  the  San,  they  again — and  as  it  turned  out, 
finally — invested  Przemysl  and  approached  Cracow  at  the  precise  mo- 
ment when  the  armies  which  had  saved  Warsaw  and  Ivangorod  were 
coming  southwest,  and  that  of  Ivangorod  threatened  Cracow  from  the 
north  as  the  Galician  army  now  threatened  it  from  the  east. 

Thus  the  real  benefit  of  Hindenburg's  thrust  was  shortlived.  By 
the  time  he  had  fallen  back  to  the  German  and  Austrian  frontiers,  his 
retreat  was  mainly  toward  the  southwest,  the  Russian  menace  in 
Galicia  had  become  even  more  serious  than  it  had  been  when  he  started. 
He  had  but  postponed  the  danger  for  a  moment  and  he  had  now  to  deal 
with  it  in  an  aggravated  form. 

III.    LODZ 

We  have  now  come  to  the  moment  when  the  western  and  eastern 
campaigns  merge.  Hindenburg  is  now  compelled  to  make  a  second 
effort  to  relieve  the  Austrians  in  Galicia  and  save  Cracow.  He  has 
still  only  very  restricted  numbers.  The  Germans  are  making  their 
last  desperate  effort  in  Flanders;  they  have  failed  against  the  Belgians 
and  French  from  Nieuport  to  Dixmude;  they  afe  attacking  the  British 
about  Ypres,  and  the  British  are  holding  on  doggedly  while  the  French 
are  striving  to  reinforce  them.  Unless  the  Germans  can  now  break 
through  in  the  west  in  a  brief  time,  they  will  have  to  abandon  the 
western  effort  and  turn  their  attention  eastward.  The  Russian  pres- 
sure— which,  in  Allied  plans,  made  before  the  war,  should  have  become 
effective  in  the  last  days  of  August — is  about  to  count  in  the  last  days 
of  November. 

For  his  second  effort  Hindenburg  takes  advantage  again  of  the 
strategic  railroads  which  run  in  a  circle  about  the  Russian  frontier. 
In  his  drive  at  Warsaw  he  had  used  these  railroads  to  move  troops  from 
East  Prussia  to  Silesia.  When  he  had  failed  at  Warsaw  he  had  retired 
southwest  upon  Cracow  and  Breslau,  destroying  Russian  railroads  as  he 
retired.    The  Russian  troops  had  followed  him  through  Lodz  and  even 


2o6 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


to  the  Silesian  boundary.  But,  owing  to  the  configuration  of  the  ter- 
ritory, they  were  now  farther  from  Warsaw  than  German  troops  at 
Thorn  would  be,  and  they  had  behind  them  only  the  ruined  roads 
and  railroads,  which  Hindenburg  had  wrecked. 


«■■"•"  ■(AOgTRlAN 


HINDENBURG  S  SECOND  DRIVE  FOR  WARSAW 

Hindenburg  left  only  Austrians  to  deal  with  the  advancing  Russians  on  the  front  from  Cra- 
cow to  Kalisz,  moved  rwrth  to  the  gap  between  the  Vistula  and  Warthe  rivers,  and  there  sent  in 
several  corps  under  Mackensen 


MEN  AND  GUNS  OF 
THE  TWO   KAISERS 


Copyright  hy  Undfrzvoud  'd  inder:cood 

THE  IMPERIAL  GUARD  PASSES  IN  REVIEW  BEFORE  EMPEROR  WILLIAM 

At  the  left  of  the  Kaiser  is  General  Lowenfeldt,  and  at  the  extreme  right  General 

Von  Billow. 


GENERAL  VON  MOLTKE 


GENERAL  VON  FALKENHAYN 


GENERAL  VON  HEERINGEN 


CROWN  PRINCE  RUPERT  OF  BAVARIA 


General  Von  Moltke,  nephew  of  the  great  Moltke  of  Bismarck's  day  was  Chief  of  Staff  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
World  War.  Because  of  his  failure  to  seize  and  hold  the  French  and  Belgian  seacoast  when  opportunity  offered  and 
because  of  rumored  mistakes  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  Moltke  lost  his  position  and  turned  over  his  office  to  the 
Kaiser's  favorite,  Kalkenhayn,  whose  star  was  to  set  before  X'erdun  as  Moltke's  set  on  the  road  to  Calais. 

The  armies  of  GeneralVon  Heeringen  and  Crown  Prince  Rupert  of  Bavaria  met  the  French  after  they  had  pene- 
trated (Serman  territory  some  fifteen  or  twenty  miles,  about  a  fortnight  after  the  War  began.  The  battle  was  an 
undoubted  German  victory.  The  French  "75's"  were  outranged  by  the  heavy  German  field  artillery,  and  in  three 
days  the  French  were  driven  back  across  the  border  and  the  invasion  of  Lorraine  was  at  an  end. 

A  fortnight  later,  while  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  on;  these  same  generals  fought  another  engagement  on  this 
same  front — ''the  Second  Battle  of  Nancy."  They  were  opposed,  as  before,  by  the  French  general  Castelnau.  Their 
aim  was  to  cut  through  the  gap  in  the  French  barrier  forts  between  Toul  and  Epinal  and  thus  arrive  on  the  flank  and 
rear  of  all  the  French  armies.  Though  fighting  under  the  eyes  of  the  Kaiser  himself  they  were  repulsed  with  great 
slaughter — else  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  might  have  ended  very  differently. 


Photograph  bv  Paul  Thompson 

GKNKRAL  MACKF.NSKN 


GENERAL  LUDENDORFF 


THE  KAISER  IN  WARTIME 


GENERAL  VON  KLUCK 


General  Mackensen,  con(|ucrur  of  the  Russians  under  Dmitrieff  at  the  Dunajec,  in  the  spring  of  1915.  The 
trapped  Roumanian  army  surrendered  to  him  in  Decemher,  1916. 

Genera'  Ludendorff,  close  associate  of  Hindenburg.  He  has  been  called  "the  brains  of  Hindenburg,"  and  even  the 
"real  German  dictator."  His  mastiff-like  visage  recalls  the  bull-dog  countenance  of  Hindenburg  and  even  more  the 
resolute  mask  of  the  old  "Iron  Chancellor"  Bismarck. 

The  Kaiser's  wartime  photographs  betray  the  fact  that  he  has  aged  greatly  during  the  conflict.  This  shows  him 
in  his  field  uniform,  with  helmet  covered  so  as  to  offer  no  glittering  mark  to  sniping  aviators.  For  all  the  dozens  of 
gaudy  uniforms  in  which  he  used  to  take  so  much  delight,  he  has  never  been  indiscreet  enough  to  lead  an  army  in  per- 
son— except  at  manoeuvres.  He  is  said,  however,  to  have  waited  "in  shining  armour"  to  take  part  in  one  or  two  trium- 
phal entries  which  failed  to  come  off. 

(leneral  Von  Kluck,  about  August  23d,  made  a  desperate  effort  to  "run  around  the  end"  of  the  Allied  line,  inter- 
posed between  it  and  Paris  and  produce  another  Sedan.  He  did  not  quite  succeed,  and  immediately  found  himself  in  a 
very  dangerous  position  during  the  Battle  ot  the  Marne.  Thanks  to  Sir  John  French's  fadure  to  rise  to  the  occasion, 
Kluck  was  able  by  dint  of  desperate  fighting  against  the  gallant  Maunoury  to  make  good  his  retreat  to  the  Aisne. 


Photograph  by  Paul  Thompson 

ONE  OF  HINDENBURG'S  THRUSTS  AT  WARSAW 
There  is  plenty  of  room  on  this  broad  road  for  ammunition  and  supply  trains  to  advance  along  with  the  infantry. 


ll(j;<vn^ht  ''V  Hr<j:cii  'jf  Da:cjon 


AN  INCIDENT  DURING  THE  GERMAN  EFKOR  1   K )  DRIVE   THE  RUSSIANS  HOME  FROM  GALICIA 

The  German  soldiers  are  coming  out  of  the  garrison  church   at   Pr/cmysl.  alter  attendinc  Sunday  morning  service, 
few  civilians  are  m  the  street  and  the  shop-windows  are  tightlv  shuttered. 


Copyright  by  Brozin  ^  Dazvson 

EFFECT  OF  THE  GERMAN  BOMBARDMENT  OF  PRZEMYSL 


GENERAL  VON  AUFFENBERG  (Right) 

The  unlucky  Austrian  general  from  whom  the  Russians 
captured  a  quarter  of. a  million  prisoners  at  the  Battle 
of  Lemberg,  one  of  the  great  disasters  of  military  history 
which  brought  the  Austrian  war  establishment  to  the  verge 
of  ruin. 


TYPICAL  AUSrRL\N  INFAN  TRWV.EN 

As  is  shown  in  another  part  of  this  book  the  Austrian 
makes  a  good  and  courageous  soldier.  Men  of  many 
diverse  races  fight  under  the  colours  ot  the  Dual  Monarchy 
yet  no  dissension  has  appeared. 


PARCELS  FROM  FRIENDS  AT  HOME  ARRIVE  TO  CHEER  GERMAN  ARTILLERY 

OFFICERS  BEFORE  WARSAW 


THE  AUSTRIANS 


Copyri^hi  by  thi-  I ntfrnationul  W 


It  was  Austria  s  mission  in  Austro-German  strategy  to  meet  the  main  Russian  thrust  and  parry  it,  while  Germany 
was  disposing  ol  France.  But  Austria  was  unable  to  carry  out  her  part  of  the  program,  and  when  she  had  been  de- 
teated  by  the  Serbians  at  the  Jedar  and  by  the  Russians  at  Lemberg,  Germany  was  compelled  to  draw  troops  from 
the  western  front  to  send  to  her  rescue  and  thus  lost  her  own  chance  for  a  quick  victory  over  France 

Ihe  upper  picture  shows  some  of  the  celebrated  Rangers  Corps  guarding  a  road;  the  lower  one,  a  group  of  officers 
seated  before  one  of  the  guns  used  m  bombarding  Antwerp.  >     &       f 


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ONE  OF  THE  SKODA  HOWITZERS  THAT  REDUCED  LIEGE 

On  August  7th,  the  German  infantry  penetrated  between  the  forts  before  Liege  and  occupied  the  city  and  the 
citadel;  but  they  were  unable  to  take  the  forts.  These  maintained  their  tire  till  Cierman  and  Austrian  heavy  guns  were 
brought  forward.  Under  this  attack  the  forts  crumbled  almost  instantly  They  were  the  work  of  the  famous 
Brialmont,  and  supposed  to  be  very  strong.  Rut  they  had  been  allowed  to  fall  into  disrepair  and  their  reduction  proved 
to  be  child's  play  to  the  mighty  new  engines  of  destruction. 


WARSAW 


215 


Accordingly  Hindenburg  left  only  the  Austrians  to  deal  with  the 
advancing  Russians  on  the  front  from  Cracow  to  Kalisz  and  moved 
his  mass  right  along  the  frontier  north  to  Thorn  and  the  gap  between 
the  Vistula  and  Warthe  rivers  and  there  sent  in  several  corps  under 
Mackensen,  soon  to  earn  world  fame.     These  troops  moved  rapidly 


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v^jv-^i/ 

I 

THE   BATTLE  OF  LODZ,  DURING  HINDENBURG  S   SECOND  CAMPAIGN 

FOR  WARSAW 

Troops  hurried  eastward  soon  turn  the  balance  against  the  Russians,  and  December  6th 
the  Germans  reenter  Lodz  after  six  weeks  of  the  most  sanguinary  fighting.  German  official  re- 
ports claim  100,000  Russian  prisoners 

across  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Russians  to  the  southeast,  turned  their 
flank  and  presently  interposed  between  them  and  Warsaw,  much  as 
Kluck  sought  to  interpose  between  the  Anglo-French  forces  and  Paris 
in  the  September  campaign  in  the  west. 

Here,  then,  in  the  last  days  of  November,  while  the  Battle  of  Ypres 
is  just  ending,  is  the  promise  of  a  second  Tannenberg,  the  capture  of  a 
large  Russian  army,  and  the  ultimate  fall  of  Warsaw.     The  position  of 


2i6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Russian  army  is  desperate,  it  would  seem,  because  its  northern 
flank  is  turned  by  the  Germans,  while  it  is  assailed  in  front  by  more 
Germans,  and  the  Austrians  have  advanced  north  from  Cracow,  threat- 
ening its  southern  flank.  But  the  Russians  escaped,  showing  again  the 
same  qualities  which  shone,  even  in  disaster,  in  the  Manchurian  campaign. 

At  the  moment  when  Russky,  who  commanded  at  Lodz,  seemed  lost, 
the  Germans  on  his  northern  flank  are  involved  by  a  thrust  out  from 
Warsaw  and  south  from  the  Vistula  made  by  troops  brought  down  from 
East  Prussia  and  out  of  the  fortress  garrisons.  Two  German  corps 
are  surrounded  and  Petrograd,  long  silent  in  the  midst  of  disaster, 
suddenly  claims  a  huge  success.  This  does  not  happen.  General  von 
Francois,  the  German  commander  whose  corps  are  trapped,  manages  to 
fight  his  way  out,  by  exertions  which  the  Russians  frankly  concede  to 
have  been  "unbelievable."  The  Germans  are  helped  by  failures  of 
Rennenkampf,  who  once  more,  as  in  the  Tannenberg  times,  discloses 
tardiness  and  now  goes  into  retirement. 

But  already  the  situation  has  compelled  the  Germans  to  borrow  aid 
from  the  west.  The  end  of  the  western  campaign  has  come  and  the 
decision  of  the  Marne  stands.  Troops  hurried  eastward  soon  turn  the 
balance  against  the  Russians  and  December  6th  the  Germans  reenter 
Lodz  after  six  weeks  of  the  most  sanguinary  fighting  the  war  in  the  east 
had  yet  seen.  German  oflScial  reports  claim  100,000  Russian  prisoners; 
the  Russians  claim  material  captures,  but  the  actual  eff^ect  of  all  the 
fighting  has  been,  in  the  immediate  area  of  conflict,  to  reproduce  western 
conditions  of  deadlock,  and  the  Polish  front  rapidly  tends  to  descend  into 
the  same  state  of  trench  warfare  that  has  obtained  on  the  Aisne  since 
the  middle  of  September. 

IV.    THE  THIRD  BID  FOR  WARSAW 

When  in  October  the  Russians  began  their  advance  from  Warsaw, 
following  Hindenburg  toward  Cracow,  it  seems  clear  that  they  tempora- 
rily renounced  the  Galician  field  as  the  main  theatre  of  operations  and 
put  forth  their  full  strength  in  Poland.  After  Lodz  they  again  reverted 
to  their  old  idea.     Lodz  demonstrated  clearly  that  it  would  be  impos- 


WARSAW  217 

sible  to  move  west  out  of  Poland.  It  was,  in  fact,  as  the  Germans  said 
in  their  official  announcements  at  the  time,  a  permanent  check  to  Rus- 
sian offensive  toward  Silesia  and  Posen. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  the  first  Hindenburg  advance  toward 
Warsaw  had  checked  the  Russian  operations  in  Galicia  and  turned  them 
into  a  retirement  behind  the  San,  the  Lodz  operation  did  not  affect  the 
Galician  field  and  the  Russians  still  continued  to  press  on  toward 
Cracow,  after  their  Polish  army  had  evacuated  Lodz,  and  retired  toward 
Lowicz  and  Skierniewice,  covering  Warsaw.  A  new  effort  was  re- 
quired to  relieve  the  Galician  situation.  This  new  effort  was  made  in 
Poland;  in  it  we  see,  unmistakably,  the  contribution  of  troops  brought 
from  the  west.  The  necessity  for  this  operation  was  revealed  in  the 
severe  defeat  suffered  by  Austrian  armies  coming  up  out  of  the  Car- 
pathians  and  seeking  to  relieve  Przemysl  and  redeem  western  Galicia. 

Accordingly  Hindenburg  resumed  his  pressure  in  Poland;  from  the 
Lower  Vistula  south  before  Lodz  he  began  a  terrific  frontal  attack  upon 
the  Russians,  employing  the  numbers  he  had  now  borrowed  from  the 
west.  Under  this  pressure  the  Russians  retired  slowly,  giving  over 
Lowicz  and  Skierniewice  and  retiring  upon  Warsaw.  They  finally 
took  their  stand  on  the  eastern  banks  of  the  Bzura  and  Rawka,  little 
rivers  which  together  stretch  straight  across  the  front  of  Warsaw  from 
the  Lower  Vistula  for  many  miles  south.  Below  this  system  the  Rus- 
sians fortified  the  banks  of  the  Pilitza  and  then  of  the  Nida,  which  enters 
the  Upper  Vistula  north  of  Tarnow. 

The  position  was  largely  accidental.  The  Russians  had  intended  to 
defend  Warsaw  from  the  Blonie  lines,  much  nearer  the  city;  the  Bzura  is 
more  than  twenty  miles  west  of  the  Polish  capital.  But  little  by  little 
they  discovered  that  their  lines  held;  they  found  that  they  had  been 
driven  into  a  defensible  position,  and  they  hung  on.  At  the  same  time 
they  drew  back  from  before  Cracow,  north  of  the  Vistula,  standing 
behind  the  Nida,  south  of  it  behind  the  Dunajec.  They  had  now 
entered  the  lines  they  were  to  hold  from  December  until  May  between 
the  Lower  Vistula  and  the  Carpathians,  and  until  August  before  War- 
saw. 


2i8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  German  attacks  upon  the  Bzura-Rawka  lines  recalled  the 
similar  efforts  in  Flanders,  at  the  Yscr  and  before  Ypres.  German 
losses  were  exceedingly  heavy;  German  gains  were  inconsiderable,  a 
trench  here,  a  farmhouse  there.  Meantime  the  weather  had  come  to 
the  rescue  of  Russia.  An  early  and  severe  winter  had  destroyed  Napo- 
leon. The  winter  of  1914-1915  was  one  of  the  mildest  in  Polish  history 
and  the  roads  were  turned  into  swamps.  The  superior  mobility  of  the 
Germans  was  abolished  as  a  factor  and  they  were  unable  to  use  their 
heavy  artillery  because  of  the  difficulties  of  transport.  These  condi- 
tions had  materially  affected  the  Lodz  operation;  they  had  an  almost 
decisive  influence  now. 

By  January  ist  the  attempt  to  get  Warsaw  by  frontal  attack  has 
failed.  It  will  be  resumed  in  January  and  February,  combined  with  a 
thrust  south  from  East  Prussia,  via  Mlawa  and  along  the  railroad  up 
which  the  Russians  had  marched  to  disaster  in  the  Tannenberg  time. 
But  it  will  fail  again,  and  this  failure  will  be  absolute.  Meantime,  the 
Russians  will  abandon  their  momentary  plan  to  move  west  from  Poland 
toward  Breslau  and  through  Galicia  to  Cracow.  They  will  more  and 
more  direct  their  energies  toward  forcing  the  passes  of  the  Carpathians 
and  reaching  the  Hungarian  Plain. 

Well  into  February  the  Germans  will  continue  their  efforts  to  get 
Warsaw  from  the  front  and  from  the  north.  In  all  of  this  time  they 
will  content  themselves  with  bolstering  up  Austrian  defence  in  Galicia 
by  more  and  more  considerable  reinforcement,  and  by  a  gradual  taking 
over,  first  of  High  Command  and  then  of  the  direction  of  the  smaller 
units.  It  is  not  until  the  February  attacks  fail,  and  the  Russian  line 
before  Warsaw  is  proven  too  strong  to  be  broken,  that  Germany,  in  her 
turn,  will  go  to  Galicia  and  make  her  main  effort  in  the  field  where,  for 
many  months,  Russia  has  been  steadily  progressing. 

January  ist,  then,  is  a  date  when  it  is  possible  to  dismiss  the  Warsaw 
operation  as  actually  terminated,  despite  subsequent  efforts.  From  the 
Baltic  to  the  Carpathians  the  line  begins  to  take  the  same  stationary 
form  that  the  western  line  has  already  assumed.  There  is  a  slight 
fluctuation  in  East  Prussia;  it  will  be  February  before  the  Germans, 


WARSAW 


219 


having  won  the  Battle  of  the  Mazurian  Lakes,  can  announce  that  East 
Prussia  is  freed  from  the  invaders.  But  actually  the  decision  has  been 
reached,  Warsaw  cannot  be  taken  from  the  north  or  from  the  west. 
Germany  must  make  up  her  mind  to  this,  and  when  she  makes  up  her 
mind  it  will  be  too  late  to  hope  to  resume  the  great  western  offensive  in 
the  spring. 


DEADLOCK  IN  POLAND,  DEC,   I914-MAY,  I915 
January  ist  is  the  date  when  it  is  possible  to  dismiss  the  Warsaw  operation  as  actually 
terminated,  despite  subsequent  efforts.     The  line  begins  to  take  the  same  stationary  form  that 
the  western  line  has  already  assumed 

Instead,  there  must  be  prepared  a  new  eastern  campaign  and  that 
campaign  will  have  for  its  real  purpose,  not  alone  taking  Warsaw  and 
the  line  of  the  Vistula,  not  merely  abolishing  the  threat  of  Austria,  but 
destroying  the  military  power  of  Russia  and  compelling  a  separate  peace; 
in  a  word,  adopting  against  Russia  the  strategy  and  purpose  which 
failed  against  France  at  the  Marne. 


220  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


V.    SERBIA  TRIUMPHANT  AGAIN 


While  the  German  advance  from  Lodz  upon  Warsaw  was  going 
forward,  a  fresh  Austrian  disaster  attracted  the  attention  of  the  world. 
As  far  back  as  the  first  days  of  November,  Austria,  hoping  permanent 
relief  from  the  German  operations  toward  Lodz,  had  detached  troops 
to  dispose  of  the  Serbian  nuisance,  which,  since  the  victory  of  the  Jedar, 
had  injured  Austrian  prestige  and  imperilled  Hapsburg  power  in  all  the 
Slav  regions,  but  particularly  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

And  once  more  it  was  reserved  for  Serbia,  prime  cause  of  all  the 
terrible  world  conflict,  to  give  Europe  a  great  surprise,  the  fourth  in  three 
brief  years,  and  to  win  a  shining  and  conspicuous  triumph. 

In  1913,  at  the  outset  of  the  First  Balkan  War — when  Europe  pre- 
serving the  memory  of  Slivnitza,  forecast  Serbian  defeat,  and  the 
invasion  of  Serbia  by  the  Turks  was  prophesied  by  those  most  hopeful 
of  Bulgarian  victory — it  was  the  Serb  and  not  the  Bulgar  who  proved 
irresistible,  invincible,  won  back  Old  Serbia  at  Kumanovo,  Macedonia 
at  Monastir,  and  captured  the  Turkish  Commander  at  Adrianople. 

A  few  months  later,  when  Austria  had  precipitated  the  Second 
Balkan  War  to  destroy  King  Peter's  nation,  it  was  the  Serb  and  not 
the  Bulgar  who  again  prevailed,  and  the  Battle  of  Bregalnitza  as  com- 
pletely shattered  the  legend  of  Bulgarian  invincibility  as  the  reverse 
of  Mars-la-Tour  had  wrecked  that  of  France.  The  victims  of  a  breach 
of  faith,  attacked  by  night  and  without  warning,  without  declaration 
of  war,  the  Serbs  rallied,  took  the  offensive,  sent  the  Bulgars  in  rout 
back  over  the  Rhodopians  and  restored  to  Serbia  the  southern  half  of  the 
empire  of  the  great  Dushan. 

Finally,  in  the  opening  month  of  the  World  War,  when  the  fortune  of 
the  Allies  in  the  west  was  most  desperate,  it  was  the  victory  of  the 
Serb  at  the  Jedar  which  opened  the  more  prosperous  period  that  cul- 
minated at  the  Marne.  At  the  Jedar  four  Austrian  army  corps  had 
been  routed,  Austrian  prestige  in  the  Balkans  shattered,  the  first 
Slav  triumph  won  in  that  long  series  which  by  December  was  to  bring 
Austria  to  the  lowest  ebb  in  her  history  since  the  Hungarian  Revolution. 


WARSAW 


221 


On  December  ist  Serbia  was  once  more  in  the  presence  of  grave 
peril.  The  October  drive  of  Germany  had  released  several  army  corps 
of  Austrians  in  Galicia  and  Poland,  and  these  came  south  to  complete 
the  work  of  destroying  the  troops  of  King  Peter,  who  had  for  months 
defended  their  frontiers.  Before  this  overwhelming  force  the  Serbs 
had  retreated.  All  the  corner  of  Serbia  between  the  Save  and  the  Drina 
was  lost.  Coming  east  from  Bosnia  the  Austrian  right  approached  Bel- 
grad,  which  for  four  months  had  defied  daily  bombardment;  the  centre 


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BBBB  SERBIAN 


SERBIAN  BATTLEFIELDS 

I — The  Jedar,  August,  1914.  In  the  opening  month  of  the  World  War,  when  the  fortune 
of  the  Allies  in  the  west  was  most  desperate,  it  was  the  victory  of  the  Serb  at  the  Jedar  which 
opened  the  more  prosperous  period  which  culminated  at  the  Marne 

II — Valievo,  December,  1914.     One  of  the  most  complete  of  Austrian  disasters 


222  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

reached  Valievo,  the  left  penetrated  to  Uchitza,  on  the  Serbian  Morava. 
Presently  Belgrad  fell,  a  birthday  present  to  the  aged  Francis  Joseph, 
the  only  conquest  of  his  army  in  the  whole  struggle. 

In  the  first  week  in  December  the  fate  of  Serbia  seemed  sealed.  A 
second  Belgium,  another  little  state  destroyed  in  the  contest  between 
the  great,  seemed  assured.  Austrian  armies  appeared  certain  to  reach 
Nish,  the  temporary  Serbian  capital,  to  open  the  Orient  Railway  to  the 
Bulgarian  frontier  and  persuade  Bulgaria,  still  smarting  from  her  defeat 
by  Serbia,  to  cast  her  lot  with  the  two  Kaisers  and  open  her  territory 
for  the  passage  of  the  Turks  to  the  battlelines  of  western  Europe. 

In  the  moment  of  greatest  peril,  however,  Serbia  was  saved — partly 
by  her  own  courage,  by  her  own  determination,  without  which  destruc- 
tion was  inescapable;  partly  by  the  new  advance  of  the  Russians. 
While  the  Austrian  troops  were  still  before  Belgrad,  Cossacks  once  more 
crossed  the  Carpathians,  swept  down  into  the  Hungarian  Plain;  panic 
reached  the  very  gates  of  Budapest,  and  three  army  corps  were  hurriedly 
recalled  from  Serbia  to  defend  Hungary.  Once  more  at  the  critical 
moment  the  Austro-German  Alliance  had  to  surrender  triumph  in  one 
field  because  of  deadly  peril  in  another. 

No  sooner  had  the  three  corps  been  withdrawn  than  the  Serbs  again 
took  the  off'ensive.  Old  King  Peter,  now  stricken  in  years  and  infirmi- 
ties, but  retaining  something  of  the  fire  that  earned  him  his  cross  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour  as  a  soldier  of  France  in  1870,  rode  in  front  of  his  troops, 
mounted  on  a  white  charger,  and  harangued  them  as  their  chiefs  of  re- 
mote centuries  were  accustomed  to  do.  Then  followed  one  of  the 
most  complete  of  Austrian  disasters.  In  a  few  days  the  whole  force 
had  fled  across  the  frontiers,  leaving  thousands  of  prisoners,  many 
cannon,  and  much  material,  behind  them.  Belgrad  was  retaken;  by 
December  15th  Serbia  was  free  of  Austrians,  saved  for  the  time  being; 
saved  until  the  third— and  fatal— attack,  the  Balkan  drive  of  Macken- 
sen  almost  a  year  later. 


CHAPTER  ELEVEN 

NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS 

I 
NEW  YEAR,  1915 

The  New  Year — which  was  to  witness  the  most  brilliant  military 
triumphs  of  Modern  Germany,  triumphs  rivalling  the  Napoleonic  cycle — 
opened  dismally  enough  for  Berlin.  Five  months  of  war  and  a  million 
casualties  had  sufficed  to  complete  the  destruction  of  all  the  initial 
plans  and  hopes  of  Germany.  The  supreme  hope,  that  of  a  short  war, 
had  gone  glimmering  and  Lord  Kitchener's  forecast  of  a  three-year  war 
had  begun  to  find  converts  even  in  Germany.  And  the  prospect  of  a 
long  war  raised  new  problems,  of  which  the  military,  if  it  was  not  the 
most  pressing,  was  by  no  means  the  least. 

In  point  of  fact,  new  political  considerations  were  now  becoming 
apparent.  There  was  the  question  of  Austria,  a  question  at  once  politi- 
cal and  military;  there  was  the  problem  of  Italy,  destined  to  become 
more  and  more  grave  as  the  months  passed  until  the  spring  should  see 
the  House  of  Savoy  again  in  the  field  against  the  House  of  Hapsburg. 
There  was,  too,  the  similar  and  only  less  serious  problem  of  Roumania, 
which  was  not  to  find  so  speedy  a  solution  as  that  of  Italy,  but  was  des- 
tined to  prove  even  more  dangerous  to  German  safety.  There  was  the 
additional  necessity  to  care  for  Turkish  defence,  a  necessity  which  would 
grow  with  the  months  and  become  pressing  in  the  spring,  when  the 
Allied  fleets  knocked  at  the  door  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Allied  armies 
took  root  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula. 

Finally,  the  problem  of  sea  power  was  beginning  to  become  acute. 
A  world  which  too  eagerly  and  too  completely  accepted  the  British 
view  as  to  the  effect  of  the  British  blockade  was  not  completely  mis- 
taken in  recognizing  thus  early  that  the  British  fleet  would  steadily 

and  increasingly  hamper  the  domestic  economy  of  Germany  and  compel 

223 


224  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

her  to  employ  one  expedient  after  another  to  meet  the  shortage 
incident  to  the  blockade.  Only  in  food  did  the  reckoning  prove  radi- 
cally mistaken  and  even  in  this  department  there  was  discomfort,  with- 
out immediate  or  intolerable  privation. 

The  sense  of  this  closing  net,  the  anger  at  the  nation  which  thus 
struck  the  whole  German  people  while  it  remained  removed  from  the 
weight  of  German  arms,  was  to  drive  the  German  Government,  the 
naval  school  of  Tirpitz,  into  a  submarine  campaign  that  would  involve 
neutrals,  and  in  the  case  of  the  greatest  of  all  neutrals,  the  United  States, 
produce  a  situation  which  after  many  clashes  would  at  last  add  the 
United  States  to  the  nations  at  war  with  Germany. 

The  paralysis  of  the  German  merchant  marine;  the  closing  of  the 
seas  to  the  German  flag  while  British,  French,  and  even  Belgian  ships 
still  sailed  the  ocean  and  brought  to  French  and  British  ports  the  muni- 
tions and  supplies  essential  to  preserve  them,  while  their  own  factories 
were  still  unready  and  their  own  industrial  system  not  yet  readjusted; 
the  resources  of  ships  and  sailors,  which  permitted  the  transport  of 
armies;  the  arrival  of  colonial  troops  from  Australia,  Canada,  India, 
which  permitted  the  nations  to  redress  the  balance  which  was  with 
Germany  at  the  outset,  thanks  to  her  superior  preparation;  these  were 
things  that  exercised  an  ever-growing  influence  upon  German  thought 
and  German  action. 

Nor  could  there  be  any  mistaking  the  resentment  in  the  whole 
Fatherland,  as  it  was  recognized  that,  so  far  as  the  world  was  concerned, 
Germany  had  become  a  besieged  city,  and  German  explanations  and 
German  statements,  save  for  the  few  fugitive  messages  sent  through  the 
air,  were  condemned  to  satisfy  German  readers  alone;  while  the  world, 
the  neutral  world  to  which  Germany  desired  to  appeal,  found  its  evi- 
dence and  drew  its  conclusions  from  anti-German  sources  alone. 

II.    THE    MILITARY    PROBLEM 

Looking  first  at  the  military  problem,  it  was  plain  on  January  i, 
1915,  that  German  prospects,  without  being  desperate,  were  dark.  It 
was  true  that  men,  the  world  over,  too  promptly  began  to  compare  the 


NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS    225 

posture  of  Germany  in  19 15  with  that  of  Napoleon  in  18 13.  The  out- 
side world  neither  understood  the  enormous  accession  of  faith  and  con- 
fidence the  restricted  victories  of  the  opening  phase  had  brought  to 
Germans,  and  the  unparalleled  magnitude  of  German  effort  which  was 
to  come,  nor  could  they  realize,  as  the  Germans  did,  how  futile  were 
many  of  the  hopes  in  Allied  quarters  of  the  prompt  arrival  of  Kitchen- 
er's millions  and  the  limitless  flow  of  Russian  masses. 

Yet,  despite  the  exaggerations,  the  fundamental  conception  of  the 
non-Teutonic  world  was  correct.  Germany  had  failed  at  the  Marne  and 
in  her  subsequent  efforts  to  reverse  the  decision  of  the  Marne.  Her 
armies  now  stood  on  the  defensive  in  the  west  and  there  was  no  promise 
that  the  initiative  could  be  reclaimed.  Two  months  of  terrible  slaugh- 
ter before  Warsaw  had  proven  as  sterile  as  the  murder  done  in  the  battles 
of  Flanders.     Warsaw  stood  as  Calais  and  Boulogne  stood. 

Looking  southward  to  Austria  the  picture  was  dismal  in  the  extreme. 
The  defeat  of  Lemberg  had  shaken  the  whole  fabric  of  Hapsburg  mili- 
tary life.  After  Lemberg  the  efforts  of  German  commanders  to  rally 
and  reorganize  Austrian  armies  had  saved  the  armies,  but  it  had  failed 
to  make  them  victorious.  Temporary  Russian  retirements  in  Galicia 
had  again  and  again  been  followed  by  Russian  victories,  and  in  the  last 
days  of  the  year  a  second  Serb  triumph  had  revealed  the  permanent 
disorder  of  Austrian  forces.  The  Russian  armies  were  again  pressing  up 
and  over  the  Carpathians,  and  from  Budapest  came  insistent  demands 
that  Germany  should  guard  the  Magyar  marshes  against  the  Slav  danger. 

Reckoning  on  the  basis  of  country  occupied,  it  was  true  that  Ger- 
many was  now  fighting  in  foreign  lands,  for  the  most  part.  The  East 
Prussian  invasions  had  been  repulsed,  but  not  until  grave  injuries  had 
been  done  to  Junker  estates.  Not  less  than  8,000  square  miles  of  in- 
dustrial France,  holding  in  peace  times  2,000,000  people,  was  occupied, 
as  was  the  bulk  of  Belgium  and  some  15,000  square  miles  of  Russian 
soil.  But,  to  balance  this,  France  clung  to  a  corner  of  Alsace,  Russia 
to  a  paring  of  East  Prussia,  and  Austria  had  lost  in  Galicia  and  Bukowina 
nearly  35,000  square  miles  of  territory  including  the  oil-fields  of  Galicia. 

If  anything  else  were  needed  to  incline  the  balance  toward  the  Allied 


226  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

side,  it  could  be  found  in  the  isolation  and  inevitable  extinction  of  Ger- 
man colonial  power.  Togo  and  the  Kamerun  were  both  lost,  Kiaou- 
Chau  and  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  were  gone.  The  doom  of  German 
Southwest  Africa  had  been  sealed  by  the  failure  of  the  Boer  rebellion, 
and  a  Boer  General,  Louis  Botha,  was  gathering  up  the  troops  which 
would  presently  conquer  it.  German  East  Africa  still  endured,  but 
not  even  a  German  could  believe  that  it  would  permanently  escape  the 
fate  of  the  other  colonies. 

On  the  military  side  Germany  had  now  once  more  to  bend  her  ener- 
gies to  restore  Austria.  She  had  to  reckon  on  the  eventual  demand  of 
the  Turk  for  guns,  and  men  to  man  them.  The  chance  of  a  resumption 
of  the  offensive  in  the  west  in  the  spring  was  already  fading,  but  the 
failure  meant  more  time  for  France  and  Britain,  aided  by  the  workshops 
of  America,  to  restore  the  balance  in  numbers  and  preparation.  The 
story  of  how  Germany  met  the  military  problems  is  one  of  the  most 
magnificent  in  military  and  industrial  history.  Unfortunately  for  her, 
the  political  problems  were  beyond  her  capacity — beyond  all  human 
capacity,  probably — and,  as  it  turned  out,  her  military  successes  could 
only  in  part  postpone  the  political  perils  that  were  now  revealed. 

III.    ITALY 

Of  all  the  political  problems,  that  of  Italy  was  the  most  dangerous. 
Count  Nigra  had  once  said  that  Italy  and  Austria,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  could  only  be  allies  or  open  enemies.  The  Triple  Alliance  had 
been  denounced  by  Italy  in  the  opening  days  of  the  war.  With  the 
denunciation  of  the  fact  of  the  Treaty,  although  the  letter  endured  for 
some  months  thereafter,  Italian  hopes  turned  again  to  the  Irredenta,  and 
the  Italian  people,  far  more  promptly  than  the  Crown  or  the  politicians, 
began  to  clamour  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Trentino  and  Triest,  of  the 
islands  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  lost  Venetian  province  of  Dalmatia, 
still  adorned  by  some  of  the  most  splendid  monuments  of  Ancient  Rome. 

Such  an  agitation  could  have  but  one  consequence  unless  Austria 
were  prepared  to  resign  Triest  and  the  Trentino,  and  Austria  was  not 
prepared  for  any  such  sacrifice.     Under  the  influence  of  Germany  she 


NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS    227 

tardily,  very  tardily,  consented  to  certain  cessions,  but  they  were  too 
slight  to  satisfy  Italian  demand.  Bismarck,  in  refusing  to  allow  his 
ally  of  1866  to  acquire  Trent,  had  sown  the  seeds  of  later  disaster,  and 
almost  from  the  morning  of  the  war  it  was  clear  that  Italy  would  even- 
tually enter  the  alliance  against  Germany. 

Turkish  participation  merely  increased  Italian  agitation  for  war, 


ITALIA  IRREDENTA 

As  soon  as  the  Triple  Alliance  was  denounced,  Italian  hopes  turned  to  the  Irredenta,  and 
the  Italian  people  began  to  clamour  for  the  acquisition  of  the  Trentino  and  Triest 

because  the  alliance  of  the  Turk  with  the  Central  Powers,  besides  re- 
opening the  Tripolitan  question,  assured  the  latter  of  supremacy  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean,  where  Italy  had  great  ambitions,  all  of  which 
ran  counter  to  those  of  Berlin  and  Vienna  but  found  ready  hearing  and 
small  opposition  in  Allied  capitals.  It  was  a  desirable  thing  for  Italy 
that  Germany  and  Austria  should  be  beaten.  It  would  be  a  fatal 
thing  for  many  Italian  hopes  if  they  won. 

Nor  was  it  less  essential  that  Italy  should  contribute  to  the  defeat  of 


228  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Central  Powers,  if  she  was  to  share  in  the  results.  There  were  in 
Greece  and  Serbia  eager  aspirants  for  the  eastern  shores  of  the  Adriatic 
and  the  islands  and  shores  of  Asia  Minor.  The  noise  of  Allied  fleets 
before  the  Dardanelles  forts  presently  awoke  echoes  in  Rome  that  Ger- 
man diplomacy  could  not  silence.  The  hereditary  antipathy  to  the  Aus- 
trian and  the  longing  for  Triest  mounted  with  the  weeks  until  they 
reached  a  point  in  popular  emotion  where  Prince  Biilow  grimly  conceded 
that  "the  street"  had  won;  and  Italy,  despite  the  fears  of  her  Sovereign 
and  the  opposition  of  Giolitti,  her  most  influential  politician,  was 
plunged  into  the  world  strife. 

We  shall  see  that  the  decision  came  too  late  to  prevent  the  German 
victory  of  the  Dunajec,  which  transformed  the  whole  face  of  the  eastern 
war  for  a  year.  We  shall  see  that  Italian  hesitations,  taken  with  Allied 
blunders  in  the  Balkans,  combined  to  clear  the  way  for  the  great  drive 
through  Serbia  to  Constantinople.  But  also,  at  a  still  more  distant 
time,  we  shall  see  Italy  sending  her  troops  to  Saloniki,  as  she  had  sent 
them  to  Valona,  before  she  entered  the  war.  We  shall  see  her,  at  a 
critical  moment,  extending  her  declaration  of  war  to  include  Germany. 

But  in  January,  1915,  the  Italian  danger  was  only  apparent,  it  was 
not  yet  imminent,  and  Berlin  could  believe  for  many  months  that  Italy 
would  remain  neutral.  To  this  end  she  exerted  all  her  efi^orts,  and  it  was 
with  an  eye  to  the  moral  effect  in  Rome  that  she  prepared  the  greatest 
of  her  victories,  the  Dunajec,  which,  unhappily  for  her,  came  just  too 
late  to  check  Italy's  course,  although  it  did  avail  to  restrict  the  influence 
of  Italy  in  the  war  for  nearly  a  year.  Fatally,  however,  the  prospect 
of  a  long  war  was  beginning  to  weigh  upon  Berlin,  for  if  a  swift  victory 
such  as  those  of  1866  and  1870  might  have  left  the  neutrals  still  recon- 
ciled to  their  roles,  a  long  war  held  out  attractions  to  their  racial  and 
national  hopes  which  could  not  be  mistaken. 

IV.   ROUMANIA 

Not  less  real  than  the  Italian  was  the  Roumanian  danger.  Within 
Austrian  and  Hungarian  frontiers  there  lived  more  than  3,250,000  people 
of  Roumanian  tongue  and  race.     They  were  a  majority  in  the  great 


NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS    229 

Hungarian  province  of  Transylvania;  the  largest  group  amongst  the 
many  races  in  numbers  in  Temesvar;  a  considerable  element  in  Buko- 
wina.  All  these  provinces  touched  the  Roumanian  frontier.  In  every 
Roumanian  heart  there  had  been  for  many  years  a  desire  to  achieve  the 
re-union  of  Roumania,  as  that  of  Italy  had  been  achieved  in  the  previous 
century.  Could  the  Austrian  provinces  be  won,  Roumania  would  be- 
come a  compact  state  of  nearly  100,000  square  miles,  as  large  as  the 
mainland  of  Italy;  if  not  a  Great  Power,  second  only  to  Spain  among  the 
lesser  nations  of  Europe. 

Such  hopes  had  seemed  impossible  of  realization  until  the  Second 
Balkan  War  first  revealed  the  weakness  of  Austrian  policy  and  the 
crumbling  of  the  Hapsburg  edifice.  Until  that  time  Roumania  had,  per- 
force, consented  to  remain  a  minor  member  of  the  firm  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and,  as  Italy  had  been  drawn  to  Berlin  by  the  quarrel  with 
France  over  Tunis,  Roumania  had  been  influenced  in  the  same  sense  by 
the  gross  injustice  and  ingratitude  of  Russia  after  the  Turkish  War. 
In  that  conflict  Roumanian  troops  had  saved  the  Russian  army  at  Plevna, 
but  Russia  had  robbed  Roumania  of  her  portion  of  Bessarabia  and  flung 
her  a  morsel  of  the  Bulgarian  Dobrudja  as  an  insufficient  recompense. 

Ruled  by  a  Hohenzollern,  who  in  the  opening  days  of  the  World 
War  sought  to  cast  the  lot  of  his  country  with  the  head  of  his  House, 
Roumania  had  marched  with  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome — held  not  a  little 
by  the  presence  of  Italy  in  the  partnership,  which  enlisted  the  Rou- 
manian tradition  of  Latin  origin — from  the  era  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin 
to  the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  wars.  But  when  Austria,  eager  to  crush 
Serbia,  had  given  her  support  to  the  creation  of  a  Bulgaria  even  greater 
than  that  which  had  been  erected  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  and  abol- 
ished by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Roumanian  allegiance  faltered. 

Bulgaria  was  the  rival  of  Roumania  in  the  Balkans  and  had  openly 
declared  her  purpose  to  reclaim  the  Dobrudja.  Bulgarian  plans  looked 
forward  to  achieving  a  hegemony  in  the  Balkans  comparable  to  that 
which  Prussia  had  achieved  in  Modern  Germany.  To  all  such  plans 
Roumania  was  necessarily  hostile,  because  they  both  threatened  her 
integrity  and  menaced  her  influence.     When  Austria  sacrificed  Bukhar- 


230  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

est  for  Sofia,  Bukharest  openly  altered  her  policy;  accepted  Russian 
warrant  for  attacking  Bulgaria;  and,  by  her  attack  in  1913,  completely 
demolished  the  whole  structure  of  Austrian  statecraft.  Moreover,  the 
Roumanian  soldiers  who  invaded  Bulgaria  openly  announced  that  they 
were  taking  this  route  to  Transylvania  and  Bukowina. 

Once  the  breach  had  been  made,  the  consequences  were  inevitable. 
Roumania  followed  Italy  in  declaring  her  neutrality  when  the  war  came, 
despite  the  desire  of  the  King,  whose  subsequent  death  soon  removed  a 
Teutonic  ally  not  less  potent  than  Constantine  of  Greece.  When  Ital- 
ian policy  began  to  drift  toward  the  Allies,  Roumania  tacitly  followed. 
More  and  more  Roumanians  looked  over  the  Hungarian  boundaries 
to  where,  beyond  the  Transylvanian  Alps,  millions  of  their  race  broth- 
ers suffered  something  approaching  intellectual  and  moral  slavery  under 
the  Magyar  yoke. 

When  the  first  Russian  victories  brought  the  Slav  to  the  Roumanian 
boundaries  of  Bukowina  and  even  across  the  Carpathians  into  the  Hun- 
garian Plain,  Roumanian  patriots  and  politicians  listened  eagerly  to 
Russian  promises,  based  upon  Roumanian  participation.  Only  Russian 
disaster  could  abolish  or  postpone  such  participation.  Had  Russian  di- 
plomacy been  a  httle  less  stiff  or  Roumanian  demands  a  little  less  grandi- 
ose, Roumania  might  have  followed  Italy  at  once.  As  it  was,  the  Dunajec 
postponed  what  it  could  not  prevent.  At  Bukharest,  as  at  Rome, 
German  diplomacy  was  to  perform  miracles,  but  the  ultimate  failure 
was  already  assured,  short  of  German  victory  in  the  war,  when  1915 
began. 

v.    AUSTRIA 

The  military  side  of  the  Austrian  problem  was  plain.  But  the 
political  aspects  were  not  less  patent  to  Berlin.  Half  of  the  Austrian 
population  was  Slav.  In  the  opening  battles  Czech,  Croat,  Serb,  and 
even  Polish  regiments  fought  with  something  less  than  half-hearted 
zeal.  The  Italians  from  Triest  and  the  Trentino,  the  Roumanians  from 
Transylvania  and  Temesvar,  easUy  succumbed  to  the  assault  of  enemies 
a  degree  less  hateful  to  them  than  the  races  whose  yoke  they  bore.  The 
vast  Russian  captures  after  Lemberg,  the  Serbian  disasters,  the  later 


PICTURES  OF  TRENCH 
WARFARE 


GERMAN  SHELTERS  UF  SANDBACS,  IN  THE  UUNES  ALONG 
THE  BELGIAN  COAST 


— ^-An 


i   h/ 


yj 


RELAI    K. 

J    s>4  D£       F. 

f^'"^  COtJRElifiSJ       /^ 

1^  S?-«^^  -^  .S!JW..'/«k^i»^>-    ^?:!^E^ 


THE  ELABORATION  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 

A  typical  trench  on  the  western  front,  braced  to  prevent  caving  in,  with  the  usual  boardwalk  and  the 
numerous  telephone  and  telegraph  lines  needed  in  a  modern  communication  system.  The  shell  case,  hang- 
ing from  the  cross  beam,  is  struck  when  a  gas  attack  is  discovered,  as  a  warning  to  all  within  hearing  to  put 
on  masks.  The  inset  shows  an  underground  telephone  e.xchange  which  is  part  ot  the  system  of  communi- 
cation between  the  front  lines  and  headquarters  in  the  rear. 


AN  OBSERVATION  STATION 

These  are  placed  in  buildings,  trees,  shell  craters,  etc.— wherever  the  observer  can  see  the  effect  of  his 
batteries  fire.  Telephone  communication  back  to  the  gun  is  arranged  and  the  observer  then  reports  as  to 
the  ranue,  the  movements  of  his  OYi^n  and  the  enemy's  infantry,  etc. 


AN  UNDERGROUND  PASSAGE  DUG  BY  THE  AUSTRIANS  AT  DUBUS,  RUSSIA,  WITH  AN  OUTLET 

IN  A  CHURCH 


•■£ 


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ac'- 


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Ct5       ■•5. 

<    -3  g 


5?  -g. 


A  LIGHT  GUN   Kl.AlioR  \  |  |,|,Y   I.M  RKNCHF.D 

Note  the  curtains  which  are  closely  drawn  when  there  is  danger  of  aerial  observation.  These  guns 
are  used  to  cut  wire  entanglements,  destroy  parapets,  silence  enemy  artillery,  and  for  barrage  fire  either  with 
or  without  gas  shells. 


BKLGI.^NS  ENTRENCHED  OUTSIDE  ANTWERP 

In  this  final  stand  ot  Belgian  patriotism  against  the  German  invaders  there  is  a  strong  appeal  to  Anier- 
'can  admiration.  lor  a  nation  whose  own  history  begins  at  Lexington,  the  resistance  of  the  weak  to  the 
strong,  the  defense  of  liberty  by  the  few  against  the  nianv  at  the  cost  of  all  that  men  hold  dear,  is  a  moving 
spectacle. 


UNDERGROUND  WITH  THE  BRITISH 

(Above)     King  George  inspects  a  trench  won  from  the  Germans. 

(Belmv)     These  British  Red  Cross  Officers  have  "dug  themselves  in"  very  comfortably  and  are  just 
sittmg  down  to  dinner.     Cave  life  is  not  always  incompatible  with  good  cheer. 


NEW  HORIZONS  AND  NEW  GERMAN  PROBLEMS    239 

Galician  defeats,  were  all  due  in  some  part  to  the  failure  of  the  subject 
races  of  Austria  and  Hungary. 

Yet  it  was  of  prime  importance  to  prevent  this  disintegration  from 
spreading,  because  every  evidence  of  crumbling  was  but  a  new  incentive 
to  Roumanian  and  Italian  appetite,  and  every  Austrian  disaster  had  an 
echo  in  Bukharest  and  in  Rome  which  no  one  could  mistake.  It  was 
not  alone  that  the  crumbling  of  Austria  weakened  the  Central  Alliance 
directly,  but  it  was  also  that  each  new  crack,  each  fissure,  in  the  Aus- 
trian unity  was  a  new  invitation  to  other  nations  to  enlist  and  add  their 
numbers  and  resources  to  the  enemies  of  Germany. 

Napoleon  faced  the  same  problem  in  18 13,  when  he  lingered  in 
eastern  Germany,  because  he  realized  that  a  retreat  behind  the  Rhine 
would  mean  that  his  German  allies  would,  either  from  desire  or  neces- 
sity, enter  the  ranks  of  his  foes ;  as  they  did,  when,  at  last,  after  the  dis- 
aster at  Leipzig,  he  was  compelled  to  retire  behind  the  old  frontiers. 
More  than  all  else  this  political  situation  forced  itself  to  German  atten- 
tion in  the  shaping  of  the  campaigns  of  1915.  It  compelled  the  aban- 
donment of  the  west,  quite  as  much  as  any  military  consideration. 
It  compelled  Germany  to  allow  to  Britain  the  time  to  begin  to  get  her 
masses  In  the  field,  and  it  held  Germany  in  the  east  until  February,  1916. 

More  and  more  it  became  clear  that,  while  Germany  continued  to 
win  victories,  she  could  count  on  the  neutrality  of  Roumania  and  the 
annoying  rather  than  dangerous  hostilities  of  Italy.  But  only  in  vic- 
tory was  there  safety.  On  the  military  side,  the  Austrian  armies  would 
take  on  new  efficiency  when  a  German  general  and  German  artillery 
had  won  the  Dunajec,  and  the  great  Russian  retreat  from  the  Carpathi- 
ans to  the  Beresina  began.  But  once  the  Russian  counter-offensive 
came,  Austrian  armies  would  crumble  in  a  new  disaster  comparable 
to  that  of  Lemberg  and  having  more  immediately  unfavourable  conse- 
quences. 

More  and  more  Austria  became  a  burden,  a  deadweight  upon  Ger- 
man military  and  civil  policy.  Less  and  less  useful  became  Austrian 
military  assistance,  and  greater  and  greater  became  the  share  of  Ger- 
many in  the  work  of  the  Alliance.     But  In  addition  to  this  was  the  posi- 


240  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tive  peril  that  grew  out  of  the  long-standing  enmities  Austrian  policy 
had  engendered  or  out  of  the  weaknesses  inherent  in  the  heterogeneous 
nature  of  Hapsburg  populations,  weaknesses  that  at  one  time  contri- 
buted to  the  breakdown  of  the  Austrian  army  and  to  the  growth  of  the 
number  of  nations  at  war  with  Germany. 

All  this  is  clearer  now  than  at  the  moment — yet  little  was  hidden 
from  German  eyes — when  the  Kaiser's  Ministers,  with  the  opening  of 
the  new  year,  took  up  the  problems  of  a  long  war  and  were  compelled 
to  estimate  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  their  new  undertaking.  These 
influenced  the  military  situation;  they  compelled  strategy  to  bow  before 
considerations  of  state;  they  forced  the  Germans  to  make  their  main 
effort  in  the  east;  and,  even  at  this  early  date,  they  made  clear  the 
consequences  of  immediate  or  eventual  failure  either  in  the  east  or  the 
west.  From  the  task  of  destroying  France,  Germany  was  now  defi- 
nitely recalled  to  devote  her  best  skill  to  the  salvage  of  Austria. 


CHAPTER  TWELVE 

ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  DUNAJEC 

I 

IN  THE  CAUCASUS 

The  first  days  of  January  saw  a  considerable  Turkish  disaster  on  the 
Russian  frontier  in  the  Caucasus.  Into  this  difficult  region,  where 
campaigning  was  made  the  more  difficult  by  the  severity  of  the  winter, 
the  Turks  had,  in  obedience  to  German  dictation,  sent  several  of  their 
best  corps.  The  ostensible  purpose  was  to  recover  the  famous  fortress 
of  Kars,  lost  after  a  gallant  defence  in  the  last  Russian  war.  But, 
in  fact,  Kars  had  small  value  for  the  Turks.  The  real  purpose  of  their 
effort  was  to  compel  the  Russians  to  divert  troops  to  this  front  from  the 
Austrian  frontier  and  thus  take  off  some  of  the  pressure  upon  their 
hard-pressed  German  ally. 

For  the  Turk  there  were  much  more  pressing  services  to  be  per- 
formed near  at  hand.  His  entrance  into  the  war  had  cost  him  the  last, 
shadowy  title  to  his  ancient  Egyptian  estate,  and  the  friendly  Khedive 
had  lost  his  throne.  Britain  had  proclaimed  a  protectorate  and  placed 
an  Anglophile  ruler  on  the  Khedivial  throne,  thus  completing  the  work 
of  making  good  her  position  in  Egypt,  recognized  by  France  in  the 
famous  and  fatal  agreement  of  1904.  To  Suez  and  to  Cairo  and  to  the 
lost  African  provinces,  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  opportunity  seemed  to  beckon 
the  Osmanli  along  the  road  that  his  Arab  predecessors  of  the  Caliphate 
had  marched. 

That  such  a  venture  might  have  succeeded  seemed  and  seems  pos- 
sible. Britain  still  lacked  the  men  to  defend  Egypt;  the  native  troops 
were  at  least  cold  to  their  Christian  masters,  if  they  were  not  disloyal. 
Time  had  not  been  allowed  for  the  fortification  of  the  shores  of  the 
Suez  Canal,  which,  less  than  a  year  after,  were  to  face  and  master  a 
Turkish  attack.     Could  Suez  have  been  reached,  and  the  canal  blocked, 

241 


242  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  injury  to  Britain  would  have  been  great,  although  by  no  means  as 
considerable  as  German  military  writers  announced  a  year  later,  when 
the  road  from  Berlin  to  Byzantium  had  been  opened  and  Germany  found 
a  Teutonic  purpose  to  be  served  by  OsmanU  effort  at  Suez. 

German  control  of  Turkish  military  policy  was,  however,  complete, 
and  while  the  proclamation  of  the  Holy  War  was  still  stirring  the 
imagination  of  the  world,  even  if  it  fell  flat  in  Islam,  beyond  the  immedi- 
ate territories  of  the  Turk;  while  the  world  was  looking  for  revolts  in  India 
and  Egypt,  in  Tripoli  and  Tunis;  while  it  was  expecting  Turkish  attack 
at  Suez,  several  Turkish  corps  were  making  the  difficult  advance  from 
Erzerum  toward  Kars,  and  the  Russian  troops,  heavily  outnumbered, 
were  falling  back  into  the  Caucasian  marshes,  south  and  east  of  Batum 
and  Trebizond. 

In  this  difficult  country,  suffering  from  insufficient  equipment  and 
from  the  rigours  of  a  terrible  winter,  the  Turks,  after  brief  preliminary 
successes,  met  complete  disaster.  Of  three  corps,  one,  with  its  Turkish 
and  German  officers,  was  captured.  Two  more,  striving  to  cover  the 
retreat,  were  heavily  beaten,  losing  flags,  guns,  and  prisoners.  Not  less 
than  100,000  Turkish  troops  were  thus  eliminated  from  the  battleline, 
and  German  prestige  suffered  its  first  heavy  blow  in  Constantinople, 
a  blow  from  which  it  did  not  recover  until  the  successful  defence  of  the 
city  a  few  months  later. 

From  this  moment  and  for  more  than  a  year  the  Caucasus  front  loses 
its  importance.  The  subsequent  changes  in  position  were  not  consider- 
able. The  Russians  did  not  bring  many  troops  east  from  the  Galician 
front ;  the  German  purpose  was  not  served  by  the  Turkish  effort.  But 
when,  in  the  next  winter,  the  Russians  were  ready  to  move  in  this 
Armenian  district,  the  fall,  first  of  Erzerum  and  then  of  Trebizond,  to 
the  sword  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  gave  the  world  the  first  hint 
of  the  renaissance  of  Russian  military  strength,  so  shaken  at  the  Duna- 
jec  and  after. 

II.    LAYING  THE  ROUMANIAN  PERIL 

In  December  and  early  January  Austrian  disaster  had  for  the  second 
time  led  the  world  to  believe  that  a  collapse  of  the  Dual  Empire  might 


ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  243 

presently  change  the  whole  face  of  the  conflict.  While  Russian  armies 
again  passed  the  central  and  eastern  Carpathian  passes,  other  forces 
swept  Bukowina  and  approached  Transylvania.  The  occupation  of 
the  Crownland  was  a  fair  invitation  to  Roumania  to  join  the  conflict 
on  the  Russian  side  and  receive  Bukowina  as  a  bribe  and  Transylvania 
as  a  reward  for  participation. 

For  Germany  the  problem  was  promptly  set  to  protect  Hungary, 
grown  impatient  through  disaster  and  anxious  because  of  impending 
attack  from  Serbia,  from  Galicia  and  Bukowina,  and  because  of  the 
possibility  of  Roumanian  hostility.  The  resignation  of  Count  Berchtold 
and  the  selection  of  Baron  Burian  were  evidences  that,  within  the  em- 
pire, Hungarian  apprehensions  were  recognized.  The  visit  of  Count 
Tisza  to  the  Kaiser  was  a  sign  that  Germany  had  been  warned. 

This  warning  Germany  received  with  all  possible  attention  and  acted 
upon  with  amazing  promptness.  Thus  in  January,  while  the  Russian 
occupation  of  Transylvania  was  being  discussed,  German  troops  were 
brought  south  and  concentrated  in  lower  Hungary.  Their  purpose, 
it  was  duly  announced  from  Vienna  and  Berlin,  was  a  new  invasion  of 
victorious  but  stricken  Serbia.  Yet  a  few  weeks  later  these  troops  ap- 
peared in  Transylvania,  and  moved  east,  parallel  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  as  a  warning  to  the  Hohenzollern  king  of  this  state  that,  to 
take  Transylvania,  he  must  fight  the  head  of  the  House  of  Hohenzollern. 

Under  the  pressure  of  these  troops,  Russian  armies  In  Bukowina 
speedily  began  to  give  ground.  Like  the  Shenandoah  Valley  in  our 
Civil  War,  Bukowina  was  becoming  a  thoroughfare  of  invasion  and  a 
pathway  of  destruction.  Step  by  step  they  were  driven  from  before 
the  Borgo  and  Kirilibaba  passes;  they  were  cleared  out  of  the  foothills 
of  the  Carpathians,  and  by  the  middle  of  February  their  retreat  had 
halted  at  the  Sereth  River,  a  few  miles  south  and  west  of  Czernowitz 
and  the  Russian  frontier;  more  than  two  thirds  of  Bukowina  had  been 
reconquered,  and  the  Germans  had  Interposed  a  wall  of  troops  between 
the  Czar  and  his  prospective  Roumanian  ally. 

At  the  same  time  there  came  from  Budapest  new  rumours  of  Russian 
disaster,  of  the  suicide  of  a  Russian  commander,  and  the  capture  of  the 


244  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

General  Staff  of  the  defeated  army.  These  rumours  were  duly  denied, 
but  there  remained  the  solid  fact  that  Bukowina  had  been  reconquered; 
the  invitation  to  Roumania  to  participate  in  the  war  had  been  abruptly 
cancelled  by  German  arms,  and  from  Bukharest  there  came  no  more 
reports  of  the  intervention  of  the  Latin  state  without  delay.  On  the 
contrary,  there  were  credible  reports  of  the  release  of  vast  stores  of 
grain  previously  purchased  by  Germany  and  Austria,  temporarily  held 
up  by  the  Roumanian  Government,  but  now  permitted  to  go  north.  A 
military  campaign  waged  for  obvious  political  ends  had  succeeded. 

Nor  did  the  quieting  of  Roumania  end  the  success  of  German  policy. 
A  German  loan  to  Bulgaria  again  stimulated  rumour  that  Ferdinand  and 
his  Bulgarian  subjects  were  contemplating  an  entrance  into  the  war 
on  the  German  side,  were  planning  to  retake  Macedonia,  to  strike  at 
Serbia  and  Greece,  and,  by  cutting  the  Orient  Railway,  shut  off  the 
Slav  state  from  Saloniki  and  foreign  supplies,  and,  by  invading  the 
Valley  of  the  Morava,  open  a  road  between  Berlin  and  Constantinople 
and  thus  unite  the  Central  European  nations.  This  rumour,  however  idle 
at  the  moment,  supplied  an  interesting  forecast  of  what  was  to  come, 
and  gave  Allied  diplomacy  a  warning  which  it  stupidly  failed  to  take. 

Finally,  from  Albania  came  a  fresh  incursion  into  Serbia  along  the 
marches  of  the  Drina,  directed  at  Prisrend  and  the  territory  still  popu- 
lated by  Albanians  but  ceded  to  Servia  and  Montenegro  by  the  Treaty 
of  London.  Here  was  new  work  for  the  Serbian  army,  calculated  to 
keep  it  occupied,  south  of  the  Danube  and  away  from  Bosnia,  until 
Germany  had  dealt  with  Russian  activity  in  the  southeast. 

Such,  briefly  summarized,  were  the  purpose  and  achievement  of  Ger- 
man arms  in  Bukowina.  Thus  promptly  and  completely  had  the  Kaiser 
answered  the  appeal  for  help  made  a  few  weeks  before ;  thus  had  he  justified 
the  affection  and  esteem  in  which  he  had  long  been  held  by  the  Hungari- 
ans, and  temporarily  silenced  the  whispers  of  discontent  in  Budapest. 

HI.    THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MASURIAN  LAKES 

To  answer  the  Austro-German  thrust  through  Bukowina  and  over 
the  Carpathians,  the  Russians  chose  to  strike  at  East  Prussia.     Strateg- 


ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  245 

ically  such  a  move  was  advantageous  because  it  meant  moving  troops 
a  far  shorter  distance  away  from  Warsaw,  which  remained  the  centre 
of  miHtary  operations  in  the  whole  eastern  front.  Practically,  could 
East  Prussia  be  overrun,  the  whole  Russian  front  would  be  straight- 
ened; a  great  province,  a  source  of  food  supply  to  Germany,  would  be 
conquered;  and,  ultimately,  the  German  position  between  the  Bzura 
and  the  Nida  in  Russian  Poland  would  be  exposed  to  attack  in  the 
flank  and  rear. 

Thus,  while  the  main  Russian  and  German  armies  faced  each  other 
west  of  Warsaw  on  the  lines  they  had  taken  when  Hindenburg's  great 
offensive  against  the  Polish  capital  had  been  halted  in  December,  new 
armies  were  directed  against  the  German  positions  north  of  the  Vistula 
and  south  of  the  Niemen,  on  a  front  from  Tilsit  to  Johannisberg,  while 
another  force  moved  down  the  north  bank  of  the  Vistula  toward  Thorn. 

Again,  as  in  the  case  of  Tannenberg,  the  geographical  circumstances 
explain  the  military  operations.  Inside  the  eastern  frontier  of  East 
Prussia  some  fifty  miles  there  extends  from  north  to  south,  between 
Insterburg  and  Johannisberg,  that  intricate  tangle  of  water  known  as 
the  Masurian  Lakes,  out  of  which  flows  the  Angerapp  River,  which 
joins  the  Inster  at  Insterburg  to  make  the  Pregel,  a  stream  that  enters 
the  sea  at  Konigsberg.  West  of  this  region  Samsonoff  had  suffered  his 
great  disaster  in  September  at  Tannenberg.  To  this  obstacle  the  Rus- 
sians had  returned  in  October  after  defeating  a  German  invasion  of 
Suwalki  Province  at  the  Battle  of  Augustovo. 

For  three  months  Russian  and  German  forces  had  faced  each  other 
in  this  region  with  little  or  no  change  of  position.  Now  the  Russians 
undertook  to  turn  the  Germans  out  of  their  strong  position  behind  the 
Masurian  Lakes  by  attacking  from  the  north  and  south;  that  is,  by 
coming  in  on  the  flanks.  At  the  outset  this  move  met  with  apparent 
success.  Coming  west  on  the  solid  ground  between  the  Niemen  and 
the  Angerapp  rivers,  the  Russians  approached  Tilsit,  took  Pilkallen, 
began  to  talk  again  of  a  siege  of  Konigsberg.  At  the  same  time,  to  the 
south  of  the  Masurian  region,  between  the  East  Prussian  frontier  and 
the  Vistula,  they  made  headway  toward  Thorn. 


246 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


In  the  first  week  in  February,  however,  Hindenburg  countered  with 
terrific  force.  The  first  sign  was  a  renewal  of  the  German  offensive 
south  of  the  Vistula  and  along  the  Bzura-Rawka  front.  On  this  line  the 
Germans  began  a  series  of  desperate  assaults,  which  were  announced 
as  a  new  drive  at  Warsaw.     Petrograd  proclaimed  the  slaughter  in  these 


BAL'^ 

__^3kMemel 

*       \ 

^IC     SEA           ^=^i\*\ 

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\        'V.«^             HI  EMEU                     \ 

^V^^'V^^^'^' '                  OMariampol(                    /          \ 
\  /.SJ^umbinnen              ^*v      ^— — -^^^             /             \ 
y^  /        NKaluari3oV»i,X          f       v^   /              \ 

^denigsberg         |„ 

^_^ 

V_^-Danzigh 

s'g^^^y.         (fSuwalki                   r-^    y                         \ 

^ 

iir^^y~^^    \ossowiec          /       •v^^S5>'*^^'''''^ 

?^ 

/\J'                 '        Mlawatl                Oslrolenka 

/-^ — V        ("TtoT^T^  \JBielostok,,__— --^''''^ 

/          lomzha         "~o/                  *^   / 

• 

^\^                                                   VPultusk,^-^  , 

,,,jjj\^-^           V — -/__                 y 

\                   tow  ia  (-,_____„„, — — -'\\       "^ 

\ o-'"^                                \?prest  Litovsk 

THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MASURIAN  LAKES 

Seven  months  after  the  war  had  broken  out  German  soil  was  practically  free  of  Russians. 
Line  A-B  shows  the  Russian  front  before  the  battle.     The  arrows  show  the  lines  of  the  Rus- 
sian retreat 

fights  the  greatest  in  the  whole  war,  and  there  were  circumstantial 
reports  that  the  Kaiser  himself  had  been  shocked  by  the  sacrifice  of 
life  in  a  forlorn  undertaking. 

By  the  second  week  in  this  month,  however,  the  truth  became  ap- 
parent. The  German  attacks  had  been  mere  screening  movements  to 
cover  the  withdrawal  of  troops  from  this  front  to  East  Prussia,  and 


ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  247 

very  soon  Petrograd  began  to  concede  defeat  and  retreat  in  East 
Prussia,  while  Berlin  announced  a  second  Tannenberg  and  the  capture  of 
40,000  Russians.  In  any  event,  it  was  clear  that  by  the  use  of  auto- 
mobiles, by  again  employing  the  strategic  railways  along  the  East  Prus- 
sian frontier,  the  Germans  had  rushed  overwhelming  forces  into  East 
Prussia,  beaten  the  Russian  flanking  force  between  the  Niemen  and 
the  Angerapp  and  completely  redeemed  East  Prussia,  save  for  a  little 
corner  about  Lyck. 

By  February  15th  German  troops  were  advancing  eastward  all  along 
the  front  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Niemen,  were  across  the  Russian  fron- 
tier in  many  places,  and  were  still  driving  the  Russians  back  toward 
their  fortresses  of  Kovno,  Grodno,  Bielostok,  and  Ostrolenka;  that  is, 
behind  the  Niemen  and  the  Narew.  Seven  months  after  the  war  had 
broken  out  German  soil  was  practically  free  of  Russians,  and  from  the 
Roumanian  frontier  to  the  Baltic  German  troops,  with  the  support  of 
their  Austro-Hungarian  allies,  were  advancing.  Their  success  in  East 
Prussia  was  to  tempt  them  to  one  more  bid  for  Warsaw,  from  the  north, 
but  this  failed,  like  the  others.  The  road  to  Warsaw  ran  neither  through 
East  Pjussia  nor  northern  Poland. 


IV.    PRZEMYSL 


The  disaster  of  the  Masurian  Lakes,  which  divided  the  attention  of 
the  world  with  the  Allied  naval  operations  just  beginning  before  the 
Dardanelles,  was  counterbalanced  in  the  following  month  by  the  Russian 
capture  of  Przemysl  on  March  22d.  Invested  for  a  moment  in  Septem- 
ber, relieved  when  Hindenburg  made  his  first  drive  for  Warsaw,  and 
promptly  surrounded  again  when  the  Russians  resumed  the  road  to 
Cracow  before  the  Battle  of  Lodz,  Przemysl  had  been  shut  in  ever  since. 
Its  surrender  was  one  of  the  most  spectacular  incidents  in  the  war  and  it 
did  much,  temporarily,  to  destroy  the  effect  of  recent  Russian  reverses  and 
checks.  Since  Bazaine  had  laid  down  his  arms  in  Metz  four  decades 
before,  Europe  had  seen  no  such  capitulation,  and  Russian  estimates 
placed  the  number  of  captives  at  130,000. 

Before  his  surrender,  the  Austrian  commander.  General  Kusmanek, 


248  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

had  destroyed  all  the  forts,  blown  up  the  bridges,  turned  the  rifles  and 
cannon  into  useless  junk.  But  this  diminished  the  material  rather  than 
the  moral  efifect  of  the  victory.  Actually  the  last  considerable  fortress  of 
Galicia,  east  of  the  Dunajec  and  north  of  the  Carpathians,  had  now  fallen. 
As  for  the  numbers  of  prisoners,  they  astonished  the  whole  world  and 
explained  a  surrender  which  took  the  Russians  by  surprise.  Like 
Metz,  Przemysl  had  fallen  to  hunger,  and,  like  the  Lorraine  fortress,  it 
had  fallen  because  it  was  provisioned  to  hold  a  garrison,  not  a  host. 

The  siege  itself  had  been  marked  by  no  considerable  military  effort. 
The  Russians  had  merely  invested  the  place  and  sat  down  before  it.  A 
few  brief  attacks  had  demonstrated  that  it  was  beyond  the  resources  of 
their  artillery  train.  Now  and  again  there  had  been  sorties;  a  desperate 
effort  by  Hungarian  troops  just  preceded  the  surrender.  Several  at- 
tempts on  the  part  of  the  Germans  and  Austrians  to  relieve  it  had  come 
close  to  success,  but  ultimately  failed.     Time  and  hunger  did  the  rest. 

In  the  closing  days  of  the  siege,  cats  and  dogs  had  sold  for  prices  re- 
calling the  Paris  market  in  1871.  There  seems  to  have  been  much  mis- 
management of  resources,  and  the  defence  shed  little  lustre  on  Austrian 
arms.  The  last  sortie  of  the  Hungarians  seemed  to  the  Russians  useless 
sacrifice,  for  it  was  promptly  and  completely  checked. 

With  the  fall  of  Przemysl  the  Galician  campaign  entered  its  final 
stage.  The  troops  released  by  the  surrender  joined  the  armies  that  had 
long  been  battling  in  the  Carpathians,  advancing  when  opposed  only  by 
Austrians,  retreating  when  German  reinforcements  came  up.  Each 
attack  after  retreat  found  the  passes  more  strongly  fortified,  found  the 
task  more  terrible.  Still  Russia  stuck  to  it,  and  with  the  fall  of  Przemysl 
the  world  looked  for  the  arrival  of  spring  and  the  Russians  together  in 
the  Hungarian  Plain. 

In  this  it  was  mistaken.  Carpathian  hopes,  like  the  expectations 
aroused  by  the  Allied  fleet  before  the  Dardanelles,  were  soon  to  be  de- 
stroyed, and  one  failure  after  another  was  to  meet  Allied  armies  and 
fleets  in  the  whole  eastern  field.  Yet  it  is  worth  recalling  that  the  mo- 
ment when  Przemysl  fell  was  the  most  fortunate  moment,  from  the  Allied 
point  of  view,  since  the  struggle  had  opened.     Austrian  collapse,  German 


ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  249 

surrender,  these  were  the  things  that  the  press  of  the  world  outside 
German  and  Austrian  territories  talked  of  at  the  very  moment  when 
Germany  had  gotten  well  forward  in  the  preparation  of  that  tremendous 
thrust  at  the  Dunajec,  which  was  to  usher  in  a  full  year  of  Teutonic 
victories. 

Przemysl  is  a  high-water  mark;  dead  low  water  in  Allied  prospects 
comes  something  more  than  a  year  later,  with  the  disaster  and  surrender 
of  the  British  at  Kut-el-Amara.  It  remains,  now,  briefly  to  ex- 
amine the  final  phases  of  the  great  Carpathian  battle  in  which  the 
Russian  flood  was  finally  checked,  the  Russian  armies  were  exhausted 
and  shaken  by  their  terrible  efforts  and  losses,  and  the  failure  of  Russian 
munitions  brought  disaster  comparable  in  modern  military  history  only 
with  that  of  Napoleon  in  the  Moscow  campaign. 

V.  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  CARPATHIANS 

There  had  been  fighting  in  the  Carpathians  as  early  as  September, 
after  Lemberg,  when  the  Cossacks  crossed  the  range.  There  had  been 
new  and  more  serious  fighting  in  October  and  November,  when  the  Rus- 
sians came  west  again  and  approached  Cracow.  But  it  was  not  until 
the  new  year  that  the  Russians  definitely  abandoned  the  attack  to  the 
west  and  set  their  faces  toward  the  south  and  strove  to  cross  the  Carpa- 
thians into  Hungary.  Their  attempts  to  the  south  on  the  edge  of  Rou- 
mania,  designed  to  influence  Roumanian  policy,  had  met  a  swift  check  at 
German  hands,  and  Bukowina  had  been  cleared  of  Slavs  in  January  and 
February.  Similar  German  operations,  made  in  response  to  Hungarian 
appeals,  had  closed  the  passes  immediately  to  the  north  of  Bukowina, 
through  which  the  shortest  rail  line  to  Lemberg  goes. 

By  March,  when  the  Battle  of  the  Carpathians  takes  its  final  form, 
the  Russian  effort  is  concentrated  upon  the  Dukla  and  Lupkow  passes 
while  the  Austrians  and  Germans  are  now  on  the  north  side  of  the  Car- 
pathians from  this  point  south  to  the  frontiers  of  Roumania. 

The  passes  by  which  the  Russians  were  now  seeking  to  reach 
Hungary  are  the  lowest  in  the  range.  The  Dukla  is  but  1,500  feet  at  the 
crest  and  opens  easily  into  the  headwaters  of  the  affluents  of  the  Hun- 


2SO 


HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 


garian  Theiss.  In  this  pass,  as  in  several  of  the  others,  there  had  been 
terrific  fighting  all  through  the  winter  and  the  casualties  had  been  ex- 
ceedingly heavy.  White  uniforms  had  been  adopted  to  deceive  the 
outposts,  every  device  had  been  employed  to  aid  the  assailant  and  the 
defender,  alike.  And  slowly  but  steadily  the  Russians  had  progressed 
in  the  Dukla  until  they  were  actually  at  the  edge  of  the  Hungarian  Plain. 
But  in  the  other  passes  the  stiffening  of  German  reinforcements  had 
permanently  checked  the  Slav. 


■■Extreme  Line  of  Russian  Invasion 

■  1  Approximate  Front  during  Battle  of  the  Carpathians  V 


THE   GALICIAN   CAMPAIGN,   SEPT,    I9I4-MAY,   I915 
Russia's  Carpathian  Army  literally  beat  itself  to  pieces  against  the  barrier  that  faced  it 

The  opening  weeks  of  April  saw  the  crisis.  A  stupendous  Russian 
effort  gained  still  more  ground  at  a  frightful  cost.  The  world  believed 
that  Russia  was  forcing  her  way  through  the  passes,  when,  by  the  third 
week  in  April,  Ivanofif's  army  came  to  a  practical  but  not  an  absolute 
standstill.  The  cost  had  been  beyond  the  resources  of  Russia  in  men,  in 
guns,  above  all  in  ammunition.     To  the  south,  Austrian  troops,  with 


ON  THE  EAST  FRONT  251 

German  contingents,  were  actually  breaking  out  in  the  foothills  of  the 
Carpathians  on  the  Galician  side,  threatening  the  flank  of  the  Russians 
in  the  Dukla  and  the  Lupkow. 

Actually  the  Battle  of  the  Carpathians  was  over,  although  it  had  two 
more  weeks  to  run.  Germany  had  succeeded  at  last  in  erecting  a  bul- 
wark against  Russian  floods  in  Galicia,  as  she  had  promptly  broken  the 
force  of  Russian  invasion  twice  in  East  Prussia.  By  the  third  week  in 
April  there  is  something  approaching  a  deadlock  along  the  whole  east- 
ern front  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Roumanian  frontier.  There  is,  as  yet,  no 
sure  sign  of  the  Russian  halt,  but  it  had  come. 

Looking  backward  we  may  now  perceive  that  Russia  had  for  all  the 
months  since  November,  since  the  opening  of  the  Battle  of  Lodz,  been 
bearing  an  ever-increasing  burden  of  German  effort.  Her  mission  to 
deal  with  the  Austrians  had  been  triumphantly  discharged  by  the  victory 
of  Lemberg  and  its  immediate  consequences.  All  German  efforts  to 
abolish  this  Lemberg  decision  by  Polish  and  East  Prussian  drives  upon 
Warsaw  had  failed.  Only  when  Germany  had  sent  her  troops  into  Ga- 
licia and  Bukowina  had  Russian  advance  slowed  down.  Przemysl,  in  late 
March,  had  been  an  authentic  sign  of  Russian  strength;  the  attack 
upon  the  Carpathian  passes  had  been  a  final  proof  of  Russian  devotion 
and  determination.  But  Russia  had  now  reached  the  point  where  she 
must  have  aid,  and  effective  aid,  from  her  western  allies.  If  they  were 
ready  to  begin,  if  Anglo-French  efforts  in  Flanders  and  France  recalled 
German  troops  from  Galicia  and  Poland,  Russia  was  still  capable  of 
useful  service. 

But  if  this  help  did  not  come,  Russia  could  no  longer  bear  the  burden 
she  had  been  bearing  through  the  months  of  furious  fighting  that  sepa- 
rated Lemberg  and  Tannenberg  from  Przemysl  and  the  Carpathians. 

The  best  of  Russia's  officers  and  of  her  first-line  soldiers  had  found 
their  graves  on  the  fields  of  victory  and  defeat  in  East  Prussia,  Poland, 
and  Galicia.  The  Carpathian  Army  had  literally  beaten  itself  to  pieces 
against  the  barriers  that  faced  it.  Russian  military  achievement  had 
surpassed  her  own  and  her  enemies'  expectation,  but  no  Russian  warn- 
ing, although  there  had  been  many,  had  sufficed  to  moderate  the  hopes 


252  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR. 

and  expectations  of  the  western  allies  of  the  Slav.     They  were  soon  to  be 
undeceived. 

It  remains,  now,  to  look  westward  and  examine  rapidly  the  progress 
of  events  from  the  German  defeat  at  Ypres  to  the  moment  when  Russian 
effort  was  checked  at  the  summit  of  the  Carpathians  and  Russia  began  to 
lack  the  strength  to  continue  the  work  begun  at  Lemberg  and  carried 
forward,  to  the  very  great  advantage  of  her  western  allies,  up  to  the 
arrival  of  spring.  It  is  well  to  remember,  too,  that  at  this  moment  Rus- 
sia had  at  last  realized,  through  the  failure  of  the  Allied  fleets  in  the 
Dardanelles,  that  she  was  to  receive  no  immediate  aid  in  munitionment 
or  supplies,  of  which  she  stood  in  desperate  need,  from  her  western 
allies. 


CHAPTER  THIRTEEN 

IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,   1914,  TO  MAY,  1915 

I 

THE  PROBLEM 

When  the  German  attack  in  Flanders  ceased  and  the  Germans  began 
to  transport  some  fraction  of  their  main  force  eastward  to  reUeve 
Hindenburg  in  his  Lodz  venture,  to  aid  him  in  his  later  attacks  upon 
Warsaw  and  finally  to  prop  up  the  crumbling  Austrian  armies,  they  left 
a  field  upon  which  they  had  missed  victory  by  the  narrowest  margin. 
Napoleon  was  never  nearer  to  winning  Waterloo  than  were  the  Germans 
to  achieving  a  complete  success  about  Ypres.  Had  Russian  pressure 
been  one  whit  less  severe,  had  Austrian  collapse  been  one  degree  less 
imminent,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  Germans  would  have  missed 
arriving  at  Calais  and  crushing  in  the  whole  westernflanksof  the  Allies. 

When  the  German  flood  at  last  subsided  it  left  behind  it  a  victorious 
but  well-nigh-annihilated  foe  in  Flanders.  To  meet  the  storm  the  Allies 
had  flung  into  the  gap  the  most  heterogeneous  mass  of  men  that  Europe 
had  known  since  the  Mohammedan  invasion.  Asia  and  Africa,  Australia 
and  Canada,  were  represented  by  white,  by  black,  and  by  yellow  troops 
who  fought  beside  the  French,  the  Belgians,  and  the  British.  Sailor 
lads  from  Brittany  marched  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  Senegalese; 
troops  from  British  India  held  ground  within  sight  of  Arabs  and  Berbers 
from  Algeria  and  Morocco.  Languages,  customs,  religions  of  four  con- 
tinents and  a  score  of  races  were  represented  in  this  strange  horde. 

Actually  the  Allies  had  striven,  as  men  strive  when  there  is  a  break 
in  the  dyke,  to  stop  the  rapidly  growing  gap  by  every  conceivable  and 
available  resource.  Never  in  military  history  was  there  such  a  jerry- 
built  wall  as  stretched  across  the  pathway  of  German  floods,  wavered 
and  faltered  under  German  attack,  and  just  held  at  the  final  mo- 
ment, when,  with  the  eastern  crisis  becoming  ever  more  insistent,  the 

253 


254  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Germans,  under  the  eyes  of  their  emperor,  called  upon  the  famous 
Prussian  Guard  to  deliver  the  final  blow. 

And  when  the  wave  at  last  was  spent,  there  stretched  from  Switzer- 
land to  the  sea  that  long  line  of  trenches  which  henceforth  for  more  than 
two  years  was  to  be  the  western  front.  Such  an  ending  to  a  Franco- 
German  campaign  had  been  foreseen  neither  in  Berlin  nor  in  Paris. 
That  such  a  condition  would  endure,  not  for  months  but  for  years, 
was  a  thing  wholly  hidden  from  German  and  French  High  Command 
in  November,  19 14. 

For  the  Germans  there  was  the  firm  belief  that  a  few  months  of 
winter  campaigning  would  dispose  of  the  Russians,  permit  the  capture  of 
Warsaw,  and  that  spring  would  see  the  return  to  the  west  of  the  troops 
borrowed  from  the  west  for  the  winter  months. 

As  for  the  Allies,  their  forces  already  began  to  talk  of  that  happy  hour 
when  Kitchener's  "Million"  would  arrive,  by  Easter  at  the  latest,  and 
the  long  German  lines  would  be  broken,  the  whole  of  France  delivered, 
and  the  decision  of  the  Marne  enforced  along  the  Rhine.  No  one  yet 
foresaw  the  magnitude  of  German  resources  or  effort;  no  one  yet  fore- 
saw that  the  heavy  artillery,  prepared  to  win  field  battles  and  reduce 
fortresses;  the  machine  guns,  which  only  in  the  German  army  had  been 
provided  by  thousands  to  obtain  victory  in  the  decisive  battle  in  the 
open  field,  would  give  Germany  an  advantage  in  trench  warfare  enabling 
her  to  hold  her  lines,  not  for  weeks  or  months,  but  beyond  the  date  of 
the  second  anniversary  of  the  war,  with  wholly  insignificant  changes. 

Actually,  the  German  problem  had  been  posed  in  the  east;  it  was  the 
problem  of  disposing  of  Russia  by  spring  and  returning  to  the  west  to 
reopen  the  Marne  verdict  in  the  summer  and  win  the  war  in  the  first 
year.  The  problem  of  the  Allies  was  to  reorganize  their  shaken  armies, 
to  raise  the  British  forces  that  could  supply  the  necessary  superiority 
of  numbers  in  the  west,  and  to  provide  that  heavy  artillery  and  ammuni- 
tion which  were  utterly  lacking  and  without  which  the  attack,  in  the 
new  conditions  of  war,  was  a  mere  murder.  All  this  it  was  impera- 
tively necessary  that  the  Allies  should  accomplish  before  Russia  was 
beaten  down  by  the  whole  weight  of  German  attack — before  the  victory 


THE    SLAVS    IN 
THE  WORLD  WAR 


PART  OF  THE  CRACK  CAVALRY  C(JRPS  FORMERLY  KNOWN  AS 
CZAR'S  OWN  HUSSARS 


rHE 


PICTURES   OF   RUSSIAN  AND 
SERBIAN    SOLDIERS 


Copyright  by  Underwood  ^  Underwood 

GRAND  DUKE  NICHOLAS 


Copyright  by  Underwood  ^  Undertvood 

GENERAL  RENNENKAMPF 


Cof<\rig,ht  by  lh<-    Jmencan  Press  Assoeiation 

GENERAL  RUSSKY 


•-i  'J  Undenvood 


GENERAL  BKl  .slI.oFF 


FOUR  RUSSLAN  GENERALS 

The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  uncle  of  the  Czar,  is  a  real  soldier  and  an  able  soldier.  rh(Hit;h  a  Romanotf  his  political 
tendency  is  toward  liberalism.  The  Czar  was  probably  jealous  of  him,  and  after  his  abdication  a  plot  was  launched 
to  offer  (irand  Duke  Nicholas  the  crown. 

(jeneral  Rennenkampf.  After  winning  Tannenber^  from  one  Russian  army  under  Samsonoff,  Hindcnburg  pursued 
a  second,  that  of  Renncnkampf,  from  the  very  gates  of  Konigsberg  across  his  frontier.  Later,  two  German  corps 
under  Von  Francois  were  surrounded  and  Pctrograd  claimed  a  victory.  But  it  failed  to  materialize.  The  trapped 
Germans  by  exertions  which  the  Russians  frankly  conceded  to  have  been  "incredible"  found  their  way  out,  thanks  to 
the  tardiness  of  Renncnkampf,  who  went  at  once  into  retirement  after  this  fiasco.  ' 

Russky  and  Hrusiloff  commanded  two  of  the  five  armies  which  took  part  in  the  great  Russian  offensive  in  August 
and  September,  1914.     They  operated  in  Galicia,  while  Rennenkampf  and  Samsonoff  invaded  East  Prussia. 


Pholograph  by  Undenvood  U  Uiideru.'Ood 


RUSSIAN  SOLDIERS 


The  Rfssian  muzhik  makes  a  good  soldier.     To  begm  vvith  there  is  an  inexhausnb  e  supply  of  h.m,     "^ j'^s  gre^t 
endurance,  is  patient,  good-natured,  and  obedient,  but  lacks  m,t,at<ve      On  the  whole  he  has  given  a  good  account 
of  h  msdf  in  the  war.    'hc  would  have  done  better  had  he  been.equ.pped  and  supplied  as  ^ffi--;'^/; '^e  sold  e^^^ 
the  other  races.     Moreover,  there  is  good  reason  for  the  suspicion  that  he  has  sometimes  been  led  to  his  undoing  by 
traitorous  pro-German  generals. 


Photograph  by  Underwood  U  U nderivood 

THE  FORMER  CZAR'S  BODYGUARD  OF  PICKED  COSSACKS  RIDING  TOj 
THE  DEFENCE  OF  WARSAW 


RUSSIANS  AND  AUSTRIANS 
When  Russians  and  Austrians  are  pitted  against  each  other  as  man  to  man  in  a  fair  encounter,  this  is  apt  to  be 
the  result.  The  Austrians  march  to  the  rear  as  prisoners.  The  Austrians  have  more  spirit  and  dash,  but  they  lack 
the  stolid  strenRth  and  steadfastness  of  the  Russian  peasants.  Moreover,  the  Russians  are  racially  a  unit:  while  the 
Austro-Hungarians  are  of  many  races,  and  the  Slavic  blood  in  many  makes  them  laggards  in  war  against  their  kinsmen 
of  the  steppes. 


Copyright  by  the  American  Press  Association 


Copyright  by  Underwood  U  Under.ixiQd 

SERBIA  IN  THE  WAR 

The  raw  matenal  of  which  Serbian  soldiers  are  made. 

The  finished  product. 

Gallant  little  Serbia  was  finally  overcome  by  the  overwhelming  strength  of  her  adversaries.  But  the  world  will 
not  soon  forget  the  splendid  succession  of  victories  which  preceded  her  days  of  disaster.  In  the  First  Balkan  War 
she  deteated  the  Turks  at  Kumanovo,  at  Monastir,  and  at  .Adrianople;  in  the  Second  Balkan  War  she  shattered  the 
legend  of  Bulgarian  invincibility  at  Bregalnitza;  in  the  opening  month  of  the  World  War  when  the  fortune  of  the  Allies 
was  most  desperate  it  was  the  victory  of  the  Serb  at  Jedar  which  opened  the  more  prosperous  period  which  culminated 
at  the  Marne.  In  the  early  days  of  December  Belgrad  fell,  but  once  again  the  Serbians  rallied.  Belgrad  was  re- 
taken; by  December  ij,  1914,  Serbia  was  free  of  Austrians,  saved  for  the  time  being,  saved  until  the  third — and  fatal 
—  attack,  the  Balkan  drive  of  Mackensen  almost  a  year  later.  In  October,  1918,  the  Serbian  army  again  showed  its 
mettle  in  its  marvellous  dash  to  final  victory- 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      263 

of  Lemberg,  which  had  given  the  Russians  the  initiative  and  the  advan- 
tage in  the  east,  should  have  lost  its  influence. 

We  have  seen  that  the  Germans  failed  in  the  east.  All  their  mighty 
efforts  were  insufficient  to  abolish  the  consequences  of  the  initial  Aus- 
trian collapse  and  the  early  Russian  triumphs  in  time  to  resume  the 
western  campaign  in  the  spring.  Not  less  absolute  was  the  Allied 
failure  in  the  west.  For  another  year,  after  the  critical  spring.  Kitch- 
ener's million,  as  an  offensive  force,  was  to  be  a  myth.  The  task  set  for 
Britain  was  beyond  the  capacity  of  any  nation,  untrained  to  wars  of  the 
national  sort  and  lacking  the  resources  in  trained  men  which  conscrip- 
tion alone  supplies. 

Without  Britain,  France  could  not  free  her  soil.  Almost  a  million 
French  had  been  killed,  wounded,  or  captured  in  the  first  four  months  of 
the  war.  The  industrial  districts  of  France  had  been  seized  and  were 
held.  France  could  and  did  address  herself  to  the  task  of  organizing 
her  national  life  within  a  brief  time.  But  such  organization  was  for  long 
beyond  the  capacity  of  British  Government  or  people.  Months  after 
the  need  for  heavy  explosives  had  been  disclosed,  the  faults  of  the 
British  military  system — its  inability  to  learn — combined  to  keep  the 
munition  works  at  the  task  of  turning  out  useless  shrapnel. 

From  political,  military,  and  industrial  aspects,  the  story  of  the  Brit- 
ish department  of  Allied  effort,  deduction  of  course  being  made  for  the 
Navy,  remains  the  story  of  failure,  of  inability  to  perceive  the  char- 
acter and  magnitude  of  the  war,  of  failure  to  understand  the  new  hori- 
zons, the  new  conditions,  to  grasp  the  fundamental  fact  that  the  war 
could  only  be  won  when  Britain  conscripted  her  youth  and  set  her  ma- 
turity to  the  organized  task  of  munitionment.  Under  the  strain  of  the 
first  really  considerable  war  in  British  history,  the  whole  fabric  of  Brit- 
ish Imperial  life  broke  down. 

On  the  military  side  the  British  failure  was  complete  in  all  but  de- 
fensive operations.  The  world  knew  little  of  the  original  campaign  of 
Field-Marshal  Sir  John  French.  The  legend  that  he  had  saved  the 
French  before  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  and  contributed  the  decisive 
thrust  in  this  engagement  served  to  deceive  and  delude  the  British 


264  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

themselves.  Not  even  Neuve  Chapelle  opened  their  eyes  and  it  re- 
quired the  dismal  slaughter  at  Loos  in  September,  1915,  to  demonstrate 
the  need  of  a  new  commander-in-chief  and  of  a  new  system. 

Field-Marshal  Sir  John  French's  services  to  his  country  and  to  the 
Allied  cause  at  the  Aisne  and  at  Ypres  were  incontestably  great.  On  the 
latter  field  the  British  army — the  old  army — died,  holding  a  line  whose 
collapse  would  have  brought  ruin  to  the  Allied  defence  in  the  west. 
Not  a  little  of  the  failure  of  the  British  commander  must,  in  fact,  be 
charged  to  Lord  Kitchener.  We  shall  not  know  until  history  has  cleared 
the  ground  how  far  the  commander  in  the  field  was  blocked,  handicapped, 
finally  exhausted  by  an  administration  of  the  War  Department,  which 
in  such  instances  as  that  of  heavy  explosives  starved  the  army  in 
France  because  it  misunderstood  the  conditions  of  the  new  warfare. 
Yet  in  the  light  of  such  evidence  as  exists,  the  recall  of  the  Field- 
Marshal  seems  to  have  been  inevitable  and  the  responsibility  for  failure 
in  the  field  in  some  part  his  own. 

As  for  the  British  army,  more  was  asked  it  than  could  fairly  be  asked 
of  any  army  in  the  first  year  of  the  war.  And  what  it  did  was  a  larger 
portion  of  the  impossible  than  was  then  conceivable.  It  fought  with 
rifles  against  machine  guns — ^with  shrapnel  against  high  explosives;  it 
manufactured  its  bombs  out  of  jam  tins  and  matched  them  against 
the  products  of  prepared  machinery.  It  was  often  defeated  but  never 
conquered;  and  never — save  between  Mons  and  the  Marne — greatly 
disorganized. 

In  the  nature  of  things  this  British  army  was  for  nearly  two  years  a 
"forlorn  hope";  it  could  not  be  compared  on  the  military  side  with  the 
highly  organized  German  armies  or  with  the  French  conscript  armies; 
yet,  without  its  contribution,  the  war  would  have  been  irrevocably 
lost  in  the  first  year;  and  after  the  first  year,  its  mounting  strength  and 
growing  eflSciency  were  recognized  even  by  the  foe. 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war,  this  British  army  never  had 
an  equal  chance,  most  of  its  offensives  were  sheer  sacrifices,  made 
gallantly  and  willingly,  but  foredoomed  to  defeat  because  equipment  was 
lacking  and  training  was  still  to  be  acquired.     Political  blunders,  such 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      265 

as  Antwerp  and  Gallipoli,  added  further  burdens  and  led  to  further 
disastrous  consequences.  Many  of  the  blunders  were  censurable 
and  indefensible;  many  were  the  inevitable  concomitants  of  national 
unpreparedness.  Yet  the  critic  who  recognizes  necessarily  the  fail- 
ure, from  the  military  point  of  view,  feels  his  words  unfair,  in  the 
presence  of  the  spirit  and  the  devotion  of  the  men  who  held  the  line 
from  the  first  Ypres  battle  to  the  coming  of  the  new  armies  or  died  unhesi- 
tatingly in  the  opening  days  of  the  Somme,  a  sacrifice  to  the  tuition  of 
a  nation  which  had  to  learn  modern  warfare  in  the  most  expensive  of  all 
schools. 

With  the  weapons  they  had;  with  the  officers  that  were  available — 
officers  as  destitute  of  training  as  their  men;  under  the  burden  of  the 
most  powerful  attack  military  history  records,  both  in  numbers  and  in 
mechanical  appliances,  the  British  army  hung  on;  and  if  the  original 
"contemptible  little  army"  died  on  the  line,  its  presence  there  prevented 
an  immediate  disaster  to  the  Allied  cause  and  its  tenacity  insured  the 
coming  of  the  other  British  armies  which  were  to  know  victory  and 
regain  the  offensive. 

The  close  of  the  period  we  are  now  to  review  was  to  reveal  the  fact 
that  the  Allies  in  the  west  were  still  unready.  A  moment  was  to  come 
when,  coincident  with  the  fatal  thrust  that  Mackensen  was  to  deliver 
against  Radko  Dimitrieff  at  the  Dunajec,  German  attacks  in  Flanders 
were  to  disclose  the  fact  that  Russia  could  not  be  relieved  by  pressure 
exerted  on  Germany's  western  front  and  must  go  from  retreat  to  re- 
treat until  the  coming  of  winter  found  her  terribly  beaten  armies  at  the 
Beresina  and  Dwina. 

The  military  operations  in  this  period  are  of  practically  no  value, 
compared  to  that  attaching  to  the  struggles  in  the  east,  because 
they  resulted  in  no  tactical  or  strategic  advantage  to  either  side — 
did,  in  fact,  no  more  than  contribute  to  revealing  the  fact  that  Rus- 
sia could  expect  no  help  in  the  west,  at  the  precise  moment  when 
the  temporary  success  of  Russia  had  compelled  Germany  to  turn  all 
her  attention  for  the  summer  campaign  toward  Warsaw  and  not  toward 
Calais. 


266  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

II.    joffre's  "nibbling" 

To  the  operations  in  the  west  in  the  period  we  are  now  to  examine, 
and,  indeed,  for  many  months  thereafter,  there  was  applied  the  pictu- 
resque term  of  "nibbhng."  Actually,  these  operations  were  local  offen- 
sives, undertaken  in  all  but  one  of  the  more  considerable  instances  by 
the  French,  and  they  were  designed  to  keep  as  many  German  troops  as 
possible  occupied,  to  prevent  the  transfer  to  the  east  of  any  large 
number  of  army  corps,  to  strain  German  resources  in  men  and  munition 
by  a  double  pressure  on  the  eastern  and  western  fronts.  Beside 
these  purposes  local  objectives  were  insignificant. 

The  world  misunderstood  these  operations  completely.  It  saw  in 
each  activity  from  Switzerland  to  the  North  Sea  the  evidences  of 
a  grandiose  attempt  to  reach  the  Rhine  or  the  lower  Meuse.  It  did 
not  understand  the  weakness  of  the  Allies,  the  difficulties  of  the 
British,  the  inadequate  resources  of  the  French — in  men  as  a  result  of 
their  terrible  losses,  and  in  munitions  because  of  German  occupation 
of  so  much  of  the  industrial  portion  of  France.  From  November  to 
May  the  whole  outside  world  waited  for  the  new  Allied  "drive"  in  the 
west,  were  waiting  for  it  when  the  German  thrust  at  Ypres  crushed  in 
half  of  the  whole  salient  and  won  a  local  success  more  considerable  than 
any  the  Allies  had  achieved  in  all  the  months  preceding. 

The  first  of  these  "nibbles"  was  in  some  respects  the  most  consider- 
able and  successful.  In  December  French  forces  appeared  along 
the  western  slopes  of  the  Vosges  and  beyond  the  summits  in  that 
corner  of  Alsace  to  which  the  French  had  clung  after  they  had  aban- 
doned Miihlhausen  in  August.  They  flowed  down  the  valley  of  the 
Thur  and  reoccupied  Thann;  they  approached  the  village  of  Cernay, 
which  is  the  key  to  Miihlhausen,  and,  after  long  and  desperate  fighting, 
took  the  mountain  of  Hartmannsweilerkopf,  from  which  they  could  look 
down  into  Miihlhausen  a  scant  ten  miles  away. 

But  despite  local  successes  in  the  villages  of  Steinbach  and  Anspach, 
despite  a  slight  advance  along  the  plain  toward  Altkirch,  the  larger 
purpose  could  not  be  realized.     The  French  were  unable  to  break  the 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      267 

German  line  at  the  point  where  it  left  the  plain  and  approached  the  Vos- 
ges.  Miihlhausen  could  not  be  taken,  nor  were  any  of  the  later  efforts 
more  successful.  Some  little  territory  was  won  north  of  the  Thur,  some 
more  Alsatian  villages  were  "redeemed,"  upward  of  350  square  miles 
of  Alsace  was  reunited  to  France,  but  although  each  new  general  who 
came  to  the  Vosges  eagerly  undertook,  with  the  limited  resources  allowed 
him,  to  break  through  to  Miihlhausen,  the  failure  was  absolute. 

Checked  in  Alsace,  the  French  turned  to  Champagne  and  endeavoured 
to  push  up  the  slopes  of  the  hills  north  of  Soissons  and  beyond  the  Aisne, 
where  Kluck  had  held  the  British  in  September.  Again  there  was  a 
preliminary  success  in  early  January,  the  gain  of  several  miles.  But 
as  promptly  came  a  German  counter-thrust  and  this  time  the  French 
lost,  not  alone  what  they  had  gained,  but  the  ground  turned  over  to  them 
by  the  British  when  Field-Marshal  French  had  gone  north  in  October. 
Only  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  river  were  the  French  able  to  hold. 
Germany  claimed  a  crushing  victory  and  talked  rather  obscurely  of 
Gravelotte;  the  French  explained  that  the  floods  in  the  river  behind 
them  had  made  their  position  indefensible.  Neither  statement  is 
worth  considering.  The  Germans  never  tried  to  advance  farther; 
the  French  were  unable  to  progress  on  this  front  until  April,  19 17.  The 
local  operation  promptly  lost  all  importance. 

In  February  the  French  undertook  a  still  more  ambitious  operation 
in  Champagne,  on  the  ground  which  was  to  see  the  great  and  desperate 
attack  in  the  following  September.  Over  a  narrow  front  and  for  the 
possession  of  insignificant  ridges  commanding  a  railroad  line  vital  to 
German  communications,  the  French  and  Germans  fought  for  weeks. 
The  battleline  rested  on  the  east  upon  the  Argonne  and  from  the 
western  flank  the  cathedral  of  Rheims  was  visible.  After  casualties 
not  much  under  200,000  for  the  French  and  German  combined — and  the 
French  loss  was  much  the  heavier — there  ensued  a  new  deadlock.  The 
French  had  gained  rather  less  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  on  a  front  less  than 
a  dozen.  But  there  was  never  much  promise  that  they  would  actually 
penetrate  the  German  lines,  and  any  original  hope  was  promptly  extin- 
guished when  German  reserves  arrived. 


268  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

While  this  last  attack  was  going  forward  the  British  undertook  their 
first,  and  for  the  present  period  their  last,  offensive,  attacking  in  the 
district  south  of  Lille.  This  effort  is  worth  examining  in  more  detail 
because  it  disclosed  the  extent  of  the  weakness  of  British  organization 
and  was  the  first  of  that  series  of  failures,  extending  through  Gallipoli 
and  Loos,  to  Kut-el-Amara,  which  revealed  how  little  British  military 
training  had  kept  pace  with  that  of  continental  nations  in  later  years, 
and  how  long  was  to  be  the  task  of  organizing  new  British  armies. 

But  in  dismissing  these  early  French  operations  it  is  well  to  recall 
that  each  of  them  was  designed  primarily  to  aid  the  Russians  and  to 
divert  German  attention  from  Galicia  and  from  Poland;  the  Alsatian 
attack  coincided  with  the  great  drive  of  Hindenburg  to  the  Bzura- 
Rawka  line;  the  Champagne  attack  with  the  opening  of  the  Battle  of 
the  Carpathians;  and  the  Soissons  fight  which  just  preceded  it  with  the 
demand  of  the  Hungarians  for  German  aid  to  repulse  the  Russian 
menace  in  Bukowina  and  the  growing  Roumanian  threat,  due  to  Russian 
victories  in  the  Crownland. 

In  this  synchrony  of  operations  east  and  west  it  is  possible  to  see 
what  the  French  were  striving  to  do,  not  on  their  own  frontier  primarily 
but  in  the  wide  field  of  the  continental  strife.  Nor  can  one  doubt 
that,  while  their  efforts  were  not  fully  successful  in  this  larger  field 
nor  of  any  real  consequence  locally,  they  did  materially  reduce  the 
pressure  upon  their  Slav  ally  and  postpone  the  day  when  Germany  was 
able  to  regain  the  ofTensive  in  the  east. 

III.    NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

On  March  loth  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  a  few  miles  southwest  of  the 
great  city  of  Lille  and  just  north  of  the  strong  German  post  of  La 
Bassee,  which  had  seen  desperate  fighting  in  October  and  November, 
the  British  launched  a  great  attack  upon  a  four-mile  front.  The  im- 
mediate objective  of  the  attack  was  the  Aubers  ridge,  which  in  military 
comment  is  described  as  the  key  to  the  city  of  Lille  itself. 

This  attack  was  preceded  by  the  first  of  those  avalanches  of  artillery 
bombardment  to  become  familiar  thereafter  and  to  be  described  at  once 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      269 

by  the  Germans,  who  gave  it  the  enduring  name  of  drum-fire.  Under 
this  storm  of  fire,  deHvered  from  300  guns  concentrated  in  a  narrow 
area,  the  German  first-line  trenches  disintegrated,  even  the  second  fine 
was  shaken,  and  the  British  infantry  made  its  first  advance  with  Httle 
or  no  serious  opposition,  finding  the  ground  strewn  with  German  dead, 
and  capturing  scores  of  men  overcome  by  the  noise  and  shock  of  the  fire. 

But  beyond  the  first-Hne  trenches  the  British  came  under  machine- 
gun  fire  from  scattered  points  in  which  the  German  second  fine  had  not 
been  destroyed.  They  also  sufi^ered  severely  as  a  result  of  the  miscal- 
culation of  their  own  guns,  but  the  fatal  circumstance  was  the  failure 
of  reserves  to  arrive. 

There  was  a  moment  when  it  seemed  as  if  the  road  to  Lille  was  open. 
But  the  British  could  not  seize  the  moment,  and  it  passed  forever.  After 
two  days  the  Germans  were  able  to  repulse  all  attacks  with  terrific 
slaughter.  The  British  had  gained  a  mile  on  a  front  of  four;  uie  ruins 
of  the  village  of  Neuve  Chapelle  were  in  their  hands,  but  the  larger 
success  had  been  lost.  British  Command  had  failed  to  synchronize  men 
with  guns,  to  prepare  reserves  to  follow  the  first  waves  of  attack.  What 
was  to  happen  at  Loos  and  Gallipoli  on  a  far  larger  scale  had  now  oc- 
curred at  Neuve  Chapelle. 

In  this  battle,  which  filled  the  bulletins  at  the  time  but  is  now 
hardly  more  than  a  forgotten  skirmish,  the  British  first  tasted  the  cup 
of  bitterness  which  the  Germans  had  drunk  to  the  dregs  in  the  Battle  of 
Ypres.  Under  German  artillery  and  machine-gun  fire,  the  British  losses 
surpassed  that  of  the  British  contingents  who  fought  with  Wellington 
at  Waterloo.  The  "butcher's  bill"  had  been  13,000  casualties;  the 
gains,  a  mile  of  territory,  2,000  German  prisoners,  and  the  privilege  of 
burying  3,000  Germans  fallen  to  British  guns. 

In  Allied  strategy  this  blow  in  Artois  had  been  delivered  in  strict 
conjunction  with  the  French  ofi^ensive  far  off  in  Champagne  and  at  the 
moment  when  the  arrival  of  German  reserves  on  the  latter  field  disclosed 
the  fact  that  Germany  was  weakening  her  line  before  the  British.  In 
September  a  similar  double  thrust  was  to  be  undertaken  in  Champagne 
and  Artois,  which  would  cost  the  French  120,000  casualties  and  the 


270  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

British  60,000.  Looking  back  to  it,  after  the  mighty  struggles  of  the 
later  months,  Neuve  Chapelle  seems  insignificant.  Yet  it  was  the  first 
time  that  a  considerable  use  was  made  of  massed  fire.  It  forecast 
exactly  the  tactics  Mackensen  was  to  employ  in  his  great  victory  in 
Galicia  not  many  weeks  later,  and  it  did  come  within  sight  of  a  con- 
siderable triumph  that  might  have  restored  Lille  to  France. 

In  the  first  blush  London  celebrated  Neuve  Chapelle  as  the  "battle 
bigger  than  Waterloo";  but  the  later  disclosures  changed  the  whole  tone 
of  British  comment,  and  England  presently  realized  that  a  meaningless 
local  gain  had  been  achieved  at  a  frightful  cost,  because  British  troops 
had  fallen  under  their  own  guns  and  British  reserves  had  wholly  failed 
to  arrive  at  the  moment  when  real  victory  was  within  easy  grasp. 
Taken  with  the  scandal  over  the  shell  supply — which  soon  developed 
and  revealed  that  the  British  High  Command  was  still  sending  shrapnel 
in  limited  quantities  to  an  army  that  required  heavy  explosives  in 
enormous  quantities  and  could  not  get  them  at  all — Neuve  Chapelle  was 
a  saddening  incident  to  the  British  people. 

IV.  THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

In  early  April  the  French  undertook  an  interesting  campaign  to 
abolish  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  the  single  breach  in  the  yoke  of  permanent 
French  fortifications  from  Verdun  to  Switzerland,  which  the  German? 
had  been  able  to  make  in  September.  Coming  out  from  Metz  and 
ascending  the  valley  of  the  little  Rupt  de  Mad,  the  Germans  had 
actually  crossed  the  Meuse,  taken  foot  on  the  west  bank,  and  also 
captured  Fort  Camp  des  Remains,  above  the  town  of  St.  Mihiel  on  the 
east  bank. 

The  ground  held  by  the  Germans  was  a  narrow  spearhead  thrust 
straight  through  the  armour  of  France.  Never  had  the  Germans  been 
able  to  widen  the  wound  or  deepen  it  after  the  first  thrust,  but  they  re- 
mained in  possession  of  a  portion  of  the  hills  of  the  Meuse  and  they  cut 
the  railroad  from  Commercy  to  Verdun.  Now  the  French,  coming 
north  out  of  Toul  and  south  out  of  Verdun,  endeavoured  to  break  this 
salient  along  its  sides.     Some  initial  success  they  had  at  Les  Eparges; 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      271 

they  took  several  hills  and  a  village  or  two.  But  then  they  were 
stopped.  German  heavy  artillery  in  Fort  Camp  des  Remains  held 
them  up.  The  local  success  did  not  hide  the  larger  failure.  A  still  more 
ambitious  effort  in  July,  and  from  the  Bois-Ie-Pretre,  above  the  west  of 
Pont-a-Mousson,  similarly  failed.  Verdun  was  left  in  danger  and  the 
extent  of  the  danger  was  to  be  disclosed  in  February,  1916. 

Finally  we  come  to  the  last  of  the  battles  in  the  west  in  the  period 
under  examination,  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres,  which  coincided  almost 
exactly  with  the  date  at  which  the  world  believed  that  Kitchener's 
million  were  to  begin  their  triumphal  advance  in  the  west;  and  it 
terminated  in  a  local  German  success  at  the  moment  when  Mackensen 
was  to  regain  for  Germany  the  initiative  in  the  east. 

The  new  blow  fell  on  April  22d.  It  was  delivered  by  relatively 
small  contingents,  and  it  is  plain  that  the  Germans  had  no  expectation 
of  anything  but  a  local  triumph,  the  moral  effect  of  which  would  far 
surpass  the  military.  Not  only  did  it  come  in  an  hour  when  the  news 
from  the  east  was  to  fill  the  world,  but  the  Allied  failure  at  the  Dar- 
danelles had  dashed  the  hopes  of  all  the  enemies  of  Germany  and  a 
shining  Teutonic  triumph  held  out  a  promise  to  hold  Italy  to  neutrality. 
Again,  the  Allies  were  already  collecting  an  army  to  send  to  the 
Dardanelles  on  the  most  foolish  of  all  ventures  and  German  pressure 
was  conceivably  calculated  to  withhold  troops  from  the  Near  East. 

The  German  attack  was  preceded  by  the  first  discharge  of  "poison 
gas"  of  the  war.  Not  since  the  slaughter  in  Louvain  and  the  bombard- 
ment of  Rheims  had  any  event  made  such  a  noise  in  the  world  as  this  first 
use  of  gas  as  a  weapon  of  destruction.  It  added  instantly  to  the  horrors 
of  conflict  and  it  was  in  violation  of  all  the  restrictions  that  humanity 
and  international  agreement  had  placed  about  the  conduct  of  war.  It 
instantly  changed  the  whole  temper  of  the  British,  who  suffered  most 
severely,  mainly  in  the  Canadian  contingent;  it  abolished  quarter  on  the 
western  front  for  many  months,  and  it  brought  in  its  train  a  savagery 
and  brutality  that  the  wars  of  the  Nineteenth  Century  did  not  know. 

Even  in  its  immediate  purpose,  this  weapon  was  unsuccessful.  It 
did  not  give  Germany  a  shining  triumph.     It  did  not  open  a  gap  in  the 


272  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Allied  defence,  it  merely  brought  to  horrible  death  a  few  thousands  of 
Allied  soldiers,  and,  before  many  weeks  had  passed,  the  Allies  had  pre- 
pared an  apparatus  protecting  their  soldiers  and  had  in  their  turn 
adopted  this  hideous  method  of  killing,  which  subsequently  brought 
as  many  thousand  Germans  to  terrible  agony  and  frightful  death. 

In  selecting  the  Ypres  front  as  the  point  of  attack,  the  Germans  had 
pitched  upon  the  point  best  known  to  the  outside  world  in  the  whole  Al- 
lied line  from  Belfort  to  Nieuport.  Here  the  Germans  had  attacked  in  the 
autumn  and  by  but  a  shadowy  margin  failed  to  get  through.  Belligerent 
and  neutral  nations,  watching  for  the  advance  of  the  Kitchener  army,  still 
hardly  taking  shape,  saw,  instead,  what  seemed  to  be  a  new  German 
drive  forCalais  and  for  several  days  a  real  German  advance.  Nor  were  the 
military  reasons  less  weighty  in  determining  the  point  of  attack;  Ypres 
was  a  salient  on  which  the  Germans  from  higher  and  encircling  ground 
could  pour  down  a  converging  fire,  cutting  all  the  lines  of  communication. 

The  original  attack  fell  to  the  west  of  Ypres,  at  the  moment  when 
this  beautiful  city,  with  some  of  the  most  interesting  monuments  of 
Flemish  art,  was  melting  into  dust  and  ashes  under  a  terrific  cannonade. 
At  the  point  where  the  French  and  British  lines  touched — the  French 
position  held  largely  by  native  troops — the  Germans  launched  immense 
clouds  of  gas.  First  amazement  and  then  terror  followed.  The  men 
who  had  endured  artillery  fire  and  faced  death  with  unfaltering  courage 
for  many  months  broke  and  fled,  a  gap  opened  in  the  Allied  front. 

This  break  exposed  the  flank  of  the  Canadians.  They,  too,  had 
suff^ered  from  the  gas,  but  less  severely  than  their  French  neighbours. 
They  did  not  break  or  immediately  retreat.  They  extended  to  cover 
the  exposed  flank  and  hung  on.  No  reserves  were  available  for  hours, 
and  in  these  first  hours  nearly  a  third  of  the  Canadian  contingent  died  or 
were  wounded  and  captured  on  their  lines.  Presently  the  crisis  passed. 
Reinforcements  arrived,  the  Belgians  extended  their  aid  to  the  French, 
the  British  brought  up  troops  from  the  south.  Ypres  was  not  lost,  the 
dyke  between  the  Germans  and  Calais  still  held. 

It  is  worth  recalling,  too,  that  for  England,  the  Canadian  contingent 
bore  the  brunt  as  the  Australian  Anzacs  were  to  win  equal  glory  at 


IN  THE  WEST,  NOVEMBER,  1914,  TO  MAY,  1915      273 

Gallipoli.  In  the  history  of  the  British  Empire  the  Second  Battle  of 
Ypres  may  well  prove  memorable,  for  Canadian  loyalty  there  gave 
shining  answer  to  German  forecasts  of  colonial  secessions;  while  in 
German  Southwest  Africa,  British  South  Africa  was  presently  to  emu- 
late the  example  of  Canada  in  Flanders  and  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
at  the  Dardanelles. 

The  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  lasted  five  days;  by  the  third  the  Ger- 
mans no  longer  claimed  to  be  making  progress  and  at  points  they  were 
presently  pressed  back,  but  the  whole  Ypres  salient  had  to  be  flattened 
out.  Actually  the  British  gave  up  more  ground  than  they  had  surren- 
dered in  the  First  Battle,  but  solely  because  of  the  collapse  of  the  French 
line  to  the  west,  under  the  poison  gas  attack.  Guns,  prisoners,  ground, 
the  Germans  had  taken,  but  the  triumph  was  local  and  of  no  permanent 
value  on  the  military  side. 

Yet  the  lesson  of  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  was  unmistakable,  al- 
though the  world  was  long  in  learning  it.  A  swift,  heavy  blow  had  dis- 
closed the  fact  that  the  Allies  were  unready.  Their  previous  offensives  had 
disclosed  the  same  weakness.  Now  it  was  clear  that  only  by  heroic  efforts 
could  they  check  a  German  attack.  They  could  not  break  the  German 
lines,  they  could  only  with  difficulty  hold  their  own.  The  whole  British 
front  had  been  affected  by  the  attack  and  new  dispositions  had  to  be  made. 

Before  she  went  east,  Germany  had  undertaken  one  attack  to  dem- 
onstrate that  she  need  fear  no  real  danger  from  the  Anglo-French  quar- 
ter. She  had  established  the  fact.  Not  until  September  would  her 
western  lines  be  threatened  and  not  until  July,  1916,  would  the  British 
be  ready  to  take  an  effective  share  in  the  western  offensive  operations. 
The  legend  of  "Kitchener's  Million"  disappeared  in  thin  air,  the  hope 
of  the  speedy  deliverance  of  France  vanished,  the  first  authentic  sign 
of  German  recovery  was  now  perceived  by  the  world  which  was  to  have 
a  second  and  greater  proof  in  a  few  hours. 

In  the  major  problem,  to  reorganize,  to  get  forward  in  time  to  take 
the  pressure  off  Russia,  France  and  Britain  had  failed  at  the  moment 
when  the  Russian  strength  was  becoming  inadequate  for  the  task  on  the 
Russian  front. 


CHAPTER  FOURTEEN 
CONCLUSION 

While  the  echoes  of  the  guns  about  Ypres  were  filHng  the  world,  the 
Austro-German  army  of  Mackensen  attacked  and  almost  destroyed  the 
Russian  army,  commanded  by  Radko  Dimitriefif— the  victor  of  Lule 
Burgas — which  stood  behind  the  Dunajec  River,  in  western  Galicia.  The 
immediate  consequence  of  this  disaster  was  the  dislocation  of  the  whole 
Russian  front;  the  eventual  result,  the  retreat  from  the  Carpathians  and 
the  Vistula  to  the  Dwina  and  the  Beresina. 

These  great  events  do  not  concern  the  present  narrative,  they  be- 
long, as  I  see  it,  to  the  second  phase  of  the  war,  the  attack  upon  Russia. 
With  the  Battle  of  the  Dunajec  ends  that  first  phase,  comprehended  in 
the  attack  upon  France  and  the  consequences  of  this  attack.  These 
consequences,  since  the  attack  failed,  were  the  deadlock  in  the  west 
and  the  loss  to  Germany  of  the  initiative  in  the  east  and  west.  To 
obtain  the  necessary  numbers  to  deal  the  colossal  blow  that  should 
destroy  France,  Germany  had  weakened  her  eastern  front  and  relied 
upon  Austria  to  hold  up  Russia.  Still  relying  upon  Austria  mainly, 
after  the  Marne,  Germany  had  elected  to  endeavour  to  reopen  the 
decision  of  the  Marne  in  all  the  weeks  from  September  to  the  middle  of 
November. 

Compelled  at  last  to  go  east,  while  the  Battle  of  Flanders  was  still 

unwon  and  the  decision  of  the  Marne  stood,  Germany  had  then  to  labour 

under  the  disadvantages  which  had  resulted  from  the  successes  won  by 

Russia  over  Austria  and  the  position  gained  in  Galicia.     Not  until 

the  Dunajec  did  Germany  finally  restore  the  balance,  not  until  the 

Dunajec  did  she  escape  from  the  consequences  of  the  Marne  campaign, 

consequences  which  aff^ected  the  eastern  quite  as  much  as  the  western 

field. 

Had  the  Allies  been  prepared  to  take  the  offensive  in  the  west, 

274 


CONCLUSION  275 

when  Germany  at  last  turned  eastward  in  November,  they  would  have 
won  the  war.  Had  they  been  able  in  the  spring,  when  the  German  at- 
tack at  the  Dunajec  began,  to  make  a  similar  attack  in  the  west,  Ger- 
man disaster  would  have  been  immediate.  The  failure  in  the  autumn 
enabled  Germany  to  erect  those  colossal  dykes  against  the  Allies  in  the 
west  which  extended  from  the  North  Sea  to  Switzerland.  Failure 
in  the  spring  condemned  Russia  to  bear  that  terrible  burden  which 
almost  brought  irreparable  disaster  and  real  German  victory. 

In  the  spring  of  191 5  it  was  plain  that  the  advantage  belonged  to  the 
alliance  which  could  strike  the  first  heavy  blow,  but  the  superficial  circum- 
stances alike  favoured  the  Allies  and  seemed  to  indicate  that  they  would  be 
able  to  retain  the  initiative  which  they  had  won  at  the  Marne  and  bring 
Germany  to  swift  and  complete  defeat.  All  this  was  impossible  because 
Great  Britain  had  been  unable  to  transform  herself  into  a  military  nation 
and  to  do  in  months  what  her  Allies  and  enemies  had  achieved  only 
by  long  years  of  patient  and  universal  training.  As  for  France,  she 
lacked  the  numbers,  now,  to  risk  alone  the  supreme  effort,  for  if  it  failed, 
German  victory  in  the  west,  while  Britain  was  still  unprepared,  was 
inevitable. 

In  this  situation  there  was  allowed  to  Germany  a  new  opportunity, 
and  as  it  turned  out,  another  year,  in  which  to  win  the  war.  If  she  could 
dispose  of  Russia  and  return  to  the  west  before  Britain  had  at  last  organ- 
ized her  millions  and  her  industries,  she  might  hope  for  the  complete  vic- 
tory that  had  escaped  her  in  the  Marne  conflict.  But  if  she  failed  in  the 
east,  if  she  were  compelled  to  come  west  with  the  Russian  task  incom- 
plete, as  she  had  been  compelled  to  go  east  while  France  still  stood,  then 
German  failure  in  the  second  phase  would  be  as  patent  as  it  was  now  in 
the  first. 

Only  victory  in  the  east,  followed  by  triumph  in  the  west,  could  per- 
manently abolish  the  decision  of  the  Marne.  Unless  it  was  abolished 
the  time  was  bound  to  come  when  Germany  would  have  to  face  fresh 
millions  coming  from  Britain  and  find  herself  outnumbered  and  deprived 
of  all  the  advantages  that  superior  preparation  and  organization  had 
given  her  at  the  start.     This  is  what  did  happen,  but  not  until  the  sum- 


276  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

mer  of  1916.  And  as  it  did  happen  the  decision  of  the  Marne  stood,  and 
stands,  the  one  great  event  in  the  whole  World  War  from  August,  19 14, 
to  September,  1916. 

All  that  the  science,  knowledge,  skill,  genius  of  two  races  could  mo- 
bilize met  at  the  Marne  in  a  struggle  in  which  the  fate  of  one  race,  at  least, 
was  in  the  balance,  and  if  France  fought  for  life,  Germany  fought  for  a 
world  power  that  could  hardly  have  escaped  her  had  she  prevailed.  But 
she  did  not  prevail ;  everything  she  hoped  to  attain  escaped  her  on  this 
field.  Afterward  she  still  had  numbers,  the  fruits  of  her  years  of  prepa- 
ration remained  in  her  hands,  but  the  moment  had  escaped  her  and  did  not 
return.  Had  Napoleon  won  at  Waterloo,  his  old  domination  of  Europe 
would  not  have  been  regained,  but  had  Germany  won  at  the  Marne, 
William  H  would  have  attained  an  eminence  that  Napoleon  never 
reached  in  his  most  fortunate  hour. 

At  the  Marne,  France  willed  to  live;  in  the  gravest  hour  in  the  his- 
tory of  their  race,  French  commanders  and  French  soldiers  alike  dis- 
played not  merely  the  courage  that  was  traditional  and  was  equalled  by 
German  devotion,  but  those  qualities  which  have  often  given  France  the 
supremacy  in  Europe  and  have  never  failed  to  save  her  when  her  condi- 
tion seemed  desperate.  And  by  her  will  to  live,  France  saved  Britain, 
Russia,  Europe,  from  a  German  domination,  which  in  the  German  mind 
was  to  renew  the  glories  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

A  second  sacrifice  and  a  second  agony  were  to  be  demanded  of  the 
French  people  at  Verdun,  but  the  stakes  of  that  terrible  contest  were  in- 
comparably smaller,  and  the  greatest  possible  fruit  of  German  victory  on 
the  Meuse  would  have  been  provinces  and  indemnities.  Nor  was  there 
ever  a  grave  danger  of  this  harvest.  At  the  Marne,  Germany  fought  for 
a  World;  at  Verdun,  for  a  War;  and  while  she  fought  at  Verdun,  her 
statesmen  talked  of  a  victorious  peace,  which  if  it  still  indicated  great 
ambitions,  no  longer  disclosed  Napoleonic  aspirations. 

With  all  its  mighty  events,  with  all  its  noble  and  splendid  pages,  the 
history  of  the  first  two  years  of  the  great  conflict  is  the  history  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne.  We  have  seen  in  these  chapters  how  Germany 
strove  to  abolish  that  decision;  we  shall  see  in  those  which  describe  the 


CONCLUSION  277 

attack  upon  Russia  how  she  continued  to  strive  to  abolish  it  in  tremen- 
dous struggles  from  the  Straits  of  Dover  to  the  Golden  Horn,  from  the 
Meuse  to  the  Beresina;  but  after  splendid  successes,  we  shall  see  the 
continuing  failure.  Like  Marathon,  the  Marne  was  a  mortal  wound; 
but,  unlike  Marathon,  it  did  not  kill  at  once. 


Mr.  Simonds's  History  of  the  Progress 
OF  THE  War  Will  Be  Carried  For- 
ward IN  THE  Succeeding  Volumes. 

Editor 


PART  II 

I 

THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR.    MOBILIZATION  FOR  WAR 
BY  AN  AMERICAN  MILITARY  EXPERT 

II 

TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR 

M.  DELCASSE.  BY  STEPHANE  LAUZANNE 

MARECHAL  JOFFRE.  BY  STEPHANE  LAUZANNE 

HI 

REPORTS  OF  EYE-WITNESSES  AND  PERSONAL  ADVENTURES 

THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM.      BY  ARNO  DOSCH-FLEUROT 

IV 

HOW  BRITAIN  DID  THE  JOB 

BY  IAN  HAY  (CAPTAIN  BEITH) 

V 

THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA 

BY  STANLEY  WASHBURN 

VI 

HOW  THE  NAVY  SAVED  ENGLAND 

BY  WINSTON  CHURCHILL 

VII 
THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY 
BY  WALDEMAR  KAEMPFFERT  AND  CARL  DIENSTBACH 

VIII 

FLYING  MACHINES  AND  THE  WAR 

BY  ORVILLE  WRIGHT  AND  FRED  C.  KELLY 

IX 

LANGUAGE  OF  THE  BIG  GUNS 

BY  HUDSON  MAXIM 


I 

THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR 

By  AN  AMERICAN  MILITARY  EXPERT 

MOBILIZATION  FOR  WAR 

The  mobilization  of  a  country  for  war  means  the  putting  into  effect  of  all 
measures  necessary  to  pass  from  a  quiet,  peaceful  community  to  a  military 
state  in  which  the  strong  hand  of  military  power,  as  exemplified  in  the  chief 
executive  of  the  State,  reaches  out  to  all  parts  of  the  whole  national  fabric — ■ 
the  men,  the  animals,  the  industries,  the  soil  itself  and  all  its  products.  It 
means  the  assembling  of  the  military  companies,  regiments,  brigades,  divisions, 
and  army  corps  which  form  the  actual  fighting  units  that  enter  into  the  cam- 
paign. It  means  the  gathering  together  of  the  State's  human  resources,  in  and 
even  out  of  the  country,  so  as  to  supply  them  with  food,  weapons,  clothing, 
transportation,  and  medicines.  It  means  the  supplying  of  the  navies,  the 
building  of  new  ships,  the  closing  of  harbours  with  mines  and  submarine  nets, 
the  patrolling  and  defence  of  all  frontiers,  and  measures  for  the  protection  of  all 
bridges,  railroads,  and  highways.  In  other  words,  it  means  the  putting  into 
actual  effect  of  the  million  and  one  things  which  are  necessary  to  defend  the 
country  in  case  of  an  attack  from  an  enemy.  Every  thinking  person  in  the 
United  States  must  realize  something  of  what  this  means  when  he  recalls  the 
early  months  of  1917,  when  war  with  Germany  at  last  seemed  imminent. 

Mobilization  does  not  in  itself  imply  the  transportation  of  all  the  men  and 
material  which  are  assembled  in  various  places  to  engage  in  the  war.  This  is 
termed  concentration:  that  is,  after  all  the  military  organizations  are  assem- 
bled and  equipped  at  their  home  stations,  near  where  the  men  that  compose 
them  reside,  they  are  moved  to  the  frontiers,  and  wherever  they  are  needed,  by 
rail  or  ship.  Where  a  nation  is  bounded  by  strong  antagonists  who  are  thor- 
oughly prepared  and  ready  to  take  the  offensive,  the  full  power  of  that  nation 
is  put  into  motion  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  in  order  to  prevent  complete 
disaster.  In  countries  of  this  kind  all  the  departments  of  the  State,  when  the 
mobilization  is  ordered,  have  been  already  thoroughly  organized  and  all  work 
together  for  the  complete  military  efficiency  of  the  country.  They  have  all 
been  trained,  long  ahead  of  time,  to  know  exactly  what  this  means.  Each 
military  unit,  each  factory,  and  all  supplies  have  been  assigned  their  exact 
places  in  time  of  peace,  and  every  man  knows  what  to  do  when  the  summons 
is  issued.     All  the  civil  functions — courts,  police,  municipal,  State  and  national 

281 


282  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

authority — are  directed  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  miUtary  head  of 
the  nation,  and  no  project  is  gone  into,  either  political,  commercial,  or  financial, 
which  will  not  benefit  the  military  situation  and  help  out  the  armies  and 
navies  that  are  attempting  to  gain  mastery  over  the  enemy.  The  whole  idea 
of  the  mobilization  and  after  this  of  the  concentration  of  the  troops  against  the 
enemy  is  to  make  all  persons  in  the  country  work  as  a  team,  from  the  factory 
workers  and  the  farmers  at  home  to  the  commander-in-chief  handling  the 
armies  in  the  field. 

France  offers  one  of  the  best  examples  of  a  well-organized  country.  This 
was  amply  demonstrated  in  the  first  part  of  the  present  World  War.  Even 
the  minutest  details  of  French  mobilization  had  been  carefully  arranged  years 
ahead  of  time.     The  army  of  France  consists  of  three  classes. 

First  let  us  speak  of  what  is  known  as  the  active  army — that  is,  the  first 
line,  which  contained  the  younger  men  who  were  expected  to  stand  the  brunt 
of  the  heaviest  fighting.  This  is  the  part  of  the  army  which  is  kept  con- 
stantly under  arms  in  time  of  peace  and  through  which  every  man  in  the 
country,  physically  able  for  service,  passes  to  gain  his  military  education;  for 
France,  as  is  the  case  with  all  countries  in  Europe,  requires  all  its  citizens  to  be 
ready  to  serve  in  the  army  in  tune  of  peace  so  as  to  prepare  them  for  war. 

The  next  class  is  called  the  reserve,  and  is  composed  of  men  just  older  than 
those  in  the  active  army.  Most  of  these  are  from  twenty-seven  to  thirty-five 
years  of  age,  the  superior  limit  being  thirty-seven  years.  They  are  men  with 
families,  with  responsible  positions  in  civil  life,  and  of  course  at  their  age  are 
more  settled  in  their  habits  and  occupations,  and  consequently  are  not  so 
active  as  the  younger  men  who  compose  the  first  line.  These  men  still  are 
able  to  endure  great  hardship  and  even  to  engage  in  campaigns,  but  they  are 
not  expected  to  stand  exposure  and  hard  marching  to  the  same  extent  as  the 
younger  men  of  the  active  army. 

The  third  class,  known  as  the  territorial  army,  is  composed  of  men  over 
thirty-seven  years  of  age.  Many  of  these  are  now  serving  in  the  field  army, 
as  all  differences  as  to  classes  of  troops  have  now  been  abolished.  The  terri- 
torials ordinarily  are  not  supposed  to  serve  in  a  campaign  but  are  used  for 
the  protection  of  railroads,  bridges,  important  factories,  works,  and  stores  in 
the  interior  of  the  country  near  where  they  reside.  They  are  especially  useful 
for  this  purpose  because  they  know  most  of  the  residents  in  their  part  of  the 
country  and  all  of  those  who  are  engaged  or  will  be  engaged  in  the  military 
preparations  necessary  in  their  especial  localities,  because  these  are  rehearsed 
so  often  in  time  of  peace.  In  France  the  same  persons  who  rehearse  them 
in  time  of  peace  execute  them  in  time  of  war. 

Mobilization  of  the  active  army  in  France  meant  merely  filling  up  the 
ranks  to  war  strength  with  the  men  who  had  left  during  the  previous  two  years. 
The  active  armies  in  all  European  countries  in  time  of  peace  have  from  one  half 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  283 

to  two  thirds  of  their  full  strength  on  duty  with  the  colours  as  compared  with 
their  full  strength  in  time  of  war,  so  that  when  the  reserves  of  the  active  army 
are  called  upon,  each  knows  his  place  in  the  ranks.  Each  man,  when  he  leaves 
the  active  army  in  France,  at  the  conclusion  of  his  two  or  three  years  of  service 
or  course  of  instruction,  is  given  a  little  book,  in  the  back  of  which  is  pasted  a 
leaf  of  instructions.  This  tells  him  in  the  minutest  detail  where  he  should  re- 
port in  case  of  mobilization,  what  railways  he  should  take  from  his  home  to  get 
to  his  regiment  or  battery,  on  which  day  of  mobilization  he  should  report,  and 
even  the  hour  of  the  day  on  which  he  should  join  the  colours.  Nor  were  these 
instructions  handed  to  him  in  a  perfunctory  manner;  pains  were  taken  to  see 
that  he  knew  and  thoroughly  realized  what  they  meant  so  that  there  could  be 
no  doubt  of  his  intelligent  action  when  the  call  came. 

Mobilization  of  the  whole  country  in  France  required  about  sixteen  days. 
This  meant  putting  all  parts  of  the  army — active,  reserve,  and  territorial — ■ 
on  a  thorough  war  footing,  and  organizing  all  the  industries  so  that  they  would 
be  in  condition  to  supply  the  sinews  of  war.  Of  course,  long  before  this  time 
had  expired,  hundreds  of  trains  were  speeding  to  the  front,  loaded  with  troops, 
while  other  regiments  were  being  formed  behind  them  to  fill  up  the  empty  cars 
on  their  return  from  carrying  up  the  first  contingents. 

The  general  mobilization  in  France  was  announced  on  the  afternoon  of 
August  I,  1914,  throughout  the  whole  Republic.  Before  this,  although  some 
few  military  movements  had  taken  place,  the  people  generally  had  heard  only 
vague  rumours  of  such  a  procedure.  As  is  usually  the  case  in  an  ordinary  peace- 
ful community,  most  persons  had  succeeded  in  dismissing  these  disturbing 
thoughts  from  their  minds,  so  that  when  the  actual  summons  came,  it  burst 
like  a  bombshell  among  this  industrious  people. 

The  announcement  of  the  great  event  was  made  in  various  ways  in  the 
different  localities,  in  accordance  with  the  custom  prevailing  in  the  particular 
place.  In  some  towns,  church  bells  were  tolled;  in  many,  drummers  paraded 
the  streets;  and  in  others,  trumpets  called  the  people  together  for  the  announce- 
ment. Usually  the  police  read  the  notice  to  the  people  at  the  street  corners, 
or,  if  in  the  country,  at  the  meeting  places,  cross  roads,  or  churches.  Notices 
were  conspicuously  posted  at  all  points  of  vantage.  They  were  sent  out  by  the 
civil  functionaries  particularly  charged  with  this  duty.  These  had  been  keep- 
ing the  blanks  for  years,  all  ready  for  the  eventful  day,  and  all  that  they  had  to 
do  was  to  fill  in  the  date  and  send  messengers  to  the  various  points  in  their 
precincts  which  already  had  been  selected.  For  some  days  before  the  actual 
notice  was  posted,  word  had  been  quietly  passed  around,  to  each  one  sub- 
ject to  call,  to  have  ready  certain  articles  which  he  was  expected  to  fur- 
nish for  himself.  This  was  particularly  the  case  with  shoes.  As  the  French 
troops  have  always  been  famous  for  their  marching,  the  importance  of  having 
good  shoes  for  a  campaign  is  probably  more  highly  appreciated  in  that  country 


284  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

than  in  any  other.  Little  groups  of  men  had  been  coming  and  going  at  the 
cobblers'  shops  for  days,  while  the  cobblers  worked  night  and  day  to  finish  up 
their  customers'  shoes.  Ail  preferred,  when  they  first  went  out,  to  wear  shoes 
that  had  been  worn  a  little  and  walked  in,  instead  of  brand-new  ones  that 
might  hurt  their  feet  for  several  days  and  render  them  incapable  of  marching. 
The  cobblers  themselves  soon  joined  their  respective  organizations  and  made 
ready  to  repair  the  shoes  of  their  comrades  in  much  the  same  way  as  a  black- 
smith reshoes  the  horses  in  a  cavalry  regiment. 

When  the  actual  mobilization  was  announced,  the  men  in  the  first  line  were 
required  to  join  their  organizations  by  noon  of  the  next  day.  Imagine  a  man  in 
the  country,  in  the  interior  of  France,  a  farmer  or  labourer,  a  banker  or  a  mer- 
chant, when  he  first  heard  the  notice  of  mobilization  on  August  ist.  The  first 
thing  he  did,  of  course,  was  to  look  in  his  precious  little  book  to  be  sure  of  his 
instructions,  and  to  see  the  hour  and  the  minute  on  which  his  train  would  leave 
for  the  headquarters  of  his  regiment.  If  his  book  had  been  lost  he  reported  to 
the  nearest  local  functionary,  who  directed  him  how  to  proceed,  and  in  addition 
gave  him  a  printed  card  with  all  necessary  instructions.  The  local  officials  also 
took  charge  of  all  the  wives,  children,  and  domestic  animals  that  had  to  be  left 
behind  by  the  departing  soldiers.  Arrangements  were  made  at  once  for  their 
care  and  subsistence  while  the  soldiers  were  away.  Each  district  is  always  pre- 
pared to  supply  everything  necessary  to  families  that  are  unable  to  earn  their 
own  living  when  the  master  of  the  house  departs. 

On  leaving  his  home,  the  man,  now  transformed  from  his  ordinary  char- 
acter into  that  of  a  soldier,  took  with  him  his  two  pairs  of  precious  marching 
shoes,  one  slightly  used  and  one  brand  new.  He  took  socks,  underwear, 
tobacco,  toilet  articles,  and  the  clothes  he  had  on.  Everything  else  needed  for 
his  military  equipment  he  would  find  at  the  barracks  of  his  company.  Upon 
arrival  at  the  railway  station  he  found  all  the  conductors,  engineers,  switch- 
men, firemen,  in  fact  all  employees  of  the  railroad,  incorporated  in  the  mili- 
tary service.  All  these  had  passed  automatically  under  military  jurisdiction, 
put  on  a  uniform,  and  become  part  of  the  army.  The  town  through  which  he 
walked  on  his  way  to  the  railway  station  was  now  under  the  strictest  police 
control.  Everything  was  quiet.  The  strong  arm  of  the  law  of  war  and  military 
power  could  be  felt  to  pervade  everything. 

The  French  soldier  seldom  becomes  riotously  drunk — as  do  Americans, 
Englishmen,  and  Irishmen — because  he  seldom  drinks  whisky  or  other  hard 
liquor — with  one  exception.  He  likes  absinthe;  but  the  sale  of  this  intoxi- 
cant was  prohibited  at  the  first  call  of  mobilization.  At  the  railroad  station 
a  large  area  was  fenced  in  for  the  exclusive  use  of  soldiers,  and  lights  were  pro- 
vided so  that  the  whole  space  could  be  illuminated  at  night  to  facilitate  the  en- 
trainment  of  the  troops.  In  different  corners  of  this  area  around  the  station 
the  men  belonging  to  the  various  regiments  in  that  particular  part  of  the 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  285 

country  were  assembled  into  little  groups,  so  that  those  assigned  to  each  regi- 
ment could  proceed  together  and  not  become  mixed  with  other  contingents 
when  the  cars  approached  for  their  accommodation.  Here  our  soldier  met 
many  of  his  old  comrades  who  had  served  with  him  during  his  period  with  the 
active  army,  and  the  actuality  of  impending  events  was  brought  forcibly  to  his 
mind.  All  thoughts  of  home  and  family  now  were  set  aside  and  their  place  was 
taken  by  reflections  as  to  what  would  happen  and  what  could  be  done  to 
overcome  the  obstacles  ahead.  Within  a  few  minutes  the  group  of  men  to 
which  he  had  attached  himself  passed  out  to  the  railway  siding  where  the  cars 
were  in  readiness.  These  were  ordinary  baggage  cars,  transformed  into  rough 
passenger  carriages  by  having  benches  put  into  them.  Thousands  of  cars 
were  equipped  in  this  manner  as  if  by  magic,  because  the  benches  had  been 
ready  for  years,  stored  in  convenient  localities  from  which  they  made  their 
appearance  at  once  when  mobilization  was  ordered.  The  cars  in  France  are 
small.  Each  one  held  only  thirty-two  men  sitting  back  to  back  in  the  centre, 
while  the  rest  of  the  space  was  taken  up  by  their  luggage.  After  a  triprof 
an  hour — during  which  of  course  the  discussion  centred  upon  where  their 
regiment  might  be  going,  where  the  first  battles  would  take  place,  and 
whether  everything  would  move  as  planned — they  arrived  at  the  town  which 
was  the  headquarters  of  the  regiment.  Many  trains  were  encountered  on 
the  way,  all  moving  north  and  filled  with  men,  horses,  artillery,  and  supplies; 
and  a  few  cars  already  emptied  were  met,  passing  back  to  the  south  for  their 
second  load. 

On  ahghting  from  the  train  our  soldier  marched  with  his  comrades  to  the 
barracks  of  his  regiment.  Here  he  quickly  found  his  company  which,  within  the 
hour,  had  procured  uniforms,  arms,  knapsacks,  and  other  equipment  from  the 
regimental  storehouse.  This  was  all  new  material  which  had  been  kept  in 
good  condition  and  added  to  from  day  to  day  in  the  expectation  of  just  such  an 
event  as  this.  The  size  of  the  garments  was  suitable  for  each  person  and  the 
material  the  best  that  could  be  had.  Each  day  for  years  the  minutia  of  the 
arrangements  necessary  to  equip  the  soldiers  had  been  attended  to,  and  all  of 
these  matters  had  been  gone  over  time  and  time  again  before  the  mobilization, 
until  every  detail  was  considered  to  be  as  nearly  perfect  as  it  was  possible  to 
make  it.  They  had  never  been  tried  out  in  actual  war,  however,  and  there 
were  many  who  had  misgivings  as  to  their  efficiency.  But  the  mobilization 
worked  out  with  the  utmost  perfection.  Not  a  hitch  occurred.  By  the  after- 
noon of  the  second  day  the  active  army  was  on  a  thorough  war  footing  at  its 
home  stations,  and  our  soldier  was  completely  equipped  from  head  to  foot  with 
the  uniform  and  arms  of  the  Republic.  The  regiments  were  all  ready  to  entrain 
and  move  to  the  frontier  where  concentration  would  take  place.  It  is  true 
that  the  soldiers  still  had  the  red  trousers  and  blue  coats  worn  by  the  troops 
for  many  generations.   There  were  some  who  contended  that  the  bright  colours 


286  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

were  too  conspicuous  for  modern  war;  that  they  would  form  an  excellent  target 
to  an  enemy  thousands  of  yards  away.  But  this  feeling  was  drowTied  by  the 
sentiment  that  clung  to  the  old  uniform  which  had  seen  the  troops  of  the  Re- 
public victorious  on  hundreds  of  battlefields.  Clad  in  these  colours,  Napoleon's 
victorious  legions  had  conquered  the  world.  The  most  glorious  pages  of  French 
history  were  brightened  by  the  old  uniform.  What  would  the  soldiers  think  of 
themselves  if  their  glory  was  quenched  by  the  dirt-gray  uniforms  which  their 
principal  antagonists,  the  Germans,  had  adopted  as  their  campaign  equipment? 
It  is  hard  for  people  outside  of  France  to  understand  how  strong  was  the  senti- 
ment attaching  to  these  colours.  It  cost  them  dear  in  lives,  in  the  early  part 
of  the  war,  before  they  consented  to  change  to  an  inconspicuous  garb. 

These  splendid  troops  embarked  by  regiments  on  their  waiting  cars,  and  as 
each  station  was  passed  the  number  of  trains  constantly  increased.  For  the 
army  corps  to  which  each  regiment  belonged  was  being  gathered  together. 
Finally  the  total  number  of  trains  moving  forward  for  this  single  army  corps 
exceeded  one  hundred.  These  carried  all  the  artillery,  all  the  infantry,  cavalry, 
ammunition,  and  wagons  necessary  for  a  body  of  upward  of  45,000  men.  In 
fact,  during  the  first  few  days  of  August,  there  were  more  than  100,000  cars 
moving  through  France,  and  not  a  hitch  occurred  an5Tvhere.  When  the  army 
corps  in  its  railway  trains  arrived  at  its  destination  and  the  unloading  began, 
each  detail  had  been  worked  out  as  to  where  the  organizations  which  they  bore 
should  go.  Platforms  had  been  erected  to  facilitate  the  unloading  of  wagons 
and  animals.  It  takes  even  longer  to  unload  trains  than  to  load  them;  but  the 
operation  had  been  performed  many  times  in  mancEuvres  and  was  well  under- 
stood. 

There  was  great  fear  that  the  Germans  might  be  enabled  to  break  through 
the  frontier  troops  by  mobilizing  and  concentrating  more  rapidly.  Then  they 
could  get  into  the  interior  of  France,  blow  up  bridges  and  other  strategic  points 
on  the  railways,  and  thus  seriously  hinder  an  orderly  concentration.  The 
frontier  troops,  however,  stood  their  ground  in  excellent  fashion  and  all  trains 
moving  to  the  front  averaged  eighteen  miles  an  hour.  When  the  French 
realized  that  all  the  active  army  corps  had  arrived  at  their  appointed  places  in 
such  excellent  order,  a  great  feeling  of  confidence  pervaded  the  country.  Not 
only  did  the  army  corps  arrive  promptly,  but  the  great  field  armies,  which  con- 
sisted of  from  five  to  six  army  corps,  or  about  250,000  men,  were  organized 
without  delay.     This  again  added  confidence  to  the  whole  French  army. 

It  is  difficult  to  realize  the  amount  of  preparation  necessary  to  accomplish 
so  orderly  a  mobilization,  and — although  each  man  thought  that  such  an 
act  would  cause  new,  strange,  and  undreamed-of  feelings  and  occurrences— 
when  the  actuality  presented  itself  everything  seemed  perfectly  natural  and 
simple  because  it  had  been  rehearsed  and  thought  about  so  many  times  before. 
In  France  each  man  was  made  to  think,  from  the  time  that  he  was  a  raw 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  287 

recruit,  that  the  fate  of  his  country  might  hang  on  his  action  in  an  emergency. 
And  when  the  hour  came  he  proceeded  to  do  his  duty  in  a  quiet,  intelligent 
manner. 

Not  only  France,  but  all  other  countries  in  Europe,  South  America,  and 
even  Asia  are  now  arranged  in  a  military  way  so  that  they  can  mobilize  in  an 
extremely  short  space  of  time.  All  of  them  use  about  the  same  system.  They 
require  each  man,  when  he  comes  of  age,  either  to  undergo  military  training  or 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness  for  such  duty.  The  country  is  divided  into  various 
districts  for  military  purposes  and  from  each  one  of  these  districts  a  certain 
army  unit  is  raised  in  time  of  peace.  When  war  comes  each  district  has  its 
particular  functions  to  perform  and  no  additional  orders  are  necessary  in  the 
emergency.  The  districts  in  Europe  are  organized  on  a  basis  of  what  are 
called  army  corps.  Army  corps  are  Uttle  armies  in  themselves.  That  is,  they 
have  all  branches  of  the  military  service  in  them— artillery,  cavalry,  infantry, 
engineers,  air  troops,  and  supply  trains.  When  on  a  war  footing,  they  have  al- 
together about  50,000  men  in  their  ranks  and  as  auxiliaries.  These  are  the  or- 
ganizations which  enter  the  campaigns  and  do  the  actual  fighting,  several  of 
them  being  grouped  together  into  the  great  aggregations  now  alone  known, 
technically,  as  armies. 

Now  it  is  these  units,  these  army  corps,  that  are  mobilized  and  filled  up  to 
get  into  the  field  when  war  begins.  They  are  called  tactical  units,  because 
tactics  is  that  part  of  the  military  art  which  pertains  to  action  on  the  field  of 
battle.  When  these  troops  leave  home,  other  military  organizations  take  their 
places.  These  are  constantly  being  filled  up  with  recruits  to  supply  the 
vacancies  left  by  drafts  into  the  active  army,  which  make  good  the  losses  that 
take  place  in  the  field.  In  fact,  in  the  present  war,  some  of  the  organizations  in 
the  German  army  had  to  be  completely  replenished  two  or  three  times  in  the 
first  few  months.  That  is,  a  battalion  which  started  out  with  a  thousand  men 
had  to  be  supplied  with  three  thousand  men  during  the  first  months  to  keep  its 
strength  to  one  thousand  at  all  times.  This  does  not  mean  that  all  of  the  men 
were  killed,  but  that  this  number  had  to  be  supplied  to  take  the  place  of  sick 
and  wounded,  and  those  who  had  dropped  out  from  exposure,  fatigue,  and  other 
causes.  Of  course  many  joined  and  rejoined  two  or  three  times.  One  can 
easily  realize  the  great  perfection  that  a  system  must  have  in  order  to  keep  up 
with  these  tremendous  demands. 

The  army-corps  districts  each  contain  acertain  number  of  able-bodied  young 
men  capable  of  bearing  arms.  For  instance,  an  army-corps  district  may  have 
400,000  able-bodied  young  men  in  it  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  thirty- 
seven  years.  In  time  of  peace  this  district  contains  one  army  corps  of  50,000 
men.  It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  these  50,000  men  may  be  replenished  eight 
times  in  case  of  necessity,  and  therefore  if  the  equipment,  uniforms,  and 
supplies  are  on  hand,  and  if  the  men  have  previously  been  trained,  additional 


288  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

army  corps  can  be  organized  very  easily.  Now  the  Germans  had  about 
400,000  able-bodied  young  men  in  each  of  their  army-corps  districts,  and  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  they  had  ready  sufficient  equipment  for  turning  out,  in- 
stead of  one  army  corps  from  each  district,  four  army  corps. 

Each  year  recruits  were  called  to  the  colours  and  served  their  allotted  time 
of  two  or  three  years  according  to  whether  they  were  with  the  infantry,  cav- 
alry, or  artillery.  After  this  they  were  turned  into  the  reserve.  In  Germany 
only  about  55  per  cent,  of  the  total  number  of  young  men  available  each  year 
were  called  on  for  military  service,  because,  among  other  things,  the  expense  of 
their  maintenance  was  very  great  and  because  they  were  needed  in  industrial 
pursuits.  Every  one,  however,  was  listed,  and  many  of  those  who  did  not  pass 
regularly  through  the  ranks  of  the  army  received  a  certain  amount  of  military 
training  which  fitted  them  for  certain  work.  Every  man,  be  it  understood, 
knew  his  appointed  place  when  mobilization  was  ordered.  When  the  call 
came,  therefore,  instead  of  only  twenty-five  army  corps  taking  the  field,  which 
is  the  number  of  army-corps  districts  Germany  had,  each  army  corps  formed 
three  more  in  its  district,  and  one  hundred  army  corps  were  put  into  the  field 
within  a  very  short  time  after  the  war  began.  This  was  the  surprise  that  Ger- 
many sprung  on  the  AlHes.  It  required  200,000  men  for  the  field  organiza- 
tions out  of  approximately  400,000  in  each  army-corps  district,  and  left  behind 
a  reserve  of  100  per  cent.  There  was,  therefore,  a  total  of  about  ten  million 
able-bodied  young  men  who  could  be  used  for  active  military  service.  About 
half  of  these  had  been  thoroughly  trained  before  the  war  began  and  the  other 
half  were  immediately  placed  in  training.  Each  year  a  certain  number  of 
youths  become  of  military  age  in  each  country  and  the  various  nations  figure 
out  their  campaigns  so  as  to  make  their  annual  contingents,  as  they  are  called, 
supply  the  annual  losses.  If  the  annual  contingents  of  youths  are  not  suf- 
ficient to  cover  the  losses  due  to  the  war,  the  nation  constantly  grows  weaker, 
and  of  course  if  the  losses  are  great  enough  will  eventually  lose  in  the  struggle, 
mainly  through  shortage  of  men.  If,  however,  the  campaigns  are  so  con- 
ducted that  the  losses  will  not  exceed  materially  the  annual  contingent  a  nation 
will  never  run  short  of  men.  Sometimes  the  nation  is  able  to  control  this  and 
sometimes  it  is  not.  Everything  depends  upon  the  expertness  with  which  it 
handles  its  troops  and  upon  the  pressure  which  is  brought  to  bear  by  the  enemy. 

In  the  army-corps  districts,  the  boundaries  of  which  are  prescribed  as 
definitely  as  the  boundaries  of  states  are  established  in  the  United  States,  every 
horse  and  mule  is  listed  and  assigned  to  its  place  in  the  military  service,  be  it 
with  the  active  army,  with  the  depot  organizations,  or  held  in  reserve  for  an 
emergency.  All  motor  transportation  suitable  for  military  service  receives  a 
small  subsidy  in  time  of  peace,  or  is  developed  in  some  other  way  with  a  view 
to  its  use  in  time  of  war.  The  drivers  of  all  motor  trucks  stay  with  them  when 
they  go  into  service.     They  know  exactly  where  to  go  when  mobilization  is 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  289 

ordered.  All  arms  and  clothing  factories,  all  producers  of  foods  are  assigned 
their  place  in  ^the  general  system.  Each  army-corps  district  has  its  com- 
mander, both  in  peace  and  in  war,  designated  beforehand.  If  the  active  corps 
have  gone  to  war,  the  command  of  the  district  is  left  usually  to  an  old  general 
who  has  commanded  troops  in  this  same  district  when  young  and  in  active  ser- 
vice. Some  of  the  old  generals  now  serving  in  Europe  in  this  home  service  are 
more  than  seventy  years  of  age,  but  they  are  still  bright,  alert,  and  ready  to  ad- 
minister their  commands. 

The  army-corps  districts  are  grouped  together,  for  purposes  of  control  and 
administration,  into  larger  ones  called  army  districts,  which  correspond  to 
the  plan  for  grouping  the  army  corps  for  duty  in  the  field.  These  army  dis- 
tricts in  turn  are  handled  directly  by  the  supreme  military  commander  of  the 
State,  who  is  always  nominally  the  King,  Emperor,  or  President  of  the  country. 
Actually  they  are  handled  by  the  Army  General  Staff. 

All  miUtary  organizations  and  systems  are  made  as  simple  as  possible  be- 
cause, under  the  great  strain  of  a  rapid  mobilization,  particularly  while  such 
enormous  numbers  of  human  beings  are  moving  about  from  place  to  place, 
mistakes  are  apt  to  occur  which  may  result  in  the  most  serious  consequences. 
The  more  complicated  a  system  is,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  a  mistake  will  be 
made.  And  so  the  greatest  simplicity  is  required  throughout.  Ordinarily, 
not  more  than  five  different  units  or  duties  are  prescribed  for  any  one  person  to 
handle,  because,  if  more  than  this  number  are  to  be  watched  by  any  one  in- 
dividual, some  will  probably  be  forgotten,  with  consequent  injury  to  the  rest. 
Therefore  efficient  military  organization,  from  the  top  down,  allows  to  each 
commander  not  more  than  five  things  to  watch  or  administer.  For  instance, 
the  general  headquarters  of  any  one  group  of  armies  will  have  five  armies  to 
watch;  each  army  commander  will  have  five  army  corps  to  watch;  each  army- 
corps  commander  has  to  watch  his  two  divisions  of  infantry,  his  artillery,  his 
cavalry,  and  his  special  troops;  and  so  on,  down.  Sometimes  this  number  must 
be  varied  according  to  the  circumstances,  but  it  is  the  average  which  all  attempt 
to  maintain,  with  the  object  of  keeping  the  machinery  as  simple  as  possible. 

All  countries  use  the  same  general  system  of  mobilization.  The  greatest 
precautions  are  taken  to  insure  the  means  of  transportation,  such  as  railroads, 
especially  junctions.  In  a  well-organized  nation,  each  man  on  the  day  ap- 
pointed knows  and  goes  to  his  place,  and  the  country  by  one  step  transforms 
itself  from  a  peaceful  industrial  community  into  an  active  military  body  ready 
to  strike,  and  strike  hard.  This  is  the  operation  of  mobilization,  and  although 
tremendously  difficult  to  carry  out  smoothly,  it  is  only  the  beginning  of  war. 
Think  of  what  it  means  when  the  details  of  a  great  mobilization  have  not  been 
worked  out  in  advance — ^when  it  is  necessary  to  do  these  things  after  war  is  de- 
clared or  when  war  is  imminent! 

On  account  of  its  great  expense,  its  interruption  of  the  ordinary  pursuits  of 


290  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  people,  and  its  very  great  influence  on  industry,  mobilization  is  a  serious 
matter,  never  ordered  unless  war  is  practically  a  certainty. 

Even  after  mobilization  is  carried  out  efficiently — that  is,  when  all  the 
stores  and  men  and  organizations  have  been  assembled  at  their  home  stations^ 
there  remains  the  complicated  and  difficult  process  ot  transporting  large  mili- 
tary units  to  the  actual  place  where  they  are  going  to  fight.  This  is  done  by 
railroads,  steamships,  or  marching,  as  the  case  may  be.  In  the  United  States 
the  distances  are  so  great  that  if  the  map  of  Europe  were  applied  to  this  country 
the  distance  travelled  by  New  York  troops  to  the  Mexican  border  at  El  Paso 
would  be  almost  as  great  as  from  Petrograd,  Russia,  to  Genoa,  Italy,  and  the 
distance  from  the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Coast  is  much  greater. 

Where  speed  is  an  important  military'  consideration  against  an  active 
enemy,  transportation  is  a  difficult  and  complicated  process.  Railroad  sched- 
ules have  to  be  made  out  for  each  organization  and  railroad  cars  have  to  be 
distributed  so  that  movements  shall  not  interfere  with  each  other.  When  it  is 
realized  that  an  army  corps  of  50,000  men  requires  from  100  to  125  thirty-car 
railway  trains  for  its  transportation,  it  may  be  appreciated  how  great  is  the  task 
of  military  concentration  particularly  as  thirty  or  more  army  corps  may  need  to 
be  concentrated  at  one  time  on  a  single  front,  as  was  actually  done  in  some 
countries  in  Europe.  One  wrecked  culvert,  bridge,  or  tunnel  on  a  main  line 
might  completely  negative  the  plans  for  a  whole  campaign  and  bring  about  de- 
feat. 

It  IS  difficult  for  a  person  not  conversant  with  military  methods  to  realize 
how  carefully  the  railway  lines  of  Europe  were  guarded  in  August,  1914. 
Thousands  of  soldier-laden  trains  were  moving  in  every  country.  The  safety  of 
these  countries  depended  upon  the  safe  and  punctual  arrival  of  the  trains  at 
their  appointed  destinations.  Ordinarily  the  armies  of  the  European  coun- 
tries can  be  completely  mobilized  in  four  or  five  days.  Their  concentration  by 
railroads  on  the  frontiers  requires  from  ten  days  to  two  weeks  more.  The 
whole  process,  therefore,  of  turning  out  the  troops  and  actually  putting  them  in 
the  field  requires  from  two  to  three  weeks.  All  tliis  time  the  full  military 
power  of  the  State  is  developing,  and  great  precautions  are  taken  to  guard  it 
from  interference.  For  this  reason  fortifications  and  garrisons  are  maintained 
at  important  points  near  the  border  so  as  to  protect  the  troops  while  they  are 
being  carried  from  their  home  stations  to  the  frontier.  These  frontier  troops  are 
maintained  at  war  strength,  or  nearly  so,  during  peace;  very  much  as  the  regu- 
lar army  is  in  the  United  States.  They  are  ready  to  defend  themselves  at  an 
hour's  notice,  and  are  expected  to  hold  back  their  opponents  for  a  time,  long 
enough  to  allow  their  own  armies  to  assemble  and  concentrate  behind  them  for 
the  campaign. 

On  the  French  and  German  borders  when  the  war  broke  out  these  frontier 
troops,  or  covering  troops  as  they  are  called,  met  the  attacks  of  each  other 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  291 

wherever  it  was  possible  and  held  each  other  in  play  while  their  armies  made 
ready  behind  them.  Arrangements  of  this  kind  are  made  everywhere,  accord- 
ing to  locality,  both  on  land  and  sea.  The  great  masses  of  troops  are  assembled 
in  accordance  with  the  plan  that  has  been  decided  upon  for  the  campaign :  that 
is,  whether  the  armies  immediately  after  concentration  shall  move  into  the 
enemy's  country  or  whether  they  shall  assume  the  defensive  and  let  him  at- 
tack first. 

Where  circumstances  permit,  countries  at  war  always  prefer  to  attack  first 
and  carry  on  an  offensive  campaign;  for  offensive  war  is  what  wins.  In  accord- 
ance with  what  is  known  of  an  enemy's  dispositions,  troops  are  assembled  along 
the  frontiers  and  concentrated  into  the  larger  armies  for  the  actual  strokes. 
As  they  arrive  they  are  unloaded  and  marched  forward  to  their  respective  posi- 
tions. All  the  roads  over  which  they  are  to  advance  by  marching  have  been 
selected  previously.  As  each  army  corps  detrains,  it  forms  and  begins  its 
march  to  the  front.  The  campaign  then  begins  in  dead  earnest.  Casualties 
occur  which  cause  a  stream  of  wounded  and  incapacitated  persons  to  start 
flowing  from  the  front  to  the  rear.  Not  only  persons,  but  horses,  motor 
vehicles,  and  all  sorts  of  supplies  which  have  been  hurt  or  damaged  in  the 
campaign  are  moved  to  the  rear  for  medical  assistance  or  repairs.  The  places 
of  these  have  to  be  taken  by  fresh  personnel  and  material  sent  up  from  the 
home  country,  so  that  behind  a  well-organized  army  to-day  a  constant  stream 
of  personnel  and  equipment  flows  to  the  rear  while  another  stream  of  fresh 
personnel  and  equipment  flows  forward  by  a  different  channel. 

The  degree  of  efficiency  of  all  these  plans  and  arrangements  depends  pri- 
marily on  how  accurately  conditions  have  been  studied  and  arranged  for  before- 
hand in  time  of  peace.  Of  course  the  first-line  troops  of  the  active  armies  go 
into  the  field  before  all  others,  and  as  soon  as  these  have  been  marched  into  the 
campaign  the  second-line  troops,  or  those  a  little  older,  follow  them  up.  The 
second-line  troops  man  the  frontiers  and  occupy  the  fortresses  which  are  main- 
tained as  rallying  places  for  the  armies  in  case  they  are  defeated.  Forts  are 
placed  at  vital  points  such  as  where  a  network  of  great  roads  comes  together, 
at  important  crossings  of  rivers,  opposite  great  passes  in  mountains,  or  as  bars 
to  easy  lines  of  approach  by  the  enemy.  The  great  entrenched  camps  are 
capable  of  holding  several  army  corps.  Their  defensive  works  are  made  up 
of  embankments,  trenches,  barbed-wire  entanglements,  and  other  obstacles 
that  will  help  to  hold  an  enemy  off  for  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  allow  the 
armies  to  reform  behind  them  and,  where  reformed,  quickly  to  take  the  offen- 
sive from  them.  Sometimes  the  second-line  troops  are  actually  put  into  the 
field  with  the  first-line  armies.  This  is  now  the  case  both  in  France  and  Ger- 
many, so  that  the  duty  of  looking  after  the  permanent  forts  and  all  the  commu- 
nications within  these  countries  is  left  to  still  older  men.  In  fact,  in  the  interior, 
men  up  to  sixty  years  of  age  can  be  utilized  to  advantage. 


292  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Properly  trained  officers  are  very  difficult  to  supply  after  war  has  begun,  or 
in  fact  at  any  time.  Casualties  among  officers  in  the  present  war  have  been 
very  heavy  because,  at  the  beginning,  each  nation  attempted  to  carry  out  its 
purpose  in  the  shortest  time  possible,  and  all  officers  were  ordered  to  expose 
themselves  without  reserve.  The  greatest  exertions  are  now  being  made  to 
fill  their  places.  In  Germany,  selected  men  who  have  good  educations  are 
taken  from  the  different  military  organizations  in  the  field  and  sent  to  military' 
schools,  where  they  receive  additional  training  for  several  months,  to  fit  them  to 
become  officers.  They  are  then  sent  back  to  their  regiments.  In  this  way  the 
officer  material  is  provided  for,  although  of  course  these  men  are  not  so  good 
officers  as  those  trained  before  the  war.  The  training  received  in  actual  war, 
however,  counts  for  a  great  deal.  Other  countries  also  have  an  efficient  system 
for  keeping  up  the  supply  of  officers.  England  actually  maintains  schools  for 
officers  on  the  Continent,  right  behind  her  armies  that  are  engaged  in  combat. 
This  brings  the  practical  realities  of  warfare  very  close  to  those  who  are  being 
instructed. 

Each  war  has  the  effect  of  developing  many  instruments,  devices,  and 
supplies  which  have  never  been  known  before,  for  necessity  is  the  mother  of  in- 
vention. For  instance,  during  the  Napoleonic  wars,  sugar  was  extracted  from 
beets,  as  none  could  be  imported  during  the  blockade.  During  the  present  war, 
benzol  has  been  extracted  from  coal  by  the  Germans,  for  use  instead  of  gaso- 
lene in  motor  vehicles.  It  was  an  incident  of  warfare.  Troops  in  this  war 
have  been  able  to  go  from  one  place  to  another  more  quickly  than  at  any 
time  before,  because  of  the  unprecedented  use  of  motor  vehicles  and  other 
mechanical  transportation.  Electrical  means  of  communication  have  been  so 
perfected  that  vastly  greater  numbers  of  men  can  be  handled  than  ever  before, 
while  air  craft  have  brought  about  means  of  reconnaissance  which  were  unheard 
of  and  even  undreamed  of  in  former  campaigns. 

An  accurate  timing  of  military  movements  of  all  sorts  Is  one  of  the  very  im- 
portant things  in  war,  and  the  nation  has  a  great  advantage  that  can  foresee 
just  vv'hat  its  enemy  will  do  and  just  what  time  it  will  take  him  to  do  it.  In  esti- 
mates of  time  the  elements  of  distance  and  numbers  are  very  clearly  defined 
factors,  to  each  of  which  must  be  assigned  a  value  and  a  relative  efficiency;  that 
is,  whether  the  enemy  is  organized  so  as  to  be  better  in  battle  or  on  the  march 
than  one's  own  troops.  Mere  numbers  in  themselves  mean  very  little.  What 
numbers  are  able  to  do  depends  entirely  on  their  efficiency.  For  instance,  a 
great  mob,  although  it  may  have  a  clearly  defined  purpose,  we  may  say,  of 
destroying  a  building  or  of  lynching  a  person  confined  in  a  jail,  is  easily  handled 
by  a  well-organized  group  of  men  perhaps  only  one  twentieth  as  strong  in 
numbers.  In  fact,  numbers  in  themselves  are  dangerous,  because  a  very  num- 
erous army  is  apt  to  lack  cohesion;  and,  defeated,  is  not  able  to  escape  nearly  so 
easily  as  a  small  force  under  the  same  circumstances.    In  war  the  attacker  al- 


THE  NEW  SCIENCE  OF  WAR  293 

ways  covers  the  maximum  space  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible  so  as  to  catch 
his  adversary  before  he  is  entirely  ready  to  begin.  He  attempts  to  gain  con- 
trol of  important  points  in  the  enemy's  country.  Such  a  point,  for  instance,  is 
New  York.  An  attacker  would  at  once  attempt  to  gain  the  city  of  New  York, 
which  is  the  greatest  port  and  railway  centre  of  the  East.  The  defender,  on  the 
other  hand,  strives  to  maintain  unimpaired  the  means  of  resistance  afforded  by 
his  country,  and  covers  the  distance  as  quickly  as  possible  in  order  to  stop  the 
enemy  from  accomplishing  his  object. 

During  mobilization,  every  detail  which  will  gain  time  or  delay  an  enemy  is 
of  the  utmost  consequence.  This  element  of  time  is  considered  so  important  by 
belligerents  that  they  go  to  any  lengths  to  destroy  the  enemy's  communica- 
tions, his  railroads,  tunnels,  ships,  and  roadways.  Usually  spies  are  stationed 
in  a  prospective  enemy's  country  with  this  object  in  view.  The  mobilization 
plans  of  a  country  going  to  war  must  contemplate  not  only  that  its  troops  will 
be  victorious  in  the  field,  but  also  that  they  may  be  defeated  and  that  resistance 
may  have  to  be  kept  up  for  a  long  time,  even  for  a  period  of  years,  before  it  is 
successful.  The  longer  a  country  is  able  to  maintain  itself  and  offer  resistance, 
the  greater  is  the  hope  of  ultimately  wearing  out  the  enemy  and  of  obtaining 
assistance  from  some  exterior  source. 

To-day  difficulties  in  the  way  of  rapid  mobilization  are  perhaps  greater  than 
ever  before  in  history,  on  account  of  the  masses  of  men  to  be  moved  and  the  in- 
tricate and  complicated  means  of  moving  them.  These  great  masses  of  men 
are  almost  entirely  dependent  on  railroads  for  their  food,  ammunition,  and 
stores.  With  the  smaller  armies  of  ancient  days,  food  could  be  obtained  in  the 
immediate  vicinity,  from  the  country  itself,  but  these  days  are  long  since 
passed.  The  huge  armies  of  to-day  cannot  be  provisioned  from  so  small  a 
territory.  War  to-day  must  contemplate  not  only  Immediate  destruction  of  the 
hostile  army,  but  more  than  ever  before  the  cutting  off  of  its  means  of  com- 
munication so  that  the  enemy  cannot  obtain  necessary  food  and  munitions. 

Mobilization,  therefore,  signifies  preparation  in  the  most  efficient  manner 
possible,  by  every  means  known  to  a  country  for  furthering  its  military  objects. 
It  is  not  enough  merely  to  defeat  an  enemy.  Each  defeat  must  be  a  Hnk  in  the 
chain  of  his  destruction.  If  a  victory  uses  up  the  attacker  more  than  it  does  his 
enemy,  it  might  under  certain  circumstances  be  more  costly  ultimately  than  a 
defeat.  The  necessity  should  be  apparent,  therefore,  to  all  military  nations 
that  they  must  have  well-thought-out,  consistent  programmes,  to  be  followed 
in  case  of  war.  This  has  always  been  a  difficult  matter  for  States  given  over  to 
party  governments.  Such  States  are  ordinarily  run  by  discussion  and  ruled  by 
speech,  with  the  result  that  the  governments  are  conducted  not  necessarily  by 
the  greatest  administrators  but  more  often  by  the  most  fluent  talkers.  "  For  he 
who  thinks  aright  but  cannot  communicate  his  thoughts  in  a  telUng  speech  is 
just  as  insignificant  in  a  democracy  as  if  he  could  not  think  at  all."    Great  men 


294  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  action  are  seldom  good  orators  and  good  orators  are  seldom  great  men  of 
action.  Consequently,  to  carry  out  a  good  military  mobilization,  a  nation 
should  be  taught  to  have  great  confidence  in  its  military  leaders  and  to  rely 
on  their  judgment,  initiative,  and  ability.  This  confidence  should  be  con- 
tinually fostered  by  educational  preparation  in  time  of  peace. 


MAN-SAVING: 

THE  WORK  OF  THE  RED 
CROSS  AND   ITS   ALLIES 


Copyright  by  Undenvood  y  Underwood 

A  RED  CROSS  STEAMER,  LADEN  WITH  NURSES,  LEAVING  NEW  YORK  HARBOUR  FOR 

THE  THEATRE  OF  WAR 


THE  RED  CROSS  ON    THE  BAllLEEIEED 

An  aid  station  in  the  trenches  (upper  left)  where  the  wounded  first  receive  a  doctor's  care  and  are  pre- 
pared for  the  journey  back  to  the  dressing  station.  A  wounded  soldier  in  the  trenches  {upper  right),  bandaged- 
and  ready  to  be  sent  to  the  aid  station.  The  trip  back  to  the  field  hospital,  first  by  bearers  {tozver  left)  then 
by  horse  ambulance  (Inwer  right) 


AN  AMBULANCE  ON  RAILS 

One  method  of  transporting  tlie  wounded  on  the  French  front  from  field  hospital  to  evacuation  hospital. 
Each  ot  these  little  cars  has  room  for  four  stretchers  which  are  hung  on  springs. 


A  FIELD  HOSPITAL 
At  field  hospitals  like  these  the  seriously  wounded  are  cared  for  until  they  can  be  sent  to  the  base  hospitals. 


1  HE   I'AKT  OK  PRIESTS  AND  NUNS 
The  priests  administered  the  last  rites  to  the  dying,  and  succoured  the  wounded  after  the  French  stand  at  the  Meuse. 
Little  Belgian  children  were  being  taught  the  alphabet  in  the  schoolroom  shown  in  the  lower  picture  a  short  time 
before  it  became  a  hospital  for  wounded  Germans. 


MME.  CARREL  FLUSHING  A  WOUND 
The  new  process  of  woiind-flusliing  in  operation.     Mme.  Carrel  says  "no  man  lias  yet  died  from   liis  wounds  in  our 


hospital;  indeed,  the  only  one  vvc  have  lost  at  all  died  from  pneumonia 


Cn/.vMtK  I'V  i'n.hr;iooiltS'  V lulcniood 


THE  CARREL  HUSFllAL 
An  operation  at  the  Carrel  Hospital  at  Compiegne,  France.     Dr.  Carrel's  new  method  of  irrigatins;  wounds  is  very 
successful.     Patients  are  turned  out  perfectly  cured,  many  of  whom  without  the  use  of  the  new  system  would  be  Ute- 


long  cripples. 


Copyright  by  UndeTZCOod  \s'  i  ndencood 

MISS    MURIKL   THOMPSON,   A    BRITISH    NURSE       SERBIAN  RED  CROSS  NURSE  AT  WORK  IN  A 
WHO  WAS  DECORATED  BY  KING  ALBERT  FOR  HOSPITAL  AT  BELCRAD 

HER  BRAVERY  UNDER  FIRE 


C-i;yright  by  the  International  Nfzc J  Strnuc 

STRETCHER-BEARERS  AT  WORK  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE 
They  show  more  interest  in  the  photographer  and  less  solicitude  for  their  burden  than  do  the  tiirbaned  bystanders. 


Copyright  by  Underzcood  ^  Underwood 

WRECK  OF  A  RED  CROSS  TRAIN  AND   IHE  MARY  BRIDGE  ACROSS  THE  MARNE 


Copyright  by  ihi-  InUmai'.onul  Atas  Servici: 

KED  CROSS  NURSES  AS  STRETCHER-BEARERS 


Cvpxrighi  by  the  International  News  Sen^ice 

COMPETENT  NURSING  HAS  PUT  THIS  LIITLE  MAN  UPON  HIS  FEET  AGAIN 
At  the  moment  he  appears  to  be  actually  enjoying  the  war. 


II 

TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  AND  THE 
WORLD  WAR 

By  STfiPHANE  LAUZANNE,  Editor  of  the  Paris  Matin 

1.— M.  DELCASSE 

In  the  month  of  July,  1898,  M.  Theophile  Delcasse,  the  newly  appointed 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  took  possession  of  the  Minister's  suite  of  offices,  and 
installed  himself  in  the  famous  room  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  His  first  act  was  to 
change  the  position  of  the  historic  table  which  had  once  belonged  to  Vergennes. 
On  this  table  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  between  England  and  France  is  said 
to  have  been  signed.  It  used  to  stand  in  the  centre  of  the  Minister's  room,  a 
little  in  shadow.  M.  Delcasse  had  it  placed  near  the  window,  full  in  the  light. 
Talking  with  an  intimate  friend  on  this  same  day  he  declared  frankly: 

"There  is  much  to  be  done.  But  first  of  all  we  shall  adjust  all  the  points  of 
difficulty  which  exist  to-day  in  the  relations  between  France  and  England." 

The  friend  supposed  him  to  be  joking.  These  difficulties  were  many; 
the  problems  included  Egypt,  Siam,  the  Soudan,  Newfoundland,  Morocco. 
One  need  be  dowered  with  a  stout  heart  to  undertake  to  settle  all  these. 

M.  Delcasse  did  have  a  stout  heart,  and,  what  is  even  better,  perseverance. 
In  1899  a  preliminary  agreement  was  signed  estabhshing  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish spheres  of  influence  in  the  Soudan  and  on  the  white  Nile.  But  this  was  only 
a  minor  affair.  The  crucial  difficulty  was  Egypt  itself,  which  France  had 
formerly,  and  which  England  then,  claimed.  How  was  this  to  be  settled?  M. 
Delcasse  considered  that  the  best  arrangement  would  be  the  one  which,  once 
for  all,  should  settle  all  colonial  differences  between  the  two  countries.  To 
England,  Egypt,  that  is  to  say  Eastern  Africa;  to  France,  Morocco  contiguous 
to  Algeria,  that  is  to  say  Western  Africa.  All  the  rest  was  only  what  might  be 
called  "the  trimmings"  to  make  the  portion  of  each  equal  and  complete. 

In  1902  his  aims  were  accomplished.  A  general  agreement  was  signed,  and 
according  to  the  prediction  made  when  he  entered  upon  his  duties  at  the  Quai 
d'Orsay,  "all  the  points  of  difficulty  were  adjusted."  France  and  England 
could  shake  hands. 

M.  Delcasse,  turning  then  toward  Italy,  signed  with  her  some  months 
later  an  almost  identical  agreement.  He  mapped  out  the  spheres  of  influence 
of  each  of  the  two  countries  as  he  had  done  with  England,  obtaining  from  Italy 
a  pledge  of  non-interference  m  all  matters  save  those  concerning  Tripoli. 

303 


304  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Moreover,  Italy — although  continuing  her  alliance  with  Germany  and  Austria 
— engaged  never  to  become  in  any  way  an  instrument  of  aggression  in  their 
hands  against  France.  Italy  and  France  were  once  more  sisters  and  friends,  as 
in  the  past. 

There  remained  Germany. 

M.  Delcasse  was  blamed  that  he  had  not  turned  to  Germany  as  to  England 
and  Italy — that  he  had  not  treated  her  as  he  had  the  neighbours  to  the  west  and 
south  of  France.  This  reproach  was  entirely  undeserved.  To  begin  with,  he 
had  only  one  subject  to  discuss  with  Germany — Alsace-Lorraine.  But  that  was 
the  very  subject  which  Germany  always  refused  to  discuss.  Then,  every  time 
M.  Delcasse  tried  to  confer  with  Germany  he  encountered  as  an  interlocutor 
one  who  dodged  and  dissembled,  one  who  refused  to  speak  clearly  and  frankly. 

The  following  anecdote  in  this  connection  is  eminently  characteristic: 

In  1899,  when  Englandwasinthemidstof  the  Boer  War,  the  German  Foreign 
Office  all  at  once  found  an  occasion  to  remark  to  M.  Delcasse  that "  it  was  a  great 
pity  that  France  and  Germany  never  sought  to  come  together  for  a  chat.'' 

"The  two  countries,"  Germany  went  on  to  say,  "had  every  reason  for 
coming  to  an  understanding.  United,  they  would  be  able  to  do  great  things 
and  would  be  practically  masters  of  the  world." 

Somewhat  surprised  at  this  unlooked-for  proffer  of  friendship,  M.  Delcasse 
thought  that  he  had  better  consult  the  President  of  the  Republic  (then  M. 
Loubet),the  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (then  M.  Waldeck-Rousseau), 
'and  his  other  colleagues.  The  Council  was  inclined  to  suspect  either  a  trap,  or 
an  intrigue  directed  against  England.  Nevertheless,  there  was  no  reason  for  re- 
fusing to  discuss  matters.  It  is  the  custom  of  France,  when  addressed,  to  make 
a  suitable  reply. 

So  M.  Delcasse  replied  to  Germany:  "You  speak  of  'getting  together!' 
What  do  you  mean?  You  say  there  is  good  reason  why  we  should  understand 
one  another.  What  is  this  reason  ? "  These  were  pointblank  questions,  at  once 
frank  and  loyal.  But — neither  the  following  day  nor  the  day  after  that,  nor 
ever,  has  France  received  any  answer.  Germany  has  never  once  mentioned  this 
advance.  She  seems  unaware  of  having  made  it.  But  to-day,  when  one 
studies  Germany's  diplomatic  methods,  it  is  easy  to  perceive  what  she  had  in 
mind;  she  was  trying  to  tempt  France  into  vague,  mysterious  negotiations 
with  no  definite  object.  Then  she  would  go  to  England  with  the  tale  that 
"  France  is  conspiring  with  us  against  you."  In  a  word,  her  object  had  been  to 
start  a  quarrel  between  France  and  England. 

But,  it  has  been  said,  M.  Delcasse  might  have  talked  with  Germany  upon 
his  own  initiative  about  another  subject — Morocco.  To  this  he  has  always  re- 
plied that  there  was  no  more  reason  for  consulting  Germany  about  Morocco, 
than  for  consulting  the  United  States  or  Austria.  Germany  had  no  special  in- 
terest in  Morocco.    The  Mediterranean  Powers  were  the  ones  interested  there 


TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  305 

and  there  were  good  reasons  for  consulting  them.  But  Germany  is  not  a 
Mediterranean  Power,  and  on  several  occasions  Prince  Bismarck  himself  de- 
clared that  Germany  had  no  intention  of  meddling  in  the  Mediterranean 
question. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  Germany  perceived  that  M.  Delcasse  v^^as  her  enemy  and 
determined  to  get  rid  of  him.     In  1904  she  managed  to  do  so. 

Having  recourse  to  the  habit  of  unmannerly  bluster  which  had  many  times 
served  her  ends,  Germany  announced  in  April,  1904,  that  she  would  not 
recognize  the  French  Agreement  of  Morocco,  because  there  had  been  no  inter- 
national conference  on  the  subject.  The  Kaiser  embarked  for  Tangier  where 
he  made  a  noisy  speech,  and  France  was  startled  by  the  spectre  of  war.  In  1904 
she  was  neither  in  a  moral  nor  material  sense  ready  for  war.  She  believed  in 
international  peace,  in  the  friendship  of  nations,  and  in  compulsory  arbitration. 
Her  arsenals  were  empty.  Moreover,  a  good  many  Frenchmen  refused  to  be- 
lieve that  this  was  a  premeditated  scheme  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  bully  and 
to  threaten  France.  In  short,  the  majority  thought  it  necessary  to  yield. 
France  yielded.  M.  Delcasse  tendered  his  resignation  and  left  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs  where  he  had  been  in  office  for  seven  years. 

To-day,  in  mentally  reviewing  this  period,  one  asks  which  service  of  M. 
Delcasse  was  the  greater;  that  he  had,  by  dint  of  the  magnificent  work  of  seven 
years,  made  friends  with  England  and  Italy;  or  that,  in  the  moment  of  his  swift 
descent  from  power,  he  had  unveiled  the  brutal  designs  of  Germany  before 
the  whole  of  Europe. 

"Germany,"  he  once  said  to  me,  "understands  and  respects  only  one  thing 
— force.  Those  who  speak  of  coaxing  Germany  or  of  making  concessions  to  her, 
stupidly  deceive  themselves.  If  you  are  so  unlucky  as  to  allow  Germany  to  get 
hold  of  even  one  finger,  she  will  seize  your  whole  hand,  then  your  arm,  then 
your  shoulder.  Your  whole  body  soon  will  be  in  her  clutches.  There  is  no  need 
to  provoke  Germany;  but  when  one  is  face  to  face  with  her  and  sure  of  one's 
position,  one  must  be  bold  and  resolute.     No  weakness!" 

And  he  added: 

"Those  who  have  sacrificed  me  to  German  bluster  have  thought  that  this 
would  settle  everything.  What  a  mistake!  Germany  demands  not  merely  a 
sacrifice  of  our  pride.  She  calls  for  territory  and  money.  She  intends  to  rule 
and  to  dominate  the  world,  and  is  resolved  that  her  interests  shall  be  served 
before  the  rights  of  others  are  considered." 

It  is  remarkable,  recalling  to-day  these  phrases  of  more  than  thirteen  years 
ago,  to  see  how  exact  was  the  estimate  of  the  man  who  formulated  them,  how 
clear  was  his  vision  of  the  cataclysm  about  to  be  let  loose  upon  the  world. 

France  was  soon  to  see  who  was  right  and  who  was  wrong.  Incident  swiftly 
succeeded  incident,  at  Morocco  and  elsewhere;  the  deserters  of  Casablanca, 
Agadir,  the  descent  of  German  dirigibles  on  French  territory. 


3o6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

M.  Delcasse,  meanwhile,  in  dignified  retirement,  set  himself  to  work.  He 
devoted  his  attention  to  the  navy,  wishing  to  see  France  take  her  place  among 
the  great  naval  powers.  In  191 1  he  returned  to  office  as  Minister  of  Marine 
and  remained  in  that  position  for  two  years,  labouring  incessantly  for  the  re- 
plenishment of  arsenals,  the  letting  of  armour  contracts,  and  the  building  of  the 
fleet  which  was  destined,  when  the  time  came,  to  join  England's  navy  in  the 
task  of  assuring  to  the  Allies  their  supremacy  upon  the  sea. 

In  1914,  when  war  was  declared,  all  turned  to  M.  Delcasse.  He  had  fore- 
seen the  war.  Now  that  it  had  come,  if  France  found  herself  not  isolated,  but 
with  strong  allies,  she  owed  this  state  of  affairs  to  him.  Therefore,  when  the 
French  Ministry  of  National  Defence  was  formed  on  the  2d  of  September, 
1914,  M.  Delcasse  once  more  took  charge  of  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
after  an  absence  often  years,  reentered  the  office  on  the  Quai  d'Orsay  where  he 
had  signed  agreements  with  England  and  Russia,  and  where  he  had  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  alliance  which  to-day  unites  all  the  nations  of  the  Entente. 

On  resuming  his  duties  at  the  Foreign  Office,  his  very  first  act  was  a  master- 
stroke. During  the  forty-eight  hours  following  his  return  to  power,  he  nego- 
tiated the  famous  Agreement  of  London.     It  runs  thus: 

The  undersigned,  duly  designated  by  their  respective  Governments,  make  the 
following  declaration:  The  British,  French,  and  Russian  Governments  mutually 
engage  themselves  not  to  conclude  a  separate  peace  during  the  course  of  the  present 
war.  The  three  Governments  agree  that  when  the  time  comes  to  discuss  terms  of 
peace,  none  of  the  Allied  Powers  shall  state  the  conditions  of  peace  without  a  pre- 
liminary agreement  with  each  of  the  other  Allies. 

{Signed)  Paul  Cambon 

Benckendorff  (Comte  de) 
Edward  Grey. 

To  this  document  is  added  the  following  line: 


"  This  Declaration  will  be  published  to-day." 

(Signed)       Delcasse 


September  4,  1916. 


This  is  the  Constitution  of  the  Allies — the  solemn  pact  which  unites  them. 
It  is  the  wall  against  which  all  German  attempts  to  weaken  or  destroy  the 
alliance  have  thus  far  spent  themselves  in  vain.  If  M.  Delcasse  had  accom- 
plished nothing  else  during  his  second  Ministry,  he  would  still  have  herein 
rendered  once  again  a  service  of  incalculable  value  to  his  country. 

It  is  still  too  early  to  judge  his  work  during  the  first  year  of  the  war.  There 
was  one  incontestable  triumph — Italy's  entry  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  on  the 
23d  of  May,  191 5.  There  was  one  unavoidable  misfortune — Bulgaria's  entry 
on  the  side  of  Germany. 


TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  307 

The  policy  which  M.  Delcasse  followed  in  the  Balkans  was  very  simple,  yet 
one  must  recognize  a  certain  grandeur  in  his  conception.  This  policy  con- 
sisted in  lining  up  the  whole  group  of  Balkan  States  against  Germany.  To  do 
this  it  became  necessary  to  appease  the  irritated  Bulgarians  and  to  ask  certain 
sacrifices  of  the  Greeks,  the  Serbians,  and  the  Roumanians.  This  was  the  task 
which  M.  Delcasse  set  himself.  He  received  encouragement  from  England  and 
above  all  from  Russia,  who  took  it  upon  herself  to  guarantee  the  loyalty  of 
Bulgaria.  He  had  few  illusions  as  to  the  value  and  importance  which  attached 
to  the  cooperation  of  Greece,  and  to  him  the  great  essential  seemed  to  be  to 
reconcile  the  Serbs  and  Bulgars,  and  to  revamp  a  Balkan  alliance  against  the 
Central  Powers.  He  was  mistaken  and  he  failed;  but  the  long  train  of  mis- 
takes which  the  Balkans  have  inspired  during  the  last  two  years  largely 
extenuates  the  gravity  of  his  error.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  any  European  states- 
man who  should  suppose  it  possible  to  unite  peaceably  the  four  or  five  races 
who  dwell  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would  have  made  the  same  mistake.  Any 
European  statesman  who  places  much  confidence  in  any  Balkan  State  what- 
soever, and  who  is  simple  enough  to  judge  this  race  by  the  same  standards 
as  other  European  races,  would  be  fooled  the  same  way.  There  is  no  people 
in  the  world  to  whom  one  can  more  fittingly  apply  the  American  expression: 
"Champagne  taste,  beer  income."  Each  kingdom  in  the  Balkans  has  at  its  dis- 
posal resources  comparable  with  those  of  Switzerland  or  Colombia;  each  one,  if 
we  are  to  believe  what  they  tell  us,  should  about  equal  Austria  or  Brazil  in  area 
and  should  possess  dominion  over  all  the  Near  East. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  in  November,  191 5,  M.  Delcasse  quitted  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  for  the  second  time,  and  once  more  went  into  retirement. 

Those  who  care  to  be  just  must  recognize  that  he  was  the  one  who  con- 
structed the  bulwark  which  civilization  maintains  to-day  against  the  Central 
Powers.  He  it  was  who  first  perceived  the  German  peril  and  laboured  to  raise 
a  breastwork  against  it;  he  it  was  who  bound  together  the  group,  then  scat- 
tered, that  form  the  Allies  of  to-day;  he  it  was  who  laboured,  after  having 
reconciled  his  country  with  England,  to  reconcile  England  with  Russia.  And 
we  owe  it  to  him  that  the  4th  of  September,  1914,  did  but  cement  the  union  of 
the  Allied  Powers,  and  turned  the  adversaries  of  Germany  into  a  block  of  gran- 
ite so  hard  that  she  has  not  thus  far  been  able  to  chisel  off  a  single  particle. 

Because  of  this  the  name  of  Delcasse  will  always  remain  linked  with  the 
history  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  history  of  the  Allied  Powers  in  this  war. 

2.— marEchal  joffre 

Already  a  great  deal  has  been  written  concerning  Marechal  Jofi^re.  But 
much  remains  to  be  said  before  the  whole  story  is  told.  This  is  the  present 
writer's  excuse  for  the  following  sketch. 


3o8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

JofFre  deserves  the  credit  of  having  been  probably  the  only  one  to  foresee  the 
kind  of  war  in  which  the  world  is  now  engaged — a  slow-moving  war  along  vast 
fronts,  wherein  patience  is  more  serviceable  than  valour  and  enthusiasm  ac- 
complishes less  than  painstaking  calculation. 

Even  now  I  seem  to  hear  Joffre  saying: 

"Henceforth  it  will  not  be  commanders-in-chief  who  win  battles,  but  colo- 
nels and  even  simple  captains.  .  .  .  The  conflict  will  extend  along  a  front 
of  four  or  five  hundred  kilometres,  and  on  so  huge  a  field,  the  will  of  a  single 
man  cannot  take  hold.  No  finite  mind  can  contrive  and  play  tricks  upon  a 
checker  board  so  vast.  .  .  .  The  general  will  have  played  his  part  when  he 
has  assembled  in  the  chosen  region  all  the  armies  which  are  needed  there.  It  is 
the  colonels  and  captains  who  must  take  the  stage  as  soon  as  the  first  shots  are 
fired.  They  are  the  ones  by  whom  the  issue  of  the  engagement  must  be  de- 
cided. The  victorious  troops  will  be  those  who  can  hang  on  the  longest,  who 
have  the  best  wind,  the  strongest  grip,  the  most  unfaltering  faith  in  their 
ultimate  success." 

He  spoke  these  words  to  me  in  August,  1912,  a  few  days  before  going  off  to 
direct  the  grand  manoeuvres  of  the  French  army  in  Touraine.  The  Matin 
recorded  his  words  at  that  time.  But  I  should  never  have  forgotten  them  in 
any  case.  I  can  still  recall  how  he  looked  in  the  dim-Ht  room  of  the  Higher 
Council  of  War  at  the  Invalides;  I  can  still  recall  the  man  with  the  clear  blue 
eyes;  I  seem  still  to  hear  his  voice,  deliberate  and  almost  soft  in  tone.  Never 
did  eyes  see  the  future  more  clearly;  never  did  voice  utter  prophecy  more 
startlingly  realized. 

A  calmer  man  could  not  be  found  in  all  of  our  seething,  tumultuous  France. 
Self-possession  is  JofFre's  dominant  characteristic,  and  probably  it  was  to  this 
self-possession  of  his  that  France  owed  her  safety  in  the  month  of  September, 

I9H- 

In  those  days  the  responsibilities  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  were  over- 
whelming. If  there  was  little  confusion  in  our  souls  during  those  days,  we 
nevertheless  suffered  keenly.  Instead  of  the  expected  victory  in  Alsace  came 
ruinous  invasion — the  mighty  onrush  of  the  German  horde  advancing  on  Paris 
by  forced  marches.  The  Government  could  only  call  upon  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  to  "Hang  on  and  fight."  On  the  shoulders  of  Joffre  rested  the  burden 
of  France's  fate.  Strong  though  they  were,  he  was  forced  to  stoop;  but  his  soul 
never  yielded.  The  composure  which  he  owed  to  his  well-regulated  manner  of 
life  created  about  him  an  atmosphere  of  peace,  of  quiet  confidence. 

M.  Millerand  has  related  that  when  he  was  appointed  Minister  of  War, 
on  September  2,  1914,  his  first  thought  was  to  seek  out  General  Joffre.  He 
found  him  in  a  little  house  at  Romilly  on  the  banks  of  the  Marne — self- 
possessed,  quiet,  calm,  as  though  the  military  tragedy  then  being  enacted  was 
but  an  everyday  manoeuvre. 


TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  309 

General  JofFre  told  the  Minister  of  his  plans,  speaking  with  the  utmost 
simplicity  and  clearness;  and  M.  Millerand  says  that  when  he  came  out  of  the 
little  house  at  Romilly,  he  went  on  his  way  reassured  and  tranquil — greatly  im- 
pressed by  so  much  sang-froid.  Self-mastery  is  in  truth  the  first  step  toward  the 
conquest  of  fate.  At  the  solemn  hour  of  the  Marne  JofFre  was  master  of  him- 
self, even  as  a  Roman  emperor  in  the  hour  of  his  triumph  seemed  master  of  the 
world. 

France  is  proud  of  having  produced  the  greatest  soldiers  of  history,  but 
never  before  has  she  been  able  to  boast  of  a  soldier  so  simple.  Listen  to  this 
order  Issued  on  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  September,  1914,  when  the  victory  of 
the  Marne  was  assured : 

"  The  battle  which  has  been  in  progress  for  five  days  has  ended  in  victory. 
Our  vigorous  recovery  of  the  offensive  has  won  this  success.  One  and  all, 
officers  a7id  men,  you  have  responded  nobly  to  my  call.  Your  coun  ry  owes  you 
much." 

When  one  considers  that  the  victory  of  the  Marne  is  probably  the  greatest 
in  history,  it  follows  that  the  hero  of  the  Marne  is  the  greatest  victor  in  history. 
Is  it  not  then  remarkable  that  this  man  should  announce  his  success  in  terms  so 
measured,  so  unpretending,  so  restrained? 

It  makes  one  think  of  Fabius,  whom  the  Roman  legionaries  used  to  call 
"Cunciator"  ("The  Delayer");  but  JofFre  is  a  greater  and  better  man  than  was 
Fabius.  He  not  only  possesses  the  modest  simplicity  of  the  greatest  Roman 
generals,  but  all  the  good  qualities  of  the  French  also  are  his;  the  infinite  ca- 
pacity for  taking  pains,  the  ever-present  good  sense,  the  ingrained  thrift 
which  made  him  so  extremely  careful  in  his  expenditure  of  blood  and  soldiers. 
He  has,  too,  all  the  sparkle  of  the  French  esprit  and  all  the  Frenchman's  good 
humour. 

One  day  a  Paris  crowd  recognized  him  as  he  left  the  Foreign  Office,  where  he 
had  been  taking  part  in  a  great  Council  of  War.  He  and  his  automobile  were 
surrounded.  He  was  loudly  cheered,  and  as  he  placed  his  foot  on  the  step,  an 
anxious  voice  shouted :   "  When  will  the  war  end  ?" 

General  JofFre  smilingly  looked  the  crowd  over  and  then  turned  to  his 
chaufFeur: 

"You  have  heard,  Martin?    When  will  the  war  end?" 

The  whole  crowd  laughed  good-humouredly  and  cheered  him  louder  than 
ever.    This  mischievously  jocular  answer  was  Joffre,  pure  and  simple. 

His  soldiers  both  loved  and  respected  him,  and  bestowed  upon  him  the 
homely  sobriquet  of  "Grand-papa.  He  was  also  called  "Our  JofFre"  because 
they  felt  that  he  belonged  to  them  and  was  one  of  them;  because  he  was  all  that 
they  wished  him  to  be.  But  it  must  not  be  thought  that  JofFre  won  the  army's 
affection  by  overlooking  and  tolerating  peccadilloes.  Always  hard  upon  him- 
self, he  showed  that  he  could  be  equally  haxd  on  others.      Discipline  never 


3IO  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

boasted  a  more  inflexible  guardian.  He  had  no  pity  for  incapable  and  unlucky 
generals,  and,  in  less  than  a  year,  sixty-four  such  went  into  retirement  or  were 
relieved  of  their  commands.  Neither  would  he  tolerate  misdemeanours  on  the 
part  of  officers  or  the  rank  and  file.  When  he  learned  that,  on  the  battlefield  of 
the  Marne,  the  soldiers  were  occasionally  picking  up  the  pointed  helmets  of  the 
Prussian  dead  or  other  arms  and  equipment  of  the  enemy,  to  send  as  souvenirs 
and  trophies  to  their  families,  he  formally  forbade  such  practices  by  an  order 
couched  in  very  severe  terms.  This  order  was  ever  after  obeyed,  and  one  could 
see  the  soldiers  pass  without  a  glance  the  pointed  German  helmets  which 
strewed  the  roads  and  ditches.  Compare  this  strictness  with  the  easy-going 
tolerance  which  permitted  German  officers  to  carry  off  linen  and  crockery  found 
in  occupied  houses,  and  to  send  them  home  to  Germany  in  bales  and  packing- 
cases! 

Moreover,  the  soldiers  knew  that  their  "Grand-papa"  was  trying  in  every 
possible  way  to  save  their  lives.  It  was  General  Joffre  himself  who  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war  gave  the  order  for  discarding  the  too-visible  red  trousers  and  for 
the  substitution  of  greenish  blue  ones.  He  it  w^as  who  decreed  that  the  officers' 
red  caps,  which  served  so  well  as  targets  for  German  sharpshooters,  must  be 
covered;  that  all  decorations,  metal  buttons,  and  everything  that  could  serve 
as  something  to  aim  at,  must  be  done  away  with. 

"He  will  end,"  said  the  poilus,  laughing,  "by  making  each  one  ^ of 
us  wrap  himself  in  an  individual  cloud  which  will  make  us  completely  in- 
visible." 

What  remains  to  be  said.''  That  he  formulated  orders  and  rendered  de- 
cisions which  were  models  of  clarity,  brevity,  and  eloquence.''  .  .  .  The  well- 
known  order  of  the  day  on  the  eve  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  is  an  excellent 
example.  It  began  with  the  famous  sentence:  "Cost  •what  it  may,  the  hour  for 
the  advance  has  come:  let  each  man  die  in  his  place,  rather  than  fall  back."  This 
order  will  always  hold  a  glorious  place  in  the  annals  of  France.  It  is 
truly  a  pity  that  the  public  at  large,  the  foreign  nations,  cannot  be  familiar 
with  the  four  or  five  hundred  orders  of  the  day  which  he  composed  during  the 
period  when  he  was  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  army.  Their  prime 
characteristic  is  that,  as  one  reads  them,  one  wishes  constantly  to  shout  out 
"0/  course!  He  is  right!"  They  were  indeed  so  full  of  common  sense  that  no 
one  cared  to  discuss  them.     It  was  obviously  useless. 

On  the  24th  of  December,  1916,  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic, 
while  granting  him  a  well-earned  rest,  bestowed  upon  General  JoflTre  the  highest 
possible  military  honour  —  one  which  had  been  in  abeyance  for  forty-five 
years.  He  was  appointed  Marshal  of  France.  But  this  recompense  is  nothing 
beside  the  place  which  the  Victor  of  the  Marne  will  forever  hold  in  the  hearts 
of  the  French  people.     There  is  actually  not  a  cottage  throughout  all  France 


TWO  GREAT  FRENCHMEN  311 

which  does  not  contain  in  some  room  a  portrait  of  JofFre,  not  a  city  is  so  poor 
in  patriotism  tliat  it  does  not  boast  a  statue  of  Joffre  in  one  of  its  pubhc  squares. 
For  many  centuries  there  will  be  no  child  who  does  not  learn  to  spell  the  name 
of  Joffre.  For  countless  generations,  he  will  remain  the  revered  "Grand- 
papa" who  saved  the  whole  French  family  in  its  hour  of  peril. 


in 

REPORTS  OF  EYE-WITNESSES  AND  PERSONAL 

ADVENTURES 

1.— THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM 

By  ARNO  DOSCH-FLEUROT 

The  day  before  the  German  troops  entered  Brussels,  the  day  they  occupied 
Louvain,  on  August  19th,  three  other  American  correspondents  and  I  went  to 
Louvain  from  Brussels  in  a  taxicab.  Without  reahzing  it,  and  without  being 
stopped  by  outposts,  we  drove  directly  between  the  retreating  Belgians  and 
the  advancing  Germans.  We  were  trapped  in  Louvain,  and  when  the  Ger- 
mans learned  of  our  presence  they  held  us  there  three  days  on  parole.  This 
gave  us  time  to  know  and  love  that  charming  old  university  city.  Less  than 
a  week  later  two  of  us  returned  and  saw  it  burn 

In  those  days  in  Brussels  every  day  had  a  character  of  its  own,  and  this 
was  Wednesday,  the  day  after  the  Queen  and  the  Court  had  hurried  in  the 
night  to  Antwerp.  The  streets,  which  had  been  full  of  people  the  day  before, 
were  nearly  deserted.  The  few  pedestrians  hurried  along  silently.  Even  the 
civic  guards,  with  their  high-domed  hats  and  their  cockades,  no  longer  patrolled 
the  streets.  Only  the  Belgian  flags  hanging  from  every  house  front  showed 
that  the  city  was  not  half  empty. 

The  four  in  our  party,  Mr.  John  T.  McCutcheon,  Mr.  Will  Irwin,  Mr.  Irvin 
S.  Cobb,  and  I  had  been  trying  for  two  days  to  get  permission  to  leave  the  city 
so  we  could  see  some  of  the  fighting  between  the  Germans  and  the  Belgians, 
and  this  morning  we  were  on  edge  with  anticipation.  Mr.  Brand  Whitlock, 
the  American  Minister,  had  been  intervening  in  our  behalf,  and  we  also  had, 
besides  our  passports,  impressive  documents  issued  by  Mr.  Ethelbert  Watts, 
the  Consul-General,  explaining  that  we  were  American  citizens.  With  these 
we  went  to  the  Gendarmerie,  a  massive  old  citadel  of  a  building,  to  secure 
"laissez  passers." 

Entering  the  old  Gendarmerie  through  a  small  door  in  a  great  wooden  gate, 
we  passed  under  a  low,  deep  arch  and  came  upon  half  a  dozen  unshaved  guards 
sitting  before  a  long,  plain  table  in  the  courtyard.  Their  uniforms  gave  no 
evidence  of  rank,  but  the  manner  in  which  they  summoned  us  before  them  left 
no  doubt  as  to  their  authority.  As  we  stood  explaining  our  need  I  noticed  the 
courtyard  was  filled  with  military  wagons,  heaps  of  grains  and  provisions,  and 
about  fifty  horses  being  harnessed  before  they  had  finished  their  morning  oats. 

#2 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  313 

From  an  upper  window  some  one  was  throwing  out  bags  of  grain,  which  were 
being  hurriedly  loaded  into  wagons. 

We  were  told  that  no  "laissez  passers"  were  being  issued.  "But  you 
might  try  to  see  what  you  can  do  with  these,"  suggested  one  of  the  guards, 
pointing  to  our  passports. 

Two  days  in  Brussels  had  taught  us  to  take  every  opportunity  at  once. 
So  we  left  in  a  hurry,  but,  as  only  one  of  us  spoke  French  and  that  poorly,  we 
decided  to  stop  at  the  American  Legation  to  get  some  one  to  explain  to  our 
French  taxicab  driver  what  it  was  that  we  wanted  him  to  do. 

As  we  turned  the  corner  of  the  Rue  de  Treves  we  saw  the  American  flag  fly- 
ing before  the  Legation.  This  was  the  first  intimation  we  had  that  the  city 
was  threatened  with  invasion.  But  even  then  we  did  not  expect  anything 
more  than  a  cavalry  raid,  nor  did  the  people  of  Brussels. 

Our  taxicab  driver  was  instructed  to  take  us  as  far  as  he  could  go,  and  it 
came  near  being  only  half  a  dozen  blocks.  There  we  were  stopped  by  a  double 
row  of  derailed  street  cars  across  the  avenue.  These  were  obviously  calculated 
to  break  the  formation  of  the  expected  Uhlan  raid  and  were  so  placed  as  to 
make  a  direct  charge  impossible.  The  work  had  been  done  by  a  company 
of  middle-aged  citizens  in  blue  smocks  drawn  in  at  the  belt  line  by  their  sword 
belts.  Their  costume  was  that  of  the  revolution  of  1830,  which  made  of  Bel- 
gium an  independent  kingdom. 

These  staunch  citizens  were  for  not  letting  us  pass  at  first,  but  one  of  them 
said  of  the  taxicab  driver,  "Let  him  get  his  fare,"  and  that  seemed  to  be  a  bet- 
ter argument  than  our  passports.  So  our  taxicab  was  permitted  to  describe  a 
letter  S  passing  through  the  barricade  and  we  went  on  out  of  the  avenue.  We 
now  met  a  good  many  of  these  smocked  burghers,  binding  the  trees  along  the 
avenues  into  masses  of  barbed  wire,  and  upsetting  carts  in  the  cross  lanes. 
Then,  for  the  next  mile  or  two,  we  passed  many  people  strolling  or  reading  in 
the  parkways,  even  nurses  with  baby  carriages.  But  after  we  passed  the  civic 
guards  at  the  barricades  on  the  edge  of  the  Forest  of  Soignies  we  had  the  road 
to  ourselves  as  far  out  as  the  village  of  Tervueren,  where  King  Leopold's  Congo 
Museum  stands. 

We  were  now  well  out  of  the  city  and  still  going.  There  was  not  even  a 
sentry  for  two  or  three  miles  before  we  came  to  the  village  of  Tervueren.  There 
half  a  dozen  people  were  sitting  in  front  of  a  cafe,  and  they  stared  dumbly  after 
us  as  we  took  the  Louvain  road.  That,  too,  was  empty  so  far  as  we  could  see, 
except  for  a  Belgian  soldier  mounted  on  a  bicycle,  whom  we  soon  overtook  and 
invited  into  the  taxicab.     We  hoped  to  learn  the  password  from  him. 

About  halfway  to  Louvain,  at  a  point  from  which  you  can  see  a  corner  of 
the  field  of  Waterloo,  we  came  upon  a  dozen  refugees  with  packs  on  their  backs. 
They  stopped  only  long  enough  to  tell  us  they  were  from  Tirlemont,  the  next 
important  town  beyond  Louvain.     "Uhlans!"  they  cried,  as  they  hurried  on 


314  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

toward  Brussels.  In  their  tone  was  the  same  terror  heard  in  the  voice  of  set- 
tlers on  the  American  frontier  when  they  cried  "  Indians ! " 

Within  the  next  half  mile  the  road  became  blocked  with  refugees.  They 
were  of  all  kinds  and  ages,  peasants  with  their  household  goods  m  ox-carts, 
townspeople  in  carriages,  men  on  horseback,  women  afoot.  I  counted  eleven 
small  children  and  one  very  old  woman  in  a  cart.  A  dignified  old  peasant 
grandmother  sat  in  a  wagon,  on  a  chair  that  looked  as  if  it  might  have  been 
lifted  from  the  chimney  corner.  There  were  two  red-cheeked  girls,  with  their 
skirts  tucked  up,  carrying  a  trunk.  They  had  carried  that  trunk  at  least  eight 
miles  already. 

Those  who  were  wearing  leather  shoes  were  mostly  footsore.  Some  carried 
their  shoes  in  their  hands.  But  those  in  wooden  shoes  clicked  steadily  on. 
Occasionally,  when  a  spasm  of  cannonading  began  beyond  Louvain,  the  whole 
line  started  forward  at  a  faster  pace.  Little  children  holding  to  the  hands  of 
their  parents  were  shaken  into  a  dog-trot.  Oxen  were  prodded  into  an  un- 
gainly lope.  Those  with  hght  burdens  pressed  past  those  with  heavy.  But 
none  that  I  saw  deserted  his  burden.  The  nearer  we  drew  to  Louvain  and 
the  louder  the  cannonading,  the  m.ore  hurried  and  silent  were  the  refugees. 
Those  who  looked  at  us  at  all  hardly  seemed  to  see  us.  Only  a  few  stopped 
and  stared  after  us.  They  seemed  trying  to  figure  out  what  manner  of  mad- 
men we  were. 

In  the  midst  of  the  refugees  we  came  upon  a  Belgian  soldier  still  carr^'ing 
his  gun.  "Where  are  the  English?  Where  arc  the  French?"  he  called  out 
to  us,  and  as  we  stopped  to  answer  his  question,  the  refugees  that  dammed  up 
behind  repeated  the  question.  "Are  the  English  close?"  they  asked  appeal- 
ingly.  We  replied  that  we  did  not  know  but  assured  them  the  road  to  Brussels 
was  open  and  safe. 

We  now  began  to  meet  soldiers  In  groups  of  twos  and  threes,  and  from  each 
group  came  the  same  questions,  "Where  are  the  English?  Where  are  the 
French  ? " 

We  soon  came  to  understand  the  eagerness  of  the  question.  The  Belgians 
had  been  holding  the  German  advance  for  nearly  three  weeks.  Liege  had  fallen 
four  days  previously  and  they  had  fought  every  inch  of  the  road  as  they  re- 
treated. Each  day  they  had  been  expecting  to  receive  the  support  of  the 
English  and  the  French,  and,  now  that  their  capital  was  threatened,  they 
could  not  believe  that  their  allies  were  not  right  behind  them. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  German  army  first  encountered  the  French  army  at 
Namur,  twenty-five  miles  southeast  of  Brussels,  and  It  was  not  until  two  days 
after  the  occupation  of  Brussels  that  the  German  advance  column  which  went 
direct  from  Brussels  to  Mons  had  Its  first  skirmish  with  the  English  at  Bray: 
a  small  town  near  the  French  frontier. 

At  Laefdael,  a  village  four  miles  from  Louvain,  we  came  upon  ten  thousand 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  315 

Belgians  drawn  up  in  a  valley  to  the  north  of  the  road  where  the  Germans  ad- 
vancing from  the  south  could  not  see  them.  The  right  flank  of  the  Belgians 
lay  right  along  the  road,  and  we  could  see  what  the  Belgian  army  was  made  of. 
They  were  a  dusty  and  foot-sore  lot,  most  of  them  exhausted  and  asleep  on  the 
grass,  but  those  who  were  awake  smiled  and  waved  their  hands  at  us.  Of  the 
hundreds  of  faces  I  saw  in  that  brave  little  army  there  was  not  one  which 
showed  defeat.  And,  despite  their  careless  attitude,  they  were  in  good  mili- 
tary order.  Scattered  among  them  were  the  rapid-fire  guns  drawn  by  dogs, 
which  had  done  such  astonishingly  good  work  on  the  retreat  from  Louvain. 
To  me  those  patient  Belgian  dogs,  lying  on  their  sides  panting  in  the  sun,  gave 
the  whole  scene  a  peculiarly  pathetic  look.  It  all  seemed  so  small  and  ama- 
teurish against  the  advancing  German  army  with  its  half  million  men  and  its 
complete  equipment.  But,  three  days  later  when  we  came  back  that  way, 
the  wrecked  town  of  Laefdael  and  the  graves  on  the  south  side  of  the  road 
showed  that  the  Belgians  and  their  dog-drawn  mitrailleuses  gave  a  good  ac- 
count of  themselves  that  afternoon  before  they  retreated. 

A  mile  from  the  ramparts  of  Louvain  we  were  stopped  by  two  English 
motion-picture  men  in  an  automobile,  who  said  it  was  dangerous  to  go  farther. 
As  we  stood  talking  with  them  I  saw  a  soldier  lift  his  head  in  the  beet-field 
beside  the  road.  I  looked  closer  then  and  saw  that  the  field  was  full  of  Belgian 
soldiers  behind  every  hay-cock  and  every  bush.  But  the  cannonading  was 
still  vigorous  on  the  far  side  of  Louvain  and  we  considered  it  still  safe  to  go  a 
little  closer.  We  also  knew  that  Louvain  had  been  the  headquarters  of  the 
Belgian  army  and  we  thought  it  was  yet.  But  that  morning  at  ten  o'clock 
King  Albert  had  moved  his  headquarters  to  Malines. 

Our  taxicab  driver  was  frightened  by  what  the  motion-picture  men  told  us, 
and  refused  to  go  farther.  He  did  not  want  to  risk  his  car,  he  said.  So  we 
told  him  to  wait  for  us  there  and  the  four  of  us  set  off  afoot  for  Louvain. 
The  road  was  now  crowded  with  refugees,  but  we  were  too  intent  on  pushing 
forward  to  the  fighting  line  to  pay  much  attention  to  them.  To  the  questions 
"Where  are  the  English  ?  Where  are  the  French  ? "  we  merely  shook  our  heads. 
We  could  not  trust  ourselves  to  answer.  We  knew  now  in  its  fullness  what  that 
question  meant  to  them.  It  was  not  until  we  passed  the  old  ramparts,  made 
into  a  boulevard,  that  we  found  our  way  free  of  refugees.  They  had  not  come 
through  Louvain,  but  had  passed  around  it  on  the  rampart.  The  streets,  how- 
ever, were  full  of  people.  The  quarter  from  which  we  entered  was  the  oldest 
and  the  poorest,  and  the  narrow  streets  were  at  points  blocked,  but  people 
moved  aside  courteously  to  give  us  passageway.  There  was  no  sign  of  fleeing 
and  that  was  what  gave  us  courage  to  go  on.  We  thought  these  people  were 
in  the  street  merely  listening  to  the  cannonading. 

We  stopped  a  priest  to  inquire  our  way  and  he  turned  back  fifty  yards  to 
take  us  to  a  cloister,  where,  he  said,  there  was  a  priest  who  could  speak  English. 


3i6  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

As  we  entered  the  low,  cool  arch  so  common  to  Belgian  houses  we  could  see  the 
T)riests  at  the  bottom  of  their  garden  among  the  pear  trees  and  the  wall  fruit. 
Among  ourselves,  we  commented  that  here  at  least  the  ravages  of  war  would 
not  be  felt.     A  week  later  that  cloister  was  a  ruin. 

The  priests  came  forward  to  meet  us  and  refused  to  hear  a  word  of  apology 
until  we  had  rested  and  drunk  a  glass  of  light  red  wine.  To  them,  we  found, 
the  war  was  in  another  world,  even  though  the  cannonading  was  now  quite 
loud.  After  a  few  minutes  we  pressed  on  toward  the  Grand  Place,  where  we 
still  expected  to  find  the  Belgian  headquarters.  There  were  now  twice  as 
many  people  in  the  streets  as  before.  Even  the  girls  and  young  women,  usu- 
ally kept  under  cover  in  Belgium,  were  standing  in  the  roadway,  though  when 
the  rest  of  the  people  greeted  us  with  their  usual  courtesy,  like  convent-bred 
girls  they  lowered  their  eyes.  Most  of  the  people  took  us  for  English  and 
wished  us  well.  When  we  said  we  were  Americans,  "Vive  les  Americains" 
always  floated  down  the  road  behind  us. 

We  had  not  gone  far  down  the  twisting  Rue  de  Bruxelles,  watching  for  the 
Gothic  fa9ades  of  the  wonderful  Hotel  de  Ville,  when  an  automobile  swung  in 
from  the  north  and  raced  through  the  street  back  toward  Brussels.  The  occu- 
pants, whom  we  took  to  be  Brussels  newspapermen,  cried  something  after  us, 
but  all  we  could  hear  was  the  one  word,  "danger." 

They  had  hardly  gone  before  eight  or  ten  Belgian  soldiers,  the  first  we  had 
seen  in  the  town,  came  hurrying  through  an  alley  from  the  south  and  dashed 
across  the  Rue  de  Bruxelles.  As  they  passed  there  was  a  stir,  but,  as  soon  as 
they  were  out  of  sight,  all  faces  were  again  turned  down  the  street.  No  one 
would  have  guessed  they  had  just  passed. 

Twenty  paces  past  the  alley  a  single  horseman  rode  around  the  comer  into 
the  Rue  de  Bruxelles  from  a  side  street.  He  wore  a  badly  fitting  dust-gray 
uniform  and  carried  a  long  steel  spear.  Close  behind  him  came  another  gray- 
uniformed  man  on  a  bicycle,  a  carbine  slung  over  the  handle-bars.  For  ten 
seconds  I  stood  in  the  middle  of  the  street  and  stared  at  them  before  I  realized 
that  they  were  German  soldiers.  Then  I  remembered  the  Belgians  in  the 
alley  and  stepped  into  the  nearest  doorway  out  of  range.  There  was  no 
shooting,  however.  The  Germans  rode  unmolested  into  the  next  street,  scan- 
ning the  four  of  us  curiously  as  they  passed. 

All  at  once  we  realized  that  it  was  time  we  tried  to  get  back  to  our  taxicab. 
The  townspeople,  also  understanding  our  need  to  get  away,  most  of  them  taking 
us  for  English,  gave  us  the  road.  But  before  we  reached  the  rampart  we  could 
see  the  gray  backs  and  the  shining  bayonets  of  an  infantry  column  turning  into 
the  Brussels  road  from  the  boulevard.  Ahead  of  them  were  a  few  straggling 
refugees  from  Tirlemont. 

Behind  the  infantry  came  a  company  of  lancers,  one  riding  ahead,  his  auto- 
matic pistol  in  his  hand,  his  eyes  scanning  the  houses  and  the  faces,  watch- 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  317 

ing  for  the  first  false  move.  The  others  rode  stolidly  on.  Next  came  a  bicycle 
company,  then  more  infantry  and  cavalry,  at  the  head  of  each  company  one 
man  with  his  pistol  drawn.  The  ranks  were  thinned  in  some  companies  and 
there  were  many  empty  saddles.  These  were  the  men  who  had  just  forced  the 
retreat  of  the  Belgians,  and  immediately  behind  them  came  their  rapid-fire 
guns  and  large  pieces  of  artillery.  The  horses  that  drew  them  came  trotting 
along  the  boulevard,  and  it  was  not  more  than  half  an  hour  before  we  could 
hear  them  at  Laefdael. 

I  thought  I  would  never  forget  the  least  detail  of  that  first  advance  on 
Brussels,  but  I  remember  two  minor  things  best.  I  noticed  a  lancer  staring 
at  my  coat  and  I  put  up  my  hand  to  find  that  I  was  still  wearing  the  colours  of 
the  Allies — the  Belgian,  French,  English,  and  Russian.  The  lancer,  however, 
merely  smiled  at  my  discomfiture.  As  soon  as  he  was  gone  I  removed  those 
colours.  A  little  later  the  first  of  the  Uhlans  appeared.  They  were  recog- 
nized at  once  by  the  flat  tops  to  their  helmets  and  some  one  near  me  hissed. 
In  a  moment  the  muzzle  of  an  automatic  travelled  across  our  faces  with  pain- 
ful slowness.  I  could  feel  the  crowd  sway  and  the  breath  of  relief  when  the 
Uhlan  rode  on.  For  some  reason,  which  I  was  unable  to  determine  after  two 
weeks  in  Belgium,  the  Uhlans  had  acquired  the  reputation  of  butchers.  They 
were,  in  fact,  no  more  brutal  than  the  rest  of  the  German  army.  All  were 
bound  by  inflexible  rules.  When  they  were  cruel  it  was  because  their  orders 
were  cruel.     If  they  were  barbarous  it  was  because  war  is  barbarous. 

The  hardest  thing  to  describe  about  the  entry  of  the  Germans  into  Louvain 
is  the  hush  that  fell  over  the  city.  Except  for  the  click  of  German  heels, 
the  clatter  of  German  horses,  and  the  rumble  of  German  artillery  you  could 
have  heard  a  sigh  twenty  feet  away  anywhere  in  Louvain.  With  the  whole 
city  at  this  nervous  tension  a  German  military  aeroplane  of  the  Taube  type 
swept  low  overhead,  and  every  face  in  the  city  stared  at  the  black  imperial 
crosses  on  the  underside  of  the  great  planes,  symbols  of  the  German  invasion. 

As  if  it  were  the  imperial  fancy  to  give  another  sign  of  its  power,  at  this 
moment  the  silence  was  broken  by  a  high,  clear  flute  sound  from  around  the 
bend  in  the  Rue  de  Bruxelles,  and  a  large,  gray  German  war  automobile  raced 
through  the  street.  Over  it,  reaching  from  the  ground  in  the  front  of  the  hood 
to  the  back  of  the  tonneau,  were  two  long,  sharp,  scythe-like  knives  bent  con- 
vexly.  These  were  merely  wirecutters,  so  the  automobile  could  charge 
through  barbed  wire,  but  they  gave  the  car  a  sinister  air.  A  general  staff 
officer,  evidently  bound  forward  to  direct  the  attack  on  Laefdael,  sat  alone  in 
the  tonneau,  and  the  only  man  in  the  automobile  with  a  rifle  was  the  herald 
beside  the  driver,  a  curious  brass  instrument  to  his  lips,  its  four  horns  announc- 
ing shrilly  to  the  countryside  that  here  was  a  man  worth  killing.  It  was  a 
piece  of  imperial  audacity,  and  Louvain  admjred  that. 

We  had  been  led  to  believe  that  the  Germans  were  only  making  a  recon- 


3i8  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

naissance  in  force  and  that  before  the  afternoon  was  over  we  would  be  able 
to  swing  to  the  north  and  regain  the  Belgian  lines.  But  the  German  troops 
kept  coming  along  the  rampart  all  afternoon,  and  when  the  provision  trains 
and  cook  stoves  appeared  we  began  to  realize  that  this  was  an  invasion. 
Other  war  automobiles  also  passed,  and  late  in  the  afternoon  there  was  a  large 
detachment  of  infantry.  Night  was  coming  on  and  it  occurred  to  us  that  we 
were  in  a  slightly  precarious  position.  We  might  be  taken  for  spies.  For 
that  matter  we  had  been  taking  the  precaution  to  mingle  with  the  crowd, 
and  the  townspeople  had  helped  to  shield  us  from  scrutiny.  Now  it  became 
necessary  to  report  our  presence  to  the  police. 

When  we  reached  the  Grand  Place  there  were  half  a  dozen  military  auto- 
mobiles drawn  up  before  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  the  beauty  of  which  was  partly 
hidden  by  scaffolding  set  up  for  supports.  The  Rue  de  la  Station,  the  widest  in 
the  city,  was  also  crowded  with  these  automobiles,  filled  with  officers  of  the 
distinctively  Prussian  type.  Down  a  narrow  street  came  another  hne,  similar 
to  that  which  had  passed  on  the  ramparts,  and  it  also  took  the  street  which 
led  to  Brussels.  By  six  o'clock  we  had  seen  about  thirty  thousand  men  pass  in 
the  direction  of  Brussels,  all  with  their  baggage  trains  and  cooking  apparatus. 
It  had  also  filtered  through  the  town  that  Louvain  had  become  staff 
headquarters,  and  that  at  three  in  the  afternoon  the  German  general  had 
taken  possession  of  the  hotel  which  King  Albert  had  left  at  ten  in  the 
morning. 

We  made  an  attempt  to  get  an  interpreter  by  applying  at  the  School 
of  Languages  which  faced  the  Grand  Place,  but  the  interpreter  did  not  come 
until  later,  and  meanwhile  we  stood  among  the  Louvain  people  watching  the 
spectacle.  While  we  were  intent  on  the  never-ending  hne  of  troops  coming 
down  the  narrow  street,  a  whole  infantry  division  came  marching  down  the  Rue 
de  la  Station,  in  parade  order,  singing  "Every  Little  Movement  Has  a  Meaning 
All  Its  Own."  This  carried  far  down  the  line  until  a  regiment  broke  it  with 
"In  the  Night."  It  was  plain  to  see  that  these  troops  were  fresh  and  good- 
humoured.  They  had  had  a  little  skirmish  that  morning  at  Diest,  just  enough 
to  lift  their  spirits,  but  had  not  had  the  real  fighting  seen  by  those  who  passsed 
along  the  ramparts. 

Not  to  be  outdone,  and  at  the  same  time  feeling  the  seriousness  of  war  a 
little  more,  a  company,  which  had  been  at  Liege  and  Tirlemont,  coming  down 
the  side  street,  began  to  sing  "Die  Wacht  am  Rhein."  The  line  from  Diest 
in  the  next  lull  changed  to  the  patriotic  also  and  sang  the  inspiring  "Deutsch- 
land  iiber  AUes."  After  that  we  heard  hardly  anything  else  but  that,  and 
late  in  the  evening  they  were  still  marching  to  it. 

By  this  time  Louvain  was  full  of  soldiers,  but  our  interpreter  had 
found  us.  The  ease  with  which  he  picked  us  out  of  the  crowd  showed  how 
conspicuous  we  were.     Every  few  minutes  we  were  stopped  with  the  gruff 


FEEDING  THE  MEN 
AND    THE    GUNS 


BAfCING  FOR  THE  GERMAN  ARMY 
This  "  battery"  of  ovens  is  capable  of  turning  out  16,000  loaves  ol  bread  a  day. 


PICTURES   OF   TRANSPORT 
AND    SUPPLY   WORK 


Copyright  by  tlw  I iiui luiUunaL  i\i':vs  Sfn'ice 


RUSSIAN  FIELD  KITCHENS 
These  are  field  kitchens  used  hy  the  Russian  army.     In  this  case  they  have  been  captured  by  the  Germans. 


axjKINC,   FOR  THE   KAISER 
His  field  chef  is  preparing  luncheon  near  the  front. 


U  ilder-uiood 


A  TRAIN-L(MU  OK  "CANNON-FODDER"  IN  CiAl.ICIA 

This  picture  is  typical  of  the  Russian  mihtary  problem.     There  are  men  innumerable,  but 
supplies  and  equipment  are  inadequate. 


TRANSPORTATION  OF  AMMUNITION  AND  SUPPLIES 

The  upper  picture  shows  ammunition  and  stores  for  the  front  at  railhead.     From  here  they  are  sometimes 
moved  forward  (as  shown  in  the  lower  picture)  by  a  light,  narrow-gauge  radway. 


TRANSPORTATION  OF  AMMUNITION  AND  SUPPLIES 
After  leaving  the  rails  supplies  go  forward  bv  motors  as  far  as  roads  and  other  conditions  permit;  then 
comes  the  turn  of  the  pack-horses;  and  finally  man-power  is  often  needed  to  cover  the  rest  ol  the  distance 
to  the  entrance  of  the  communication  trench. 


Copyright  by  Underwoodi^  Undcruood 


A  SERBIAN  CONVOY  IN  RETREAT 


This  picture  shows  why  supplies  sometimes  fail  to  arrive  and  disgruntled  soldiers  must  lie 
down  to  sleep  upon  empty  stomachs. 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  PIONEERS 

The  Germans  have  hastily  put  together  this  bridge  across  the  Vistula,  only  to  have  it  endangered  by  great  chunks 
of  floating  ice  from  upstream.     They  are  breaking  these  to  allow  them  to  pass  on  under  the  bridge. 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  327 

question,  "English?"  In  consequence  it  took  us  some  time  to  make  our  way 
to  the  Place  de  la  Station  to  the  hotel  our  interpreter  had  picked  for  us. 

There  were  half  a  dozen  staff  officers  in  the  next  hotel  and  we  decided  to 
tell  them  our  troubles.  They  listened  politely  for  a  moment  and  then  they 
broke  out  laughing.  "Going  to  war  in  a  taxicab,"  they  laughed,  "this  is  a 
joke."  We  were  glad  they  took  it  that  way.  What  we  had  heard  of  the  Ger- 
man army  had  led  us  to  expect  quite  different  treatment.  We  were  told,  how- 
ever, that  we  had  done  the  wise  thing  in  reporting  ourselves. 

By  this  time  the  town  had  begun  to  feel  that  the  invasion  of  the  Germans 
was  not  attended  by  all  the  atrocities  they  were  supposed  to  be  guilty 
of.  German  soldiers  had  entered  the  food  stores  and  were  buying  like  any 
other  customers.  In  fact,  Louvain  had  a  rush  of  business  such  as  it  had  not  had 
for  years.  I  think  Louvain  went  to  bed  that  night  feeling  as  we  did,  that, 
whatever  the  German  invasion  might  portend,  the  army  was  made  up  of  pretty 
good  fellows. 

In  the  morning  M.  Sabbe,  the  interpreter,  called  for  us  and  took  us  to  the 
barber's,  where  the  German  officers  waited  their  turn  like  the  rest  of  us,  and 
then  to  breakfast  at  the  best  restaurant  in  Louvain.  Its  proprietor  had  drawn 
its  iron  blinds  and  taken  down  its  sign,  and,  with  all  their  detailed  knowledge 
of  the  invaded  country,  the  Germans  had  not  discovered  it.  There  our  break- 
fast was  cooked  by  the  woman  who  owned  the  restaurant,  a  slight  little  Flem- 
ish woman  with  the  gentle  smile  and  even  the  parted  hair  of  a  Mona  Lisa. 
The  usual  spiritual  quality  of  her  face  was  also  heightened  no  doubt  by  the 
fact  that  she  was  soon  to  have  a  child. 

It  was  well  into  the  morning  before  our  complacency  was  disturbed.  Two 
ignorant  little  men,  who  looked  as  if  they  might  be  a  peasant's  stable  hands, 
were  led  briskly  up  the  street  by  a  squad  of  soldiers  to  the  staff  headquarters. 
Ten  minutes  later  a  large  closed  van  which  looked  like  a  city  patrol  wagon 
passed  down  the  street  and  turned  to  the  left  upon  reaching  the  station.  It 
was  followed  by  a  number  of  people  wearing  Red  Cross  badges.  In  five  more 
minutes  it  was  followed  by  a  squad  of  soldiers  and  in  ten  minutes  more  by  the 
Red  Cross  attendants  bearing  stiff",  undersized  bodies  wrapped  in  blankets. 
This  was  the  first  military  execution  in  Louvain.  The  undersized  men  had 
been  found  guilty  of  shooting  at  the  soldiers. 

Meanwhile  we  had  been  ordered  to  keep  to  our  hotel,  our  eating  place,  and 
the  main  streets.  We  were  promised  that  Mr.  Whitlock  would  be  informed  of 
our  whereabouts,  but  we  were  not  to  return  to  Brussels.  We  had  learned  too 
much  about  the  movement  of  the  troops. 

That  second  day  in  Louvain,  Thursday,  was  full  of  activity.  A  half-dozen 
aeroplanes  made  their  headquarters  to  the  right  of  the  station,  and  to  the  left 
was  the  place  of  execution.  Meanwhile  the  troops  passed  constantly  in  three 
columns,  those  from  Diest  still  singing  the  four  favourites  of  the  day  before, 


328  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

occasionally  varying  with  the  Austrian  national  air.  Early  in  the  day  it 
struck  me  that  the  troops  were  all  blond.  They  were,  in  fact,  all  from  points 
north  and  east  of  Berlin,  and,  though  I  watched  idly  while  no  less  than  forty 
thousand  passed,  I  counted  only  thirteen  men  who  were  not  decided  blonds. 
I  also  doubt  if  there  were  a  dozen  whose  hair  was  not  cHpped  close  to  the  scalp. 

By  noon  the  relation  between  the  soldiers  and  the  townspeople  had  become 
a  little  strained.  About  this  time  there  were  half  a  dozen  shots  on  a  side 
street  and,  after  a  while,  a  German  officer  who  had  been  shot  through  the  leg 
was  carried  by  on  a  litter.  Behind  was  the  dead  body  of  a  Belgian.  Evi- 
dently the  German  officer  was  the  better  shot.  As  the  day  wore  on  military 
executions  down  to  the  left  of  the  railroad  station  became  more  frequent. 
There  were  perhaps  fifteen.  At  the  staff  headquarters  of  the  German  army 
we  were  told  there  had  been  a  good  deal  of  sniping  from  houses,  mostly  in  the 
outskirts  and  in  small  adjoining  villages,  and  the  punishment  for  this  was 
death. 

During  the  day  announcements  were  posted  throughout  the  town,  signed 
by  the  burgomaster,  calling  upon  the  citizens  to  surrender  all  their  arms  at 
once.  A  little  later  he  made  another  announcement  ordering  all  doors  and 
windows  to  be  closed  by  eight  in  the  evening.  In  this  announcement  he  said 
he  was  speaking  in  behalf  of  the  military  authorities.  That  night  I  think  all 
Louvain  went  to  bed  with  an  uncomfortable  feeling  of  impending  danger. 

But  the  next  morning  the  town  was  quiet.  The  troops  were  still  coming 
through  steadily  in  three  streams.  We  began  to  realize  that  this  was  the  main 
invading  army  headed  for  Paris.  On  many  of  the  wagons  in  fact  was  scrawled, 
"Direkt  nach  Paris."  That  day  will  live  in  my  memory  chiefly  on  account  of 
the  rumble  of  wagons.  The  main  provision  train — with  food  for  350,000  men 
for  a  month — went  through  Louvain  all  day  long  and  until  far  into  the  night. 

Early  that  morning,  however,  it  was  announced  that  the  burgomaster  and 
two  other  prominent  citizens  had  been  held  as  hostages.  The  notice  was 
signed  by  the  military  commander  and  stated  that  the  least  indication  of  hos- 
tility to  the  German  troops  would  place  all  three  hostages  in  a  "very  danger- 
ous position."  We  were  told  at  the  staff  headquarters  that  this  measure  had 
been  taken  because  it  seemed  impossible  otherwise  to  prevent  sniping.  I 
doubt,  however,  whether  that  announcement  troubled  Louvain  as  much  as  the 
one  that  followed  in  the  afternoon.  All  houses  facing  on  the  Rue  de  Bruxelles 
and  the  Rue  de  la  Station — the  route  the  troops  were  taking — were  placed 
under  special  restrictions.  All  windows  were  to  be  closed  at  eight  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  the  curtains  drawn,  and  lights  so  placed  that  the  shadow  of  any 
one  approaching  the  window  would  be  thrown  upon  the  curtain.  These 
lights  were  to  be  left  burning  all  night.  At  the  same  time  the  street  doors  were 
to  be  left  unlocked. 

This  order  was  made  to  discourage  sniping,  but  it  was  terrifying  to  the 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  329 

women  of  Louvain.     Half  a  dozen  whose  acquaintance  we  had  made  did  not 
go  to  bed. 

As  the  word  had  gone  forth  that  all  persons  found  in  a  house  from  which 
one  shot  had  been  fired  were  being  shot,  we  had  taken  the  precaution  during 
the  day  to  secure  the  front  rooms  in  our  hotel  to  prevent  complications.  So 
we  had  to  pay  for  our  security  by  sleeping  in  closed  rooms  with  kerosene  lamps. 
I  stood  it  until  three  in  the  morning,  then  I  put  out  my  light  and  opened  the 
windows. 

On  the  morning  of  the  third  day  we  were  told  we  could  return  to  Brussels, 
and  we  found  it  took  an  hour  or  so  to  say  good-bye  to  the  kindly  people  we  had 
come  to  know.  We  left  our  Mona  Lisa  hostess  with  the  greatest  regret. 
Besides  being  the  best  cook  in  Louvain,  she  was  a  sweet  and  gentle  woman. 
I  remember  she  made  us  laugh  by  trying  to  tell  us  in  English  about  the  pre- 
dicament of  the  mayor.  She  said  he  had  a  "crisis  of  the  nerves."  Undoubt- 
edly he  had,  when  any  one  of  45,000  people  could  cost  him  his  life. 

Then  there  were  our  friends  the  priests,  our  guide  and  counsel  M.  Sabbe, 
and  the  tobacco  dealer,  who  had  the  best  brands  of  Havana  cigars  and  who 
behind  his  store  had  built  a  little  grotto  with  a  fountain  which  was  the  de- 
light of  his  wife  and  three  growing  daughters.  There  were,  besides,  the 
pleasant-spoken  woman  who  sold  us  fresh  linen  and  the  buxom  pastry  cook 
from  whom  we  got  delicious  little  cakes  right  out  of  the  oven.  Our  speaking 
acquaintance  included  most  of  the  people  who  lived  on  the  main  streets  and 
they  all  wished  us  a  safe  journey.  Those  who  knew  us  best  expressed  the  hope 
that  we  would  return  to  Louvain  in  a  happier  time. 

That  time  did  not  seem  very  near,  however,  after  reading  the  latest  notice 
that  was  being  posted  as  we  left.  It  was  explicit  and  complete.  It  said  in 
plain  language  that  every  citizen  found  with  a  weapon  in  his  possession  or  in 
his  house  would  be  immediately  shot.  Every  person  in  a  house  from  which  a 
shot  was  fired  would  be  shot.  And  every  house  from  which  a  shot  was  fired 
would  be  burned. 

Four  days  later  I  returned  to  Brussels  from  the  French  frontier,  to  which  I 
had  followed  the  German  troops  in  their  march  into  France,  and  was  met  with 
the  news  that  Louvain  was  being  burned.  There  were  a  dozen  stories  current 
as  to  why  it  was  being  burned,  but  none  of  th  ;n  was  susceptible  of  proof. 
I  tried  to  get  at  the  facts,  as  I  realized  that  the  burning  of  Louvain  would  go 
down  in  history,  but  I  doubt  whether  it  will  ever  be  known  just  what  happened 
in  Louvain  immediately  before  the  city  was  ordered  to  be  destroyed.  The  de- 
tails, however,  are  not  really  important.  Ill-feeling  had  been  growing  from  the 
second  day.  The  German  troops  had  become  bad-tempered  when  their  com- 
rades were  shot  by  snipers,  and  the  people  of  the  town  had  in  turn  grown  restive 
under  the  rule  of  the  mailed  fist.  There  had  been  an  exchange  of  shots,  perhaps 
even  a  conspiracy,  and  the  German  troops  took  the  full  measure  of  reprisal. 


330  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

On  the  way  out  of  Belgium  the  next  day  I  passed  through  Louvain  in  com- 
pany with  other  newspaper  correspondents  who  were  trying  to  get  out  by  way 
of  Holland.  We  were  told  that  a  troop  train  returning  to  Germany  with 
wounded  and  with  English  prisoners  would  leave  the  Gare  du  Nord  in  Brussels 
at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning.  It  finally  left  about  four  in  the  afternoon. 
In  the  station  we  heard  the  usual  tales  about  Louvain  and  there  was  consider- 
able excitement  about  it  among  the  soldiers.  The  officers  treated  it  coolly 
as  a  reprisal  of  war,  but  the  excitement  brought  on  by  destruction  showed  in 
their  men.  At  different  times  during  the  day  five  soldiers  told  me  in  a  whisper 
that  Brussels  would  be  next,  and  there  was  no  doubt  from  their  tone  they  hoped 
it  would  be.  There  was  even  reason  to  fear  it.  For,  as  we  reentered  the  sta- 
tion on  the  way  back  from  a  hurried  luncheon  in  the  hotel,  two  rapid-fire  guns 
were  being  drawn  up  before  the  Gare  du  Nord  so  that  they  commanded  the  two 
principal  streets  of  Brussels. 

The  train  ran  very  slowly  and  did  not  reach  Louvain  until  nearly  evening. 
Some  of  the  near-by  towns  were  also  afire,  and  at  all  the  stations  there  were 
many  soldiers.  But  it  was  not  until  we  came  in  sight  of  Louvain  that  we 
realized  the  extent  of  the  destruction.  Some  of  us  had  not  been  able  to  credit 
it  until  we  saw  v/ith  our  own  eyes.  I  was  prepared  to  find  one  or  two  of  the 
more  troublesome  quarters  destroyed,  but  the  first  thing  that  caught  my  eye 
was  the  roofless  church  of  St.  Pierre.  Across  the  Grand  Place  the  Hotel  de 
Ville  still  stood,  but  everything  in  between,  a  distance  of  half  a  mile,  and 
everything  for  a  mile  beyond,  to  the  farthest  rampart,  was  burnt.  All  the 
handsomest  houses  in  the  northern  end  of  the  city  were  bare  brick  and  stone 
walls.  There  were  a  few  buildings  along  the  ramparts  to  the  east  still  stand- 
ing, but  these,  too,  were  burning  when  our  train  went  on  two  hours  later. 

My  first  inclination,  as  the  train  pulled  in,  was  to  go  through  the  ruined 
town,  but  the  train  had  hardly  come  to  a  stop  before  a  soldier,  drunk  both  from 
excitement  and  drink,  shoved  his  head  into  the  window  and  cried  with  an  ex- 
pressive gesture,  "Three  cities  razed!     Three!     There  will  be  more!" 

He  had  hardly  gone  before  another  shoved  in  his  head  and  cried  "English" 
in  a  menacing  tone.  We  called  back  "Americans,"  but  he  did  not  understand. 
"Americans  from  the  United  States,"  I  said  in  German.  "We  are  not  ene- 
mies." "All  who  cannot  speak  German  well  are  enemies,"  he  replied,  fumb- 
ling at  his  belt.  It  looked  for  a  second  as  if  we  were  in  for  a  struggle,  but  an- 
other more  intelligent  soldier  pushed  him  aside  with  the  explanation,  "He's 
drunk." 

I  realized  by  this  time  it  would  be  extremely  dangerous  to  go  down  the 
streets  of  Louvain  in  the  twilight  with  my  poor  command  of  German.  More- 
over, the  final  act  of  the  destruction  of  Louvain  was  being  staged  right  in 
front  of  us.  While  it  was  being  played,  during  a  period  of  more  than  an  hour, 
the  third  soldier,  who  had  not  been  drinking  but  was  much  excited,  remained 


THE  GERMAN  ENTRY  INTO  BELGIUM  331 

at  the  window  talking  to  us.  As  the  station  was  crowded  with  other  excited 
soldiers  we  did  our  best  to  keep  him  there. 

Meanwhile  I  could  see  directly  out  of  the  entrance  upon  the  Place  de  la 
Station  and  down  the  Rue  de  la  Station  as  far  as  the  wrecked  church  of  St. 
Pierre.  Every  house  along  that  stately  street  was  burnt.  The  homes  of  all 
our  kindly  acquaintances  were  gone.  We  had  been  told  that  the  people  had 
all  been  warned  to  leave,  but  I  wondered  what  had  become  of  the  little  Flemish 
woman  of  the  restaurant  with  childbirth  approaching,  and  the  many  lone  wo- 
men whose  husbands  and  brothers  were  in  the  Belgian  army. 

About  a  hundred  English  prisoners  were  led  across  the  Place  de  la  Station 
and,  after  they  had  been  placed  in  cars,  a  long  line  of  citizens  of  Louvain  were 
brought  around  in  a  circle  under  guard.  I  could  not  make  out  at  first  what  the 
purpose  of  this  was  as  my  view  was  temporarily  cut  ofF  by  a  cow  that  was  led 
to  the  main  entrance  of  the  station.  But  presently  a  bayonet  was  run  into 
the  neck  of  the  cow,  and,  as  it  fell,  I  could  see  a  group  of  about  fifteen  men,  in 
civilian  clothes,  closely  guarded.  The  long  line  of  Louvain  citizens  was  being 
led  around  them. 

It  was  difficult  to  make  out  what  was  going  on.  I  asked  the  soldier  at  our 
window  and  he  said  carelessly,  "Oh,  those  are  the  civilians  who  returned  to-day 
to  shoot  us  after  we  had  burned  half  the  town.  We  are  going  to  shoot  some  of 
them." 

The  outer  line  of  civilians  kept  marching  in  a  circle  until  they  had  all  passed 
close  to  the  men  in  the  centre.  Then  the  line  opened  and  the  inner  group  passed 
out  to  the  right.     A  group  of  soldiers  followed. 

After  an  interval  of  only  a  minute  or  two,  hardly  time  for  absolution,  we 
could  hear  the  rifles  of  the  firing  squad.  Evidently  the  careless  soldier  knew 
what  he  was  talking  about. 

"Hear  that,"  he  said,  as  the  rifles  cracked.    "What  did  I  tell  you?" 

Immediately  some  one  climbed  on  a  gun  carriage  among  the  group  of  citi- 
zens standing  motionless  before  the  station  entrance.  I  could  not  hear  a  word 
he  said,  but  his  expressive  gestures  showed  he  was  exhorting  his  fellow  towns- 
men to  accept  their  fate  and  yield  to  their  conquerors. 

While  he  talked,  the  butcher  in  the  foreground  skinned  the  cow  with  pro- 
fessional coolness,  and  began  carving  the  carcass.  It  was  nearly  dark  by  this 
time  and  a  number  of  soldiers  came  with  candles  and  stood  around  the  animal, 
the  blood  of  which  had  spread  over  the  station  platform. 


IV 
HOW  BRITAIN  DID  THE  JOB 

By  IAN  HAY  (CAPTAIN  BEITH),  Author  of  "The  First  Hundred  Thousand" 

When,  in  August,  1914,  the  war  burst  upon  Europe,  it  found  Great  Britain 
just  about  as  unprepared  for  war  as  a  country  could  well  be.  Assisted  by  our 
national  habit  of  taking  the  benevolent  intentions  of  our  neighbours  for 
granted,  we  had  yielded  to  the  assurances  of  those  politicians  who  held  that 
the  best  way  to  keep  out  of  war  is  to  remain  unprepared  for  war.  The  result 
was  that  when  the  little  British  regular  army — the  so-called  Expeditionary  Force 
— hurled  its  contemptible  little  self  across  the  Channel  to  the  discomfiture  of 
the  divine  dispositions  of  the  Kaiser,  it  went  alone — nerved  to  the  grimmer  de- 
termination by  Lord  Kitchener's  explicit  assurance  that  it  need  expect  no 
reinforcements  for  at  least  six  months,  for  the  very  simple  and  most  convincing 
reason  that  there  were  no  reinforcements  to  send.  That  little  force  was  prob- 
ably the  best  equipped,  the  best  led,  and  the  finest  body  of  troops  ever  put  into 
the  field  by  Great  Britain.  They  fought  the  greatest  rear-guard  action  in 
history,  and  they  fought  it,  week  after  week,  without  once  breaking  their 
formation  or  losing  their  morale.  But — they  fought  it  alone.  Their  own  coun- 
try could  not  help  them. 

However,  to  be  just,  the  moment  the  clear  call  came,  there  was  never  any 
difficulty  whatever  about  getting  more  men.  They  enlisted  in  swarms.  The 
difficulty  was,  on  the  spur  of  the  m.oment,  to  organize  machinery  that  would 
handle  them — feed  them,  house  them,  equip  them,  and  get  them  into  fighting 
trim.  Men  stood  in  the  street  for  days,  in  a  long  and  most  pathetic  queue, 
waiting  to  enlist;  and  as  most  of  them  had  thrown  up  their  jobs  in  order  to  do 
so,  they  were  almost  star\'ing  before  they  were  taken  in.  The  ordinary  re- 
cruiting offices,  snowed  under,  delegated  a  great  deal  of  their  work,  perforce,  to 
amateur  organizations,  such  as  local  political  clubs.  These  proceeded  to  enroll 
recruits  with  a  zeal  which  rather  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  humblest  re- 
cruit possesses  a  personality  and  a  stomach  of  his  own.  When  a  man  joins  the 
British  army,  he  first  of  all  fills  up  and  signs  what  is  called  an  attestation  paper, 
and  takes  the  oath.  He  is  then  dispatched,  with  his  paper,  to  the  head- 
quarters of  his  regiment,  where  he  hands  over  the  paper  and  is  duly  enrolled. 
At  least,  that  is  vi^hat  happens  in  normal  tunes.  In  the  fall  of  1914,  at  any 
hour  of  a  given  day  or  night,  some  fifty  or  a  hundred  surprisingly  cheerful 
individuals  were  apt  to  arrive  at  regimental  headquarters,   and   announce, 

332 


HOW  BRITAIN  DID  THE  JOB  333 

usually  in  chorus,  to  the  overdriven  officers  in  charge,  that  they  had  "come 
for  tae  jine  the  Airmy."  They  were  asked  for  their  attestation  papers. 
These  were  not  always  forthcoming.  Sometimes  they  had  been  treated  like 
the  now  historic  "scrap  of  paper";  but  more  often  the  society  which  had 
enrolled  the  man  had  held  his  paper  back,  with  a  view  to  mailing  it  forward 
in  a  bunch  with  others  at  some  more  convenient  season.  The  trouble  was  that 
until  these  papers  were  forthcoming  the  men  could  not  be  regarded  as  soldiers, 
and  no  public  money  could  be  expended  upon  them.  They  might  neither  be 
fed,  nor  clothed,  nor  (officially)  housed.  This  threw  a  heavy  private  burden 
upon  the  officers,  whose  slender  resources  were  strained  to  the  uttermost  to 
provide  for  this  officially  non-existent  multitude.  However,  ultimately  the 
papers  arrived,  and  all  concerned  embarked  upon  the  task  of  finding  an  owner 
for  each  paper.  Owing  to  the  paucity  of  Scottish  tribal  names,  a  Scottish 
battalion  was  particularly  difficult  to  index;  and  the  task  of  sorting  out  the  in- 
numerable Campbells  and  Camerons  and  Wilsons  and  Thomsons — not  to  men- 
tion the  riotous  hordes  of  "Macs  " — was  a  soul-destroying  business.  Day  after 
day,  night  after  night,  the  sifting  process  went  on,  with  infinite  labour  and  dis- 
comfort. So  much  for  the  voluntary  system,  and  the  shunning  of  "mili- 
tarism." 

In  due  course  the  new  battalions  were  evolved  out  of  chaos,  and  departed 
into  space  to  undergo  their  training.  They  possessed  no  uniforms — nothing 
beyond  the  civilian  clothes  they  stood  up  in.  Practically  no  man  owned  a 
greatcoat.  If  he  did,  he  promptly  sold  it,  to  save  the  trouble  of  carrying  it, 
for  Tommy  is  the  most  improvident  creature  in  the  world. 

We  had  all  types.  There  were  miners  by  the  hundred — the  finest  soldiers 
in  the  world  for  trench  fighting,  because  they  handle  pick  and  shovel  by  in- 
stinct, and  they  appear  to  prefer  residence  below  ground  to  residence  upon  the 
surface — shipbuilders,  farmers,  carpenters,  shepherds,  and  members  of  other 
and  rarer  trades.  One  platoon,  for  instance,  contained  a  waiter  from  a 
restaurant,  who  was  accustomed  to  parade  every  morning  in  the  ranks,  bright 
and  early,  in  all  the  glories  of  evening  dress.  The  outstanding  feature  of 
"K  I,"  as  we  called  ourselves,  was  its  ability  to  produce  on  demand  an  expert 
to  cope  with  any  possible  emergency.  If  an  escape  of  gas  was  discovered  in  the 
orderly  room — literal,  not  figurative — a  plumber  was  instantly  forthcoming  to 
cope  with  the  matter.  In  fact,  it  was  hardly  safe  for  an  officer  to  pose  to  his 
platoon  as  an  expert  upon  any  subject  at  all,  for  fear  some  lifelong  expert 
should  uplift  his  voice  in  the  rear  rank  and  refute  his  doctrines.  And  it  may 
be  added  that  in  "  K  I  "  no  considerations  of  military  etiquette  ever  prevented 
him  from  doing  sol  I  still  cherish  the  recollection  of  a  certain  junior  officer 
who  devoted  twenty  minutes  to  explaining  the  points  of  the  compass  and  the 
elements  of  map-reading  to  a  man  who  afterward  explained  that  he  was  by  pro- 
fession a  land-surveyor! 


334  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Such  was  the  material  we  had  to  handle.  It  was  an  army  of  all  the  talents 
— except  soldiering.  No  one  who  saw  Aldershot  during  the  first  months  of  the 
war  will  ever  forget  it.  Men  wandered  about  in  droves,  dressed  like  nothing 
on  earth.  The  spirit  of  discipline  was  hardly  born.  Rules  and  regulations 
were  regarded  either  as  antiquated  relics  of  the  age  of  peace,  or  else  as  a  form 
of  industrial  tyranny.  The  officer  was  regarded  as  a  rapacious  employer, 
while  the  sergeant — or  foreman,  as  he  was  usually  called — was  looked  upon  as  a 
hired  bully.  If  a  man  felt  disinclined  to  go  upon  parade,  he  simply  did  not 
go;  and  he  felt  both  surprised  and  pained  if,  on  returning  from  a  trifling  absence 
of  three  days,  prepared  to  forget  and  forgive  upon  a  monetary  basis — say  the 
loss  of  three  days'  pay — he  found  himself  under  arrest  as  a  deserter.  But  we 
can  judge  these  men  by  no  standard  but  their  ov/n.  They 'had  joined  the 
army,  to  a  man,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  in  the  sure  and  certain  expectation  of 
being  forthwith  provided  with  rifle  and  bayonet,  and  of  being  despatched  at 
once  to  the  Front — wherever  and  whatever  that  might  be — to  kill  Germans. 
One  cannot  blame  them  for  feehng  a  little  disappointed  on  finding  that  the 
path  of  glory  was  approached  by  a  stony  thoroughfare  eight  months  long, 
hedged  about  with  unexpected  restrictions  on  the  subject  of  obedience  and 
sobriety.  They  had  to  acquire  the  instincts  of  a  soldier  after  they  had  settled 
down  to  another  way  of  hfe.  No  wonder  they  found  things  difficult.  Yet, 
less  than  a  year  later,  at  the  opening  assault  of  the  great  and  bloody  Battle  of 
Loos,  those  same  men  went  forward,  many  of  them  to  certain  death,  as  stead- 
ily as  the  most  seasoned  veterans. 

Such  was  the  Spirit  of  the  British  armies,  old  and  new.  And  it  is  that 
spirit  which  has  saved  us  as  a  nation,  and  done  most,  at  terrible  personal  sacri- 
fice, to  redeem  us  from  the  evils  of  unpreparedness. 


THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA* 

By  STANLEY  WASHBURN 

Had  Russia  been  fighting  Austria  alone  in  this  war,  the  whole  world  would 
have  been  ringing  for  the  last  two  months  with  the  account  of  vast  operations, 
magnificent  strategy,  and  battles  which  in  size  and  extent  have  never  before 
been  known  in  the  world's  history.  But  with  the  coming  of  the  war  here,  there 
broke  also  the  great  cloud  all  over  Europe,  and  the  details  and  scope  of  this 
remarkable  campaign  have,  as  it  seems  to  me,  been  completely  overshadowed 
by  the  nearer  and  better-understood  operations  in  the  country  of  Western 
Europe,  which  is  much  more  intimately  known  to  Englishmen  and  to  Ameri- 
cans. While  England  and  the  United  States  were  hanging  with  bated  breath 
on  the  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  subsequent  movements  in  France,  the  situ- 
ation in  Galicia  received  scant  attention,  and  barring  occasional  reports  of  the 
capture  of  towns,  the  names  of  which  were  hardly  familiar  to  us,  very  little 
news  came  from  this  zone. 

It  seems,  therefore,  appropriate  to  sketch  briefly  and  simply  what  has  been 
done  down  here  by  Russia  and  how  she  has  done  it.  With  the  mere  statement 
that  the  operations  against  Austria  involved  the  movement  of  more  than  a 
million  of  Russian  troops  against  about  a  million  of  Austrians  and  Hungarians, 
it  will  be  understood  that  the  scale  of  the  campaign  was  enormous. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  invasion  began  from  three  different 
directions,  and  the  Russian  troops  were  formed  into  three  great  groups,  each 
composing  many  army  corps,  the  total  aggregating  twenty.  These  movements 
started  from  three  bases.  Brusiloff  from  the  extreme  east,  with  his  base  on 
Odessa,  crossed  the  boundary  formed  by  the  river  Zbrucz  (local  spelling), 
with  his  central  corps  on  the  line  of  the  railroad  at  Wotocczyska,  and  com- 
menced his  march  on  Lwow  (Lemberg),  which  is  the  strategic  centre  of  cen- 
tral Galicia.  Simultaneously  Russky's  army  started  with  its  innumerable 
army  corps  and  auxiliary  troops,  having  Kiev  for  its  base.  These  divisions 
crossed  the  frontier  with  their  centre  on  the  line  of  railroad  running  from 
Radziwitow  through  Brody  and  Krasne  to  Lemberg. 

The  last  great  group  of  army  corps,  commanded  by  Ewerts,  had  its  base  on 
Brest-Litowsk,  and  moved  south  via  Lublin  to  drive  out  the  opposing  Austrians 
in  their  front,  and  take  the  whole  in  the  flank.     This,  in  a  very  broad  and  gen- 

*Reprinted  from  "Field  Notes  from  the  Russian  Front"  by  the  kind  permission  of  the'author. 

335 


336  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

eral  way,  was  the  movement  planned  and  the  general  scheme  of  strategy, 
which,  it  may  be  said,  was  carried  out  to  the  letter.  The  greatest  weakness  of 
Russia  at  the  start  of  the  hostilities  was  in  her  lack  of  strategic  lines  of  rail- 
road. If  one  takes  a  map  of  Galicia,  it  will  be  observed  that  the  Austrian 
Government  has  numerous  lines  which  run  to  the  frontier  of  Russia  and  then 
stop.  This  enabled  the  Austrians  to  mass  troops  almost  instantly.  The 
Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  had  few  such  lines,  and  the  result  was  that  the 
initial  operations  were  much  more  difficult  than  they  would  otherwise  have 
been.  Time,  in  war,  is  the  chief  factor  of  the  whole  enterprise.  Had  Russia 
had  more  railheads  at  the  frontier,  she  would  no  doubt  have  swept  Eastern 
Galicia  before  the  Austrians  could  have  concentrated  in  any  great  force. 
But  the  lack  of  such  facilities  enabled  the  enemy  to  prepare  defences  hurriedly 
at  many  points,  and  to  contest  the  Russian  advance  at  every  step.  The  opin- 
ion in  England  and  in  the  United  States  also  seems  to  have  been  that  the 
Austrian  troops  were  inferior,  and  that  Russian  advances  were  due  largely 
to  the  weakness  of  her  enemy.  Those  who  have  travelled  over  the  field  of 
operations,  and  read  in  the  page  of  abandoned  battlefields  the  tale  of  stub- 
born resistance,  must  change  their  views  about  the  Austrians,  and  at  the  same 
time  admit  the  remarkable  impetuosity  and  courage  of  the  Russian  troops, 
who,  against  enormous  obstacles,  tore  their  way  through  a  clever  and  ferocious 
resistance.  The  army  of  BrusilofF  was  the  most  distant  from  the  strategic 
centre  aimed  at  (Lemberg),  and  hence  had  the  farthest  to  go,  and  perhaps 
in  the  early  days  the  hardest  fighting.  The  Austrians,  with  their  superior 
railway  facilities,  were  able  to  prepare  a  preliminary  line  of  resistance  to  this 
army,  along  the  bluffs  and  high  ground  between  the  forks  of  the  stream  known 
on  local  maps  as  Zlota  Lipa,  and  here  they  made  their  first  stand,  a  battle 
which  in  any  other  war  would  have  taken  columns  to  describe,  but  which  in 
this  struggle  falls  into  the  class  of  a  mere  skirmish. 

From  this  point  the  Austrians  fell  back  on  a  second  line  of  defence,  and 
one  which  was,  in  fact,  an  extremely  strong  one.  This  was  the  hills  and  ridges 
east  of  the  river  called  Gnila  Lipa.  By  the  time  this  position  was  reached 
by  the  Russians,  BrusiloiT's  left  was  in  touch  with  Russky's  right  that  had 
crossed  the  boundary  around  Radziwitow.  The  position  now  defended  by  the 
Austrians  extended  from  the  town  of  Halicz  on  the  Dniester  River,  which  was 
the  Russian  southern  flank,  in  a  practically  unbroken  line  through  the  north  of 
Krasne.  The  battle  which  was  engaged  over  this  extended  line  lasted  for 
periods,  in  different  parts  of  the  position,  of  eight  to  ten  days  in  the  south, 
to  nearly  two  weeks  on  the  Krasne  position  itself. 

The  Austrian  line  was  a  very  strong  one  and  was  defended  with  an  intelli- 
gence and  vigour  which  for  days  on  end  promised  to  thwart  utterly  the  Russian 
efforts  to  break  through.  Trenches  by  the  mile,  with  bombproofs,  barbed-wire 
entanglements,  and  all  other  devices  of  modern  field  fortifications  had  been 


THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA  337 

erected  to  block  the  advance  of  the  invading  troops.  Modern  field  guns,  ma- 
chine guns,  and  field  howitzers  were  all  turned  against  the  Russians,  and  their 
losses  were  undoubtedly  very  heavy.  Some  of  the  details  of  the  general  line 
were  contested  for  eight  and  nine  days,  being  now  taken  by  one  side  and  now 
by  the  other,  with  each  assault  and  counter-assault  leaving  the  piled-up  heaps 
of  the  dead  and  wounded  in  its  wake.  All  this  time  Ewerts's  numerous  army 
corps  were  slowly  pressing  down  from  their  base  on  Brest  Litowsk,  driving 
back  heavy  forces  of  the  Austrians.  But  these  columns  were  not  determining 
factors  in  the  first  big  fight  before  Lemberg.  It  was  the  collapse  of  the  Aus- 
trian defence  toward  the  south  of  the  line  that  broke  down  the  first  big 
Austrian  stand  on  their  main  line  of  defences.  Heavy  masses  of  them  fled 
via  Halicz,  blowing  up  a  fine  steel  bridge  in  their  retreat.  But  the  Russians, 
in  spite  of  their  days  of  incessant  marching  and  heavy  fighting,  were  not  to  be 
denied,  and,  throwing  a  pontoon  bridge  over  the  river,  followed  up  their  vic- 
tory. 

This  movement  threatened  to  envelop  the  whole  Austrian  right,  and 
rendered  the  defence  still  going  on  around  Krasne  no  longer  tenable.  Orders 
were  therefore  hurriedly  given  for  the  abandonment  of  that  hard-fought  field. 
It  must  be  understood,  however,  in  justice  to  the  Austrians,  that,  even  after 
thirteen  days  of  resisting  the  Russians,  their  line  in  this  part  of  the  field  was 
not  broken,  nor  even  severely  shaken;  and  their  retirement  was  due  to  the 
strategical  exigencies  created  by  BrusilofF's  enveloping  movement  on  the 
south.  The  Austrians  then  evacuated  their  base  at  Lwow  (Lemberg),  and 
without  offering  any  further  resistance  in  the  city,  retired  to  their  newly 
created  and  even  stronger  position  extending  through  Grodek  and  north  to 
Rawa  Ruska.  Here,  for  the  first  time,  all  the  Russian  armies  were  in  touch,  as 
all  the  Austrians  were  also.  Ewerts  and  his  numerous  corps  had  forced  back 
his  antagonists  to  the  line  between  Rawa  Ruska  and  Bitgoraj.  This  then  pre- 
sented an  enormous  front,  with  all  the  armies  of  both  sides  in  touch  with  each 
other,  and  all  engaged  practically  at  the  same  time.  It  is  diflScult  to  form 
more  than  the  merest  approximate  estimate  of  numbers  engaged,  but  it  is  safe 
to  put  the  total  on  both  sides  as  above  2,500,000. 

This  battle,  the  details  of  which  are  so  little  known,  was  without  doubt 
the  hardest  fought  struggle,  and  on  the  most  gigantic  scale  that  the  war  had 
seen  up  to  the  time  when  it  took  place.  Ewerts  on  the  north  would  not  be  de- 
nied his  advance,  and  his  repeated  assaults  on  the  Austrians  resulted  in  bend- 
ing in  their  left  day  by  day  until  theirlinewasbentinto  a  right  angle,  with  Rawa 
Ruska  on  the  northeastern  corner.  Here  for  eight  days  a  battle  raged  which 
the  annals  of  history  certainly  cannot  up  to  this  time  duplicate,  for  the  ferocity 
and  bitterness  of  attack,  and  the  stubbornness  and  courageof  the  defence.  The 
Austrians,  let  it  be  said,  were  in  an  extremely  strong  position  round  this  quaint 
little  town,  and  were  prepared  to  defend  themselves  to  the  last  ditch,  which  in 


338  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

fact  they  did  to  the  letter.  At  the  extreme  corner  of  the  defence,  which  I 
suppose  one  might  call  the  strategic  centre  of  the  whole  battle — if  one  place  in 
so  huge  an  amphitheatre  can  be  picked  out — they  fought  for  six  days  with  an 
endurance  which  was  almost  incredible. 

Here  there  are  no  less  than  eight  lines  of  defence  in  little  more  than  a  mile. 
Each  of  these  was  held  to  the  last  minute,  and  some  of  them  changed  hands 
several  times  before  the  Russians  came  finally  over  them.  Each  trench  tells 
its  own  story  of  defence.  Piles  and  piles  of  empty  cartridges,  accoutrements, 
and  knick-knacks  are  heaped  in  every  ditch.  Right  across  the  field  between 
their  positions  is  written  their  hurried  change  of  line,  with  new  graves  and 
hundreds  of  haversacks  scattered  in  between.  Then  comes  another  trench 
with  the  same  signs  of  patient  endurance  under  shot  and  shell.  The  last  and 
strongest  position  of  all  before  the  final  collapse  is  a  place  to  make  the  blood 
curdle.  By  this  time  the  Russians  had  brought  up  their  heavy  field  howitzers, 
and  when  they  finally  got  the  range,  they  literally  destroyed  the  whole  posi- 
tion. One  can  walk  for  hundreds  of  yards  stepping  from  one  shell  hole  into 
another,  each  five  feet  deep  and  perhaps  ten  feet  across.  One  can  pick  up  the 
dirt  of  the  trenches  and  sift  the  shrapnel  balls  out  in  handfuls.  And  yet  even 
here  the  Austrians  hung  on  for  a  time,  as  the  mute  evidence  of  the  field  too 
clearly  tells.  In  every  direction  from  each  shell  hole  are  strewn  the  fragments  of 
blue  cloth  of  the  Austrian  uniform,  torn  into  shreds  and  ribbons  by  the  force 
of  the  explosive;  and  all  about  the  field  still  are  bits  of  arms,  a  leg  in  a  boot,  or 
some  other  ghastly  token  of  soldiers,  true  to  discipline,  hanging  on  to  a  position 
that  was  alive  with  bursting  shells. 

Beyond  this  line  was  the  artillery  position  of  the  Austrians,  and  here  again 
we  find  heaps  upon  heaps  of  brass  shrapnel  shells,  with  shattered  wheels  and 
splinters  of  caissons  in  every  direction.  This  last  stand  finally  caved  in,  and 
the  next  field,  dotted  with  dead  horses,  shows  where  the  remnant  of  the  Aus- 
trian artillery  took  its  way.  The  Austrians  never  had  a  chance  to  make  a 
stand  in  the  town  itself,  and  with  its  loss  came  the  dissolution  of  the  whole 
defence  along  the  entire  line  of  battle,  and  what  was  really  an  overhwelming 
disaster  to  the  cause  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Austrian  army  here  split 
in  two.  While  it  is  an  advantage  for  victorious  armies  to  have  separate  bases, 
it  is  anything  but  desirable  for  an  army  in  defeat,  for  naturally  each  fragment 
falls  back  on  its  own  line  of  communications.  This  is  what  actually  happened 
here  at  this  time.  The  Hungarian  corps  on  the  Austrian  right  retired  through 
the  Carpathian  passes,  while  the  Austrians  fell  back  in  confusion  on  Cracow, 
with  the  Russians  taking  Yaroslav  on  their  heels.  This,  then,  was  the  first 
great  phase  of  the  invasion  of  Galicia.  The  Russians  at  the  conclusion  of  this 
part  of  the  campaign  held  Galicia  up  to  the  river  San  and  Yaroslav,  and  had 
swept  everything  in  this  zone  before  them  with  the  exception  of  the  fortified 
position  of  Przemysl,  which,  as  I  write,  still  forms  a  strong  position  in  the 


THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA  339 

present  Austrian  line.  So  much  for  the  purely  military  aspect.  Let  us  now 
turn  to  the  methods  of  the  Russians  and  the  manner  of  their  behaviour  while 
in  a  conquered  country. 

The  Russians,  after  six  weeks  of  campaigning,  were  left  in  absolute  control 
of  the  whole  of  Galicia,  up  to  a  line  running  from  the  Carpathians  on  the  south, 
through  Przemysl  and  along  the  River  San  to  the  important  town  of  Yaroslav. 
If  one  goes  back  over  this  campaign  and  studies  the  movements  from  the 
start  of  the  war,  one  cannot  but  be  enormously  impressed  -with  the  remarkable 
achievement  accomplished  by  the  Russian  army  in  a  comparatively  short 
campaign.  Starting  from  widely  separated  bases,  with  meagre  railway  facili- 
ties, they  manoeuvred  three  giant  armies,  each  composed  of  many  corps  and 
all  working  in  general  union,  and  achieved,  without  one  effective  setback,  a 
series  of  victories  of  enormous  magnitude.  They  did  this  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  whom  history  will  show  to  have  been  by  no  means  weak.  The  theory 
that  Austria  was  a  web  of  factions  that  would  dissolve  at  the  first  impact,  and 
the  belief  that  her  troops  would  not  fight,  have  been  absolutely  disproved;  and 
it  serves  to  magnify  the  achievements  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Czar,  when  we  ac- 
cord to  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  the  credit  which  is  due  to  its  courageous 
defence  and  the  stubborn  resistance  put  up  at  every  favourable  opportunity. 

My  opinion  is  that  no  troops  could  have  made  a  braver  resistance  than  was 
offered  in  many  instances  by  the  defeated  army.  I  walked  over  one  position 
which  the  Austrians  held  for  a  day  in  a  stubble  field  with  no  defences  whatever 
save  the  fev/-inches-deep  pits  that  each  man  had  dug  for  himself.  For  a  mile 
the  paihetic  evidence  of  their  determination  to  stick  was  visible  on  every  hand. 
An  unbroken  line  of  accoutrements  and  fragments  of  shells  marks  the  position 
where  they  held  on  absolutely  without  any  shelter.  Right  in  the  centre  of  this 
hideous  zone  was  a  crossing  of  the  roads,  and  there  stands  to-day  a  moss- 
grown  old  cross  which  for  a  century  perhaps  has  received  the  reverence  of  the 
passing  peasant.  All  through  this  terrible  day  the  carved  figure  of  the  Christ 
upon  the  cross  looked  down  upon  the  dying  and  wounded.  The  top  of  the 
wooden  upright  was  shattered  with  a  bit  of  shell,  while  one  arm  of  the  figure  of 
Christ  was  carried  away  by  a  shrapnel  fragment.  Could  anything  be  more  in- 
congruous than  this  pathetic  figure  of  Him,  who  came  to  spread  peace  and 
good  will  among  men,  looking  down  to-day  on  a  field  sown  with  mangled 
corpses  ?  At  the  very  foot  of  the  cross  is  a  newly  made  grave  and  a  rude  wooden 
sign  nailed  upon  the  monument  itself:  "Here  He  the  bodies  of  121  Austrian 
warriors  and  four  Russian  warriors  of  the — th  regiment." 

After  the  terrible  fighting  that  had  gone  on  for  v»?eeks,  there  followed  a  pe- 
riod of  recuperation  and  refilling  of  the  wastage  of  both  armies.  The  Russians 
engaged  the  front  of  Przemysl  and  took  the  town  of  Sambor,  and  rested  for  a 
little.  In  the  meantime  the  Austrians,  encouraged  by  their  German  allies, 
were  making  frantic  efforts  to  pull  themselves  together.     The  fragments  of 


340  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  army  that  had  escaped  through  the  passes  of  the  Carpathians  were  taken 
by  rail  to  Cracow,  while  the  army  that  went  that  way  was  reinforced  and  stif- 
fened, and  the  whole  reorganized  and  whipped  into  shape  for  further  opera- 
tions. The  view  that  the  heart  of  the  Austrian  army  had  been  destroyed  was 
now  contradicted,  for  shortly  after  the  loth  of  October,  1914,  it  again  showed 
signs  of  life.  We  hear  that  its  left  in  Cracow  joins  the  German  right,  and 
that  many  German  army  corps  are  united  with  it  there.  Rumour  among  us 
also  says  that  the  German  Staff  is  in  command  of  all  Austrian  operations. 
In  any  case,  the  second  phase  of  the  Galician  war  is  now  in  full  blast. 

The  Austrians  began  this  by  a  terrific  attack  on  Sambor,  which  was  held 
by  the  Russians.  Their  impetus  was  so  great  that  for  several  days  it  seemed 
possible  that  the  Russians  might  be  dislodged  permanently  from  their  hard- 
won  position  on  their  left  flank.  Indeed  at  Lemberg,  where  the  guns  could 
plainly  be  heard,  there  were  constant  rumours  of  Austrian  victories.  But  their 
offensive  ultimately  failed,  and  the  tide  of  battle  gradually  ebbed  from  round 
Sambor,  and  the  interest  shifted  to  a  point  which  is  between  Sambor  and 
Przemysl.  Here  the  Austrians  concentrated  a  number  of  army  corps,  less 
than  four,  and  made  a  heroic  effort  to  break  the  Russian  line,  with  the  idea  of 
taking  Lemberg,  which  was  a  practicable  scheme,  entirely  dependent  on  the 
success  of  their  attack.  For  a  day  or  so  their  eflforts  seemed  to  be  showing 
results,  and  a  number  of  the  hospitals  in  Lemberg  were  ordered  to  be  in  readi- 
ness for  an  instant  removal.  But  this  also  failed,  and  also  the  Sambor  move- 
ment, with  a  dreadful  loss  to  the  Austrians  in  dead  and  wounded,  besides 
more  than  5,000  prisoner.s  taken  by  the  Russians. 

While  this  action  was  at  its  height,  the  combined  Austrians  and  Germans 
delivered  a  stroke  against  Yaroslav,  which  the  Russians  had  been  holding 
since  the  days  following  the  retirement  of  the  Austrians  from  their  Grodek- 
Rawa  Ruska  line.  The  details  of  this  battle  are  not  known  to  us,  and  indeed, 
the  action  is  still  under  way  as  I  am  writing  these  lines.  From  what  we  gather, 
however,  the  Germans,  after  occupying  Yaroslav,  were  driven  out  by  the  Rus- 
sians in  a  terrible  counter-attack,  and  since  then  have  made  no  headway  what- 
soever. In  a  word,  the  movements  of  the  Austro-German  united  armies  in 
this  last  effort  to  wrest  Galicia  from  the  Russians  seem  now  to  have  been  ab- 
solutely futile.  For  three  days  wc  were  travelling  just  in  the  rear  of  the  Rus- 
sian line,  and  during  all  that  time  the  cannonading  was  terrible  and  without 
Intermission.  We  are  too  near  the  operations,  both  from  the  point  of  view  of 
distance  and  time,  to  get  any  real  perspective  of  the  general  situation;  but  at 
the  time  of  writing  it  seems  safe  to  venture  the  statement  that  the  Dual  Alli- 
ance have  shot  their  bolt  on  this  frontier,  and  that  hereafter  there  will  be 
no  serious  opportunity  for  them  to  regain  the  territory  which  they  lost  in 
Galicia. 

The  fortress  of  Przemysl  still  holds  out  and  may  very  well  do  so  until  the  end 


THE  RUSSIAN  CONQUEST  OF  GALICIA  341 

of  hostilities.  It  is  strongly  defended,  and  will  take  a  lot  of  battering  before 
its  capture  can  be  effected. 

What  I  have  written  of  the  military  situation  in  Galicia  is,  I  believe,  approx- 
imately a  correct  outline  of  the  general  movements.  It  is  almost  impossible 
to  get  more  than  a  very  general  idea  of  how  things  have  actually  happened, 
except  in  a  very  hazy  way.  The  fighting  has  extended  over  such  an  enormous 
area,  the  numbers  engaged  have  been  so  large,  and  units  of  command  have 
been  so  numerous,  that  nothing  like  an  accurate  account  can  be  given  until  the 
reports  of  the  various  commanders  on  both  sides  are  to  hand  and  can  be  di- 
gested. 

The  general  fact  remains,  however,  that  Russia  has  in  two  months  handled 
an  army  of  more  than  a  million  men  with  no  serious  setbacks,  and  is  to-day 
occupying  the  richest  and  best  portion  of  the  fertile  province  of  Galicia. 

Written  October,  191 4. 


VI 
HOW  THE  NAVY  SAVED  ENGLAND* 

By  WINSTON  CHURCHILL 
(Former  First  Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty) 

London,  July  22. — What  kind  of  foe  is  this  "Great  Amphibian"  which,  for 
the  first  time  in  history,  Germany  has  drawn  out  against  her?  Many  valiant 
enemies  has  the  Prussian  army  fought  in  the  last  300  years,  on  the  whole  with 
a  balance  of  good  fortune,  but  here  is  something  new  altogether. 

Never  before  have  the  force  and  science  of  Central  Europe  come  into  armed 
conflict  with  the  western  island.  Far  back  along  the  fading  paths  of  history 
crusading  armies  moved  across  the  salt  water  to  the  fray.  The  chivalry  of 
Crecy,  and  the  archers  of  Agincourt  who  disembarked  upon  the  coast  of 
France;  the  sea  rovers  who  affronted  the  power  of  Philip  II  on  the  Spanish 
Main,  and  the  soldiers  who  withstood  him  in  the  Low  Countries;  the  armies  of 
William  III  and  the  Duke  of  Marlborough,  humbling  the  glory  of  Louis  XIV; 
the  far-ranging  ships  and  stubborn  infantry  that  sustained  a  great  king  in  one 
century  and  warred  down  a  great  emperor  in  the  next — all  had  one  birthplace, 
all  were  manifestations  of  one  peculiar  form  of  power, 

GERMAN   RAGE   AGAINST   ENGLAND 

Now  at  last  Prussia — the  embodiment  of  all  that  land  energy  could  give — 
must  join  in  unrelenting  conflict  with  the  Great  Amphibian.  It  is  no  small 
proof  of  the  shrewdness  of  the  Prussian  military  instinct  that  they  realized 
at  once  where  the  peril  lay,  and  even  while  the  German  armies  rolled  forw^ard 
to  the  terrific  assault  on  the  French  frontier,  or  drew  up  to  withstand  at  heavy 
odds  the  hosts  of  the  Czar,  their  hate  and  rage  were  concentrated  upon  the 
unorganized,  black-coated,  commerce-absorbed,  politics-loving  state  which 
could  scarcely  at  the  outset  put  150,000  men  in  the  field. 

Berlin  mobs  insulting  with  vulgar  fury  the  departing  British  Ambassador 
expressed  the  same  well-founded  apprehension  as  the  discerning  pen  and  veno- 
mous verse  of  Lissauer.  Let  us  always  labour  to  deserve  these  sincere  and 
spontaneous  tributes. 

The  Great  Amphibian  is  a  female  beast;  not  clever,  but  very  tough;  short- 
sighted, but  very  patient;  slow  and  clumsy,  but  very  strong  and  fierce — strong 
as  her  homes  in  the  broad  seas.      You  cannot  voyage  upon  them  without  see- 


*From  the  Tribune.    Copyright,  1916 — The  Tribune  Ass'n. 

j43 


HOW  THE  NAVY  SAVED  ENGLAND  343 

ing  her  dorsal  fins  cutting  the  blue  water,  and  all  over  the  worfd  she  has  de- 
posited her  young.  She  moves  at  all  times  freely  about  broad  and  narrow 
waters,  and,  when  minded,  bars  their  passage  to  all  others. 

THE   GREAT   AMPHIBIAN 

If  need  be  she  can  crawl  or  even  dart  ashore  first  a  scaly  arm,  with  sharp 
claws;  then,  if  time  and  circumstances  warrant,  a  head,  with  gleaming  teeth, 
and  shoulders  that  grow  broader  and  broader.  Then  she  can  draw  out  con- 
volution after  convolution  of  muscular  body,  till  one  cannot  tell  where  the  end 
of  her  may  be  found.  Or  she  can  return  again  to  the  deep,  to  strike  anew,  now 
here,  now  there — and  no  one  can  guess  where  the  next  attack  will  fall.  While 
she  fights  her  strength  waxes.  She  is  invigorated,  not  exhausted,  by  effort, 
and  her  ancient  craft  in  war  is  gradually  revived  in  her  as  the  struggle  deepens. 
Only  she  eats  too  much,  wastes  too  much,  and  costs  a  lotto  keep.  Withal  the 
Great  Amphibian  is  faithful  unto  death.  She  is  very  hard  to  get  at — in  fact, 
since  she  first  learned  to  swim,  no  one  has  ever  caught  her. 

The  true  characteristic  of  all  British  strategy  lies  in  the  use  of  this  amphi- 
bious power.  Not  on  the  sea  alone,  but  on  land  and  sea  together — not  the 
fleet  alone,  but  the  army  in  hand  with  the  fleet.  In  this  lies  everything.  In 
this  already  once  in  this  war  decisive  victory  has  perhaps  resided. 

BRITISH  MOBILIZATION 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  26,  1914,  orders  were  issued  to  prevent  ships  of  the 
First  Fleet  from  dispersing,  as  would  otherwise  have  been  done  at  daylight  on 
the  27th,  and  to  recall  such  as  had  started.  At  midnight  the  ships  of  the 
Second  Fleet  were  ordered  to  remain  at  their  home  ports,  in  close  proximity  to 
the  balance  of  their  crews.  On  the  27th  all  the  naval  aircraft  were  moved 
to  vulnerable  points  on  the  east  coast,  the  Second  Fleet  completed  an  informal 
"stand  by,"  telegrams  were  sent  to  admirals  abroad,  and  far  away  at  the  China 
station  the  battleship  Triumph  began  to  clear  for  action. 

During  the  27th  and  28th  the  protecting  flotillas  along  the  east  coast  were 
raised  to  their  full  strength.  On  the  night  of  the  29th  the  whole  of  the  First 
Fleet,  with  auxiliary  cruiser  squadrons  and  flotillas,  passed  the  Strait  of  Dover 
and  gained  their  war  station  in  northern  waters.  On  the  same  day  an  official 
"warning  telegram"  of  approaching  danger  was  issued.  On  the  30th  the 
"precautionary  period"  began.  Naval  harbours  were  cleared  and  modified 
examination  service  was  instituted.  On  the  31st  the  immediate  reserve  was 
mobilized  and  various  reserve  cruiser  squadrons  came  into  being. 

NAVY   MADE    READY 

On  August  1st,  shortly  before  midnight,  a  general  mobilization  of  the  navy 
was  ordered  and  the  Third  Fleet  began  to  come  to  a  war  basis,     This  step  was 


344  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

approved  by  the  Cabinet  on  Sunday,  the  2d,  and  made  regular  by  royal 
proclamation  next  day.  All  reservists,  however,  had  responded  to  the  Ad- 
miralty summons,  and  on  August  3d,  when  the  ultimatum  was  sent  requiring 
Germany  to  evacuate  Belgium,  the  whole  process  by  which  the  naval  power  of 
Great  Britain  is  placed  in  readiness  for  war  was  completed  in  all  respects. 

At  a  great  war  council  held  on  the  afternoon  of  August  4th,  attended  by 
the  principal  naval  and  military  personages  as  well  as  Cabinet  ministers  di- 
rectly concerned  with  the  Admiralty,  it  was  agreed  to  despatch  immediately 
the  whole  regular  army — not  four,  but  six  divisions,  if  necessary — to  the 
Continent  and  to  undertake  their  transportation  and  the  security  of  the  island 
in  their  absence.  This  considerable  undertaking  was  made  good  by  the  Royal 
Navy. 

Once  more  now,  in  the  march  of  the  centuries.  Old  England  was  to  stand 
forth  in  battle  against  the  mightiest  thrones  and  dominations.  Once  more, 
in  defence  of  the  liberties  of  Europe  and  the  common  right,  must  she  enter 
upon  a  voyage  of  great  toil  and  hazard,  across  waters  uncharted,  toward  coasts 
unknown,  guided  only  by  stars.  Once  more  "the  far-off  line  of  storm-beaten 
ships"  was  to  stand  between  a  Continental  tyrant  and  the  domination  of  the 
world. 

It  was  II  o'clock  at  night — 12  by  German  time — when  Berlin's  answer  to 
the  British  ultimatum  was  expected.  The  windows  of  the  Admiralty  were 
thrown  wide  open  in  the  warm  night  air.  Under  the  roof  from  which  Nelson 
had  received  his  orders  was  gathered  a  small  group  of  admirals  and  captains 
and  a  cluster  of  clerks,  pencil  in  hand,  waiting. 

Along  the  Mall,  from  the  direction  of  Buckingham  Palace,  the  sound  of  an 
immense  concourse  singing  "God  Save  the  King"  floated  in,  and  on  this  deep 
wave  broke  the  chimes  of  Big  Ben.  As  the  first  stroke  of  the  hour  boomed 
out,  a  rustle  of  movement  swept  across  the  room.  The  war  telegram  which 
means  "Commence  hostilities"  was  flashed  to  ships  and  establishments  under 
the  white  ensign  all  over  the  world. 

Aye,  commence  hostilities  at  once  against  Germany;  urge  them;  persevere  in 
them ;  concentrate  upon  them ;  repent  not  of  them ;  pursue  them  to  the  very  end. 

Certainly  Great  Britain's  entry  into  the  war  was  workmanlike.  Con- 
fronted by  the  greatest  military  power  in  the  worliand  by  a  navy  second  only 
to  her  own,  she  acted  with  instant  decision.  Her  great  fleet  disappeared  into 
the  mists  at  one  end  of  the  island,  her  small  army  hurried  out  of  the  country 
at  the  other. 

ARMY  PLAYS   BIG   PART 

By  these  extraordinary  strokes  she  might  well  have  appeared  to  the  uniniti- 
ated eye  to  divest  herself  of  her  defences,  to  lay  herself  open  to  the  greatest 
perils.     Long  stretches  of  her  eastern  coast,  guarded  only  by  unostentatious 


HOW  THE  NAVY  SAVED  ENGLAND  345 

flotillas  and  comparatively  untrained  territorials,  seemed  almost  to  invite  at- 
tack. Yet  both  these  acts  had  been  carefully  conceived  in  time  of  peace,  and 
both  were  in  harmony  with  the  highest  strategic  truth. 

The  "contemptible  little  army"  reached  the  western  battlefield  in  time  to 
play  what  well  might  be  judged  a  decisive  part  in  the  first  and  most  critical 
of  all  trials  of  strength.  The  "Grand  Fleet" — for  this  name,  so  honoured  by  our 
ancestors,  was  to  be  revived  on  the  outbreak  of  war — from  its  northern  throne 
has  ruled  the  seas  ever  since  with  a  completeness  of  control  which  even  Trafal- 
gar had  not  secured. 

It  may  well  be  that  history  furnishes  no  more  remarkable  example  of  de- 
termined adhesion  by  civil  government  to  sound  principles  of  war  as  embodied 
in  carefully  considered  plans  without  regard  to  obvious  risks  and  objections. 
Had  all  our  action  been  on  this  level,  how  many  months  of  danger,  how  many 
lives,  and  what  treasure  might  not  have  been  saved. 

BRITISH   COMMAND   OF  THE    SEA 

From  the  first  hour  of  war  it  was  evident  that  command  of  the  sea  and  all 
that  followed  from  it  rested  with  Britain.  Everywhere  German  merchant 
ships  scurried  to  port.  Everywhere  their  cruisers  hid  themselves.  Every- 
where their  commerce  raiders  were  blocked  in  neutral  or  enemy  harbours. 

But  at  any  moment  England's  naval  strength  might  be  challenged — and  if 
at  any  moment,  then  surely  the  earliest  moment  was  most  probable — and  even 
pending  battles,  the  seas  were  full  of  dangers  about  which  no  experience  existed 
as  a  guide  or  measure.  At  any  moment — and  if  at  any  moment,  then  surely 
while  it  might  delay  the  departure  of  an  expeditionary  force — a  raid  or  descent 
might  be  attempted  upon  our  coasts.  Nevertheless,  the  army  must  go  to 
France,  and  at  once.  Submarines?  Still  it  must  go.  The  French  African 
army  also  must  cross  seas  not  yet  cleared.  Never  mind — the  bulk  would  get 
there. 

And  then,  from  all  over  the  world,  the  Great  Amphibian  must  draw  her 
children,  her  resources,  and  her  food.  Ten  thousand  keels  were  carrying  on 
trade  and  transportation,  sailing  boldly  over  every  sea,  hundreds  homeward 
bound  and  hundreds  outward  bound  each  day,  on  i  per  cent,  war  insur- 
ance. 

THE   MENACE   TO   BRITAIN 

The  Australian  and  Canadian  armies,  the  Indian  divisions  for  France,  the 
territorial  divisions  for  India,  regular  divisions,  spread  garrisons  about  the 
world  and  a  dozen  minor  enterprises  claimed  transport  and  armed  convoy. 
For  the  enemy's  cruisers  were  still  at  large  and  hidden. 

Reinforcements  and  supplies  for  the  army  in  France  flowed  in  in  an  ever- 
widening  stream,  in  spite  of  the  enemy  submarine,  growing  more  daring  and 


346  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

more  skilful  every  day.  Then,  as  the  Allied  armies  recoiled  on  Paris,  land  com- 
munications by  Havre  were  threatened. 

"Shift  the  base  to  St.  Nazaire."  It  was  shifted  accordingly.  "Get  ready 
to  shift  further  south  still."  It  was  got  ready  accordingly.  "  Better  news — 
victory  on  the  Marne — the  tide  has  turned — shift  it  back  to  Havre."  Again 
it  was  shifted  accordingly. 

Meanwhile  there  was  not  a  moment's  interruption  to  the  men  and  supplies 
pouring  out  or  the  wounded  pouring  back.  And  all  the  time  Britain  must 
pen  the  second  greatest  naval  power  in  its  fortified  harbours,  guard  the  island 
from  all  attack,  or  be  ready  to  fight  the  supreme  battle  of  all  history  at  four 
hours'  notice.     She  must  keep  on  being  ready  for  years. 

ENGLAND  THE  WORLD's  ARMOURER 

The  Great  Amphibian,  going  ashore,  must  transform  a  large  part  of  her 
body.  Armies  of  millions  must  be  raised — one,  two,  three,  four  millions,  or 
more.  She  never  thought  of  that  before.  And,  of  course,  it  will  take  some 
time,  but  they  will  want  arms  and  equipment.  She  never  thought  of  that 
before,  either — not  even  at  the  time  she  thought  of  armies. 

Nevermind.  Let  us  become  the  world's  armourer  and  arsenal.  Transform 
industries,  call  out  men,  call  in  women.  Pity  to  have  overlooked  it  before. 
Half  a  year  has  been  lost — or  was  it  a  year — or  was  it  more?  But  her  faithful 
servants  on  the  sea  still  execute  punctiliously  the  tasks  confided  to  them.  Mis- 
takes can  be  put  right,  delays  can  be  retrieved,  needless  sufFeringcan  be  avoided, 
loss  can  be  endured.  All  sacrifices,  even  those  that  seem  to  have  been  in  vain, 
can  be  made  fruitful. 

Slowly  but  surely  the  whole  force  of  the  nation  and  empire  and  all  its  de- 
pendencies will  be  organized  for  war  by  land  and  sea;  not  one  scrap  will  be  wil- 
fully neglected.  The  effort  ultimately  will  reach  the  potential  maximum,  both 
in  volume  and  in  quality — unless  the  war  for  any  reason  comes  sooner  to  an 
end. 


VII 

THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY 

HOW  AIRCRAFT  INFLUENCED  THE  WAR  AND  HOW  WAR   IN- 
FLUENCED AIRCRAFT 
By  WALDEMAR  KAEMPFFERT  AND  CARL  DIENSTBACH 

In  the  Tripolitan  War  waged  by  Italy  against  Turkey  in  191 1  a  few  imag- 
inative theorists — so  they  were  called — induced  the  Italian  authorities  to  send 
to  the  front  three  or  four  French  exhibition  machines  with  which  the  army  had 
been  provided.  It  was  proved  at  once  that  scouting  could  be  done  more  ef- 
fectively on  wings  than  on  horseback.  But  the  Tripolitan  campaign  was 
aeronautically  one-sided.  The  Turks  had  neither  airships  nor  flying  machines 
and  no  artillery  designed  for  the  especial  purpose  of  bringing  down  airscouts. 
There  could  be  no  fighting  in  the  air.  The  war  proved  only  the  value  of  the 
flying  scout.     It  did  nothing  to  develop  the  airplane  or  the  airship. 

The  Balkan  War  that  followed  was  hardly  more  illuminating.  To  be  sure, 
airplanes  were  sent  up  to  reconnoitre,  but  they  were  manned  by  hired  foreign 
flyers — mercenaries  with  itching  palms  but  no  patriotic  fervour.  There  were 
no  combats  in  the  air  simply  because  the  flyers  avoided  each  other  almost  as 
politely  as  if  they  thought  it  ungentlemanly  to  trespass  on  an  opponent's 
zone.  It  seemed  as  if  a  doubt  once  expressed  by  H.  G.  Wells  in  one  of  his  well- 
reasoned,  imaginative  novels,  the  doubt  if  the  courage  of  the  Twenty-second 
Century  was  equal  to  the  test  of  fighting  in  the  air,  was  ignominiously  confirmed 
early  in  the  Twentieth. 

Hence,  Europe  entered  the  great  war  that  began  in  1914,  realizing  that  the 
airplane  and  the  dirigible  airship  would  play  a  vital  part  in  turning  the  tide  of 
battle  but  quite  ignorant  of  the  terrible  demands  that  would  be  made  on  ma- 
chines and  men  in  the  air.  Of  all  military  arms  the  aeronautic  was  the  least 
developed  because  it  was  the  least  understood.  In  the  brief  space  of  two 
frightful  years  it  became  necessary  not  only  to  evolve  an  eff"ective  system  of  air 
tactics  but  also  to  invent  new  types  of  machines.  Even  the  art  of  flying  had 
to  be  learned  anew.  The  air  lessons  that  strategists  thought  that  they  had 
learned  from  the  Tripolitan  and  Balkan  wars  were  simply  thrown  overboard. 

THE  AIRPLANE  STRENGTH  OF  THE  GREAT  POWERS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR 

Of  all  the  great  European  powers,  France  was  the  first  to  appreciate  cor- 
rectly the  possible  military  worth  of  aircraft.     Germany  long  experimented 

347 


348  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  dirigibles.  She  lost  three  precious  years  before  she  caught  up  with 
France.  And  yet  Germany  was  aeronautically  better  prepared  than  any  other 
European  power  when  the  first  shot  was  fired.  She  had  some  five  hundred 
airplanes  against  the  French  eight  hundred;  but  her  five  hundred  were  superior 
in  type.  Least  prepared  were  Russia  and  England.  Their  indifference  proved 
costly  during  the  first  year. 

We  can  only  guess  at  the  airplane  strength  of  Great  Britain  in  1914.  On 
paper  she  had  two  hundred  machines.  It  is  doubtful  if  there  were  a  hundred 
in  actual  commission — so  few  in  fact  that  they  could  play  no  very  important 
part  in  stemming  that  overwhelming  tide  of  field-gray  Germans  that  swept 
through  Belgium  and  France.  But  for  all  that  the  British  machines  were 
good,  better  in  fact  than  those  of  the  French  for  military  scouting. 

It  was  characteristic  of  Germany  that  she  alone  entered  the  war  with  a 
standardized  airplane.  Her  monoplane  Taube,  or  "  Dove,"  of  which  we  heard 
so  much  in  the  early  months  and  her  Albatross,  Aga,  and  other  biplanes  were 
by  far  the  best  military  machines  in  Europe— best  because  they  had  given  the 
most  uniformly  satisfactory  account  of  themselves  in  long-distance  flights. 
All  these  machines  were  standardized  tractors;  that  is,  their  propellers  were 
mounted  in  front.  To  relieve  the  pilot  as  much  as  possible  of  the  nervous 
and  muscular  strain  of  maintaining  his  balance,  the  Taube  and  the  Albatross 
were  made  automatically  stable  by  shaping  the  wings  like  those  of  a  dove  and 
by  giving  them  the  contour  of  a  broad  arrow-head.  They  were  strong,  as 
strength  was  conceived  in  1914.  And  they  were  wonderfully  dependable. 
There  were  some  faster  flying  machines  in  the  British  and  French  armies,  but 
on  the  whole,  the  Taubes  and  Albatrosses  anticipated  better  than  any  other 
type  the  qualities  that  the  bloody  experiences  of  the  war  have  taught  soldiers 
to  demand  of  wings  and  motors. 

Although  the  French  had  the  most  airplanes  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
it  was  a  very  heterogeneous  collection.  There  was  nothing  comparable  with 
the  standardized  German  equipment — nothing  but  a  motley  array  of  civilian 
and  sporting  machines,  some  very  fast  and  some  very  slow,  some  staunch 
and  some  daringly  flimsy.  In  the  end,  this  very  lack  of  uniformity  aided  the 
French  in  the  process  of  elimination  and  invention  that  preceded  the  develop- 
ment of  final  types  on  all  sides.  It  was  much  harder  for  the  Germans  to 
scrap  their  Taubes  and  Albatrosses  simply  because  they  had  been  standardized. 

THE   DOVES    OF   WAR 

With  their  standardized  equipment  of  Taubes,  or  Doves,  the  Germans 
boldly  took  the  initiative  in  the  air  from  the  very  first  day  of  the  war.  It 
was  the  Taubes  that  ushered  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  the  Taubes  that 
scrutinized  the  territory  before  the  army  that  rolled  over  northern  and  eastern 
France,  the  Taubes  that  encouraged  the  Germans  to  take  chances  that  might 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  349 

have  proved  fatal  had  there  been  no  guiding  intelligence  in  the  air.  They  flew 
far,  far  behind  the  French  lines.  They  soared  over  Paris  long  before  the 
German  army  was  pounding  at  its  gates.  They  were  the  harbingers  of  vic- 
tory in  driving  the  Russians  out  of  East  Prussia. 

This  superiority  of  the  Germans  in  the  early  stages  was  in  part  due  to 
training.  The  airplane  had  been  first  used  by  the  French  in  those  annual 
manoeuvres  in  which  every  European  army  engaged  before  the  war.  Appar- 
ently the  Germans  alone  had  learned  the  necessity  of  long-distance  military 
flights.  At  all  events,  there  were  few  long  French  flights  at  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities — few  attempts  to  fly  far  into  the  enemy's  country,  few  at- 
tempts to  beat  off"  the  German  Taubes.  On  the  whole,  the  French 
undertook  only  timid  short  journeys  over  the  German  lines.  There  were 
even  complaints  on  the  German  side  that  French  machines  were  seen  so 
infrequently.  It  is  clear  that  the  bird  of  battle  had  as  yet  neither  beak  nor 
talons.  It  was  a  mere  fledgling.  A  few  rifle  and  pistol  shots  were  exchanged; 
but  there  was  no  air  fighting  in  any  real  sense.  Whenever  a  German  machine 
made  a  menacing  feint  that  suggested  a  duel  the  opposing  French  machine 
generally  retired  hastily.  Nor  were  any  eff'orts  made  to  direct  artillery  fire  on 
either  side  at  first.  There  was  merely  reconnoitring,  with  all  the  advantage 
on  the  German  side  that  followed  from  the  use  of  the  best  machines  and  the  best 
trained  scouts. 

SURPRISE   ATTACKS   WERE   IMPOSSIBLE 

Inexpert  as  the  reconnoitring  was  on  all  sides  but  the  German  in  the  early 
months,  it  is  nevertheless  significant  that  there  was  no  battle  that  even  re- 
motely resembled  a  surprise  attack.  The  eyes  in  the  air  saw  everything.  Von 
Hindenburg's  operations  in  Eastern  Prussia  were  sometimes  surprisingly  sud- 
den. If  they  constitute  an  exception  it  must  be  attributed  to  the  poor  airplane 
equipment  of  the  Russians — a  feeble  imitation  of  the  French  on  a  very  much 
reduced  scale. 

Even  in  the  capture  of  Antwerp  the  Taubes  proved  their  worth.  The  Bel- 
gians and  British  had  cunningly  masked  a  few  batteries.  All  the  ranges  were 
known  to  a  foot.  As  the  Germans  advanced  they  were  met  by  a  deadly  artil- 
lery fire.  Whence  did  it  come.?  The  forts  of  the  first  line  had  long  since  been 
reduced  to  ruins  by  the  Krupp  i6-inch  howitzers,  by  12-inch  Skoda  mortars, 
and  by  8-inch  siege  guns.  The  forts  of  the  second  line  were  too  far  back  to 
deliver  so  destructive  a  fire.  The  shells  evidently  came  from  an  ingeniously 
concealed  battery  which  had  to  be  destroyed  before  the  troops  could  advance 
to  the  Nethe.  Airplanes  were  sent  up  with  strict  orders  to  note  the  location  of 
every  enemy  battery.     The  batteries  were  silenced. 

That  the  German  avalanche  was  finally  checked  at  the  Marne  is  due  en- 
tirely to  the  flying  machine,  unskilfully  handled  though  it  was  by  the  French. 


350  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

If  the  Germans  alone  had  been  provided  with  airplanes  or  if  the  French  had 
been  as  poorly  provided  with  machines  as  were  the  Russians,  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne  would  have  resulted  in  a  German  victory  and  in  the  capture  of  Paris. 
The  Germans  had  pushed  on  too  fast  and  too  far.  They  had  overreached  them- 
selves. It  was  glaringly  apparent  to  the  French  air  scouts  that  the  too-hasty 
German  advance  could  not  be  adequately  supported.  Knowing  what  they 
did  of  the  precarious  German  situation,  the  French  stood  their  ground  and  at 
last  stemmed  the  devastating  tide. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans,  too,  profited  by  the  airplane.  Without 
it  they  would  have  suffered  a  crushing  defeat  at  the  Marne.  Circling  high  up 
in  the  air,  a  German  airman  whose  name  is  unfortunately  not  mentioned  in  the 
official  reports,  saw  the  movement  undertaken  by  the  enemy  to  turn  the  Ger- 
man flank.  The  order  was  given  to  draw  in  the  lines — to  retreat,  in  other 
words.  So  the  airplane  at  the  Marne  saved  the  day  both  for  the  French  and 
the  Germans. 

The  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  followed  by  long  weary  months  of  trench 
warfare.  Both  French  and  Germans  buried  themselves  in  the  ground.  This 
stagnation  was  in  large  measure  due  to  the  airman.  It  was  impossible  to 
carry  out  any  important  strategic  movement  without  detection.  There  was 
ample  opportunity  now  to  experiment  with  new  types  of  aircraft  and  to  evolve 
an  efficient  system  of  air  tactics. 

THE    FRENCH    BEGIN   THE    RECONSTRUCTION   OF   THE   AIRPLANE 

The  French  were  probably  the  first  to  realize  that  a  military  airplane  could 
be  highly  serviceable  in  more  than  one  way.  It  might  be  good  for  scouting,  for 
fire  control,  or  for  fighting.  Because  the  aeronautic  materiel  of  the  Allies  was  so 
varied,  so  unstandardized,  they  were  soon  able  to  select  the  most  efficient  types. 
They  proved  to  be  the  high-powered  racer  of  Morane,  and  the  fast  small  bi- 
planes of  Sopwith  and  of  Bristol.  The  Morane  racers  became  models  for 
new  squadrons.  They  had  proved  to  be  good  for  scouting  because  they  were 
fast  and  because  the  wings,  elevated  as  they  were  above  the  pilot,  did  not  ob- 
struct the  view  of  the  terrain  below.  The  Taubes,  which,  like  the  French 
Bleriots,  were  monoplanes  with  wings  that  impeded  observation,  were  retained 
for  a  time  by  the  Germans,  but  merely  because  of  their  staunchness  and 
great  radius  of  action. 

In  the  first  air  fights  that  ensued,  pistols  and  rifles  were  the  weapons 
adopted,  now  as  aerially  antiquated  as  the  bow  and  arrow  or  the  blunderbuss. 
In  spite  of  their  far-sightedness,  in  spite  of  their  thoroughness,  the  Germans 
had  not  mounted  machine  guns  on  their  airplanes.  The  imaginative  French 
had  made  a  few  experiments  of  that  kind;  but  the  load-carrying  biplanes  on 
which  the  guns  were  mounted  were  much  too  slow.  To  the  British  belongs  the 
credit  of  having  begun  real  air-fighting — the  most  daring  of  all  fighting.     That 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  351 

was  because  their  staunch,  fast  biplanes  were  best  adapted  of  all  flying  ma- 
chines to  mount  machine  guns.  The  British  succeeded  in  driving  the  German 
air-scouts  back  over  their  own  lines  as  soon  as  they  appeared.  The  French  soon 
emulated  their  allies  and  became  eq^ually  proficient. 

All  subsequent  changes  in  airplane  design  were  dictated  by  the  necessity  of 
engaging  in  air-duels.  The  racing  machine  again  served  as  the  prototype  of 
the  fighting  machine.  The  French  and  the  English  seem  to  have  made  that 
discovery  first.  They  began  by  strengthening  the  racer  so  that  it  could  carry 
machine  guns.  So  they  were  the  first  to  appear  in  the  air,  much  to  the  con- 
sternation of  the  Germans,  with  craft  that  for  the  time  being  were  invulnerable 
because  of  their  manoeuvring  and  climbing  powers.  The  Germans  had  noth- 
ing that  approximated  the  racer.  Wedded  as  they  were  to  a  standard,  they 
hesitated  to  make  a  radical  change.  At  last,  however,  they  discarded  their  big 
monoplane  Taubes  in  favour  of  their  equally  standardized  Albatross  biplanes, 
which,  however,  gave  the  pilot  an  unobstructed  view.  They  first  resorted 
to  a  very  curious  expedient — the  buildingof  a  gigantic  machine  with  two  bodies 
and  two  motors  and  propellers  and  car  in  the  middle.  "Fritz"  the  British 
promptly  called  this  monstrosity  when  it  appeared.  It  was  so  powerfully  engined 
that  it  proved  to  be  speedier  than  the  French  and  British  scouts;  it  carried 
two  machine  guns  so  that  it  might  overwhelm  resistance  by  a  hail  of  bullets. 
But  "  Fritz  "  could  neither  climb  nor  manoeuvre  as  well  as  the  fighting  machines 
of  the  Allies.  For  that  reason  he  was  but  a  passing  phase  in  the  evolution  of 
the  airplane-destroyer.  The  huge  Sikorskys  of  Russia — machines  with  bodies 
as  big  as  Pullman  cars  and  almost  as  comfortable — were  even  less  serviceable. 

THE    GERMAN    FOKKERS 

The  Germans  saw  that  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  imitate  the  Allies. 
They  returned  to  the  monoplane — not  to  the  discarded  Taube,  but  to  the  un- 
tried Fokker.  Like  the  French  fighting  machines,  the  Fokker  was  made  small 
and  given  extraordinarily  powerful  engines.  It  could  dart  about  with  wasp- 
like agility.  Seated  within  its  beautifully  modelled  body  was  a  single  picked 
man,  who  had  not  only  to  manipulate  the  controls  but  also  to  work  a  machine 
gun.  The  mounting  of  that  gun  was  marvellously  ingenious.  It  was  fixed 
in  position  so  that  it  could  fire  its  six  hundred  shots  a  minute  only  straight 
ahead  between  the  blades  of  a  propeller  spinning  at  the  rate  of  twelve  hun- 
dred revolutions  a  minute.  Why  did  it  not  tear  away  the  propeller.?  Be- 
cause engine  and  gun  were  geared  together,  so  that  the  engine  pulled  the 
trigger  Only  thus  was  it  possible  to  time  the  firing  of  the  gun  with  such  ab- 
solutely mathematical  accuracy  that  a  blade  was  never  struck.  The  French 
machine  guns  were  similarly  mounted  and  similarly  fired.  It  is  impossible 
to  fix  the  credit  for  the  invention;  French  and  Germans  had  worked  it  out 
independently  before  the  war 


352  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

It  is  evident  that  in  handling  such  a  gun  the  entire  machine  must  be 
swung,  just  as  a  lancer  must  wheel  his  horse  in  order  to  lunge  with  his  weapon. 
There  is  a  reason  for  this.  The  fighting  Fokkers  and  Moranes  have  a  speed  of 
well  over  a  hundred  miles  an  hour.  When  one  rushes  past  the  other  in  that 
jockeying  for  position  that  accompanies  a  duel  in  the  air,  each  pilot  must 
reckon  with  his  own  speed  and  that  of  his  opponent — a  total  of  two  hundred 
miles  an  hour.  The  difficulty  of  making  a  hit  at  close  range — and  hits  must 
be  so  made — may  be  conceived  if  a  marksman  seated  at  the  window  of  an 
express  train  were  asked  to  hit  a  certain  passenger  in  another  train  rushing 
past  in  the  opposite  direction.  Only  by  firing  head-on  at  a  foe  directly  in 
front  of  him  can  the  fighter  hope  to  score.  That  great  fundamental  fact  was 
not  learned  until  air-fighting  in  high-speed  machines  began  in  earnest.  It  dic- 
tated the  pecuHar  mounting  of  the  machine  gun  and  its  mechanical  operation 
by  the  engine.  After  this  lesson  was  learned  and  the  Moranes  and  Fokkers  had 
been  designed  in  the  light  of  this  knowledge,  there  were  no  further  marked 
improvements  in  fighting  machines,  except  that  racing  monoplanes  were  sup- 
planted by  racing  biplanes  in  accordance  with  scientific  teaching  of  to-day. 

Over  and  over  again  has  it  been  said  that  this  is  a  war  of  mechanism  and 
that  the  old  romance  of  fighting  is  gone.  Men  are  mowed  down  or  blasted  out 
of  existence  not  by  visible  foes  but  by  invisible  engineers  miles  distant.  Even 
in  rushing  a  trench  there  is  but  scant  opportunity  for  a  furious  hand-to-hand 
struggle.  The  few  bewildered  shell-shocked  creatures  that  still  cower  alive 
beneath  a  shelter  after  a  bombardment  that  has  lasted  for  days,  are  too  dazed 
to  struggle.  But  in  the  air,  it  is  otherwise.  Only  in  the  epics  of  Homer 
are  deeds  recorded  that  can  be  fittingly  compared  with  the  feats  of  the  air- 
fighter.  In  the  battles  of  the  Iliad,  the  personal  prowess  of  a  god-like  hero 
wins  the  day;  the  fate  of  an  army  depends  on  the  courage,  strength,  and  skill  of 
an  Agamemnon,  Ajax  or  Achilles.  So  it  is  in  a  modern  air  battle.  The  ro- 
mance of  old  has  not  only  been  revived  but  intensified  a  hundred  fold.  Com- 
pared with  German  and  British  airmen  circling  around  each  other  like  falcons, 
but  flying  higher  than  any  falcon,  swooping  down  upon  each  other  with 
breathless  suddenness,  braving  simultaneously  the  perils  of  the  invisible  at- 
mospheric maelstroms  and  billows  and  the  bursting  shrapnel  of  anti-aircraft 
artillery,  squirting  death  from  a  machine  gun  during  a  few  favourable  seconds, 
how  feeble  and  insignificant  seem  the  rock-hurling,  sword-wielding  deeds  of 
Homeric  heroes ! 

These  warriors  of  the  air  are  picked  men.  Upon  their  personal  skill  and 
courage  hangs  the  fate  of  whole  divisions.  Consider  the  battle  of  the  Somme, 
for  example.  The  French  and  English  had  driven  the  German  scouts  and 
fighters  from  the  sky.  Command  of  the  air  gave  them  command  of  the  ter- 
rain, and  so  they  forced  the  Germans  back  yard  by  yard  by  means  of  the  most 
terrific  air-controlled  artillery  fire  that  either  side  had  endured  since  the  be- 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  353 

ginning  of  the  war.  Boelke,  the  aerial  Achilles  of  Germany,  the  most  dashing 
air-fighter  that  the  war  has  produced,  was  in  his  tent — but  not  sulking.  He 
had  been  ordered  home  by  the  Emperor  himself  to  rest,  to  impart  his  skill  to 
other  officers,  and  to  superintend  the  building  of  new  machines.  It  was  felt 
that  only  Boelke  could  regain  the  mastery  of  the  air.  He  was  summoned  back 
to  the  Somme  with  his  squadron.  He  was  killed  accidentally  in  a  collision  with 
a  too-eager  follower.  But  his  unmatched  prowess  saved  the  Germans  from 
further  losses.     In  a  sense,  he  alone  checked  the  advance  of  the  Allies. 

Air-fighting  ended  the  long-distance  reconnaissance  flights  that  had  pre- 
ceded the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  Only  long  bombing  raids  were  henceforth 
undertaken — raids  in  which  it  was  possible  to  avoid  the  more  dangerous  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy,  to  fly  swiftly  over  his  lines,  to  reach  the  comparatively  un- 
protected country  beyond  and  to  drop  bombs  on  the  airship  sheds  of  Friedrichs- 
hafen  and  Diisseldorf  and  the  chemical  works  of  Ludwigshafen.  Two  months 
before  the  war  it  was  taken  as  a  matter  of  course  that  half  the  numerous 
machines  entered  in  an  overland  endurance  contest  should  come  to  grief  be- 
fore reaching  their  destination.  In  these  long  bombing  expeditions  two 
dozen  machines  sometimes  took  part;  the  missing  were  brought  down  by 
cannon  or  attacking  machines  and  not  by  defective  parts.  Can  more  telling 
testimony  be  offered  of  the  wonderful  improvement  that  has  been  made  in 
airplane  design? 

DIRECTING  ARTILLERY  FIRE   FROM"  THE 'aIR 

With  the  beginning  of  trench  warfare,  the  French  and  German  air-scout 
was  assigned  to  the  dangerous  task  of  controlling  artillery  fire.  It  is  self- 
evident  that  he  would  not  be  permitted  to  wireless  back  the  hits  and  misses  of 
the  great  guns  behind  his  own  lines  undisturbed.  The  enemy  sent  swift 
air-fighters  after  him.  To  cope  with  their  fast  machines,  his  airplane  had  to 
be  redesigned.  It  was  not  fast  enough;  it  was  a  poor  climber.  The  Germans 
promptly  built  scouting  biplanes  for  fire-control  which  had  the  Fokker's  char- 
acteristic insect-like  manoeuvring  ability.  That  was  not  easily  done.  A 
Fokker  need  not  stay  aloft  hours  at  a  time;  it  need  not  carry  a  heavy  load  of 
fuel.  But  a  scouting  machine  which  stays  up  perhaps  half  a  day  must  be  a 
weight-carrier.  The  Germans  effected  a  compromise  by  making  the  machine 
as  small  as  they  could  without  limiting  its  weight-carrying  capacity  too  much. 
At  last  they  arrived  at  a  really  serviceable  military  type  remarkable  for  its 
speed,  its  manoeuvring  ability  and  climbing  power. 

The  small  modern  scouting  machine  thus  evolved  by  the  Germans  needs 
carrying  power  for  its  equipment  alone.  It  has  wireless  instruments  both 
for  sending  and  receiving  messages,  half  a  dozen  bombs,  bomb-aiming  appa- 
ratus, a  stereoscopic  camera,  and  two  machine  guns — one  fixed  in  position  and 
handled  by  the  pilot  as  in  the  Fokker  machine,  the  other  mounted  on  a  turn- 


354  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

table  and  handled  by  the  observer  who  swings  with  it.  A  scouting  machine  is 
expected  to  make  a  running  fight  to  the  rear,  but  if  it  is  cut  off  it  must  fight 
bow-on  like  a  Fokker. 

It  has  become  a  hackneyed  phrase  that  the  men  who  fire  the  great  guns 
never  see  the  target.  Hackneyed  as  it  is,  it  needs  reiteration.  It  would  take 
a  man  three  hours  to  walk  to  the  spot  where  the  projectile  fired  by  a  twelve- 
inch  Skoda  gun  buries  itself  in  the  ground.  Batteries  are  so  ingeniously  con- 
cealed that  opposing  gun-crews  must  content  themselves  with  knowing  the 
general  direction  of  the  target.  The  airplane  had  to  be  reinvented  not  only 
because  it  had  to  attack  scouts  but  because  it  had  to  aid  the  gunners.  By 
1910  the  modern  long-bore  gun  and  the  howitzer  had  outstripped  the  methods 
of  laying  it  on  the  target  devised  by  optical-instrument  makers  and  mathe- 
maticians. To  make  the  most  of  the  gun,  better  fire-control  was  an  essential. 
If  the  airplane  and  dirigible  had  not  been  invented  years  ago,  they  would  as- 
suredly have  been  invented  during  the  progress  of  the  war. 

Napoleon's  picturesquely  blasphemous  estimate  of  the  fortunes  of  battle 
is  still  valid.  But  it  needs  an  addition.  Heaven  is  not  only  on  the  side  of  the 
heaviest  artillery  but  also  on  the  side  of  the  most  efficient  fire-controlling  air- 
men. It  is  true  that  telephones  and  telegraphs  in  the  advance  trenches  are 
employed  to  communicate  the  effect  of  each  shot.  But  while  the  telephone  and 
telegraph  operators  in  the  trenches  may  see  the  sandbags  opposite,  the  crux  of 
the  enemy's  defence  is  never  revealed  to  them — the  crux  represented  by  the 
batteries  far,  far  behind  the  enemy's  front.  Before  the  eyes  of  the  man  in  the 
air,  the  whole  battleground  is  spread  out.  He  now  has  at  his  command  wire- 
less telegraph  instruments.  As  a  shot  falls  he  can  flash  back  the  word  "too 
short"  or  "too  long."  Anything  that  the  eye  in  the  air  can  see  can  be  de- 
stroyed. The  airman  must  be  regarded  as  the  miraculous  extension  of  a  gen- 
eral's eyes  and  mind.  It  lies  within  his  power  to  annihilate  a  battery  mightier 
than  that  of  any  super-dreadnought. 

The  tactics  of  the  Somme  developed  with  better  handling  of  the  airplane. 
As  the  efficiency  of  fire-control  and  scouting  was  increased,  artillery  became 
more  deadly.  Technical  improvement  in  the  airplane  was  mirrored  in  the 
tactics  adopted  by  the  opposing  general  staffs.  Hence,  the  decisive  importance 
of  artillery  in  the  war  must  be  in  a  large  measure  ascribed  to  the  airplane. 

The  technique  of  scouting  and  fire-control  bears  little  resemblance  to 
what  it  was  before  the  war.  Photographs  have  taken  the  place  of  the  eye. 
Automatic  airplane  cameras  had  been  invented  before  the  war,  but  no  one 
suspected  that  they  would  be  used  in  anything  but  long  scouting  expeditions. 
In  the  engagements  that  took  place  in  the  region  of  Arras  in  April,  1917,  no 
fewer  than  seventeen  hundred  photographs  were  made  in  a  day  of  the 
German  lines  by  dozens  of  flying  machines.  On  both  sides  along  the  western 
front    scouting   has   become   as   photographic  as   modern   astronomy.     The 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  355 

camera  is  built  into  the  machine  at  a  spot  where  the  lens  can  see  everything. 
Stereoscopic  pictures  are  taken  and  studied  in  a  stereoscope.  Indefinite 
markings  on  charts  of  fortifications,  trenches,  and  batteries  give  place  to  exact 
records  marvellously  rich  in  detail.  Counterfeits  (sham  batteries  and  trenches) 
are  easily  detected,  because  counterfeits  lack  depth. 

LEARNING   TO    FLY   ANEW 

The  art  of  flying  has  changed  fully  as  much  as  the  flying  machine  itself — 
not  in  its  principles  but  in  the  demands  made  on  the  pilot.  Generals  have  be- 
come ruthless.  Before  the  war,  machines  were  adapted  to  the  pilot;  after  the 
Marne,  the  pilot  had  to  adapt  himself  to  the  machine.  The  astonishing  somer- 
saults and  tail-first  dives  of  Pegoud  and  his  imitators  are  now  part  of  the  reper- 
toire of  every  military  flyer.  They  have  been  elevated  to  the  dignity  of  tac- 
tical evolutions.  No  matter  what  the  conditions  may  be,  no  matter  how 
daring  in  design  an  untried  machine  may  be,  the  flyer  must  rise  into  the  air. 
He  is  literally  flung  into  the  atmosphere  and  made  to  soar  without  ante-bellum 
regard  for  his  neck.     Military  exigencies  are  more  important  than  lives. 

But  the  enormously  increased  speed  of  the  new  machines  is  not  without 
its  compensation.  Ten  years  ago  the  man  in  an  airplane  was  in  the  unstable 
position  of  a  tight-rope  walker  without  a  pole.  Wilbur  Wright  testified  that 
out  of  the  sixty  seconds  in  a  minute  a  pilot  was  busily  engaged  in  working  his 
controls  for  fifty-nine  in  the  unceasing  effort  to  maintain  his  balance.  Orville 
Wright  now  comments  that  a  pilot  may  neglect  his  balance  for  a  time,  even  in 
gusty  weather,  and  still  be  certain  of  recovering  his  equilibrium  when  neces- 
sary. That  is  an  advance  so  wonderful  that  only  an  airman  can  appreciate  it 
at  its  full  worth — an  advance  made  chiefly  by  a  nice  proportioning  of  surfaces 
and  distribution  of  weights  as  a  result  of  laboratory  research. 

ZEPPELINS  AND  OTHER  DIRIGIBLES 

What  of  the  dirigibles  in  the  war?  Very  little  has  been  heard  of  them  with 
the  exception  of  the  Zeppelins.  On  paper  the  Allies  were  more  than  a  match 
for  the  Germans  in  the  number  of  dirigibles  that  could  be  launched.  But 
when  the  test  came,  when  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  taxed  all  resources  to  the 
uttermost,  the  Germans  again  proved  that  they  had  the  upper  hand.  There 
is  an  important  meteorological  reason  for  this.  The  prevailing  winds  are  from 
the  west.  Raids  in  dirigibles  are  always  made  against  the  wind,  if  possible, 
so  that  damaged  vessels  may  drift  back  to  safety.  The  meteorological  ad- 
vantage was  with  the  Germans  as  a  result. 

Only  the  Zeppelin  has  earned  laurels  comparable  with  those  of  the  airplane. 
German  army  officers  had  objected  to  the  Zeppelin's  unwieldiness.  They 
wanted  something  that  could  be  inflated  on  the  battlefield  and  that  could  be 
transported  in  two  army  wagons,  and  so  they  advocated  the  Parseval  and 


356  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Gross-Basenach  collapsible  vessels.  They  soon  saw  the  light.  It  is  signifi- 
cant that  both  England  and  Russia  were  permitted  to  buy  Parsevals  in  Ger- 
many. Austria  alone  was  initiated  into  Zeppelin  mysteries;  at  least  she  had 
announced  her  intention  of  adding  Zeppelins  to  her  airfleet  about  a  year  be- 
fore the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

Although  the  Zeppelin  proved  itself  vastly  superior  to  all  other  dirigibles 
its  design  was  no  more  final  than  that  of  the  military  airplane. 

War  has  made  speed  so  imperative  that  the  Zeppelins  have  been  shorn  of 
all  wind-resisting  appendages.  The  car  lies  close  to  the  hull  now;  the  rudders 
are  simpler  than  they  were;  the  propellers  are  no  longer  mounted  on  brackets 
at  the  side  of  the  hull,  but  directly  on  the  cars.  The  smallest  modern  Zeppelin 
built  before  the  war  was  the  Fiktoria  Luise,  a  craft  485  feet  long.  Her  type 
has  disappeared  as  the  Taube  airplane  disappeared.  It  was  too  small  and 
too  slow. 

Still  slower  and  still  smaller  were  the  dirigibles  of  the  Allies.  They  could 
not  fly  as  high  as  the  smallest  Zeppelin;  they  were  too  dependent  on  favourable 
weather.  That  applies  with  equal  force  to  the  German  non-rigid  Parsevals 
and  the  semi-rigid  Gross-Basenachs,  and  explains  why  they,  too,  have  been 
heard  of  only  infrequently.  They  must  have  been  brought  down  rather  too 
easily  if  we  may  judge  from  the  way  a  Parseval  succumbed  to  Russian  artil- 
lery fire  near  Riga  in  the  autumn  of  191 5. 

HOW  THE  ZEPPELINS  PATROL  THE  NORTH  SEA 

Except  by  the  English  Government  itself,  the  ZeppeHn  has  been  generally 
underestimated,  probably  because  of  the  indignation  aroused  by  its  attacks  on 
English  towns.  It  is  even  referred  to  in  the  press  of  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic 
as  an  egregious  failure.  Count  von  Zeppelin  is  popularly  supposed  to  have 
died  of  disappointment.  One  has  only  to  read  the  speeches  made  in  ParUa- 
ment  in  March,  1916,  by  Churchill,  Balfour,  Joynson-Hicks  and  Lord  Montagu 
of  Beaulieu  to  learn  how  keenly  the  British  authorities  regret  that  England 
did  not  build  a  fleet  of  Zeppelins  ten  years  ago,  how  much  simpler  England's 
problem  would  be  if  the  North  Sea  could  be  watched  by  a  few  giant  rigid 
dirigibles  rather  than  by  a  large  squadron  of  war  vessels,  and  how  effectually 
the  Zeppelins  keep  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  informed  of  the  activities  of 
British  battle  cruisers  and  dreadnoughts. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Zeppelin's  influence  on  naval  tactics  is  comparable 
with  the  airplane's  influence  on  land  tactics.  Britannia  unquestionably  rules 
the  waves  of  the  North  Sea;  but  the  Zeppelin  also  unquestionably  rules  its 
atmosphere.  England  has  not  been  able  to  cope  with  the  Zeppelin  naval 
scout.  Over  the  waters  of  the  North  Sea  the  Zeppelins  are  safe.  There  are 
no  hidden  fortifications  with  powerful  anti-aircraft  artillery.  A  warship 
armed  with  the  necessary  guns  can   be  descried   afar   and   avoided.     Sea- 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  357 

planes  have  proved  powerless  to  thwart  the  Zeppelin.  The  largest  have  not 
the  necessary  radius  of  action.  A  Zeppelin's  movements  may  be  extended 
for  days.  Even  over  the  restricted  waters  of  northern  Europe  a  seaplane  can 
stay  aloft  for  only  a  few  hours.  The  ZeppeUn  is  an  independent  fighting  and 
scouting  craft  like  any  cruiser.  A  seaplane  must  be  accompanied  by  a  mother 
ship.  It  cannot  rise  from  the  open  sea,  unless  the  water  happens  to  be  fairly 
smooth  and  the  weather  favourable.  From  a  ship  only  a  machine  smaller 
than  a  seaplane  can  be  launched.  The  hoisting  of  a  seaplane  on  board  of 
its  mother  ship  is  fraught  with  danger  of  attack.  The  operation  takes  time; 
the  mother  ship  must  come  to  a  full  stop;  the  whole  target  is  excellent.  In 
battle,  seaplanes  must  be  left  at  the  mercy  of  the  waves  after  the  fuel  supply 
is  exhausted. 

A  seaplane  that  rises  after  two  fleets  are  engaged,  like  the  solitary  British 
machine  that  appeared  in  the  sky  during  the  Skagerrack  battle,  can  hardly 
render  effective  service.  A  Zeppelin  which  is  on  duty  all  the  time,  if  need  be, 
must  be  reckoned  with;  it  enables  a  commander  to  begin  the  action  when  he 
— not  the  enemy — decides.  In  a  single  day  a  ZeppeUn  can  sweep  the  whole 
North  Sea  without  risk  to  itself.  A  mother  ship  with  seaplanes  would  con- 
sume several  days  in  the  same  employment.  And  what  happens  when  the 
plane  discovers  the  enemy?  It  is  discovered  itself;  the  presence  of  a  defence- 
less, near-by  mother  ship  is  advertised.  If  the  enemy  should  have  a  squadron 
of  fast  destroyers,  the  mother  ship  must  inevitably  be  captured,  which  per- 
formance seals  the  fate  of  the  seaplane. 

That  the  Zeppelin  is  more  than  a  match  for  the  seaplane  is  admirably 
demonstrated  by  the  engagement  that  took  place  near  Terschelling,  off  the 
Dutch  coast  on  July  5,  191 5.  Several  mother  ships  were  engaged  in  hoisting 
a  fleet  of  seaplanes  overboard,  when  a  Zeppelin  squadron  espied  the  operation. 
It  came  down  like  an  avalanche,  dropped  bombs  on  the  mother  ships  and 
opened  fire.  The  ships  steamed  away  at  once.  Lieutenant  Bird,  the  pilot 
of  the  single  plane  that  had  been  launched,  decided  that  salvation  lay  in  flight. 
He  rose  and  fled  over  Holland,  inland.  A  Zeppelin  had  wirelessed  the  news  of 
his  escape  back  to  a  German  base.  Airplanes  pursued  him  and  pressed  him  so 
hotly  that  he  was  forced  to  descend  in  Holland  where  he  and  his  machine  were 
interned. 

THE  ZEPPELINS  IN  THE  NORTH  SEA  BATTLES 

The  two  battles  fought  by  the  Germans  and  English  in  the  North  Sea  will 
go  down  in  history  not  only  because  super-dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers 
were  under  fire  for  the  first  time  but  also  because  of  the  part  that  the  Zeppelins 
played. 

Both  Admiral  Beatty  and  Admiral  Jellicoe  have  freely  conceded  the  naval 
value  of  the  Zeppelins  in  the  official  reports  of  the  two  great  battles  fought  in 


358  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  North  Sea.  There  can  be  no  question  that  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet 
came  out  into  the  open  only  after  the  Zeppelins  had  carefully  determined  the 
location  and  strength  of  the  British  Grand  and  Battle-Cruiser  Fleets.  Thanks 
to  the  Zeppelins,  the  German  Admiral  knew  exactly  when  the  British  Grand 
Fleet  might  be  expected  to  arrive  on  the  scene  of  the  Skagerrack  battle.  He 
retired  in  the  nick  of  time.  The  amazingly-  swift  destruction  of  three  fine 
British  battle-cruisers  during  that  historic  engagement  seems  to  presuppose 
a  knowledge  of  contemplated  mancEuvres  that  could  only  have  been  gained 
from  a  height  at  which  everything  is  revealed.  So,  too,  the  shelling  of  English 
coast  towns  by  German  warships  must  have  been  preceded  by  a  careful  Zeppe- 
lin survey  of  the  Channel  and  North  Sea  to  discover  whether  or  not  the  vessels 
to  which  the  bombardment  was  entrusted  might  venture  forth. 

THE   ZEPPELIN   AS   A   BOMB-DROPPER 

On  land  the  Zeppelins  have  been  employed  Hke  airplanes;  in  other  words, 
for  scouting  and  bomb-dropping.  Airplanes  did  not  at  first  engage  in  noctur- 
nal scouting.  The  Zeppelins,  on  the  other  hand,  hovered  over  the  enemy  night 
after  night  from  the  beginning.  Hence,  they  gave  the  Germans  an  enormous 
advantage  at  the  outset,  all  the  more  so  because  anti-aircraft  artillery  was 
still  ineffective.  They  dropped  bombs  on  the  fortress  of  Namur  in  1914  and 
materially  assisted  in  reducing  that  stronghold. 

Like  the  scouts  in  airplanes,  the  commanders  of  Zeppelins  had  much  to 
learn.  Even  in  the  most  realistically  planned  peace  manoeuvres,  dirigibles 
are  not  fired  upon  with  real  shells.  Only  war  can  teach  a  man  how  low  he 
may  dare  to  navigate.  Because  they  lacked  experience,  the  Zeppelin  command- 
ers risked  the  enemy's  fire  too  carelessly.  Crude  as  the  first  anti-aircraft 
artillery  was,  several  Zeppehns  were  destroyed  even  in  the  beginning. 

The  problem  of  arming  the  Zeppelin  against  airplanes  has  not  been  satis- 
factorily solved.  It  carries  one  or  two  machine  guns  on  top  of  its  huge  en- 
velope and  several  within  its  cars.  Although  a  Zeppelin  is  a  wonderfully 
steady  platform,  guns  can  hardly  be  expected  to  fire  with  great  precision  when 
shaken  by  near-by  engines.  The  guns  on  top  of  the  huge  envelope,  admirably 
located  as  they  are,  are  not  affected  by  vibration,  but  they  lack  shelter  and 
cannot  be  served  comfortably.  Perhaps  the  Zeppelin  that  was  destroyed 
over  London  by  Lieutenant  Robinson,  an  intrepid  boy  in  a  British  airplane, 
met  its  awful  fate  because  its  guns  were  unfortunately  mounted.  That  a 
vessel  larger  than  most  ocean  steamers  should  not  have  been  able  to  beat  off 
an  airplane  speaks  strongly  in  favour  of  that  supposition. 

How  the  Zeppelins  are  used  over  land  is  well  illustrated  by  the  attack  made 
on  the  night  of  August  11-12,  1915,  on  Bielostok,  an  important  military  rail- 
way junction.  The  craft  flew  at  a  height  of  only  8,000  feet  without  being 
hit  once  by  the  Russian  artillery.     When  Bielostok  was  reached,  the  vessel 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  359 

rose  to  10,000  feet.  Far  below,  the  city  and  the  railway  station  could  be  dis- 
tinctly seen,  brightly  illuminated.  Thirty  bombs  were  dropped,  one  after  an- 
other. Explosions  of  ammunition  followed,  so  terrific  that  they  were  felt  in 
the  Zeppelin  itself.     The  junction  was  wiped  out. 

As  a  bomb-dropper,  the  Zeppelin  is  more  successful  than  the  airplane. 
Its  sighting  instruments  are  not  only  more  elaborate  and  accurate,  but  ma- 
nipulated in  ease  and  comfort.  When  it  is  considered  that  in  dropping  a  bomb 
an  error  of  an  inch  may  be  multiplied  into  a  hundred  yards  at  the  ground,  the 
ability  of  the  Zeppelin  to  sight  its  target  carefully  gives  it  an  enormous  ad- 
vantage over  the  airplane.  Moreover,  the  heavy  bombs  carried  by  an  air- 
plane must  of  necessity  be  few  in  number;  light  bombs,  however  numerous, 
are  easily  deflected  by  the  wind.  The  bombs  of  a  Zeppelin  weigh  150 
pounds  each.  A  Zeppelin  carries  a  load  of  sixty  such  bombs — ten  times  as 
many  as  an  airplane;  if  it  does  not  hit  the  mark  at  the  first  trial,  it  can 
make  attempt  after  attempt.  Hence,  we  find  Zeppelins  assisting  the  siege 
guns  and  howitzers  in  reducing  the  fortresses  of  Belgium. 

HITTING  THE   MARK   FROM   A   HEIGHT   OF   TWO   MILES 

It  is  certain  that  far  more  is  seen  from  any  aircraft  at  night  than  is  com- 
monly supposed.  Lights  may  be  extinguished  or  covered;  but  no  amount  of 
darkening  ever  erases  the  contour  of  a  terrain  viev/ed  from  a  great  height. 
Water  always  appears  light;  massed  buildings,  forests  and  parks,  darker. 
On  the  whole,  suppression  of  details  may  even  assist  a  bomb-dropper;  the 
general  character  of  a  country  becomes  plainer,  the  landscape  more  recog- 
nizable. One  of  the  writers  vividly  remembers  the  bewildering  mass  of  de- 
tails visible  during  a  daylight  trip  in  a  Zeppelin;  landscapes  were  so  confused 
that  it  was  difficult  at  first  to  distinguish  one  from  another. 

Although  a  darkened  territory  may  actually  assist  the  commander  of  a 
Zeppelin  in  determining  his  whereabouts,  he  can  drop  bombs  successfully 
only  if  he  has  a  very  clearly  defined  mark.  The  blast  furnaces  of  English 
industrial  districts,  unmistakable  glowing  spots  that  could  not  be  extinguished 
if  iron  was  to  be  smelted  continuously,  must  have  been  splendid  marks  for  the 
Zeppelins.  There  are  stories  enough  to  that  effect.  Anti-aircraft  batteries 
have  been  silenced,  so  it  is  claimed  by  the  Germans,  simply  by  aiming  at  their 
flashes.  Firing  destroyers  are  said  to  have  been  sunk  and  searchlights  extin- 
guished. Much  larger,  blurred  targets,  on  the  other  hand,  were  missed.  In 
spite  of  countless  misses,  the  Germans  claim  to  have  done  enormous  damage  to 
factories,  stores,  ships,  and  railways  as  well  as  "deplorable  harm  to  non- 
combatants." 

The  question  of  the  ethics  of  bomb-dropping  and  of  reprisals  in  kind  is  at 
once  raised.  We  are  concerned  here  only  with  the  task  of  gauging  the  military 
value  of  aircraft.     Bomb-dropping  for  moral  effect  is  probably  a  failure.     It 


36o  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

may  be  questioned  whether  the  bombs  dropped  on  English  towns  by  the  Ger- 
mans or  by  the  EngUsh  on  German  cities  were  directed  at  anything  but  miH- 
tary  objects  sucli  as  are  found  in  any  large  city.  When  bombs  are  dropped 
on  a  town,  fortified  or  unfortified,  it  is  always  a  foregone  conclusion  that  innor 
cent  people  will  be  killed.  When  the  Germans  violated  the  principles  of  in- 
ternational law  by  torpedoing  a  hospital  ship  and  the  British  in  April,  1917 
retaliated  by  sending  a  so-called  "punitive  expedition"  to  drop  bombs,  also 
in  violation  of  international  law,  on  the  little  university  town  of  Freiburg-im- 
Breisgau,  a  curious  situation  arose:  There  were  more  important,  more 
readily  accessible  fortified  places  than  Freiburg;  but  Freiburg  was  selected 
because  it  was  unfortified  and  because  the  expedition  was  punitive.  Although 
the  killing  of  non-combatants  was  the  object  of  the  expedition,  the  bombs  were 
dropped  only  on  the  principal  buildings;  it  was  expected  that  non-combatants 
would  be  incidentally  killed  and  the  object  of  the  expedition  thus  attained. 
The  larger  the  city  the  more  likely  is  it  to  contain  buildings  of  military  im- 
portance. Hence,  an  aerial  attack  on  undefended  Munich  would  have  been 
more  justified  than  an  attack  on  an  undefended  small  university  town.  But 
only  a  Zeppelin  could  reach  Munich  with  a  load  of  bombs  from  one  of  the 
Allies'  aircraft  bases. 

THE    CONVERTIBLE   AIRPLANE — A    BRILLIANT   ENGLISH   INVENTION 

Germany's  effort  to  blockade  the  British  Isles  with  submarines  drove  home 
to  England  her  need  of  dirigibles.  To  detect  a  submarine's  periscope  from 
afar  requires  a  steadier  platform  than  that  of  a  seaplane.  England  had  neither 
the  time  nor  the  experience  to  build  vessels  comparable  with  Zeppelins.  She 
hit  upon  an  entirely  new  type  of  craft,  the  "convertible  airplane" — a  veri- 
table stroke  of  genius.  Despite  its  name,  the  convertible  airplane  has  no 
supporting  wings;  like  any  other  dirigible,  it  depends  entirely  upon  gas  to  as- 
cend. Until  the  "convertible"  came,  it  had  always  been  accepted  as  a  matter 
of  course  that  the  cars  of  dirigibles  should  be  as  roomy  as  the  pilot  houses  of 
steamships.  Some  unknown  English  genius,  noting  that  airplane  bodies 
could  be  turned  out  quickly  and  cheaply,  hit  upon  the  brilliant  idea  of  using 
them  as  cars  for  gas  envelopes.  Thus,  the  so-called  "convertible  airplane" 
was  created.  They  were  much  slower  than  the  Zeppelins,  but  their  speed  of 
forty-five  miles  an  hour  gave  them  at  least  a  fair  measure  of  that  velocity  which 
is  all-important  in  dirigibles.  Moreover,  their  large  number  made  up  for  what 
speed  they  lacked;  they  could  be  built  very  rapidly.  At  one  stroke,  almost, 
England  was  placed  in  possession  of  a  craft  not  so  air-worthy,  so  fast,  or  so 
formidable  as  the  far  huger  Zeppelin,  but  well  adapted  for  patrol  duty  in  fair 
weather.  These  small  convertibles  and  the  Zeppelins  are  the  only  dirigibles 
that  have  met  the  later  exigencies  of  the  war. 

For  lack  of  dirigibles  comparable  with  the  Zeppelins  in  radius  of  action 


THE  EYES  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  NAVY  361 

and  bomb-carrying  capacity,  the  Allies  have  experimented  with  mammoth 
airplanes.  The  ordinary  machine  is  hardly  suitable  for  very  long  flights.  Its 
quarters  are  too  cramped,  its  fuel-capacity  too  small.  At  the  very  outbreak 
of  the  war,  England  bought  the  America,  built  by  Curtiss  for  a  trans-Atlantic 
flight — a  biplane  leviathan  with  cabin  accommodation  for  five.  She  was 
engaged  in  naval  scouting  before  she  was  destroyed  in  a  storm.  Many  Amer- 
icas have  since  been  built  for  England  to  compensate  as  far  as  possible  for 
her  lack  of  Zeppelins. 

Huge  two-motored  machines  also  have  been  built  by  the  Allies  for  bombing 
raids.  The  Germans  have  built  but  one  such  craft.  Evidently  the  ZeppeHns 
meet  all  bombing  requirements. 

AIRCRAFT  MADE  THE   WAR  MORE   SCIENTIFIC 

If  we  were  to  crystallize  the  influence  of  aircraft  upon  warfare  in  a  single 
dictum,  this  is  the  conclusion  at  which  we  would  arrive:  The  use  of  aircraft 
has  made  warfare  more  than  ever  an  exact  science.  To  fight  a  battle,  a  general 
must  have  a  plan  of  action,  but  before  he  can  formulate  that  plan,  he  must 
know  something  of  his  enemy's  strength  and  movements.  He  must  have  facts. 
From  the  days  of  ancient  Greece  down  to  the  Twentieth  Century,  he  gathered 
them  bloodily  by  sending  on  troops  of  cavalry  or  by  a  reconnaissance  in  force. 
Even  then,  he  could  make  only  more  or  less  shrewd  guesses.  To  force  an 
enemy  into  an  untenable  position  has  always  been  the  object  of  a  general. 
To  do  that  he  must  have  the  most  precise  information.  With  the  introduction 
of  aircraft  into  war,  he  was  given  the  means  of  collecting  that  information 
rapidly  and  abundantly.  But,  paradoxically  enough,  it  is  harder  to  win  a 
battle  now  than  it  was  in  Napoleon's  day,  simply  because  the  enemy,  too, 
gathers  his  information  from  the  air.  The  obstacles  to  be  overcome  have  been 
multiplied  enormously.  It  is  singular  that  the  great  generals  of  history  have 
been,  for  the  most  part,  engineers.  The  use  of  aircraft  has  made  it  more  than 
ever  essential  that  the  strategist  should  be  an  engineer — that  he  should  under- 
stand not  only  how  to  handle  men  but  that  he  should  be  a  highly  trained 
physicist  as  well. 


VIII 
FLYING  MACHINES  AND  THE  WAR 

*An  Interview  with  ORVILLE  WRIGHT:     By  FRED  C.  KELLY 

"The  greatest  use  of  the  airplane  to  date  has  been  as  a  tremendously  big 
factor  of  modern  warfare.  But The  greatest  use  of  the  airplane  event- 
ually will  be  to  prevent  war. 

"Some  day  there  will  be  neither  war  nor  rumours  of  war,  and  the  reason 
may  be  flying  machines. 

"It  sounds  paradoxical.  We  are  building  airplanes  to  use  in  time  of  war, 
and  will  continue  to  use  them  for  war.  We  think  of  war  and  we  think  of 
airplanes.  Later  on,  perhaps,  we  shall  think  of  airplanes  in  connection  with 
the  wisdom  of  keeping  out  of  war. 

"The  airplane  will  prevent  war  by  making  it  too  expensive,  too  slow,  too 
difficult,  too  long  drawn  out— in  brief,  by  making  the  cost  prohibitive." 

The  man  who  makes  these  statements  about  the  airplane  is  Orville 
Wright,  one  of  the  brothers  who  invented  it. 

"Did  you  ever  stop  to  think,"  inquires  Wright,  "that  there  is  a  very  defi- 
nite reason  why  the  present  war  in  Europe  has  dragged  along  nearly  three  years 
with  neither  side  gaining  much  advantage  over  the  other?  The  reason, 
as  I  figure  it  out,  is  airplanes.  In  consequence  of  the  scouting  work  done 
by  the  flying  machines,  each  side  knows  exactly  what  the  opposing  forces 
are  doing. 

"There  is  little  chance  for  one  army  to  take  another  by  surprise.  Napoleon 
won  his  wars  by  massing  his  troops  at  unexpected  places.  The  airplane  has 
made  that  impossible.  It  has  equalized  information.  Each  side  has  such 
complete  knowledge  of  the  other's  movements  that  both  sides  are  obliged  to 
crawl  into  trenches  and  fight  by  means  of  slow,  tedious  routine  rather  than  by 
quick,  spectacular  dashes. 

"My  impression  is  that  before  the  present  war  started  the  army  experts 
expected  it  to  be  a  matter  of  a  few  weeks  or,  at  the  most,  a  few  months.  But 
it  has  run  into  years.  Now  a  nation  that  may  be  willing  to  undertake  a  war 
lasting  a  few  months  may  well  hesitate  about  engaging  in  one  that  will  occupy 
years.  Tlie  daily  cost  of  a  great  war  is  of  course  stupendous.  When  this  cost 
runs  on  for  years  the  total  is  likely  to  be  so  great  that  the  side  which  wins 
nevertheless  loses.    War  will  become  prohibitively  expensive.    And  the  scouting 


*Reprinted  by  the  kind  permission  of  Collier's  TFeekly. 

36a 


FLYING  MACHINES  AND  THE  WAR  363 

work  in  flying  machines  will  be  the  predominating  factor,  as  it  seems  to  me,  in 
bringing  this  about.     I  like  to  think  so  anyhow." 

"What,  in  your  opinion,  has  the  present  war  demonstrated  regarding  the 
relative  advantages  of  airplanes  and  Zeppelin  airships?"  the  inventor  was 
asked. 

"The  aeroplane  seems  to  have  been  of  the  more  practical  use,"  replied 
Wright.  "In  the  first  place,  dirigible  airships  of  the  Zeppelin  type  are  so  ex- 
pensive to  build,  costing  somewhere  around  half  a  million  dollars  each,  that  it 
is  distinctly  disadvantageous  to  the  nation  operating  them  to  have  one  de- 
stroyed. The  financial  risk  every  time  your  Zeppelin  is  shot  at  is  too  g,reat. 
But  what  is  more  important  is  the  fact  that  the  Zeppelin  is  so  large  that  it 
furnishes  an  excellent  target  unless  it  sails  considerably  higher  than  is  com- 
paratively safe  for  an  airplane.  And  when  the  Zeppelin  is  at  a  safe  height 
it  is  too  far  above  the  ground  for  your  scout  to  make  accurate  observations, 
though,  it  is  true,  photography  is  now  of  great  assistance  in  this  direction. 
Similarly,  when  the  Zeppelin  is  used  for  dropping  bombs,  it  must  be  too  high 
for  the  bomb  thrower  to  show  much  accuracy." 

"You  think  that  the  use  of  flying  machines  for  scouting  purposes  will  be  of 
considerably  more  importance  than  their  use  as  a  means  of  attack?"  was 
another  question. 

"That  has  been  decidedly  true  so  far,"  replied  Wright.  "About  all  that 
has  been  accomplished  by  either  side  from  bomb  dropping  has  been  to  kill  a 
few  non-combatants,  and  that  will  have  no  bearing  on  the  result  of  the  war. 

"English  newspapers  have  long  talked  of  the  danger  of  Zeppelin  attacks 
or  airplane  attacks,  but  it  was  all  for  a  purpose,  because  they  did  not  believe 
the  country  was  sufficiently  prepared  for  war  and  sought  to  arouse  the  people 
and  the  War  Department  to  action  by  means  of  the  airship  bogy." 

"Has  the  war  use  of  the  airplane  been  up  to  the  expectations  you  and 
your  brother  formed  at  the  time  of  its  invention  ? " 

"Yes,  beyond  our  expectations.  About  the  first  thing  we  thought  of  after 
we  found  that  we  could  fly  was  its  possibilities  for  scouting  purposes,  but  we 
had  little  idea  that  the  year  1917  would  see  so  many  thousands  of  airplanes  in 
army  use. 

"Aside  from  the  use  of  the  machines  for  war  purposes  the  war  has  given  a 
great  boost  to  aviation  generally.  It  has  led  more  men  to  learn  to  fly,  and 
with  a  higher  degree  of  skill  than  ever  before.  It  has  wakened  people  to  avia- 
tion possibilities." 


IX 
LANGUAGE  OF  THE  BIG  GUNS* 

By  HUDSON  MAXIM,  Inventor  of  Smokeless  Powder 

In  the  present  war,  the  big  guns,  both  on  land  and  sea,  have  told  their  own 
story,  and  they  have  commanded  conviction  of  their  usefulness  in  proportion 
to  the  loudness  of  their  voice. 

Following  the  introduction  of  armour-plate  by  Ericsson's  Monitor  and  the 
Merrimac,  armourplate  was  answered  by  increasing  the  size  of  guns  and  pro- 
jectiles. Brown  prismatic  powder  was  developed  to  slow  the  burning  and  les- 
sen the  initial  pressure,  thereby  securing  a  better  maintenance  of  pressure 
behind  the  projectile  in  its  passage  along  the  bore  of  the  gun. 

Guns  weighing  more  than  a  hundred  tons  were  built  in  England  for  the  use 
of  brovvn  prismatic  powder,  but  it  was  found  that,  after  firing  a  few  rounds, 
the  guns  drooped  at  the  muzzle  under  the  shock  of  discharge,  and  lost  their 
accuracy. 

The  invention  and  development  of  smokeless  gunpowder,  mainly  during 
the  ten  years  between  1887  and  1897,  resulted  in  radical  improvements  in 
guns  of  all  calibres. 

Only  about  44  per  cent,  of  the  products  of  combustion  of  the  old  black 
powder  and  the  brown  prismatic  powder  were  gaseous.  The  balance,  about 
56  per  cent.,  were  solid  matter,  and  produced  smoke.  It  will  be  seen,  at  a 
glance,  that  smokeless  powder,  whose  products  of  combustion  are  entirely 
gaseous,  possesses  enormous  ballistic  advantages,  quite  independent  of  its 
smokelessness.  Less  than  half  the  products  of  combustion  of  the  old  smoke- 
producing  powders  being  gaseous,  much  energy  was  absorbed  from  the  gases, 
to  heat  and  vaporize  the  soHd  products  constituting  the  smoke.  Additional 
heat  was  consumed  by  the  work  of  expelling  the  smoke  from  the  gun. 

The  products  of  combustion  of  smokeless  powder  are  not  only  practically 
all  gaseous,  but  also  they  are  much  hotter  than  the  products  of  combustion  of 
the  old,  smoky,  black  powder.  Owing  to  this  fact,  smokeless  powder  may  be 
considered  about  four  times  as  powerful  as  the  old  black  powder. 

When  a  projectile  is  thrown  from  a  gun,  although  it  is  not  heated  appre- 
ciably, yet  heat-energy  represented  by  its  velocity  is  absorbed  from  the  ex- 
panding gases  of  the  powder  charge.  When  a  12-inch  projectile  weighing  a 
thousand  pounds  is  thrown  from  one  of  our  long  naval  guns,  it  has  a  striking 
energy,  fifty  feet  from  the  muzzle,  of  about  50,000  foot-tons — that  is  to  say,  it 

*Frora  "Defenceless  America," 

364 


LANGUAGE  OF  THE  BIG  GUNS  365 

strikes  with  a  force  equal  to  that  of  50,000  tons  falling  from  a  height  of  one  foot, 
or  one  ton  falling  from  a  height  of  50,000  feet.  As  the  1 2-inch  naval  gun  weighs 
about  50  tons,  the  energy  absorbed  from  the  gases  in  the  shape  of  velocity  of 
the  projectile  is  sufficient  to  lift  a  thousand  12-inch  guns  to  a  height  of  one 
foot. 

As  a  projectile  weighs  half  a  ton,  the  force  of  the  blow  is  about  the  same  as 
though  the  projectile  were  to  be  dropped  from  a  height  of  twenty  miles,  with 
no  deduction  for  the  resistance  of  the  atmosphere. 

When  the  projectile  is  stopped,  a  quantity  of  heat  is  re-developed  exactly 
equal  to  that  absorbed  from  the  powder  gases  in  giving  the  projectile  its 
high  velocity;  and  the  quantity  of  heat  absorbed  from  the  powder  gases  in 
throwing  a  thousand-pound  projectile  from  our  big  naval  guns  is  sufficient 
to  melt  750  pounds  of  cast  iron,  which  is  enough  to  heat  the  projectile  white 
hot. 

Obviously,  when  the  projectile  strikes  armourplate,  either  the  plate  or  the 
projectile  must  yield,  for  the  reason  that  the  projectile  brings  to  bear  upon  a 
12-inch  plate  an  energy  sufficient  to  fuse  a  hole  right  through  it,  and  this  is 
substantially  what  it  does.  The  hard  and  toughened  steel  of  the  plate  is 
heated  and  softened  by  the  force  of  impact,  and,  although  the  projectile  may  be 
cold  after  it  has  passed  through,  it  actually  does  fuse  a  hole  through  the  plate, 
the  metal  flowing  like  wax  from  its  path. 

The  introduction  of  smokeless  cannon-powder  was  followed  by  a  recession 
from  guns  of  great  weight  and  calibre,  to  guns  of  smaller  weight  and  smaller 
calibre,  the  aim  being  to  make  up  for  the  greater  smashing  power  of  huge  pro- 
jectiles, thrown  at  a  lower  velocity,  with  projectiles  of  smaller  size,  thrown  at 
much  greater  velocity  and  having  a  greater  power  of  penetration  of  armour- 
plate,  which  was  constantly  being  made  thicker  and  tougher  and  harder  in 
order  to  resist  the  impact  of  armour-piercing  projectiles. 

As  armour-plate  continued  to  increase  in  thickness  and  in  powers  of  re- 
sistance, guns  of  bigger  and  bigger  calibre  had  to  be  made,  capable  of  with- 
standing the  enormous  pressure  necessary  to  throw  projectiles  of  sufficient  size 
and  at  sufficiently  high  velocity  to  penetrate  any  armourplate  that  could  be 
opposed  to  them. 

With  every  improvement  in  armourplate,  the  gun  and  the  projectile  have 
been  improved  and  enlarged,  until  now  no  armourplate  carried  by  any  ship 
can  withstand  the  naval  guns  of  largest  calibre.  In  its  race  with  armour-plate, 
the  gun  has  thus  far  been  the  winner. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  sufficiency  of  armourplate  must,  other  things 
being  equal,  inevitably  depend  upon  insufficiency  in  range  and  penetrating 
power  of  the  gun  to  which  it  is  opposed.  An  unarmoured  vessel,  with  guns 
capable  of  penetrating  the  armourplate  of  an  opponent  having  shorter-range 
guns,  needs  only  to  have  superior  speed  in  order  to  choose  a  position  out  of 


366  HISTORY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

range  of  the  armourclad's  guns,  and,  atmospheric  conditions  being  favourable, 
to  destroy  it  without  itself  being  exposed  to  any  danger  whatsoever. 

But  there  are  other  conditions  which  prevent  the  gun,  however  long  its 
range  and  however  great  its  power  of  penetration,  from  being  a  complete  de- 
fence in  the  absence  of  armoured  protection.  These  conditions  are — the 
limit  of  vision  due  to  the  rotundity  of  the  earth,  even  in  clear  weather;  the 
Hmitation  of  vision,  at  much  nearer  distances.  In  thick  or  hazy  weather;  and,  of 
course,  the  greatly  increased  difficulty  of  hitting  at  extreme  ranges.  Also,  it  is 
necessary  to  be  able  to  observe,  from  the  fighting-tops,  where  trial  shots  strike, 
in  order  to  get  the  correct  range,  and  lay  the  guns  exactly  upon  the  target. 

In  the  recent  North  Sea  fight,  firing  began  at  more  than  17,000  yards,  or 
about  ten  miles;  12-inch  and  13-inch  shells  from  the  British  ships  struck  the 
Bluecher  before  more  than  the  upper  works  of  the  Bhiecher  could  be  seen  from 
the  decks  of  the  British  ships.  Only  by  the  fire-control  officers,  a  hundred  feet 
above  the  decks,  could  her  whole  hull  be  seen.  When  the  first  huge  shells 
came  plunging  down  out  of  the  sky  upon  the  Bluecher,  her  gunners  could  not 
see  the  ships  from  which  they  came. 

To-day,  the  long-range,  high-power  naval  gun,  charged  with  smokeless 
powder,  and  throwing  a  projectile  made  of  tempered  steel  inconceivably  tough 
and  hard,  and  charged  with  high  explosive,  is  the  most  powerful  dynamic  in- 
strument ever  produced  by  man.  A  12-inch  naval  gun  throws  a  projectile 
weighing  half  a  ton,  at  a  velocity  nearly  three  times  the  speed  of  sound.  A 
charge  of  375  pounds  of  smokeless  powder,  strong  as  dynamite,  is  employed 
for  the  projectile's  propulsion. 

Believing  that  the  advantages  of  projectiles  of  great  size,  carrying  a  very 
large  bursting  charge,  could  be  better  illustrated  by  a  gun  of  extraordinary 
calibre,  I  designed  a  cannon  having  a  calibre  of  twenty-four  inches,  but  having 
a  weight  of  only  43  tons,  the  weight  and  length  of  the  gun  being  the  same  as  the 
British  12-inch  43 -ton  gun.  This  gun  was  designed  to  throw  a  semi-armour- 
piercing  projectile  weighing  1,700  pounds,  and  carrying  an  explosive  charge  of 
1,000  pounds,  the  total  weight  of  the  projectile  being  2,700  pounds.  While 
the  projectile  was  not  designed  to  pierce  heavy  armour,  it  was  capable  of 
penetrating  the  decks  and  sides  of  light-armoured  cruisers  and  deep  into  earth 
or  concrete  for  the  destruction  of  forts.  It  was  a  veritable  aerial  torpedo. 
By  means  of  the  special  form  of  multi-perforated  smokeless  powder  designed 
for  this  gun,  the  huge  projectile  could  be  thrown  to  a  distance  of  nine  miles 
with  the  gun  at  maximum  elevation,  and  still  with  a  comparatively  low  cham- 
ber pressure. 

The  projectile  was  provided  with  a  safety  delay-action  detonating  fuse, 
designed  to  explode  it  after  having  penetrated  the  object  struck,  thereby  se- 
curing the  maximum  destructive  effects. 

It  is  reported  that  the  Germans  have  made  a  huge  howitzer  weighing  45 


LANGUAGE  OF  THE  BIG  GUNS  367 

tons,  having  a  calibre  of  23 1  inches,  which  also  is  capable  of  throwing  a  pro- 
jectile weighing  more  than  a  ton  to  a  distance  of  nine  miles. 

If  Uncle  Sam  would  listen  with  an  understanding  mind  to  the  language  of 
the  big  guns  now  speaking  on  land  and  sea,  he  would  immediately  build  a  large 
number  of  huge  howitzers.  He  would  build  a  large  number  of  good  roads, 
capable  of  standing  the  tread  of  these  howitzers.  He  would  build  as  well  a 
goodly  number  of  battle-cruisers,  as  big  and  as  fast  as  any  afloat  In  foreign 
seas,  and  armed  with  guns  ranging  as  far  as  the  guns  of  any  foreign  power. 


APPENDIX 

THE  EARLY  FRENCH  OFFENSIVE 
By  FRANK  H.  SIMONDS 

In  the  third  week  of  August,  1914,  a  French  army  crossed  the  frontier  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  entered  the  Promised  Land,  toward  which  all  Frenchmen 
had  looked  in  hope  and  sadness  for  forty-four  years.  The  long-forgotten 
communiques  of  that  early  period  of  the  war  reported  success  after  success, 
until  at  last  it  was  announced  that  the  victorious  French  army  had  reached 
Saarburg  and  Morhange,  and  were  astride  the  Strassburg-Metz  railroad. 
And  then  Berlin  took  up  the  cry,  and  France  and  the  world  learned  of  a  great 
German  victory  and  of  the  defeat  and  rout  of  the  invading  army.  Even 
Paris  conceded  that  the  retreat  had  begun  and  the  "army  of  liberation"  was 
crowding  back  beyond  the  frontier  and  far  within  French  territory. 

Then  the  curtain  of  the  censorship  fell  and  the  world  turned  to  the  west- 
ward to  watch  the  terrible  battle  for  Paris.  In  the  agony  and  glory  of  the 
Marne  the  struggle  along  the  Moselle  was  forgotten;  the  Battle  of  Nancy,  of 
Lorraine,  was  fought  and  won  in  the  darkness,  and  when  the  safety  of  Paris 
was  assured  the  world  looked  toward  the  Aisne,  and  then  toward  Flanders. 
So  it  came  about  that  one  of  the  greatest  battles  of  the  whole  war,  one  of 
the  most  important  of  the  French  victories,  the  success  that  made  the  Marne 
possible,  the  rally  and  stand  of  the  French  armies  about  Nancy,  escaped  the 
fame  it  earned.  Only  in  legend,  in  the  romance  of  the  Kaiser  with  his  cavalry 
waiting  on  the  hills  to  enter  the  Lorraine  capital,  did  the  battle  live. 

When  I  went  to  France  one  of  the  hopes  I  had  cherished  was  that  I  might 
be  permitted  to  visit  this  battlefield,  to  see  the  ground  on  which  a  great  battle 
had  been  fought,  that  was  still  unknown  country,  in  the  main,  for  those  who 
have  written  on  the  war.  The  Lorraine  field  was  the  field  on  which  France 
and  Germany  had  planned  for  a  generation  to  fight.  Had  the  Germans  re- 
spected the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  is  by  Nancy,  by  the  gap  between  the 
Vosges  and  the  hills  of  the  Meuse,  that  they  must  have  broken  into  France. 
The  Marne  was  a  battlefield  which  was  reached  by  chance  and  fought  over  by 
hazard,  but  every  foot  of  the  Lorraine  country  had  been  studied  for  the  fight 
long  years  in  advance.  Here  war  followed  the  natural  course,  followed  the 
plans  of  the  general  staff  prepared  years  in  advance.  Indeed  I  had  treasured 
over  years  a  plan  of  the  Battle  of  Nancy,  contained  in  a  French  book  written 
long  ago,  which  might  serve  as  the  basis  for  a  history  of  what  happened,  as  it 
was  written  as  a  prophecy  of  what  was  to  come. 

369 


370  APPENDIX 

When  the  Great  General  Staff  was  pleased  to  grant  my  request  to  see  the 
battlefield  of  Nancy  I  was  advised  to  travel  by  train  to  that  town  accompanied 
by  an  officer  from  the  General  Staff,  and  informed  that  I  should  there  meet  an 
officer  pf  the  garrison,  who  would  conduct  me  to  all  points  of  interest  and  ex- 
plain in  detail  the  various  phases  of  the  conflict.  Thus  it  fell  out,  and  I  have 
to  thank  Commandant  Leroux  for  the  courtesy  and  consideration  which  made 
this  excursion  successful. 

In  peace  time  one  goes  from  Paris  to  Nancy  in  five  hours,  and  the  distance 
is  about  that  from  New  York  to  Boston,  by  Springfield.  In  war  all  is  different, 
and  the  time  almost  doubled.  Yet  there  are  compensations.  Think  of  the 
New  York-Boston  trip  as  bringing  you  beyond  New  Haven  to  the  exact  rear 
of  battle,  of  battle  but  fifteen  miles  away,  with  the  guns  booming  in  the  dis- 
tance and  the  airplanes  and  balloons  in  full  view.  Think  also  of  this  same 
trip,  which  from  Hartford  to  Worcester  follows  the  line  of  a  battle  not  yet 
two  years  old,  a  battle  that  has  left  its  traces  in  ruined  villages,  in  shattered 
houses.  On  either  side  of  the  railroad  track  the  graves  descend  to  meet  the 
embankments;  you  can  mark  the  advance  and  the  retreat  by  the  crosses  which 
fill  the  fields.  The  gardens  that  touch  the  railroad  and  extend  to  the  rear  of 
houses  in  the  little  towns  are  filled  with  graves.  Each  enclosure  has  been 
fought  for  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  and  every  garden  wall  recalls  the 
Chateau  of  Hougoumont,  at  Waterloo. 

All  this  was  two  years  ago,  but  there  is  to-day,  also.  East  of  Bar-le-Duc 
the  main  line  is  cut  by  German  shell  fire  now.  From  Fort  Camp  des  Romains 
above  St.  Mihiel  German  guns  sweep  the  railroad  near  Commercy,  and  one 
has  to  turn  south  by  a  long  detour,  as  if  one  went  to  Boston  by  Fitchburg, 
travel  south  through  the  country  of  Jeanne  d'Arc  and  return  by  Toul,  whose 
forts  look  out  upon  the  invaded  land.  Thus  one  comes  to  Nancy  by  night, 
and  only  by  night,  for  twenty  miles  beyond  there  are  Germans  and  a  German 
cannon,  which  not  so  long  ago  sent  a  shell  into  the  town  and  removed  a  whole 
city  block  beside  the  railroad  station.  It  is  the  sight  of  this  ruin  as  you  enter 
the  town  which  reminds  you  that  you  are  at  the  front,  but  there  are  other  re- 
minders. 

As  we  ate  our  dinner  in  the  cafe,  facing  the  beautiful  Place  Stanislas,  we 
were  disturbed  by  a  strange  and  curious  drumming  sound.  Going  out  into 
the  square,  we  saw  an  airplane,  or  rather  its  lights,  red  and  green,  like  those 
ot  a  ship.  It  was  the  first  of  several,  the  night  patrol,  rising  slowly  and  steadily 
and  then  sweeping  off  in  a  wide  curve  toward  the  enemy's  line.  They  were 
the  sentries  of  the  air  which  were  to  guard  us  while  we  slept,  for  men  do 
sentry-go  in  the  air  as  well  as  on  the  earth  about  the  capital  of  Lorraine.  Then 
the  searchlights  on  the  hills  began  to  play,  sweeping  the  horizon  toward  that 
same  mysterious  region  where  beyond  the  darkness  there  is  war. 

The  next  morning  I  woke  with  the  sense  of  Fourth  of  July.     Bang!     Bang! 


APPENDIX  371 

Bang!  Such  a  barking  of  cannon  crackers  I  had  never  heard.  Still  drowsy, 
I  pushed  open  the  French  windows  and  looked  down  on  the  square.  There  I 
beheld  a  hundred  or  more  men,  women,  and  children,  their  eyes  fixed  on  some- 
thing in  the  air  above  and  behind  the  hotel.  Still  the  incessant  barking  of  guns 
with  the  occasional  boom  of  something  more  impressive.  With  difficulty  I 
grasped  the  fact.  I  was  in  the  midst  of  a  Taube  raid.  Somewhere  over  my 
head,  invisible  to  me  because  of  the  wall  of  my  hotel,  a  German  airplane  was 
flying,  and  all  the  anti-aircraft  guns  were  shooting  at  it.  Was  it  carrying 
bombs?  Should  I  presently  see  or  feel  the  destruction  following  the  descent 
of  these? 

But  the  Taube  turned  away,  the  guns  fired  less  and  less  frequently,  the 
people  in  the  streets  drifted  away,  the  children  to  school,  the  men  to  work, 
the  women  to  wait.  It  was  just  a  detail  in  their  lives,  as  familiar  as  the  in- 
coming steamer  to  the  commuters  on  the  North  River  ferryboat.  Some 
portion  of  war  has  been  the  day's  history  of  Nancy  for  nearly  two  years  now. 
The  children  do  not  carry  gas  masks  to  school  with  them  as  they  do  at  Pont- 
a-Mousson,  a  dozen  miles  to  the  north,  but  women  and  children  have  been 
killed  by  German  shells,  by  bombs  brought  by  Zeppelins  and  by  airplanes. 
There  is  always  excitement  of  sorts  in  the  district  of  Nancy. 

After  a  breakfast  broken  by  the  return  of  the  airplanes  we  had  seen  de- 
parting the  night  before  for  the  patrol,  we  entered  our  cars  and  set  out  for  the 
front,  for  the  near  front,  for  the  lines  a  few  miles  behind  the  present  trenches, 
where  Nancy  was  saved  but  two  years  ago.  Our  route  lay  north  along  the 
valley  of  the  Meurthe,  a  smiling  broad  valley,  marching  north  and  south  and 
meeting  in  a  few  miles  that  of  the  Moselle  coming  east.  It  was  easy  to  beheve 
that  one  was  riding  through  the  valley  of  the  Susquehanna,  with  spring  and 
peace  in  the  air.  Toward  the  east  a  wall  of  hills  shut  out  the  view.  This  was 
the  shoulder  of  the  Grand-Couronne,  the  wall  against  which  German  violence 
burst  and  broke  in  September,  1914. 

Presently  we  came  to  a  long  stretch  of  road  walled  in  on  the  river  side  by 
brown  canvas,  exactly  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  used  at  foot-ball  games  to  shut 
out  the  non-paying  public.  But  it  had  another  purpose  here.  We  were 
within  the  vision  of  the  Germans,  across  the  river,  on  the  heights  behind  the 
forest,  which  outlined  itself  at  the  skyline;  there  were  the  Kaiser's  troops  and 
that  forest  was  the  Bois-le-Pretre,  the  familiar  incident  in  so  many  commu- 
niques since  the  war  began.  Thanks  to  the  canvas,  it  was  possible  for  the  French 
to  move  troops  along  this  road  without  inviting  German  shells.  Yet  it  was 
impossible  to  derive  any  large  feeling  of  security  from  a  canvas  wall,  which 
alone  interposed  between  you  and  German  heavy  artillery. 

We  passed  through  several  villages  and  each  was  crowded  with  troops; 
cavalry,  infantry,  all  the  branches  represented;  it  was  still  early  and  the  sol- 
diers were  just  beginning  their  day's  work;  war  is  so  completely  a  business  here- 


372  APPENDIX 

Transport  wagons  marched  along  the  roads,  companies  of  soldiers  filed  by. 
Interspersed  with  the  soldiers  were  civilians,  the  women  and  children,  for  none 
of  the  villages  are  evacuated.  Not  even  the  occasional  boom  of  a  gun  far  off" 
could  give  to  this  thing  the  character  of  real  war.  It  recalled  the  days  of  my 
soldiering  in  the  militia  camp  at  Framingham  in  Massachusetts.  It  was 
simply  impossible  to  believe  that  it  was  real.  Even  the  faces  of  the  soldiers 
were  smiling.  There  was  no  such  sense  of  terribleness,  of  strain  and  weariness 
as  I  later  found  about  Verdun.  The  Lorraine  front  is  now  inactive,  tranquil; 
it  has  been  quiet  so  long  that  men  have  forgotten  all  the  carnage  and  horror 
of  the  earlier  time. 

We  turned  out  of  the  valley  and  climbed  abruptly  up  the  hillside.  In  a 
moment  we  came  into  the  centre  of  a  tiny  village  and  looked  into  a  row  of 
houses,  whose  roofs  had  been  swept  off  by  shell  fire.  Here  and  there  a  whole 
house  was  gone;  next  door  the  house  was  undisturbed  and  the  women  and 
children  looked  out  of  the  doors.  The  village  was  St.  Genevieve,  and  we  were 
at  what  had  been  the  extreme  front  of  the  French  in  August,  and  against  this 
hill  burst  the  flood  of  German  invasion.  Leaving  the  car  we  walked  out  of  the 
village,  and  at  the  end  of  the  street  a  sign  warned  the  wayfarer  not  to  enter 
the  fields,  for  which  we  were  bound:  "War — do  not  trespass."  This  was  the 
burden  of  the  warning. 

Once  beyond  this  sign  we  came  out  suddenly  upon  an  open  plateau,  upon 
trenches.  Northward  the  slope  descended  to  a  valley  at  our  feet.  It  was  cut 
and  seamed  by  trenches,  and  beyond  the  trenches  stood  the  posts  that  carried 
the  barbed-wire  entanglements.  Here  and  there,  amidst  the  trenches,  there 
were  graves.  I  went  down  to  the  barbed-wire  entanglements  and  examined 
them  curiously.  They  at  least  were  real.  Once  thousands  of  men  had  come 
up  out  of  the  little  woods  a  quarter  of  a  mile  below;  they  had  come  on  in  that 
famous  massed  attack,  they  had  come  on  in  the  face  of  machine  gun  and 
"seventy-fives."  They  had  just  reached  the  wires,  which  marked  high  water. 
In  the  woods  below,  the  Bois-de-Facq,  in  the  fields  by  the  river,  4,000  Germans 
had  been  buried. 

Looking  out  from  the  trenches  the  whole  country  unfolded.  Northward 
the  little  village  of  Atton  slept  under  the  steep  slope  of  Cote-de-Mousson,  a 
round  pinnacle  crowned  with  an  ancient  chateau.  From  the  hill  the  German 
artillery  had  swept  the  ground  where  I  stood.  Below  the  hill  to  the  west  was 
Pont-a-Mousson,  the  city  of  150  bombardments,  which  the  Germans  took 
when  they  came  south,  and  lost  later.  Above  it  was  the  Bois-le-Pretre,  in 
which  guns  were  now  booming  occasionally.  Far  to  the  north  was  another 
hill,  just  visible,  and  its  slope  toward  us  was  cut  and  seamed  with  yellow  slashes : 
Those  were  the  French  trenches,  then  of  the  second  or  third  line;  beyond  there 
was  still  another  hill,  it  was  slightly  blurred  in  the  haze,  but  it  was  not  over 
five  miles  away,  and  it  was  occupied  by  the  Germans.     From  the  slope  above 


APPENDIX  373 

me  on  a  clear  day  it  is  possible  to  see  Metz,  so  near  are  French  and  German 
lines  to  the  old  frontier. 

Straight  across  the  river  to  the  west  of  us  was  another  wood,  with  a  glorious 
name,  the  Forest  of  the  Advance  Guard.  It  swept  to  the  south  of  us.  In 
that  wood  the  Germans  had  also  planted  their  guns  on  the  day  of  battle.  They 
had  swept  the  trenches  where  I  stood  from  three  sides.  Plainly  it  had  been  a 
warm  corner.  But  the  French  had  held  on.  Their  commander  had  received 
a  verbal  order  to  retreat.  He  insisted  that  it  should  be  put  in  writing,  and 
this  took  time.  The  order  came.  It  had  to  be  obeyed,  but  he  obeyed  slowly. 
Reluctantly  the  men  left  the  trenches  they  had  held  so  long.  They  slipped 
southward  along  the  road  by  which  we  had  come.  But  suddenly  their  rear 
guards  discovered  that  the  Germans  were  also  retreating.  So  the  French  came 
back  and  the  line  of  St.  Genevieve  was  held,  the  northern  door  to  Nancy  was 
not  forced. 

Looking  down  again  it  was  not  difficult  to  reconstitute  that  German  as- 
sault, made  at  night.  The  thing  was  so  simple  the  civilian  could  grasp  it.  A 
road  ran  through  the  valley  and  along  it  the  Germans  had  formed;  the  slope 
they  had  to  advance  up  was  gentle,  far  more  gradual  than  that  of  San  Juan. 
They  had  been  picked  troops  selected  for  a  forlorn  hope,  and  they  had  come 
back  four  times.  The  next  morning  the  whole  forest  had  been  filled  with  dead 
and  dying.  Not  less  than  a  division — 20,000  men — had  made  the  terrible 
venture.  Now  there  was  a  strange  sense  of  emptiness  in  the  country;  war  had 
come  and  gone,  left  its  graves,  its  trenches,  its  barbed-wire  entanglements; 
but  these  were  all  disappearing  already.  On  this  beautiful  spring  morning 
it  was  impossible  to  feel  the  reality  of  what  happened  here,  what  was  happening 
now,  in  some  measure,  five  miles  or  more  to  the  north.  Nature  is  certainly 
the  greatest  of  all  pacifists;  she  will  not  permit  the  signs  of  war  to  endure  nor 
the  mind  to  believe  that  war  itself  has  existed  and  exists. 

From  St.  Genevieve  we  went  to  the  Grand  Mont  dAmance,  the  most  fa- 
mous point  in  all  the  Lorraine  front,  the  southeast  corner  of  the  Grand- 
Couronne,  as  St.  Genevieve  is  the  northern.  Here,  from  a  hill  some  1,300 
feet  high,  one  looks  eastward  into  the  Promised  Land  of  France — into  German 
Lorraine.  In  the  early  days  of  August  the  great  French  invasion,  resting  one 
flank  upon  this  hill,  the  other  upon  the  distant  Vosges,  had  stepped  over  the 
frontier.  One  could  trace  its  route  to  the  distant  hills  among  which  it  had 
found  disaster.  In  these  hills  the  Germans  had  hidden  their  heavy  guns,  and 
the  French,  coming  under  their  fire  without  warning,  unsupported  by  heavy 
artillery,  which  was  lacking  to  them,  had  broken.  Then  the  German  invasion 
had  rolled  back.  You  could  follow  the  route.  In  the  foreground  the  little 
Seille  River  could  be  discerned;  it  marked  the  old  frontier.  Across  this  had 
come  the  defeated  troops.  They  had  swarmed  down  the  low,  bare  hills;  they 
had  crossed  and  vanished  in  the  woods  just  at  my  feet;  these  woods  were  the 


374  APPENDIX 

Forest  of  Champenoux.  Into  this  forest  the  Germans  had  followed  by  the 
thousand,  they  were  astride  the  main  road  to  Nancy,  which  rolled  white  and 
straight  at  my  feet.  But  in  the  woods  the  French  rallied.  For  days  there 
was  fought  in  this  stretch  of  trees  one  of  the  most  terrible  of  battles. 

As  I  stood  on  the  Grand  Mont  I  faced  almost  due  east.  In  front  of  me  and 
to  the  south  extended  the  forest.  Exactly  at  my  feet  the  forest  reached  up 
the  hill  and  there  was  a  little  cluster  of  buildings  about  a  fountain.  All  was 
in  ruins,  and  here,  exactly  here,  was  the  high-water  mark  of  the  German 
advance.  They  had  occupied  the  ruins  for  a  few  moments  and  then  had 
been  driven  out.  Elsewhere  they  had  never  emerged  from  the  woods;  they 
had  approached  the  western  shore,  but  the  French  had  met  them  with  machine 
guns  and  "seventy-fives."  The  brown  woods  at  my  feet  were  nothing  but  a 
vast  cemetery;  thousands  of  French  and  German  soldiers  slept  there. 

In  their  turn  the  Germans  had  gone  back.  Now,  in  the  same  woods,  a 
French  battery  was  shelling  the  Germans  on  the  other  side  of  the  Seille.  Under 
the  glass  I  studied  the  little  villages  unfolding  as  on  a  map;  they  were  all 
destroyed,  but  it  was  impossible  to  recognize  this.  Some  were  French,  some 
German;  you  could  follow  the  line,  but  there  were  no  trenches;  behind  them 
French  shells  were  bursting  occasionally  and  black  smoke  rose  just  above  the 
ground.  Thousands  of  men  faced  each  other  less  than  four  miles  from  where 
I  stood,  but  all  that  there  was  to  be  detected  were  the  shell  bursts;  otherwise 
one  saw  a  pleasant  country,  rolling  hills,  mostly  without  woods,  bare  in  the 
spring  which  had  not  yet  come  to  turn  them  green.  In  the  foreground  ran 
that  arbitrary  line  Bismarck  had  drawn  between  Frenchmen  forty-six  years 
before — the  frontier — but  of  natural  separation  there  was  none.  He  had  cut 
off  a  part  of  France,  that  was  all,  and  one  looked  upon  what  had  been  and  was 
still  a  bleeding  wound. 

I  asked  the  French  commandant  about  the  various  descriptions  made  by 
those  who  have  written  about  the  war.  They  have  described  the  German 
attack  as  mounting  the  slope  of  the  Grand  Mont  where  we  stood.  He  took 
me  to  the  edge  and  pointed  down.  It  was  a  clifF  almost  as  steep  as  the 
Palisades.  "C'est  une  blague,"  he  smiled.  "Just  a  story."  The  Germans 
had  not  charged  here,  but  in  the  forest  below,  where  the  Nancy  road  passed 
through  and  enters  the  valley  of  the  Amezeule.  They  had  not  tried  to  carry 
but  to  turn  the  Grand  Mont.  More  than  200,000  men  had  fought  for  days  in 
the  valley  below.  I  asked  him  about  the  legend  of  the  Kaiser  sitting  on 
a  hill,  waiting  in  white  uniform  with  his  famous  escort,  waiting  until  the  road 
was  clear  for  his  triumphal  entrance  into  the  capital  of  Lorraine.  He  laughed. 
I  might  choose  my  hill;  if  the  Emperor  had  done  this  thing  the  hill  was  "over 
there,"  but  had  he?  They  are  hard  on  legends  at  the  front,  and  the  tales  that 
delight  Paris  die  easily  on  the  frontiers  of  war. 

But  since  I  had  asked  so  much  about  the  fighting  my  commandant  promised 


APPENDIX  375 

to  take  me  in  the  afternoon  to  the  point  where  the  struggle  had  been  fiercest, 
still  farther  to  the  south,  where  all  the  hills  break  down  and  there  is  a  natural 
gateway  from  Germany  into  France,  the  beginning  of  the  famous  Charmes 
Gap,  through  which  the  German  road  to  Paris  from  the  east  ran,  and  still  runs. 
Leaving  Nancy  behind  us,  and  ascending  the  Meurthe  Valley  on  the  eastern 
bank,  turning  out  of  it  before  Saint  Nicholas  du  Port,  we  came  presently  to 
the  most  completely  war-swept  fields  that  I  have  ever  seen.  On  a  perfectly 
level  plain  the  little  town  of  Haraucourt  stands  in  sombre  ruins.  Its  houses 
are  nothing  but  ashes  and  rubble.  Go  out  of  the  village  toward  the  east  and 
you  enter  fields  pockmarked  by  shell  fire.  For  several  miles  you  can  walk  from 
shell  hole  to  shell  hole.  The  whole  country  is  a  patchwork  of  these  shell  holes. 
At  every  few  rods  a  new  line  of  old  trenches  approaches  the  road  and  wanders 
away  again.  Barbed-wire  entanglements  run  up  and  down  the  gently  sloping 
hillsides. 

Presently  we  came  out  upon  a  perfectly  level  field.  It  was  simply  torn  by 
shell  fire.  Old  half-filled  trenches  wandered  aimlessly  about,  and  beyond,  un- 
der a  gentle  slope,  the  little  village  of  Corbessaux  stood  in  ruins.  The  com- 
mandant called  my  attention  to  a  bit  of  woods  in  front. 

"The  Germans  had  their  machine  guns  there,"  said  he.  "We  didn't  know 
it,  and  a  French  brigade  charged  across  this  field.  It  started  at  8:15,  and  at 
8 :30  it  had  lost  more  than  3,000  out  of  6,000.  Then  the  Germans  came  out  of 
the  woods  in  their  turn,  and  our  artillery,  back  at  Haraucourt,  caught  them 
and  they  lost  3,500  men  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour.  Along  the  roadside  were  in- 
numerable graves.  We  looked  at  one.  It  was  marked:  "Here  196  French." 
Twenty  feet  distant  was  another;  it  was  marked:  "Here  196  Germans."  In 
the  field  where  we  stood  I  was  told  some  10,000  men  are  buried.  They  were 
buried  hurriedly,  and  even  now,  when  it  rains,  arms  and  legs  are  exposed. 

Two  years  had  passed,  almost  two  years,  since  this  field  had  been  fought  for. 
The  Germans  had  taken  it.  They  had  approached  Haraucourt,  but  had  not 
passed  it.  This  was  the  centre  and  the  most  vital  point  in  the  Lorraine  battle. 
What  Foch's  troops  had  done  about  La  Fere  Champenoise,  those  of  Castelnau 
had  done  here.  The  German  wave  had  been  broken,  but  at  what  cost?  And 
now,  after  so  many  months,  the  desolation  of  war  remained.  But  yet  it  was 
not  to  endure.  Beside  the  very  graves  an  old  peasant  was  ploughing,  guiding 
his  plough  and  his  horses  carefully  among  the  tombs.  Four  miles  away  more 
trenches  faced  each  other  and  the  battle  went  on  audibly,  but  behind  this  line, 
in  this  very  field  where  so  many  had  died,  life  was  beginning. 

Later  we  drove  south,  passing  within  the  lines  the  Germans  had  held  in 
their  great  advance;  we  travelled  through  Luneville,  which  they  had  taken  and 
left  unharmed,  save  as  shell  fire  had  wrecked  an  eastern  suburb.  We  visited 
GerbeviUer,  where  in  an  excess  of  rage  the  Germans  had  burned  every  structure 
in  the  town.     I  have  never  seen  such  a  headquarters  of  desolation.     Every- 


376  APPENDIX 

thing  that  had  a  shape,  that  had  a  semblance  of  beauty  or  of  use,  hes  in  com- 
plete ruin,  detached  houses,  a  chateau,  the  blocks  in  the  village,  all  in  ashes. 
Save  for  Sermaize,  Gerbeviller  is  the  most  completely  wrecked  town  in  France. 

You  enter  the  village  over  a  little  bridge  across  the  tiny  Mortagne.  Here 
some  French  soldiers  made  a  stand  and  held  off  the  German  advance  for  some 
hours.  There  was  no  other  battle  at  Gerbeviller,  but  for  this  defence  the  town 
died.  Never  was  death  so  complete.  Incendiary  material  was  placed  in 
every  house,  and  all  that  thoroughness  could  do  to  make  the  destruction  com- 
plete was  done.  Gerbeviller  is  dead,  a  few  women  and  children  live  amidst 
its  ashes,  there  is  a  wooden  barrack  by  the  bridge  with  a  post-office  and  the 
inevitable  postcards,  but  only  on  postcards,  picture  postcards,  does  the  town 
live.     It  will  be  a  place  of  pilgrimage  when  peace  comes. 

From  Gerbeviller  we  went  by  Bayon  to  the  Plateau  of  Saffais,  the  ridge  be- 
tween the  Meurthe  and  the  Moselle,  where  the  defeated  army  of  Castelnau 
made  its  last  and  successful  stand.  The  French  line  came  south  from  St. 
Genevieve,  where  we  had  been  in  the  morning,  through  the  Grand  Mont,  across 
the  plain  by  Haraucourt  and  Corbessaux,  then  crossed  the  Meurthe  by  Dom- 
basle  and  stood  on  the  heights  from  Rosieres  south.  Having  taken  Luneville, 
the  Germans  attempted  to  cross  the  Meurthe  coming  out  of  the  Forest  of 
Vitrimont. 

Standing  on  the  Plateau  of  SafFais  and  facing  east,  the  whole  country  un- 
folded again,  as  it  did  at  the  Grand  Mont.  The  face  of  the  plateau  is  seamed 
with  trenches.  They  follow  the  slopes,  and  the  village  of  Saffais  stands  out 
like  a  promontory.  On  this  ridge  the  French  had  massed  three  hundred 
cannon.  Their  army  had  come  back  in  ruins,  and  to  steady  it  they  had  been 
compelled  to  draw  troops  from  Alsace.  Miihlhausen  was  sacrificed  to  save 
Nancy.  Behind  these  crests  on  which  we  stood,  a  beaten  army,  almost  routed, 
had  in  three  days  found  itself  and  returned  to  the  charge. 

In  the  shadow  of  the  dusk  I  looked  across  the  Meurthe  into  the  brown  mass 
of  the  Forest  of  Vitrimont.  Through  this  had  come  the  victorious  Germans. 
They  had  debouched  from  the  wood;  they  had  approached  the  river,  hidden 
under  the  slope,  but,  swept  by  the  hell  of  this  artillery  storm,  they  had  broken. 
But  few  had  lived  to  pass  the  river,  none  had  mounted  the  slopes.  There  were 
almost  no  graves  along  these  trenches.  Afterward  the  Germans  had  in  turn 
yielded  to  pressure  from  the  south  and  gone  back.  Before  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne  began  the  German  wave  of  invasion  had  been  stopped  here  in  the  last 
days  of  August.  A  second  terrific  drive,  coincident  with  the  Marne,  had  like- 
wise failed.  Then  the  Germans  had  gone  back  to  the  frontier.  The  old  boun- 
dary line  of  Bismarck  is  now  in  many  instances  an  actual  line  of  fire,  and 
nowhere  on  this  front  are  the  Germans  more  than  three  or  four  miles  within 
French  territory. 

If  you  should  look  at  the  map  of  the  wholly  imaginary  Battle  of  Nancy, 


APPENDIX  ,  377 

drawn  by  Colonel  Boucher  to  illustrate  his  book,  published  before  1910,  a 
book  describing  the  problem  of  the  defence  of  the  eastern  frontier,  you  will 
find  the  lines  on  which  the  French  stood  at  Saffais  indicated  exactly.  Colonel 
Boucher  had  not  dreamed  this  battle,  but  for  a  generation  the  French  General 
Staff  had  planned  it.  Here  they  had  expected  to  meet  the  German  thrust. 
When  the  Germans  decided  to  go  by  Belgium  they  had  in  turn  taken  the  offen- 
sive, but,  having  failed,  they  had  fought  their  long-planned  battle. 

Out  of  all  the  region  of  war,  of  war  to-day  and  war  yesterday,  one  goes 
back  to  Nancy,  to  its  busy  streets,  its  crowds  of  people  returning  from  their 
day's  work.  War  is  less  than  fifteen  miles  away,  but  Nancy  is  as  calm  as 
London  is  nervous.  Its  bakers  still  make  macaroons;  even  Taube  raids  do  not 
excuse  the  children  from  punctual  attendance  at  school.  Nancy  is  calm  with 
the  calmness  of  all  France,  but  with  just  a  touch  of  something  more  than  calm- 
ness, which  forty-six  years  of  living  by  an  open  frontier  brings.  Twenty-one 
months  ago  it  was  the  gauge  of  battle,  and  half  a  million  men  fought  for  it;  a 
new  German  drive  may  approach  it  at  any  time.  Out  toward  the  old  frontier 
there  is  still  a  German  gun,  hidden  in  the  Forest  of  Bezange,  which  has  turned 
one  block  to  ashes  and  may  fire  again  at  any  hour.  Zeppelins  have  come  and 
gone,  leaving  dead  women  and  children  behind  them,  but  Nancy  goes  on  with 
to-day. 

And  to-morrow?  In  the  hearts  of  all  the  people  of  this  beautiful  city  there 
is  a  single  and  a  simple  faith.  Nancy  turns  her  face  toward  the  ancient  fron- 
tier, she  looks  hopefully  out  upon  the  shell-swept  Grand-Couronne  and  beyond 
to  the  Promised  Land.  And  the  people  say  to  you  if  you  ask  them  about  war 
and  about  peace,  as  one  of  them  said  to  me:  "Peace  vpill  come,  but  not  until 
we  have  our  ancient  frontier,  not  until  we  have  Metz  and  Strasbourg.  We 
have  waited  a  long  time,  is  it  not  so?" 


END  OP  VOLUME   ONE 


THE  COUNTRY  LIFE  PRESS 
GARDEN  CITY,  N.Y. 


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<?xpirr 


COLUMBIA 

This  boo'' 


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